Self-Policing in Politics : The Political Economy of Reputational Controls on Politicians

Contrary to what news reports might suggest, the majority of politicians behave ethically and are never subject to investigations. Is this because of the elaborate system of rules Congress has constructed to regulate the conduct of its members as well as the fear of electoral reprisal? Drawing on ec...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Autor*in:

Parker, Glenn R. [verfasserIn]

Format:

E-Book

Sprache:

Englisch

Erschienen:

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press ; 2022

©2004

Rechteinformationen:

Restricted Access

Schlagwörter:

Legislators, United States

Political corruption, Economic aspects

Political ethics, Economic aspects

Self-control, Economic aspects

POLITICAL SCIENCE / American Government / General

Umfang:

1 Online-Ressource (194 p.) ; 4 line illus. 35 tables

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Cover

ISBN:

978-0-691-22543-2

DOI / URN:

10.1515/9780691225432

Katalog-ID:

1813287651

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