The institutional determinants of CEO compensation : an international empirical evidence

Corporate governance literature suggests that the relationship between CEO effort and outcomes such as firm performance is highly uncertain due to the influence of numerous organizational and environmental contingencies that are outside CEOs control. The major focus of this study is to determine whe...
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Autor*in:	Jouber, Habib [verfasserIn] Fakhfakh, Hamadi [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2011

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: The international journal of business science & applied management - [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006, 6(2011), 3, Seite 42-57
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:6 ; year:2011 ; number:3 ; pages:42-57

Links:	Volltext Volltext Volltext Terms of use

Katalog-ID:	1029925879

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allfields	10419/190628 hdl (DE-627)1029925879 (DE-599)GBV1029925879 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Jouber, Habib verfasserin (DE-588)1188726250 (DE-627)1667635344 aut The institutional determinants of CEO compensation an international empirical evidence Habib Jouber, Hamadi Fakhfakh 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Corporate governance literature suggests that the relationship between CEO effort and outcomes such as firm performance is highly uncertain due to the influence of numerous organizational and environmental contingencies that are outside CEOs control. The major focus of this study is to determine whether institutional factors explain cross-sectional differences in CEO pay structure and sensitivity to performance and luck. Thus, we address three ultimate questions; Are CEOs rewarded for luck? Does institutional features matter for CEO pay for luck? How do systematic incentive effect is sensitive to lucks nature? Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables (I.V.) estimations based on a sample of 300 publicly traded firms covering four countries from the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental corporate governance models between 2004 and 2008 show that the answers to the two first questions are a surrounding yes. Robustness check tests relying to the third question provide evidence that pay for luck is asymmetric. That is, executives are rewarded for good luck but they are safe of bad luck. Fakhfakh, Hamadi verfasserin aut Enthalten in The international journal of business science & applied management [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006 6(2011), 3, Seite 42-57 Online-Ressource (DE-627)557882230 (DE-600)2406737-4 (DE-576)281368961 1753-0296 nnns volume:6 year:2011 number:3 pages:42-57 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/190628 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://www.business-and-management.org/paper.php?id=76 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://www.business-and-management.org/download.php?file=2011/6_3--43-57-Jouber,Fakhfakh.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/uk/ Verlag Terms of use 46 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 6 2011 3 42-57 26 01 0206 1798770903 x1k 31-08-18 26 00 DE-206 56 CEO compensation 26 00 DE-206 56 performance 26 00 DE-206 56 institutional factors 26 00 DE-206 56 luck 26 00 DE-206 56 corporate governance
spelling	10419/190628 hdl (DE-627)1029925879 (DE-599)GBV1029925879 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Jouber, Habib verfasserin (DE-588)1188726250 (DE-627)1667635344 aut The institutional determinants of CEO compensation an international empirical evidence Habib Jouber, Hamadi Fakhfakh 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Corporate governance literature suggests that the relationship between CEO effort and outcomes such as firm performance is highly uncertain due to the influence of numerous organizational and environmental contingencies that are outside CEOs control. The major focus of this study is to determine whether institutional factors explain cross-sectional differences in CEO pay structure and sensitivity to performance and luck. Thus, we address three ultimate questions; Are CEOs rewarded for luck? Does institutional features matter for CEO pay for luck? How do systematic incentive effect is sensitive to lucks nature? Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables (I.V.) estimations based on a sample of 300 publicly traded firms covering four countries from the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental corporate governance models between 2004 and 2008 show that the answers to the two first questions are a surrounding yes. Robustness check tests relying to the third question provide evidence that pay for luck is asymmetric. That is, executives are rewarded for good luck but they are safe of bad luck. Fakhfakh, Hamadi verfasserin aut Enthalten in The international journal of business science & applied management [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006 6(2011), 3, Seite 42-57 Online-Ressource (DE-627)557882230 (DE-600)2406737-4 (DE-576)281368961 1753-0296 nnns volume:6 year:2011 number:3 pages:42-57 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/190628 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://www.business-and-management.org/paper.php?id=76 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://www.business-and-management.org/download.php?file=2011/6_3--43-57-Jouber,Fakhfakh.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/uk/ Verlag Terms of use 46 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 6 2011 3 42-57 26 01 0206 1798770903 x1k 31-08-18 26 00 DE-206 56 CEO compensation 26 00 DE-206 56 performance 26 00 DE-206 56 institutional factors 26 00 DE-206 56 luck 26 00 DE-206 56 corporate governance
allfields_unstemmed	10419/190628 hdl (DE-627)1029925879 (DE-599)GBV1029925879 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Jouber, Habib verfasserin (DE-588)1188726250 (DE-627)1667635344 aut The institutional determinants of CEO compensation an international empirical evidence Habib Jouber, Hamadi Fakhfakh 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Corporate governance literature suggests that the relationship between CEO effort and outcomes such as firm performance is highly uncertain due to the influence of numerous organizational and environmental contingencies that are outside CEOs control. The major focus of this study is to determine whether institutional factors explain cross-sectional differences in CEO pay structure and sensitivity to performance and luck. Thus, we address three ultimate questions; Are CEOs rewarded for luck? Does institutional features matter for CEO pay for luck? How do systematic incentive effect is sensitive to lucks nature? Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables (I.V.) estimations based on a sample of 300 publicly traded firms covering four countries from the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental corporate governance models between 2004 and 2008 show that the answers to the two first questions are a surrounding yes. Robustness check tests relying to the third question provide evidence that pay for luck is asymmetric. That is, executives are rewarded for good luck but they are safe of bad luck. Fakhfakh, Hamadi verfasserin aut Enthalten in The international journal of business science & applied management [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006 6(2011), 3, Seite 42-57 Online-Ressource (DE-627)557882230 (DE-600)2406737-4 (DE-576)281368961 1753-0296 nnns volume:6 year:2011 number:3 pages:42-57 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/190628 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://www.business-and-management.org/paper.php?id=76 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://www.business-and-management.org/download.php?file=2011/6_3--43-57-Jouber,Fakhfakh.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/uk/ Verlag Terms of use 46 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 6 2011 3 42-57 26 01 0206 1798770903 x1k 31-08-18 26 00 DE-206 56 CEO compensation 26 00 DE-206 56 performance 26 00 DE-206 56 institutional factors 26 00 DE-206 56 luck 26 00 DE-206 56 corporate governance
allfieldsGer	10419/190628 hdl (DE-627)1029925879 (DE-599)GBV1029925879 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Jouber, Habib verfasserin (DE-588)1188726250 (DE-627)1667635344 aut The institutional determinants of CEO compensation an international empirical evidence Habib Jouber, Hamadi Fakhfakh 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Corporate governance literature suggests that the relationship between CEO effort and outcomes such as firm performance is highly uncertain due to the influence of numerous organizational and environmental contingencies that are outside CEOs control. The major focus of this study is to determine whether institutional factors explain cross-sectional differences in CEO pay structure and sensitivity to performance and luck. Thus, we address three ultimate questions; Are CEOs rewarded for luck? Does institutional features matter for CEO pay for luck? How do systematic incentive effect is sensitive to lucks nature? Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables (I.V.) estimations based on a sample of 300 publicly traded firms covering four countries from the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental corporate governance models between 2004 and 2008 show that the answers to the two first questions are a surrounding yes. Robustness check tests relying to the third question provide evidence that pay for luck is asymmetric. That is, executives are rewarded for good luck but they are safe of bad luck. Fakhfakh, Hamadi verfasserin aut Enthalten in The international journal of business science & applied management [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006 6(2011), 3, Seite 42-57 Online-Ressource (DE-627)557882230 (DE-600)2406737-4 (DE-576)281368961 1753-0296 nnns volume:6 year:2011 number:3 pages:42-57 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/190628 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://www.business-and-management.org/paper.php?id=76 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://www.business-and-management.org/download.php?file=2011/6_3--43-57-Jouber,Fakhfakh.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/uk/ Verlag Terms of use 46 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 6 2011 3 42-57 26 01 0206 1798770903 x1k 31-08-18 26 00 DE-206 56 CEO compensation 26 00 DE-206 56 performance 26 00 DE-206 56 institutional factors 26 00 DE-206 56 luck 26 00 DE-206 56 corporate governance
allfieldsSound	10419/190628 hdl (DE-627)1029925879 (DE-599)GBV1029925879 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Jouber, Habib verfasserin (DE-588)1188726250 (DE-627)1667635344 aut The institutional determinants of CEO compensation an international empirical evidence Habib Jouber, Hamadi Fakhfakh 2011 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Corporate governance literature suggests that the relationship between CEO effort and outcomes such as firm performance is highly uncertain due to the influence of numerous organizational and environmental contingencies that are outside CEOs control. The major focus of this study is to determine whether institutional factors explain cross-sectional differences in CEO pay structure and sensitivity to performance and luck. Thus, we address three ultimate questions; Are CEOs rewarded for luck? Does institutional features matter for CEO pay for luck? How do systematic incentive effect is sensitive to lucks nature? Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables (I.V.) estimations based on a sample of 300 publicly traded firms covering four countries from the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental corporate governance models between 2004 and 2008 show that the answers to the two first questions are a surrounding yes. Robustness check tests relying to the third question provide evidence that pay for luck is asymmetric. That is, executives are rewarded for good luck but they are safe of bad luck. Fakhfakh, Hamadi verfasserin aut Enthalten in The international journal of business science & applied management [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006 6(2011), 3, Seite 42-57 Online-Ressource (DE-627)557882230 (DE-600)2406737-4 (DE-576)281368961 1753-0296 nnns volume:6 year:2011 number:3 pages:42-57 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/190628 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://www.business-and-management.org/paper.php?id=76 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://www.business-and-management.org/download.php?file=2011/6_3--43-57-Jouber,Fakhfakh.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/uk/ Verlag Terms of use 46 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 6 2011 3 42-57 26 01 0206 1798770903 x1k 31-08-18 26 00 DE-206 56 CEO compensation 26 00 DE-206 56 performance 26 00 DE-206 56 institutional factors 26 00 DE-206 56 luck 26 00 DE-206 56 corporate governance
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spellingShingle	Jouber, Habib 26 CEO compensation 26 performance 26 institutional factors 26 luck 26 corporate governance The institutional determinants of CEO compensation an international empirical evidence
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topic_title	26 00 DE-206 56 CEO compensation 26 00 DE-206 56 performance 26 00 DE-206 56 institutional factors 26 00 DE-206 56 luck 26 00 DE-206 56 corporate governance The institutional determinants of CEO compensation an international empirical evidence Habib Jouber, Hamadi Fakhfakh
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title_full	The institutional determinants of CEO compensation an international empirical evidence Habib Jouber, Hamadi Fakhfakh
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title_auth	The institutional determinants of CEO compensation an international empirical evidence
abstract	Corporate governance literature suggests that the relationship between CEO effort and outcomes such as firm performance is highly uncertain due to the influence of numerous organizational and environmental contingencies that are outside CEOs control. The major focus of this study is to determine whether institutional factors explain cross-sectional differences in CEO pay structure and sensitivity to performance and luck. Thus, we address three ultimate questions; Are CEOs rewarded for luck? Does institutional features matter for CEO pay for luck? How do systematic incentive effect is sensitive to lucks nature? Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables (I.V.) estimations based on a sample of 300 publicly traded firms covering four countries from the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental corporate governance models between 2004 and 2008 show that the answers to the two first questions are a surrounding yes. Robustness check tests relying to the third question provide evidence that pay for luck is asymmetric. That is, executives are rewarded for good luck but they are safe of bad luck.
abstractGer	Corporate governance literature suggests that the relationship between CEO effort and outcomes such as firm performance is highly uncertain due to the influence of numerous organizational and environmental contingencies that are outside CEOs control. The major focus of this study is to determine whether institutional factors explain cross-sectional differences in CEO pay structure and sensitivity to performance and luck. Thus, we address three ultimate questions; Are CEOs rewarded for luck? Does institutional features matter for CEO pay for luck? How do systematic incentive effect is sensitive to lucks nature? Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables (I.V.) estimations based on a sample of 300 publicly traded firms covering four countries from the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental corporate governance models between 2004 and 2008 show that the answers to the two first questions are a surrounding yes. Robustness check tests relying to the third question provide evidence that pay for luck is asymmetric. That is, executives are rewarded for good luck but they are safe of bad luck.
abstract_unstemmed	Corporate governance literature suggests that the relationship between CEO effort and outcomes such as firm performance is highly uncertain due to the influence of numerous organizational and environmental contingencies that are outside CEOs control. The major focus of this study is to determine whether institutional factors explain cross-sectional differences in CEO pay structure and sensitivity to performance and luck. Thus, we address three ultimate questions; Are CEOs rewarded for luck? Does institutional features matter for CEO pay for luck? How do systematic incentive effect is sensitive to lucks nature? Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables (I.V.) estimations based on a sample of 300 publicly traded firms covering four countries from the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental corporate governance models between 2004 and 2008 show that the answers to the two first questions are a surrounding yes. Robustness check tests relying to the third question provide evidence that pay for luck is asymmetric. That is, executives are rewarded for good luck but they are safe of bad luck.
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title_short	The institutional determinants of CEO compensation
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/190628 http://www.business-and-management.org/paper.php?id=76 http://www.business-and-management.org/download.php?file=2011/6_3--43-57-Jouber,Fakhfakh.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/uk/
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The major focus of this study is to determine whether institutional factors explain cross-sectional differences in CEO pay structure and sensitivity to performance and luck. Thus, we address three ultimate questions; Are CEOs rewarded for luck? Does institutional features matter for CEO pay for luck? How do systematic incentive effect is sensitive to lucks nature? Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables (I.V.) estimations based on a sample of 300 publicly traded firms covering four countries from the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental corporate governance models between 2004 and 2008 show that the answers to the two first questions are a surrounding yes. Robustness check tests relying to the third question provide evidence that pay for luck is asymmetric. 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The institutional determinants of CEO compensation : an international empirical evidence

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