Arguments that count : physics, computing, and missile defense, 1949-2012
In a rapidly changing world, we rely upon experts to assess the promise and risks of new technology. But how do these experts make sense of a highly uncertain future? In Arguments that Count, Rebecca Slayton offers an important new perspective. Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as w...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Slayton, Rebecca - 1974- [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
E-Book |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press ; 2013 |
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Anmerkung: |
Includes bibliographical references and index. - Description based on PDF viewed 12/23/2015 |
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Umfang: |
1 PDF (pages cm.). |
Beschreibung: |
Mode of access: World Wide Web. |
Reihe: |
Inside technology |
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Links: | |
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ISBN: |
978-0-262-31653-8 |
Katalog-ID: |
1727348222 |
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9780262316538 electronic 978-0-262-31653-8 (DE-627)1727348222 (DE-599)KEP055122094 (OCoLC)1196098155 (MITPRESS)6642238 (EBP)055122094 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 358.1/740973 23 Slayton, Rebecca 1974- verfasserin aut Arguments that count physics, computing, and missile defense, 1949-2012 Rebecca Slayton Cambridge, Massachusetts MIT Press [2013] 1 PDF (pages cm.). Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Inside technology Includes bibliographical references and index. - Description based on PDF viewed 12/23/2015 In a rapidly changing world, we rely upon experts to assess the promise and risks of new technology. But how do these experts make sense of a highly uncertain future? In Arguments that Count, Rebecca Slayton offers an important new perspective. Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as well as perspectives in science and technology studies, she provides an original account of how scientists came to terms with the unprecedented threat of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). She compares how two different professional communities -- physicists and computer scientists -- constructed arguments about the risks of missile defense, and how these arguments changed over time. Slayton shows that our understanding of technological risks is shaped by disciplinary repertoires -- the codified knowledge and mathematical rules that experts use to frame new challenges. And, significantly, a new repertoire can bring long-neglected risks into clear view.In the 1950s, scientists recognized that high-speed computers would be needed to cope with the unprecedented speed of ICBMs. But the nation's elite science advisors had no way to analyze the risks of computers so used physics to assess what they could: radar and missile performance. Only decades later, after establishing computing as a science, were advisors able to analyze authoritatively the risks associated with complex software -- most notably, the risk of a catastrophic failure. As we continue to confront new threats, including that of cyber attack, Slayton offers valuable insight into how different kinds of expertise can limit or expand our capacity to address novel technological risks. Mode of access: World Wide Web. National security ; United States ; History ; 20th century National security ; United States ; History ; 21st century Ballistic missile defenses ; United States ; History Physicists ; Political activity ; United States ; History Computer scientists ; Political activity ; United States ; History Physics ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Computer science ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Technological complexity ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Software engineering ; Political aspects ; United States ; History United States ; Military policy 9780262019446 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780262019446 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 X:MITPRESS Verlag lizenzpflichtig ZDB-37-IEM 2013 GBV_ILN_22 ISIL_DE-18 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_22_i22818 GBV_ILN_23 ISIL_DE-830 GBV_ILN_62 ISIL_DE-28 GBV_ILN_100 ISIL_DE-Ma9 GBV_ILN_370 ISIL_DE-1373 GBV_ILN_2015 ISIL_DE-93 BO 045F 358.1/740973 22 01 0018 3848474301 olrm-h228-MITIEEE zi22818 03-02-21 23 01 0830 3957239818 olr-MIT i z 23-07-21 62 01 0028 3742913204 OLR-MIT Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Die Weitergabe an Dritte sowie systematisches Downloaden sind untersagt. z 26-08-20 100 01 3100 4472466929 09 --%%-- eBook MIT Press --%%-- --%%-- OLR-MIT-CEC Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots. z 30-01-24 370 01 4370 4011221201 olr-ebook mitieee Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. 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Zugriff von außerhalb nur für HCU-Angehörige möglich https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 2015 01 DE-93 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 23 01 0830 2018-01805, 2018-01806, 2018-01808 22 01 0018 olrm-h228-MITIEEE 23 01 0830 olr-MIT 62 01 0028 OLR-MIT 100 01 3100 OLR-MIT-CEC 370 01 4370 olr-ebook mitieee 370 01 4370 2021.12.01 |
spelling |
9780262316538 electronic 978-0-262-31653-8 (DE-627)1727348222 (DE-599)KEP055122094 (OCoLC)1196098155 (MITPRESS)6642238 (EBP)055122094 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 358.1/740973 23 Slayton, Rebecca 1974- verfasserin aut Arguments that count physics, computing, and missile defense, 1949-2012 Rebecca Slayton Cambridge, Massachusetts MIT Press [2013] 1 PDF (pages cm.). Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Inside technology Includes bibliographical references and index. - Description based on PDF viewed 12/23/2015 In a rapidly changing world, we rely upon experts to assess the promise and risks of new technology. But how do these experts make sense of a highly uncertain future? In Arguments that Count, Rebecca Slayton offers an important new perspective. Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as well as perspectives in science and technology studies, she provides an original account of how scientists came to terms with the unprecedented threat of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). She compares how two different professional communities -- physicists and computer scientists -- constructed arguments about the risks of missile defense, and how these arguments changed over time. Slayton shows that our understanding of technological risks is shaped by disciplinary repertoires -- the codified knowledge and mathematical rules that experts use to frame new challenges. And, significantly, a new repertoire can bring long-neglected risks into clear view.In the 1950s, scientists recognized that high-speed computers would be needed to cope with the unprecedented speed of ICBMs. But the nation's elite science advisors had no way to analyze the risks of computers so used physics to assess what they could: radar and missile performance. Only decades later, after establishing computing as a science, were advisors able to analyze authoritatively the risks associated with complex software -- most notably, the risk of a catastrophic failure. As we continue to confront new threats, including that of cyber attack, Slayton offers valuable insight into how different kinds of expertise can limit or expand our capacity to address novel technological risks. Mode of access: World Wide Web. National security ; United States ; History ; 20th century National security ; United States ; History ; 21st century Ballistic missile defenses ; United States ; History Physicists ; Political activity ; United States ; History Computer scientists ; Political activity ; United States ; History Physics ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Computer science ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Technological complexity ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Software engineering ; Political aspects ; United States ; History United States ; Military policy 9780262019446 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780262019446 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 X:MITPRESS Verlag lizenzpflichtig ZDB-37-IEM 2013 GBV_ILN_22 ISIL_DE-18 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_22_i22818 GBV_ILN_23 ISIL_DE-830 GBV_ILN_62 ISIL_DE-28 GBV_ILN_100 ISIL_DE-Ma9 GBV_ILN_370 ISIL_DE-1373 GBV_ILN_2015 ISIL_DE-93 BO 045F 358.1/740973 22 01 0018 3848474301 olrm-h228-MITIEEE zi22818 03-02-21 23 01 0830 3957239818 olr-MIT i z 23-07-21 62 01 0028 3742913204 OLR-MIT Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Die Weitergabe an Dritte sowie systematisches Downloaden sind untersagt. z 26-08-20 100 01 3100 4472466929 09 --%%-- eBook MIT Press --%%-- --%%-- OLR-MIT-CEC Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots. z 30-01-24 370 01 4370 4011221201 olr-ebook mitieee Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots. i z 01-12-21 2015 01 DE-93 3740748842 00 --%%-- --%%-- p --%%-- Campuslizenz l01 18-08-20 22 01 0018 Volltextzugang Campus https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 22 01 0018 Nur für Angehörige der Universität Hamburg: Volltextzugang von außerhalb des Campus http://emedien.sub.uni-hamburg.de/han/ieee/ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 23 01 0830 MIT Press EBook https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 62 01 0028 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 100 01 3100 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 100 01 3100 für Uniangehörige: Zugang weltweit http://han.med.uni-magdeburg.de/han/mitvia-ieee/ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 370 01 4370 E-Book: Zugriff im HCU-Netz. Zugriff von außerhalb nur für HCU-Angehörige möglich https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 2015 01 DE-93 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 23 01 0830 2018-01805, 2018-01806, 2018-01808 22 01 0018 olrm-h228-MITIEEE 23 01 0830 olr-MIT 62 01 0028 OLR-MIT 100 01 3100 OLR-MIT-CEC 370 01 4370 olr-ebook mitieee 370 01 4370 2021.12.01 |
allfields_unstemmed |
9780262316538 electronic 978-0-262-31653-8 (DE-627)1727348222 (DE-599)KEP055122094 (OCoLC)1196098155 (MITPRESS)6642238 (EBP)055122094 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 358.1/740973 23 Slayton, Rebecca 1974- verfasserin aut Arguments that count physics, computing, and missile defense, 1949-2012 Rebecca Slayton Cambridge, Massachusetts MIT Press [2013] 1 PDF (pages cm.). Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Inside technology Includes bibliographical references and index. - Description based on PDF viewed 12/23/2015 In a rapidly changing world, we rely upon experts to assess the promise and risks of new technology. But how do these experts make sense of a highly uncertain future? In Arguments that Count, Rebecca Slayton offers an important new perspective. Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as well as perspectives in science and technology studies, she provides an original account of how scientists came to terms with the unprecedented threat of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). She compares how two different professional communities -- physicists and computer scientists -- constructed arguments about the risks of missile defense, and how these arguments changed over time. Slayton shows that our understanding of technological risks is shaped by disciplinary repertoires -- the codified knowledge and mathematical rules that experts use to frame new challenges. And, significantly, a new repertoire can bring long-neglected risks into clear view.In the 1950s, scientists recognized that high-speed computers would be needed to cope with the unprecedented speed of ICBMs. But the nation's elite science advisors had no way to analyze the risks of computers so used physics to assess what they could: radar and missile performance. Only decades later, after establishing computing as a science, were advisors able to analyze authoritatively the risks associated with complex software -- most notably, the risk of a catastrophic failure. As we continue to confront new threats, including that of cyber attack, Slayton offers valuable insight into how different kinds of expertise can limit or expand our capacity to address novel technological risks. Mode of access: World Wide Web. National security ; United States ; History ; 20th century National security ; United States ; History ; 21st century Ballistic missile defenses ; United States ; History Physicists ; Political activity ; United States ; History Computer scientists ; Political activity ; United States ; History Physics ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Computer science ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Technological complexity ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Software engineering ; Political aspects ; United States ; History United States ; Military policy 9780262019446 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780262019446 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 X:MITPRESS Verlag lizenzpflichtig ZDB-37-IEM 2013 GBV_ILN_22 ISIL_DE-18 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_22_i22818 GBV_ILN_23 ISIL_DE-830 GBV_ILN_62 ISIL_DE-28 GBV_ILN_100 ISIL_DE-Ma9 GBV_ILN_370 ISIL_DE-1373 GBV_ILN_2015 ISIL_DE-93 BO 045F 358.1/740973 22 01 0018 3848474301 olrm-h228-MITIEEE zi22818 03-02-21 23 01 0830 3957239818 olr-MIT i z 23-07-21 62 01 0028 3742913204 OLR-MIT Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Die Weitergabe an Dritte sowie systematisches Downloaden sind untersagt. z 26-08-20 100 01 3100 4472466929 09 --%%-- eBook MIT Press --%%-- --%%-- OLR-MIT-CEC Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots. z 30-01-24 370 01 4370 4011221201 olr-ebook mitieee Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots. i z 01-12-21 2015 01 DE-93 3740748842 00 --%%-- --%%-- p --%%-- Campuslizenz l01 18-08-20 22 01 0018 Volltextzugang Campus https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 22 01 0018 Nur für Angehörige der Universität Hamburg: Volltextzugang von außerhalb des Campus http://emedien.sub.uni-hamburg.de/han/ieee/ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 23 01 0830 MIT Press EBook https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 62 01 0028 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 100 01 3100 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 100 01 3100 für Uniangehörige: Zugang weltweit http://han.med.uni-magdeburg.de/han/mitvia-ieee/ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 370 01 4370 E-Book: Zugriff im HCU-Netz. Zugriff von außerhalb nur für HCU-Angehörige möglich https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 2015 01 DE-93 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 23 01 0830 2018-01805, 2018-01806, 2018-01808 22 01 0018 olrm-h228-MITIEEE 23 01 0830 olr-MIT 62 01 0028 OLR-MIT 100 01 3100 OLR-MIT-CEC 370 01 4370 olr-ebook mitieee 370 01 4370 2021.12.01 |
allfieldsGer |
9780262316538 electronic 978-0-262-31653-8 (DE-627)1727348222 (DE-599)KEP055122094 (OCoLC)1196098155 (MITPRESS)6642238 (EBP)055122094 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 358.1/740973 23 Slayton, Rebecca 1974- verfasserin aut Arguments that count physics, computing, and missile defense, 1949-2012 Rebecca Slayton Cambridge, Massachusetts MIT Press [2013] 1 PDF (pages cm.). Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Inside technology Includes bibliographical references and index. - Description based on PDF viewed 12/23/2015 In a rapidly changing world, we rely upon experts to assess the promise and risks of new technology. But how do these experts make sense of a highly uncertain future? In Arguments that Count, Rebecca Slayton offers an important new perspective. Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as well as perspectives in science and technology studies, she provides an original account of how scientists came to terms with the unprecedented threat of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). She compares how two different professional communities -- physicists and computer scientists -- constructed arguments about the risks of missile defense, and how these arguments changed over time. Slayton shows that our understanding of technological risks is shaped by disciplinary repertoires -- the codified knowledge and mathematical rules that experts use to frame new challenges. And, significantly, a new repertoire can bring long-neglected risks into clear view.In the 1950s, scientists recognized that high-speed computers would be needed to cope with the unprecedented speed of ICBMs. But the nation's elite science advisors had no way to analyze the risks of computers so used physics to assess what they could: radar and missile performance. Only decades later, after establishing computing as a science, were advisors able to analyze authoritatively the risks associated with complex software -- most notably, the risk of a catastrophic failure. As we continue to confront new threats, including that of cyber attack, Slayton offers valuable insight into how different kinds of expertise can limit or expand our capacity to address novel technological risks. Mode of access: World Wide Web. National security ; United States ; History ; 20th century National security ; United States ; History ; 21st century Ballistic missile defenses ; United States ; History Physicists ; Political activity ; United States ; History Computer scientists ; Political activity ; United States ; History Physics ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Computer science ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Technological complexity ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Software engineering ; Political aspects ; United States ; History United States ; Military policy 9780262019446 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780262019446 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 X:MITPRESS Verlag lizenzpflichtig ZDB-37-IEM 2013 GBV_ILN_22 ISIL_DE-18 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_22_i22818 GBV_ILN_23 ISIL_DE-830 GBV_ILN_62 ISIL_DE-28 GBV_ILN_100 ISIL_DE-Ma9 GBV_ILN_370 ISIL_DE-1373 GBV_ILN_2015 ISIL_DE-93 BO 045F 358.1/740973 22 01 0018 3848474301 olrm-h228-MITIEEE zi22818 03-02-21 23 01 0830 3957239818 olr-MIT i z 23-07-21 62 01 0028 3742913204 OLR-MIT Vervielfältigungen (z.B. 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Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as well as perspectives in science and technology studies, she provides an original account of how scientists came to terms with the unprecedented threat of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). She compares how two different professional communities -- physicists and computer scientists -- constructed arguments about the risks of missile defense, and how these arguments changed over time. Slayton shows that our understanding of technological risks is shaped by disciplinary repertoires -- the codified knowledge and mathematical rules that experts use to frame new challenges. And, significantly, a new repertoire can bring long-neglected risks into clear view.In the 1950s, scientists recognized that high-speed computers would be needed to cope with the unprecedented speed of ICBMs. But the nation's elite science advisors had no way to analyze the risks of computers so used physics to assess what they could: radar and missile performance. Only decades later, after establishing computing as a science, were advisors able to analyze authoritatively the risks associated with complex software -- most notably, the risk of a catastrophic failure. As we continue to confront new threats, including that of cyber attack, Slayton offers valuable insight into how different kinds of expertise can limit or expand our capacity to address novel technological risks. Mode of access: World Wide Web. National security ; United States ; History ; 20th century National security ; United States ; History ; 21st century Ballistic missile defenses ; United States ; History Physicists ; Political activity ; United States ; History Computer scientists ; Political activity ; United States ; History Physics ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Computer science ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Technological complexity ; Political aspects ; United States ; History Software engineering ; Political aspects ; United States ; History United States ; Military policy 9780262019446 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780262019446 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/book/6642238 X:MITPRESS Verlag lizenzpflichtig ZDB-37-IEM 2013 GBV_ILN_22 ISIL_DE-18 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_22_i22818 GBV_ILN_23 ISIL_DE-830 GBV_ILN_62 ISIL_DE-28 GBV_ILN_100 ISIL_DE-Ma9 GBV_ILN_370 ISIL_DE-1373 GBV_ILN_2015 ISIL_DE-93 BO 045F 358.1/740973 22 01 0018 3848474301 olrm-h228-MITIEEE zi22818 03-02-21 23 01 0830 3957239818 olr-MIT i z 23-07-21 62 01 0028 3742913204 OLR-MIT Vervielfältigungen (z.B. 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In a rapidly changing world, we rely upon experts to assess the promise and risks of new technology. But how do these experts make sense of a highly uncertain future? In Arguments that Count, Rebecca Slayton offers an important new perspective. Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as well as perspectives in science and technology studies, she provides an original account of how scientists came to terms with the unprecedented threat of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). She compares how two different professional communities -- physicists and computer scientists -- constructed arguments about the risks of missile defense, and how these arguments changed over time. Slayton shows that our understanding of technological risks is shaped by disciplinary repertoires -- the codified knowledge and mathematical rules that experts use to frame new challenges. And, significantly, a new repertoire can bring long-neglected risks into clear view.In the 1950s, scientists recognized that high-speed computers would be needed to cope with the unprecedented speed of ICBMs. But the nation's elite science advisors had no way to analyze the risks of computers so used physics to assess what they could: radar and missile performance. Only decades later, after establishing computing as a science, were advisors able to analyze authoritatively the risks associated with complex software -- most notably, the risk of a catastrophic failure. As we continue to confront new threats, including that of cyber attack, Slayton offers valuable insight into how different kinds of expertise can limit or expand our capacity to address novel technological risks. Includes bibliographical references and index. - Description based on PDF viewed 12/23/2015 |
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In a rapidly changing world, we rely upon experts to assess the promise and risks of new technology. But how do these experts make sense of a highly uncertain future? In Arguments that Count, Rebecca Slayton offers an important new perspective. Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as well as perspectives in science and technology studies, she provides an original account of how scientists came to terms with the unprecedented threat of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). She compares how two different professional communities -- physicists and computer scientists -- constructed arguments about the risks of missile defense, and how these arguments changed over time. Slayton shows that our understanding of technological risks is shaped by disciplinary repertoires -- the codified knowledge and mathematical rules that experts use to frame new challenges. And, significantly, a new repertoire can bring long-neglected risks into clear view.In the 1950s, scientists recognized that high-speed computers would be needed to cope with the unprecedented speed of ICBMs. But the nation's elite science advisors had no way to analyze the risks of computers so used physics to assess what they could: radar and missile performance. Only decades later, after establishing computing as a science, were advisors able to analyze authoritatively the risks associated with complex software -- most notably, the risk of a catastrophic failure. As we continue to confront new threats, including that of cyber attack, Slayton offers valuable insight into how different kinds of expertise can limit or expand our capacity to address novel technological risks. Includes bibliographical references and index. - Description based on PDF viewed 12/23/2015 |
abstract_unstemmed |
In a rapidly changing world, we rely upon experts to assess the promise and risks of new technology. But how do these experts make sense of a highly uncertain future? In Arguments that Count, Rebecca Slayton offers an important new perspective. Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as well as perspectives in science and technology studies, she provides an original account of how scientists came to terms with the unprecedented threat of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). She compares how two different professional communities -- physicists and computer scientists -- constructed arguments about the risks of missile defense, and how these arguments changed over time. Slayton shows that our understanding of technological risks is shaped by disciplinary repertoires -- the codified knowledge and mathematical rules that experts use to frame new challenges. And, significantly, a new repertoire can bring long-neglected risks into clear view.In the 1950s, scientists recognized that high-speed computers would be needed to cope with the unprecedented speed of ICBMs. But the nation's elite science advisors had no way to analyze the risks of computers so used physics to assess what they could: radar and missile performance. Only decades later, after establishing computing as a science, were advisors able to analyze authoritatively the risks associated with complex software -- most notably, the risk of a catastrophic failure. As we continue to confront new threats, including that of cyber attack, Slayton offers valuable insight into how different kinds of expertise can limit or expand our capacity to address novel technological risks. Includes bibliographical references and index. - Description based on PDF viewed 12/23/2015 |
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