The political economy of antitrust
Issues in antitrust enforcement / Johan Stennek -- Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / C(c)Øecile Aubert -- Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel / Matthew E. Raiff -- Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels / John M. Connor...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
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| Format: |
E-Book |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
Bingley, U.K: Emerald ; 2007 |
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| Formangabe: |
Electronic books |
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| Anmerkung: |
Includes index |
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| Umfang: |
Online-Ressource |
| Reihe: |
Contributions to economic analysis 0573-8555 v. 282 |
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| Links: | |
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| ISBN: |
978-1-84950-866-7 |
| Katalog-ID: |
66152843X |
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| 505 | 8 | 0 | |a Front cover; The Political Economy of Anititrust; Copyright page; Introduction to the Series; Acknowledgements; Contents; List of Contributors; Chapter 1. Issues in Antitrust Enforcement; Chapter 2. Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics; Chapter 3. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path; Chapter 4. Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?; Chapter 5. Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests |
| 505 | 8 | 0 | |a Chapter 6. Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins CartelChapter 7. Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels; Chapter 8. The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control; Chapter 9. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger; Chapter 10. The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small vs. Large Member States; Chapter 11. A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control; Chapter 12. EU Merger Remedies: An Empirical Assessment |
| 505 | 8 | 0 | |a Chapter 13. The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and PracticeChapter 14. Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers; Chapter 15. Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator; Chapter 16. Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law; Chapter 17. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?; Chapter 18. Antitrust in Open Economies; Subject Index; |
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06328745 DE-101 9781849508667 electronic bk. : (p)£96.95 ; (p) 978-1-84950-866-7 (DE-627)66152843X (DE-599)BSZ338292608 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XA-GB K3850 .P65 2007eb 338.6048 The political economy of antitrust edited by Johan Stennek Bingley, U.K Emerald 2007 Online-Ressource Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Contributions to economic analysis 0573-8555 v. 282 Includes index Front cover; The Political Economy of Anititrust; Copyright page; Introduction to the Series; Acknowledgements; Contents; List of Contributors; Chapter 1. Issues in Antitrust Enforcement; Chapter 2. Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics; Chapter 3. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path; Chapter 4. Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?; Chapter 5. Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests Chapter 6. Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins CartelChapter 7. Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels; Chapter 8. The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control; Chapter 9. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger; Chapter 10. The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small vs. Large Member States; Chapter 11. A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control; Chapter 12. EU Merger Remedies: An Empirical Assessment Chapter 13. The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and PracticeChapter 14. Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers; Chapter 15. Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator; Chapter 16. Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law; Chapter 17. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?; Chapter 18. Antitrust in Open Economies; Subject Index; Issues in antitrust enforcement / Johan Stennek -- Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / C(c)Øecile Aubert -- Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel / Matthew E. Raiff -- Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels / John M. Connor -- The economics of tacit collusion : implications for merger control / Jean Tirole -- The economics and politics of international merger enforcement : a case study of the GE/Honeywell merger / Jay Pil Choi -- Remembrance of things past : antitrust, ideology, and the development of industrial economics / Stephen Martin -- The political economy of EU merger control : small vs. large member states / Johan Stennek -- A consumer surplus defense in merger control / Sven-Olof Fridolfsson -- EU merger remedies : an empirical assessment / Burcin Yurtoglu -- The significant impediment of effective competition test in the new European merger regulation : in theory and practice / Marc Ivaldi -- Vertical restraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers / Gregory J. Werden -- Political stabilization by an independent regulator / David Martimort -- Saving section 2 : reframing U.S. monopolization law / Timothy J. Brennan -- Private antitrust litigation : procompetitive or anticompetitive? / Sue H. Mialon -- Antitrust in open economies / Henrik Horn -- The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path / Joseph E. Harrington Jr -- Optimal fines in the era of whistleblowers : should price fixers still go to prison? / Giancarlo Spagnolo. - Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as the importance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrust policy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both the U.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced in the U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels. While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, the book brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. The first chapter provides an overview of some of the trends and recent research in antitrust enforcement and policy and highlights the contributions made by the chapters in this volume Online-Ausg. Online-Ausg Electronic books Ghosal, Vivek oth Stennek, Johan oth Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe The Political Economy of Antitrust http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 Verlag Volltext H-ZDB-1-EPB H-ZDB-55-BME GBV_ILN_34 ISIL_DE-18-302 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_70 ISIL_DE-89 GBV_ILN_164 ISIL_DE-916 GBV_ILN_185 ISIL_DE-Sra5 GBV_ILN_250 ISIL_DE-Ga20 GBV_ILN_281 ISIL_DE-Ei6 GBV_ILN_285 ISIL_DE-517 GBV_ILN_370 ISIL_DE-1373 GBV_ILN_673 ISIL_DE-H376 GBV hybr BO 045F 338.6048 34 01 3551 1810010942 00 HIBS-E Nationallizenz --%%-- --%%-- OLR-natlizenz Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Die Weitergabe an Dritte sowie systematisches Downloaden sind untersagt. zi002 02-10-18 70 01 0089 1679607529 OLR-NL-EMERALD Campusweiter Zugriff (Universität Hannover). Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots. z 24-04-17 164 01 0916 1706821972 OLR-EMERALD-BME-2017 Zugriff nur aus dem Hochschulnetz. Vervielfältigungen nur für den eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch z 09-08-17 185 01 3519 1799234134 OLR-EBME z 03-09-18 250 01 3250 1799262464 x 03-09-18 281 01 3281 179926548X x 03-09-18 285 01 0517 1799220982 OLR-EPB Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Die Weitergabe an Dritte sowie systematisches Downloaden sind untersagt. z 03-09-18 370 01 4370 1799239985 olr-ebook NL Der deutschlandweite Zugriff auf dieses Produkt wird im Rahmen der Allianz-Initiative Digitale Information mit finanzieller Unterstützung der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) bereitgestellt und durch die ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften organisiert. Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots. i z 03-09-18 673 01 4673 1670516911 OLR-EMERALD Readers at the KLU Library are reminded that reproduction (copying or download) is restricted to single chapters of books or single articles of journals for the purpose of research or private study only. Circulation to third parties or systematic downloads through Robots is not allowed z 10-03-17 34 01 3551 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 70 01 0089 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 164 01 0916 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 185 01 3519 Zugriff im Netz der Hochschule Stralsund http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 250 01 3250 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 281 01 3281 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 285 01 0517 E-Book http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 370 01 4370 E-Book: Zugriff im HCU-Netz. Zugriff von außerhalb nur für HCU-Angehörige möglich http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 673 01 4673 Please note: Access to these resources is restricted to KLU members only http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 673 00 DE-H376 00 Emerald eBook Collection 34 01 3551 OLR-natlizenz 70 01 0089 OLR-NL-EMERALD 164 01 0916 OLR-EMERALD-BME-2017 185 01 3519 OLR-EBME 285 01 0517 OLR-EPB 370 01 4370 olr-ebook NL 673 01 4673 OLR-EMERALD |
| spelling |
06328745 DE-101 9781849508667 electronic bk. : (p)£96.95 ; (p) 978-1-84950-866-7 (DE-627)66152843X (DE-599)BSZ338292608 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XA-GB K3850 .P65 2007eb 338.6048 The political economy of antitrust edited by Johan Stennek Bingley, U.K Emerald 2007 Online-Ressource Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Contributions to economic analysis 0573-8555 v. 282 Includes index Front cover; The Political Economy of Anititrust; Copyright page; Introduction to the Series; Acknowledgements; Contents; List of Contributors; Chapter 1. Issues in Antitrust Enforcement; Chapter 2. Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics; Chapter 3. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path; Chapter 4. Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?; Chapter 5. Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests Chapter 6. Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins CartelChapter 7. Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels; Chapter 8. The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control; Chapter 9. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger; Chapter 10. The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small vs. Large Member States; Chapter 11. A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control; Chapter 12. EU Merger Remedies: An Empirical Assessment Chapter 13. The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and PracticeChapter 14. Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers; Chapter 15. Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator; Chapter 16. Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law; Chapter 17. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?; Chapter 18. Antitrust in Open Economies; Subject Index; Issues in antitrust enforcement / Johan Stennek -- Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / C(c)Øecile Aubert -- Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel / Matthew E. Raiff -- Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels / John M. Connor -- The economics of tacit collusion : implications for merger control / Jean Tirole -- The economics and politics of international merger enforcement : a case study of the GE/Honeywell merger / Jay Pil Choi -- Remembrance of things past : antitrust, ideology, and the development of industrial economics / Stephen Martin -- The political economy of EU merger control : small vs. large member states / Johan Stennek -- A consumer surplus defense in merger control / Sven-Olof Fridolfsson -- EU merger remedies : an empirical assessment / Burcin Yurtoglu -- The significant impediment of effective competition test in the new European merger regulation : in theory and practice / Marc Ivaldi -- Vertical restraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers / Gregory J. Werden -- Political stabilization by an independent regulator / David Martimort -- Saving section 2 : reframing U.S. monopolization law / Timothy J. Brennan -- Private antitrust litigation : procompetitive or anticompetitive? / Sue H. Mialon -- Antitrust in open economies / Henrik Horn -- The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path / Joseph E. Harrington Jr -- Optimal fines in the era of whistleblowers : should price fixers still go to prison? / Giancarlo Spagnolo. - Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as the importance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrust policy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both the U.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced in the U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels. While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, the book brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. The first chapter provides an overview of some of the trends and recent research in antitrust enforcement and policy and highlights the contributions made by the chapters in this volume Online-Ausg. Online-Ausg Electronic books Ghosal, Vivek oth Stennek, Johan oth Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe The Political Economy of Antitrust http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 Verlag Volltext H-ZDB-1-EPB H-ZDB-55-BME GBV_ILN_34 ISIL_DE-18-302 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_70 ISIL_DE-89 GBV_ILN_164 ISIL_DE-916 GBV_ILN_185 ISIL_DE-Sra5 GBV_ILN_250 ISIL_DE-Ga20 GBV_ILN_281 ISIL_DE-Ei6 GBV_ILN_285 ISIL_DE-517 GBV_ILN_370 ISIL_DE-1373 GBV_ILN_673 ISIL_DE-H376 GBV hybr BO 045F 338.6048 34 01 3551 1810010942 00 HIBS-E Nationallizenz --%%-- --%%-- OLR-natlizenz Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Die Weitergabe an Dritte sowie systematisches Downloaden sind untersagt. zi002 02-10-18 70 01 0089 1679607529 OLR-NL-EMERALD Campusweiter Zugriff (Universität Hannover). Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots. z 24-04-17 164 01 0916 1706821972 OLR-EMERALD-BME-2017 Zugriff nur aus dem Hochschulnetz. Vervielfältigungen nur für den eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch z 09-08-17 185 01 3519 1799234134 OLR-EBME z 03-09-18 250 01 3250 1799262464 x 03-09-18 281 01 3281 179926548X x 03-09-18 285 01 0517 1799220982 OLR-EPB Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Die Weitergabe an Dritte sowie systematisches Downloaden sind untersagt. z 03-09-18 370 01 4370 1799239985 olr-ebook NL Der deutschlandweite Zugriff auf dieses Produkt wird im Rahmen der Allianz-Initiative Digitale Information mit finanzieller Unterstützung der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) bereitgestellt und durch die ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften organisiert. Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots. i z 03-09-18 673 01 4673 1670516911 OLR-EMERALD Readers at the KLU Library are reminded that reproduction (copying or download) is restricted to single chapters of books or single articles of journals for the purpose of research or private study only. Circulation to third parties or systematic downloads through Robots is not allowed z 10-03-17 34 01 3551 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 70 01 0089 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 164 01 0916 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 185 01 3519 Zugriff im Netz der Hochschule Stralsund http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 250 01 3250 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 281 01 3281 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 285 01 0517 E-Book http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 370 01 4370 E-Book: Zugriff im HCU-Netz. Zugriff von außerhalb nur für HCU-Angehörige möglich http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 673 01 4673 Please note: Access to these resources is restricted to KLU members only http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 673 00 DE-H376 00 Emerald eBook Collection 34 01 3551 OLR-natlizenz 70 01 0089 OLR-NL-EMERALD 164 01 0916 OLR-EMERALD-BME-2017 185 01 3519 OLR-EBME 285 01 0517 OLR-EPB 370 01 4370 olr-ebook NL 673 01 4673 OLR-EMERALD |
| allfields_unstemmed |
06328745 DE-101 9781849508667 electronic bk. : (p)£96.95 ; (p) 978-1-84950-866-7 (DE-627)66152843X (DE-599)BSZ338292608 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XA-GB K3850 .P65 2007eb 338.6048 The political economy of antitrust edited by Johan Stennek Bingley, U.K Emerald 2007 Online-Ressource Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Contributions to economic analysis 0573-8555 v. 282 Includes index Front cover; The Political Economy of Anititrust; Copyright page; Introduction to the Series; Acknowledgements; Contents; List of Contributors; Chapter 1. Issues in Antitrust Enforcement; Chapter 2. Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics; Chapter 3. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path; Chapter 4. Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?; Chapter 5. Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests Chapter 6. Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins CartelChapter 7. Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels; Chapter 8. The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control; Chapter 9. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger; Chapter 10. The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small vs. Large Member States; Chapter 11. A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control; Chapter 12. EU Merger Remedies: An Empirical Assessment Chapter 13. The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and PracticeChapter 14. Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers; Chapter 15. Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator; Chapter 16. Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law; Chapter 17. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?; Chapter 18. Antitrust in Open Economies; Subject Index; Issues in antitrust enforcement / Johan Stennek -- Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / C(c)Øecile Aubert -- Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel / Matthew E. Raiff -- Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels / John M. Connor -- The economics of tacit collusion : implications for merger control / Jean Tirole -- The economics and politics of international merger enforcement : a case study of the GE/Honeywell merger / Jay Pil Choi -- Remembrance of things past : antitrust, ideology, and the development of industrial economics / Stephen Martin -- The political economy of EU merger control : small vs. large member states / Johan Stennek -- A consumer surplus defense in merger control / Sven-Olof Fridolfsson -- EU merger remedies : an empirical assessment / Burcin Yurtoglu -- The significant impediment of effective competition test in the new European merger regulation : in theory and practice / Marc Ivaldi -- Vertical restraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers / Gregory J. Werden -- Political stabilization by an independent regulator / David Martimort -- Saving section 2 : reframing U.S. monopolization law / Timothy J. Brennan -- Private antitrust litigation : procompetitive or anticompetitive? / Sue H. Mialon -- Antitrust in open economies / Henrik Horn -- The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path / Joseph E. Harrington Jr -- Optimal fines in the era of whistleblowers : should price fixers still go to prison? / Giancarlo Spagnolo. - Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as the importance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrust policy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both the U.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced in the U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels. While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, the book brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. The first chapter provides an overview of some of the trends and recent research in antitrust enforcement and policy and highlights the contributions made by the chapters in this volume Online-Ausg. Online-Ausg Electronic books Ghosal, Vivek oth Stennek, Johan oth Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe The Political Economy of Antitrust http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 Verlag Volltext H-ZDB-1-EPB H-ZDB-55-BME GBV_ILN_34 ISIL_DE-18-302 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_70 ISIL_DE-89 GBV_ILN_164 ISIL_DE-916 GBV_ILN_185 ISIL_DE-Sra5 GBV_ILN_250 ISIL_DE-Ga20 GBV_ILN_281 ISIL_DE-Ei6 GBV_ILN_285 ISIL_DE-517 GBV_ILN_370 ISIL_DE-1373 GBV_ILN_673 ISIL_DE-H376 GBV hybr BO 045F 338.6048 34 01 3551 1810010942 00 HIBS-E Nationallizenz --%%-- --%%-- OLR-natlizenz Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Die Weitergabe an Dritte sowie systematisches Downloaden sind untersagt. zi002 02-10-18 70 01 0089 1679607529 OLR-NL-EMERALD Campusweiter Zugriff (Universität Hannover). Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots. z 24-04-17 164 01 0916 1706821972 OLR-EMERALD-BME-2017 Zugriff nur aus dem Hochschulnetz. Vervielfältigungen nur für den eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch z 09-08-17 185 01 3519 1799234134 OLR-EBME z 03-09-18 250 01 3250 1799262464 x 03-09-18 281 01 3281 179926548X x 03-09-18 285 01 0517 1799220982 OLR-EPB Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Die Weitergabe an Dritte sowie systematisches Downloaden sind untersagt. z 03-09-18 370 01 4370 1799239985 olr-ebook NL Der deutschlandweite Zugriff auf dieses Produkt wird im Rahmen der Allianz-Initiative Digitale Information mit finanzieller Unterstützung der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) bereitgestellt und durch die ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften organisiert. Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots. i z 03-09-18 673 01 4673 1670516911 OLR-EMERALD Readers at the KLU Library are reminded that reproduction (copying or download) is restricted to single chapters of books or single articles of journals for the purpose of research or private study only. Circulation to third parties or systematic downloads through Robots is not allowed z 10-03-17 34 01 3551 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 70 01 0089 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 164 01 0916 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 185 01 3519 Zugriff im Netz der Hochschule Stralsund http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 250 01 3250 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 281 01 3281 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 285 01 0517 E-Book http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 370 01 4370 E-Book: Zugriff im HCU-Netz. Zugriff von außerhalb nur für HCU-Angehörige möglich http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 673 01 4673 Please note: Access to these resources is restricted to KLU members only http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 673 00 DE-H376 00 Emerald eBook Collection 34 01 3551 OLR-natlizenz 70 01 0089 OLR-NL-EMERALD 164 01 0916 OLR-EMERALD-BME-2017 185 01 3519 OLR-EBME 285 01 0517 OLR-EPB 370 01 4370 olr-ebook NL 673 01 4673 OLR-EMERALD |
| allfieldsGer |
06328745 DE-101 9781849508667 electronic bk. : (p)£96.95 ; (p) 978-1-84950-866-7 (DE-627)66152843X (DE-599)BSZ338292608 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XA-GB K3850 .P65 2007eb 338.6048 The political economy of antitrust edited by Johan Stennek Bingley, U.K Emerald 2007 Online-Ressource Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Contributions to economic analysis 0573-8555 v. 282 Includes index Front cover; The Political Economy of Anititrust; Copyright page; Introduction to the Series; Acknowledgements; Contents; List of Contributors; Chapter 1. Issues in Antitrust Enforcement; Chapter 2. Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics; Chapter 3. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path; Chapter 4. Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?; Chapter 5. Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests Chapter 6. Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins CartelChapter 7. Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels; Chapter 8. The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control; Chapter 9. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger; Chapter 10. The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small vs. Large Member States; Chapter 11. A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control; Chapter 12. EU Merger Remedies: An Empirical Assessment Chapter 13. The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and PracticeChapter 14. Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers; Chapter 15. Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator; Chapter 16. Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law; Chapter 17. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?; Chapter 18. Antitrust in Open Economies; Subject Index; Issues in antitrust enforcement / Johan Stennek -- Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / C(c)Øecile Aubert -- Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel / Matthew E. Raiff -- Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels / John M. Connor -- The economics of tacit collusion : implications for merger control / Jean Tirole -- The economics and politics of international merger enforcement : a case study of the GE/Honeywell merger / Jay Pil Choi -- Remembrance of things past : antitrust, ideology, and the development of industrial economics / Stephen Martin -- The political economy of EU merger control : small vs. large member states / Johan Stennek -- A consumer surplus defense in merger control / Sven-Olof Fridolfsson -- EU merger remedies : an empirical assessment / Burcin Yurtoglu -- The significant impediment of effective competition test in the new European merger regulation : in theory and practice / Marc Ivaldi -- Vertical restraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers / Gregory J. Werden -- Political stabilization by an independent regulator / David Martimort -- Saving section 2 : reframing U.S. monopolization law / Timothy J. Brennan -- Private antitrust litigation : procompetitive or anticompetitive? / Sue H. Mialon -- Antitrust in open economies / Henrik Horn -- The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path / Joseph E. Harrington Jr -- Optimal fines in the era of whistleblowers : should price fixers still go to prison? / Giancarlo Spagnolo. - Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as the importance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrust policy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both the U.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced in the U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels. While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, the book brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. The first chapter provides an overview of some of the trends and recent research in antitrust enforcement and policy and highlights the contributions made by the chapters in this volume Online-Ausg. Online-Ausg Electronic books Ghosal, Vivek oth Stennek, Johan oth Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe The Political Economy of Antitrust http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 Verlag Volltext H-ZDB-1-EPB H-ZDB-55-BME GBV_ILN_34 ISIL_DE-18-302 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_70 ISIL_DE-89 GBV_ILN_164 ISIL_DE-916 GBV_ILN_185 ISIL_DE-Sra5 GBV_ILN_250 ISIL_DE-Ga20 GBV_ILN_281 ISIL_DE-Ei6 GBV_ILN_285 ISIL_DE-517 GBV_ILN_370 ISIL_DE-1373 GBV_ILN_673 ISIL_DE-H376 GBV hybr BO 045F 338.6048 34 01 3551 1810010942 00 HIBS-E Nationallizenz --%%-- --%%-- OLR-natlizenz Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Die Weitergabe an Dritte sowie systematisches Downloaden sind untersagt. zi002 02-10-18 70 01 0089 1679607529 OLR-NL-EMERALD Campusweiter Zugriff (Universität Hannover). Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots. z 24-04-17 164 01 0916 1706821972 OLR-EMERALD-BME-2017 Zugriff nur aus dem Hochschulnetz. Vervielfältigungen nur für den eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch z 09-08-17 185 01 3519 1799234134 OLR-EBME z 03-09-18 250 01 3250 1799262464 x 03-09-18 281 01 3281 179926548X x 03-09-18 285 01 0517 1799220982 OLR-EPB Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Die Weitergabe an Dritte sowie systematisches Downloaden sind untersagt. z 03-09-18 370 01 4370 1799239985 olr-ebook NL Der deutschlandweite Zugriff auf dieses Produkt wird im Rahmen der Allianz-Initiative Digitale Information mit finanzieller Unterstützung der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) bereitgestellt und durch die ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften organisiert. Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots. i z 03-09-18 673 01 4673 1670516911 OLR-EMERALD Readers at the KLU Library are reminded that reproduction (copying or download) is restricted to single chapters of books or single articles of journals for the purpose of research or private study only. Circulation to third parties or systematic downloads through Robots is not allowed z 10-03-17 34 01 3551 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 70 01 0089 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 164 01 0916 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 185 01 3519 Zugriff im Netz der Hochschule Stralsund http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 250 01 3250 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 281 01 3281 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 285 01 0517 E-Book http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 370 01 4370 E-Book: Zugriff im HCU-Netz. Zugriff von außerhalb nur für HCU-Angehörige möglich http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 673 01 4673 Please note: Access to these resources is restricted to KLU members only http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 673 00 DE-H376 00 Emerald eBook Collection 34 01 3551 OLR-natlizenz 70 01 0089 OLR-NL-EMERALD 164 01 0916 OLR-EMERALD-BME-2017 185 01 3519 OLR-EBME 285 01 0517 OLR-EPB 370 01 4370 olr-ebook NL 673 01 4673 OLR-EMERALD |
| allfieldsSound |
06328745 DE-101 9781849508667 electronic bk. : (p)£96.95 ; (p) 978-1-84950-866-7 (DE-627)66152843X (DE-599)BSZ338292608 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XA-GB K3850 .P65 2007eb 338.6048 The political economy of antitrust edited by Johan Stennek Bingley, U.K Emerald 2007 Online-Ressource Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Contributions to economic analysis 0573-8555 v. 282 Includes index Front cover; The Political Economy of Anititrust; Copyright page; Introduction to the Series; Acknowledgements; Contents; List of Contributors; Chapter 1. Issues in Antitrust Enforcement; Chapter 2. Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics; Chapter 3. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path; Chapter 4. Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?; Chapter 5. Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests Chapter 6. Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins CartelChapter 7. Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels; Chapter 8. The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control; Chapter 9. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger; Chapter 10. The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small vs. Large Member States; Chapter 11. A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control; Chapter 12. EU Merger Remedies: An Empirical Assessment Chapter 13. The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and PracticeChapter 14. Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers; Chapter 15. Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator; Chapter 16. Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law; Chapter 17. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?; Chapter 18. Antitrust in Open Economies; Subject Index; Issues in antitrust enforcement / Johan Stennek -- Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / C(c)Øecile Aubert -- Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel / Matthew E. Raiff -- Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels / John M. Connor -- The economics of tacit collusion : implications for merger control / Jean Tirole -- The economics and politics of international merger enforcement : a case study of the GE/Honeywell merger / Jay Pil Choi -- Remembrance of things past : antitrust, ideology, and the development of industrial economics / Stephen Martin -- The political economy of EU merger control : small vs. large member states / Johan Stennek -- A consumer surplus defense in merger control / Sven-Olof Fridolfsson -- EU merger remedies : an empirical assessment / Burcin Yurtoglu -- The significant impediment of effective competition test in the new European merger regulation : in theory and practice / Marc Ivaldi -- Vertical restraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers / Gregory J. Werden -- Political stabilization by an independent regulator / David Martimort -- Saving section 2 : reframing U.S. monopolization law / Timothy J. Brennan -- Private antitrust litigation : procompetitive or anticompetitive? / Sue H. Mialon -- Antitrust in open economies / Henrik Horn -- The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path / Joseph E. Harrington Jr -- Optimal fines in the era of whistleblowers : should price fixers still go to prison? / Giancarlo Spagnolo. - Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as the importance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrust policy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both the U.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced in the U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels. While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, the book brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. The first chapter provides an overview of some of the trends and recent research in antitrust enforcement and policy and highlights the contributions made by the chapters in this volume Online-Ausg. Online-Ausg Electronic books Ghosal, Vivek oth Stennek, Johan oth Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe The Political Economy of Antitrust http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0573-8555/282 Verlag Volltext H-ZDB-1-EPB H-ZDB-55-BME GBV_ILN_34 ISIL_DE-18-302 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_70 ISIL_DE-89 GBV_ILN_164 ISIL_DE-916 GBV_ILN_185 ISIL_DE-Sra5 GBV_ILN_250 ISIL_DE-Ga20 GBV_ILN_281 ISIL_DE-Ei6 GBV_ILN_285 ISIL_DE-517 GBV_ILN_370 ISIL_DE-1373 GBV_ILN_673 ISIL_DE-H376 GBV hybr BO 045F 338.6048 34 01 3551 1810010942 00 HIBS-E Nationallizenz --%%-- --%%-- OLR-natlizenz Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Die Weitergabe an Dritte sowie systematisches Downloaden sind untersagt. zi002 02-10-18 70 01 0089 1679607529 OLR-NL-EMERALD Campusweiter Zugriff (Universität Hannover). Vervielfältigungen (z.B. 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Die Weitergabe an Dritte sowie systematisches Downloaden sind untersagt. z 03-09-18 370 01 4370 1799239985 olr-ebook NL Der deutschlandweite Zugriff auf dieses Produkt wird im Rahmen der Allianz-Initiative Digitale Information mit finanzieller Unterstützung der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) bereitgestellt und durch die ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften organisiert. Vervielfältigungen (z.B. Kopien, Downloads) sind nur von einzelnen Kapiteln oder Seiten und nur zum eigenen wissenschaftlichen Gebrauch erlaubt. Keine Weitergabe an Dritte. Kein systematisches Downloaden durch Robots. i z 03-09-18 673 01 4673 1670516911 OLR-EMERALD Readers at the KLU Library are reminded that reproduction (copying or download) is restricted to single chapters of books or single articles of journals for the purpose of research or private study only. 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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000cam a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">66152843X</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20240712024727.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">110606s2007 xxk|||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="016" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">06328745</subfield><subfield code="2">DE-101</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781849508667</subfield><subfield code="c">electronic bk. : (p)£96.95 ; (p)</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-84950-866-7</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)66152843X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BSZ338292608</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="c">XA-GB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">K3850 .P65 2007eb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">338.6048</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">The political economy of antitrust</subfield><subfield code="c">edited by Johan Stennek</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Bingley, U.K</subfield><subfield code="b">Emerald</subfield><subfield code="c">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Contributions to economic analysis 0573-8555 v. 282</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes index</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Front cover; The Political Economy of Anititrust; Copyright page; Introduction to the Series; Acknowledgements; Contents; List of Contributors; Chapter 1. Issues in Antitrust Enforcement; Chapter 2. Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics; Chapter 3. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path; Chapter 4. Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?; Chapter 5. Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Chapter 6. Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins CartelChapter 7. Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels; Chapter 8. The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control; Chapter 9. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger; Chapter 10. The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small vs. Large Member States; Chapter 11. A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control; Chapter 12. EU Merger Remedies: An Empirical Assessment</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Chapter 13. The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and PracticeChapter 14. Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers; Chapter 15. Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator; Chapter 16. Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law; Chapter 17. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?; Chapter 18. Antitrust in Open Economies; Subject Index;</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Issues in antitrust enforcement / Johan Stennek -- Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / C(c)Øecile Aubert -- Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel / Matthew E. Raiff -- Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels / John M. Connor -- The economics of tacit collusion : implications for merger control / Jean Tirole -- The economics and politics of international merger enforcement : a case study of the GE/Honeywell merger / Jay Pil Choi -- Remembrance of things past : antitrust, ideology, and the development of industrial economics / Stephen Martin -- The political economy of EU merger control : small vs. large member states / Johan Stennek -- A consumer surplus defense in merger control / Sven-Olof Fridolfsson -- EU merger remedies : an empirical assessment / Burcin Yurtoglu -- The significant impediment of effective competition test in the new European merger regulation : in theory and practice / Marc Ivaldi -- Vertical restraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers / Gregory J. Werden -- Political stabilization by an independent regulator / David Martimort -- Saving section 2 : reframing U.S. monopolization law / Timothy J. 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Front cover; The Political Economy of Anititrust; Copyright page; Introduction to the Series; Acknowledgements; Contents; List of Contributors; Chapter 1. Issues in Antitrust Enforcement; Chapter 2. Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics; Chapter 3. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path; Chapter 4. Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?; Chapter 5. Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests Chapter 6. Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins CartelChapter 7. Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels; Chapter 8. The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control; Chapter 9. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger; Chapter 10. The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small vs. Large Member States; Chapter 11. A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control; Chapter 12. EU Merger Remedies: An Empirical Assessment Chapter 13. The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and PracticeChapter 14. Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers; Chapter 15. Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator; Chapter 16. Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law; Chapter 17. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?; Chapter 18. Antitrust in Open Economies; Subject Index; |
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Issues in antitrust enforcement / Johan Stennek -- Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / C(c)Øecile Aubert -- Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel / Matthew E. Raiff -- Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels / John M. Connor -- The economics of tacit collusion : implications for merger control / Jean Tirole -- The economics and politics of international merger enforcement : a case study of the GE/Honeywell merger / Jay Pil Choi -- Remembrance of things past : antitrust, ideology, and the development of industrial economics / Stephen Martin -- The political economy of EU merger control : small vs. large member states / Johan Stennek -- A consumer surplus defense in merger control / Sven-Olof Fridolfsson -- EU merger remedies : an empirical assessment / Burcin Yurtoglu -- The significant impediment of effective competition test in the new European merger regulation : in theory and practice / Marc Ivaldi -- Vertical restraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers / Gregory J. Werden -- Political stabilization by an independent regulator / David Martimort -- Saving section 2 : reframing U.S. monopolization law / Timothy J. Brennan -- Private antitrust litigation : procompetitive or anticompetitive? / Sue H. Mialon -- Antitrust in open economies / Henrik Horn -- The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path / Joseph E. Harrington Jr -- Optimal fines in the era of whistleblowers : should price fixers still go to prison? / Giancarlo Spagnolo. - Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as the importance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrust policy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both the U.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced in the U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels. While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, the book brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. The first chapter provides an overview of some of the trends and recent research in antitrust enforcement and policy and highlights the contributions made by the chapters in this volume Includes index |
| abstractGer |
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| abstract_unstemmed |
Issues in antitrust enforcement / Johan Stennek -- Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / C(c)Øecile Aubert -- Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel / Matthew E. Raiff -- Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels / John M. Connor -- The economics of tacit collusion : implications for merger control / Jean Tirole -- The economics and politics of international merger enforcement : a case study of the GE/Honeywell merger / Jay Pil Choi -- Remembrance of things past : antitrust, ideology, and the development of industrial economics / Stephen Martin -- The political economy of EU merger control : small vs. large member states / Johan Stennek -- A consumer surplus defense in merger control / Sven-Olof Fridolfsson -- EU merger remedies : an empirical assessment / Burcin Yurtoglu -- The significant impediment of effective competition test in the new European merger regulation : in theory and practice / Marc Ivaldi -- Vertical restraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers / Gregory J. Werden -- Political stabilization by an independent regulator / David Martimort -- Saving section 2 : reframing U.S. monopolization law / Timothy J. Brennan -- Private antitrust litigation : procompetitive or anticompetitive? / Sue H. Mialon -- Antitrust in open economies / Henrik Horn -- The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path / Joseph E. Harrington Jr -- Optimal fines in the era of whistleblowers : should price fixers still go to prison? / Giancarlo Spagnolo. - Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as the importance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrust policy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both the U.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced in the U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels. While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, the book brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. The first chapter provides an overview of some of the trends and recent research in antitrust enforcement and policy and highlights the contributions made by the chapters in this volume Includes index |
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Issues in Antitrust Enforcement; Chapter 2. Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics; Chapter 3. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path; Chapter 4. Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers. Should Price Fixers still Go to Prison?; Chapter 5. Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Chapter 6. Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins CartelChapter 7. Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels; Chapter 8. The Economics of Tacit Collusion: Implications for Merger Control; Chapter 9. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger; Chapter 10. The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small vs. Large Member States; Chapter 11. A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control; Chapter 12. EU Merger Remedies: An Empirical Assessment</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Chapter 13. The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and PracticeChapter 14. Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers; Chapter 15. Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator; Chapter 16. Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law; Chapter 17. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?; Chapter 18. Antitrust in Open Economies; Subject Index;</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Issues in antitrust enforcement / Johan Stennek -- Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / C(c)Øecile Aubert -- Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel / Matthew E. Raiff -- Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels / John M. Connor -- The economics of tacit collusion : implications for merger control / Jean Tirole -- The economics and politics of international merger enforcement : a case study of the GE/Honeywell merger / Jay Pil Choi -- Remembrance of things past : antitrust, ideology, and the development of industrial economics / Stephen Martin -- The political economy of EU merger control : small vs. large member states / Johan Stennek -- A consumer surplus defense in merger control / Sven-Olof Fridolfsson -- EU merger remedies : an empirical assessment / Burcin Yurtoglu -- The significant impediment of effective competition test in the new European merger regulation : in theory and practice / Marc Ivaldi -- Vertical restraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers / Gregory J. Werden -- Political stabilization by an independent regulator / David Martimort -- Saving section 2 : reframing U.S. monopolization law / Timothy J. Brennan -- Private antitrust litigation : procompetitive or anticompetitive? / Sue H. Mialon -- Antitrust in open economies / Henrik Horn -- The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path / Joseph E. Harrington Jr -- Optimal fines in the era of whistleblowers : should price fixers still go to prison? / Giancarlo Spagnolo. - Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as the importance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrust policy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both the U.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced in the U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels. While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, the book brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. 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