Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets : implications for equity and efficiency

In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination based on con- sumer characteristics like age, gender, and medical history. In this paper, I build on a recent literature to show why such policies are inefficient if consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for insurance co...
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Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Geruso, Michael [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	November 2017

Schlagwörter:	Versicherungsbeitrag / Preisdifferenzierung / Versicherungsmarkt / Nachfrage / Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse / Präferenztheorie / Adverse Selektion / Gerechtigkeit / Wohlfahrtsanalyse / Theorie / Krankenversicherung / Betriebliche Sozialleistungen / USA

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Quantitative economics - Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley, 2010, 8(2017), 3 vom: Nov., Seite 929-975
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:8 ; year:2017 ; number:3 ; month:11 ; pages:929-975

Links:	Volltext Volltext Volltext Terms of use

DOI / URN:	10.3982/QE794

Katalog-ID:	1015526721

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520			\|a In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination based on con- sumer characteristics like age, gender, and medical history. In this paper, I build on a recent literature to show why such policies are inefficient if consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for insurance conditional on the insured losses they generate. Using administrative claims data, I then show that this type of demand heterogeneity is empirically relevant in a consumer health plan setting. Younger and older consumers and men and women reveal strikingly different demand for health insurance, conditional on their objective medical spending risk. This implies that these groups must face different prices so as to sort themselves efficiently across insurance contracts. The theoretical and empirical analysis highlights a fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency that is unique to selection markets.
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publishDate	2017
allfields	10.3982/QE794 doi 10419/195558 hdl (DE-627)1015526721 (DE-599)GBV1015526721 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng D82 I11 I13 I18 jelc Geruso, Michael verfasserin (DE-588)1161011781 (DE-627)1024420434 (DE-576)50630387X aut Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets implications for equity and efficiency Michael Geruso November 2017 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination based on con- sumer characteristics like age, gender, and medical history. In this paper, I build on a recent literature to show why such policies are inefficient if consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for insurance conditional on the insured losses they generate. Using administrative claims data, I then show that this type of demand heterogeneity is empirically relevant in a consumer health plan setting. Younger and older consumers and men and women reveal strikingly different demand for health insurance, conditional on their objective medical spending risk. This implies that these groups must face different prices so as to sort themselves efficiently across insurance contracts. The theoretical and empirical analysis highlights a fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency that is unique to selection markets. 1.1\x Versicherungsbeitrag (DE-627)09139824X (DE-2867)13824-3 stw 1.2\x Preisdifferenzierung (DE-627)091383978 (DE-2867)10215-1 stw 1.3\x Versicherungsmarkt (DE-627)091398215 (DE-2867)19679-5 stw 1.4\x Nachfrage (DE-627)091379091 (DE-2867)10013-6 stw 1.5\x Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse (DE-627)091400767 (DE-2867)19210-1 stw 1.6\x Präferenztheorie (DE-627)091383900 (DE-2867)10164-6 stw 1.7\x Adverse Selektion (DE-627)091345766 (DE-2867)19227-5 stw 1.8\x Gerechtigkeit (DE-627)091362881 (DE-2867)19768-6 stw 1.9\x Wohlfahrtsanalyse (DE-627)091401534 (DE-2867)10112-4 stw 1.10\x Theorie (DE-627)091394902 (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.11\x Krankenversicherung (DE-627)091372666 (DE-2867)13292-3 stw 1.12\x Betriebliche Sozialleistungen (DE-627)091350980 (DE-2867)12592-3 stw 1.13\x USA (DE-627)091396867 (DE-2867)17829-1 stw Enthalten in Quantitative economics Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley, 2010 8(2017), 3 vom: Nov., Seite 929-975 Online-Ressource (DE-627)633816477 (DE-600)2569569-1 (DE-576)32818862X 1759-7331 nnns volume:8 year:2017 number:3 month:11 pages:929-975 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195558 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext https://doi.org/10.3982/QE794 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/QE794/epdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Verlag Terms of use 46 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2017 3 11 929-975 26 01 0206 1757471030 x1k 08-03-18 26 00 DE-206 56 Community rating 26 00 DE-206 56 adverse selection 26 00 DE-206 56 demand heterogeneity
spelling	10.3982/QE794 doi 10419/195558 hdl (DE-627)1015526721 (DE-599)GBV1015526721 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng D82 I11 I13 I18 jelc Geruso, Michael verfasserin (DE-588)1161011781 (DE-627)1024420434 (DE-576)50630387X aut Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets implications for equity and efficiency Michael Geruso November 2017 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination based on con- sumer characteristics like age, gender, and medical history. In this paper, I build on a recent literature to show why such policies are inefficient if consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for insurance conditional on the insured losses they generate. Using administrative claims data, I then show that this type of demand heterogeneity is empirically relevant in a consumer health plan setting. Younger and older consumers and men and women reveal strikingly different demand for health insurance, conditional on their objective medical spending risk. This implies that these groups must face different prices so as to sort themselves efficiently across insurance contracts. The theoretical and empirical analysis highlights a fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency that is unique to selection markets. 1.1\x Versicherungsbeitrag (DE-627)09139824X (DE-2867)13824-3 stw 1.2\x Preisdifferenzierung (DE-627)091383978 (DE-2867)10215-1 stw 1.3\x Versicherungsmarkt (DE-627)091398215 (DE-2867)19679-5 stw 1.4\x Nachfrage (DE-627)091379091 (DE-2867)10013-6 stw 1.5\x Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse (DE-627)091400767 (DE-2867)19210-1 stw 1.6\x Präferenztheorie (DE-627)091383900 (DE-2867)10164-6 stw 1.7\x Adverse Selektion (DE-627)091345766 (DE-2867)19227-5 stw 1.8\x Gerechtigkeit (DE-627)091362881 (DE-2867)19768-6 stw 1.9\x Wohlfahrtsanalyse (DE-627)091401534 (DE-2867)10112-4 stw 1.10\x Theorie (DE-627)091394902 (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.11\x Krankenversicherung (DE-627)091372666 (DE-2867)13292-3 stw 1.12\x Betriebliche Sozialleistungen (DE-627)091350980 (DE-2867)12592-3 stw 1.13\x USA (DE-627)091396867 (DE-2867)17829-1 stw Enthalten in Quantitative economics Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley, 2010 8(2017), 3 vom: Nov., Seite 929-975 Online-Ressource (DE-627)633816477 (DE-600)2569569-1 (DE-576)32818862X 1759-7331 nnns volume:8 year:2017 number:3 month:11 pages:929-975 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195558 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext https://doi.org/10.3982/QE794 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/QE794/epdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Verlag Terms of use 46 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2017 3 11 929-975 26 01 0206 1757471030 x1k 08-03-18 26 00 DE-206 56 Community rating 26 00 DE-206 56 adverse selection 26 00 DE-206 56 demand heterogeneity
allfields_unstemmed	10.3982/QE794 doi 10419/195558 hdl (DE-627)1015526721 (DE-599)GBV1015526721 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng D82 I11 I13 I18 jelc Geruso, Michael verfasserin (DE-588)1161011781 (DE-627)1024420434 (DE-576)50630387X aut Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets implications for equity and efficiency Michael Geruso November 2017 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination based on con- sumer characteristics like age, gender, and medical history. In this paper, I build on a recent literature to show why such policies are inefficient if consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for insurance conditional on the insured losses they generate. Using administrative claims data, I then show that this type of demand heterogeneity is empirically relevant in a consumer health plan setting. Younger and older consumers and men and women reveal strikingly different demand for health insurance, conditional on their objective medical spending risk. This implies that these groups must face different prices so as to sort themselves efficiently across insurance contracts. The theoretical and empirical analysis highlights a fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency that is unique to selection markets. 1.1\x Versicherungsbeitrag (DE-627)09139824X (DE-2867)13824-3 stw 1.2\x Preisdifferenzierung (DE-627)091383978 (DE-2867)10215-1 stw 1.3\x Versicherungsmarkt (DE-627)091398215 (DE-2867)19679-5 stw 1.4\x Nachfrage (DE-627)091379091 (DE-2867)10013-6 stw 1.5\x Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse (DE-627)091400767 (DE-2867)19210-1 stw 1.6\x Präferenztheorie (DE-627)091383900 (DE-2867)10164-6 stw 1.7\x Adverse Selektion (DE-627)091345766 (DE-2867)19227-5 stw 1.8\x Gerechtigkeit (DE-627)091362881 (DE-2867)19768-6 stw 1.9\x Wohlfahrtsanalyse (DE-627)091401534 (DE-2867)10112-4 stw 1.10\x Theorie (DE-627)091394902 (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.11\x Krankenversicherung (DE-627)091372666 (DE-2867)13292-3 stw 1.12\x Betriebliche Sozialleistungen (DE-627)091350980 (DE-2867)12592-3 stw 1.13\x USA (DE-627)091396867 (DE-2867)17829-1 stw Enthalten in Quantitative economics Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley, 2010 8(2017), 3 vom: Nov., Seite 929-975 Online-Ressource (DE-627)633816477 (DE-600)2569569-1 (DE-576)32818862X 1759-7331 nnns volume:8 year:2017 number:3 month:11 pages:929-975 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195558 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext https://doi.org/10.3982/QE794 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/QE794/epdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Verlag Terms of use 46 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2017 3 11 929-975 26 01 0206 1757471030 x1k 08-03-18 26 00 DE-206 56 Community rating 26 00 DE-206 56 adverse selection 26 00 DE-206 56 demand heterogeneity
allfieldsGer	10.3982/QE794 doi 10419/195558 hdl (DE-627)1015526721 (DE-599)GBV1015526721 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng D82 I11 I13 I18 jelc Geruso, Michael verfasserin (DE-588)1161011781 (DE-627)1024420434 (DE-576)50630387X aut Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets implications for equity and efficiency Michael Geruso November 2017 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination based on con- sumer characteristics like age, gender, and medical history. In this paper, I build on a recent literature to show why such policies are inefficient if consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for insurance conditional on the insured losses they generate. Using administrative claims data, I then show that this type of demand heterogeneity is empirically relevant in a consumer health plan setting. Younger and older consumers and men and women reveal strikingly different demand for health insurance, conditional on their objective medical spending risk. This implies that these groups must face different prices so as to sort themselves efficiently across insurance contracts. The theoretical and empirical analysis highlights a fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency that is unique to selection markets. 1.1\x Versicherungsbeitrag (DE-627)09139824X (DE-2867)13824-3 stw 1.2\x Preisdifferenzierung (DE-627)091383978 (DE-2867)10215-1 stw 1.3\x Versicherungsmarkt (DE-627)091398215 (DE-2867)19679-5 stw 1.4\x Nachfrage (DE-627)091379091 (DE-2867)10013-6 stw 1.5\x Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse (DE-627)091400767 (DE-2867)19210-1 stw 1.6\x Präferenztheorie (DE-627)091383900 (DE-2867)10164-6 stw 1.7\x Adverse Selektion (DE-627)091345766 (DE-2867)19227-5 stw 1.8\x Gerechtigkeit (DE-627)091362881 (DE-2867)19768-6 stw 1.9\x Wohlfahrtsanalyse (DE-627)091401534 (DE-2867)10112-4 stw 1.10\x Theorie (DE-627)091394902 (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.11\x Krankenversicherung (DE-627)091372666 (DE-2867)13292-3 stw 1.12\x Betriebliche Sozialleistungen (DE-627)091350980 (DE-2867)12592-3 stw 1.13\x USA (DE-627)091396867 (DE-2867)17829-1 stw Enthalten in Quantitative economics Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley, 2010 8(2017), 3 vom: Nov., Seite 929-975 Online-Ressource (DE-627)633816477 (DE-600)2569569-1 (DE-576)32818862X 1759-7331 nnns volume:8 year:2017 number:3 month:11 pages:929-975 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195558 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext https://doi.org/10.3982/QE794 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/QE794/epdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Verlag Terms of use 46 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2017 3 11 929-975 26 01 0206 1757471030 x1k 08-03-18 26 00 DE-206 56 Community rating 26 00 DE-206 56 adverse selection 26 00 DE-206 56 demand heterogeneity
allfieldsSound	10.3982/QE794 doi 10419/195558 hdl (DE-627)1015526721 (DE-599)GBV1015526721 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng D82 I11 I13 I18 jelc Geruso, Michael verfasserin (DE-588)1161011781 (DE-627)1024420434 (DE-576)50630387X aut Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets implications for equity and efficiency Michael Geruso November 2017 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination based on con- sumer characteristics like age, gender, and medical history. In this paper, I build on a recent literature to show why such policies are inefficient if consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for insurance conditional on the insured losses they generate. Using administrative claims data, I then show that this type of demand heterogeneity is empirically relevant in a consumer health plan setting. Younger and older consumers and men and women reveal strikingly different demand for health insurance, conditional on their objective medical spending risk. This implies that these groups must face different prices so as to sort themselves efficiently across insurance contracts. The theoretical and empirical analysis highlights a fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency that is unique to selection markets. 1.1\x Versicherungsbeitrag (DE-627)09139824X (DE-2867)13824-3 stw 1.2\x Preisdifferenzierung (DE-627)091383978 (DE-2867)10215-1 stw 1.3\x Versicherungsmarkt (DE-627)091398215 (DE-2867)19679-5 stw 1.4\x Nachfrage (DE-627)091379091 (DE-2867)10013-6 stw 1.5\x Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse (DE-627)091400767 (DE-2867)19210-1 stw 1.6\x Präferenztheorie (DE-627)091383900 (DE-2867)10164-6 stw 1.7\x Adverse Selektion (DE-627)091345766 (DE-2867)19227-5 stw 1.8\x Gerechtigkeit (DE-627)091362881 (DE-2867)19768-6 stw 1.9\x Wohlfahrtsanalyse (DE-627)091401534 (DE-2867)10112-4 stw 1.10\x Theorie (DE-627)091394902 (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.11\x Krankenversicherung (DE-627)091372666 (DE-2867)13292-3 stw 1.12\x Betriebliche Sozialleistungen (DE-627)091350980 (DE-2867)12592-3 stw 1.13\x USA (DE-627)091396867 (DE-2867)17829-1 stw Enthalten in Quantitative economics Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley, 2010 8(2017), 3 vom: Nov., Seite 929-975 Online-Ressource (DE-627)633816477 (DE-600)2569569-1 (DE-576)32818862X 1759-7331 nnns volume:8 year:2017 number:3 month:11 pages:929-975 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195558 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext https://doi.org/10.3982/QE794 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/QE794/epdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Verlag Terms of use 46 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2017 3 11 929-975 26 01 0206 1757471030 x1k 08-03-18 26 00 DE-206 56 Community rating 26 00 DE-206 56 adverse selection 26 00 DE-206 56 demand heterogeneity
language	English
source	Enthalten in Quantitative economics 8(2017), 3 vom: Nov., Seite 929-975 volume:8 year:2017 number:3 month:11 pages:929-975
sourceStr	Enthalten in Quantitative economics 8(2017), 3 vom: Nov., Seite 929-975 volume:8 year:2017 number:3 month:11 pages:929-975
format_phy_str_mv	Article
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institution	findex.gbv.de
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topic_facet	Versicherungsbeitrag Preisdifferenzierung Versicherungsmarkt Nachfrage Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse Präferenztheorie Adverse Selektion Gerechtigkeit Wohlfahrtsanalyse Theorie Krankenversicherung Betriebliche Sozialleistungen USA
sw_local_iln_str_mv	26:Community rating DE-206:Community rating 26:adverse selection DE-206:adverse selection 26:demand heterogeneity DE-206:demand heterogeneity
isfreeaccess_bool	true
container_title	Quantitative economics
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Geruso, Michael @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2017-11-01T00:00:00Z
hierarchy_top_id	633816477
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language_de	englisch
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author	Geruso, Michael
spellingShingle	Geruso, Michael jelc D82 stw Versicherungsbeitrag stw Preisdifferenzierung stw Versicherungsmarkt stw Nachfrage stw Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse stw Präferenztheorie stw Adverse Selektion stw Gerechtigkeit stw Wohlfahrtsanalyse stw Theorie stw Krankenversicherung stw Betriebliche Sozialleistungen stw USA 26 Community rating 26 adverse selection 26 demand heterogeneity Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets implications for equity and efficiency
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topic_title	D82 I11 I13 I18 jelc 26 00 DE-206 56 Community rating 26 00 DE-206 56 adverse selection 26 00 DE-206 56 demand heterogeneity Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets implications for equity and efficiency Michael Geruso 1.1\x Versicherungsbeitrag (DE-627)09139824X (DE-2867)13824-3 stw 1.2\x Preisdifferenzierung (DE-627)091383978 (DE-2867)10215-1 stw 1.3\x Versicherungsmarkt (DE-627)091398215 (DE-2867)19679-5 stw 1.4\x Nachfrage (DE-627)091379091 (DE-2867)10013-6 stw 1.5\x Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse (DE-627)091400767 (DE-2867)19210-1 stw 1.6\x Präferenztheorie (DE-627)091383900 (DE-2867)10164-6 stw 1.7\x Adverse Selektion (DE-627)091345766 (DE-2867)19227-5 stw 1.8\x Gerechtigkeit (DE-627)091362881 (DE-2867)19768-6 stw 1.9\x Wohlfahrtsanalyse (DE-627)091401534 (DE-2867)10112-4 stw 1.10\x Theorie (DE-627)091394902 (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.11\x Krankenversicherung (DE-627)091372666 (DE-2867)13292-3 stw 1.12\x Betriebliche Sozialleistungen (DE-627)091350980 (DE-2867)12592-3 stw 1.13\x USA (DE-627)091396867 (DE-2867)17829-1 stw
topic	jelc D82 stw Versicherungsbeitrag stw Preisdifferenzierung stw Versicherungsmarkt stw Nachfrage stw Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse stw Präferenztheorie stw Adverse Selektion stw Gerechtigkeit stw Wohlfahrtsanalyse stw Theorie stw Krankenversicherung stw Betriebliche Sozialleistungen stw USA 26 Community rating 26 adverse selection 26 demand heterogeneity
topic_unstemmed	jelc D82 stw Versicherungsbeitrag stw Preisdifferenzierung stw Versicherungsmarkt stw Nachfrage stw Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse stw Präferenztheorie stw Adverse Selektion stw Gerechtigkeit stw Wohlfahrtsanalyse stw Theorie stw Krankenversicherung stw Betriebliche Sozialleistungen stw USA 26 Community rating 26 adverse selection 26 demand heterogeneity
topic_browse	jelc D82 stw Versicherungsbeitrag stw Preisdifferenzierung stw Versicherungsmarkt stw Nachfrage stw Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse stw Präferenztheorie stw Adverse Selektion stw Gerechtigkeit stw Wohlfahrtsanalyse stw Theorie stw Krankenversicherung stw Betriebliche Sozialleistungen stw USA 26 Community rating 26 adverse selection 26 demand heterogeneity
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title	Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets implications for equity and efficiency
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title_full	Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets implications for equity and efficiency Michael Geruso
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title_sort	demand heterogeneity in insurance marketsimplications for equity and efficiency
title_auth	Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets implications for equity and efficiency
abstract	In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination based on con- sumer characteristics like age, gender, and medical history. In this paper, I build on a recent literature to show why such policies are inefficient if consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for insurance conditional on the insured losses they generate. Using administrative claims data, I then show that this type of demand heterogeneity is empirically relevant in a consumer health plan setting. Younger and older consumers and men and women reveal strikingly different demand for health insurance, conditional on their objective medical spending risk. This implies that these groups must face different prices so as to sort themselves efficiently across insurance contracts. The theoretical and empirical analysis highlights a fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency that is unique to selection markets.
abstractGer	In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination based on con- sumer characteristics like age, gender, and medical history. In this paper, I build on a recent literature to show why such policies are inefficient if consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for insurance conditional on the insured losses they generate. Using administrative claims data, I then show that this type of demand heterogeneity is empirically relevant in a consumer health plan setting. Younger and older consumers and men and women reveal strikingly different demand for health insurance, conditional on their objective medical spending risk. This implies that these groups must face different prices so as to sort themselves efficiently across insurance contracts. The theoretical and empirical analysis highlights a fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency that is unique to selection markets.
abstract_unstemmed	In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination based on con- sumer characteristics like age, gender, and medical history. In this paper, I build on a recent literature to show why such policies are inefficient if consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for insurance conditional on the insured losses they generate. Using administrative claims data, I then show that this type of demand heterogeneity is empirically relevant in a consumer health plan setting. Younger and older consumers and men and women reveal strikingly different demand for health insurance, conditional on their objective medical spending risk. This implies that these groups must face different prices so as to sort themselves efficiently across insurance contracts. The theoretical and empirical analysis highlights a fundamental trade-off between equity and efficiency that is unique to selection markets.
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container_issue	3
title_short	Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195558 https://doi.org/10.3982/QE794 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/QE794/epdf https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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doi_str	10.3982/QE794
up_date	2024-07-04T23:35:50.920Z
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Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets : implications for equity and efficiency

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