Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control

If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod-...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Autor*in:

Weber, Steven - 1961- [verfasserIn]

Format:

E-Book

Sprache:

Englisch

Erschienen:

Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press ; 1992

©1992

Rechteinformationen:

Restricted Access

Schlagwörter:

Strategic forces, Soviet Union

Strategic forces, United States

Nuclear arms control, United States

Nuclear arms control, Soviet Union

Game theory, Soviet Union, United States

Game theory

Politik.

Nuclear arms control

Strategic forces

Game theory.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Nuclear arms control.

Strategic forces.

POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General

Umfang:

1 online resource(350p.)

Reproduktion:

1992

Reihe:

Princeton Legacy Library ; 166

Links:

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Cover
Cover

ISBN:

978-1-4008-6243-6

DOI / URN:

10.1515/9781400862436

Katalog-ID:

1657125556

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