A reply to Mueller (2018) Supply chain collaboration : further insights into incentive alignment in the Beer Game scenario
Purpose: We expand a previous discussion in this journal by proposing a new solution concept, based on game theory, for profit allocation with the aim of aligning incentives in collaborative supply chains. Design/methodology/approach: Through the Gately's notion of propensity to disrupt, we min...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Ponte, Borja [verfasserIn] Fernández, Isabel [verfasserIn] Rosillo, Rafael [verfasserIn] Parreño, José [verfasserIn] García, Nazario [verfasserIn] Müller, David - 1973- [verfasserin des bezugswerks] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2018 |
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| Weitere Ausgabe: |
Kommentar zu Müller, David, 1973 -: A reply to Ponte et al (2016) Supply chain collaboration - 2018 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Journal of industrial engineering and management - Terrassa : Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC), 2008, 11(2018), 3, Seite 535-541 |
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:11 ; year:2018 ; number:3 ; pages:535-541 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.3926/jiem.2671 |
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| Katalog-ID: |
1039859461 |
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10.3926/jiem.2671 doi 10419/188880 hdl (DE-627)1039859461 (DE-599)GBV1039859461 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Ponte, Borja verfasserin aut A reply to Mueller (2018) Supply chain collaboration further insights into incentive alignment in the Beer Game scenario Borja Ponte, Isabel Fernández, Rafael Rosillo, José Parreño, Nazario García 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Purpose: We expand a previous discussion in this journal by proposing a new solution concept, based on game theory, for profit allocation with the aim of aligning incentives in collaborative supply chains. Design/methodology/approach: Through the Gately's notion of propensity to disrupt, we minimize the desire of the nodes to leave the grand coalition in the search of a self-enforcing allocation mechanism. Findings: We discuss the benefits and limitations of this solution in comparison with more established alternatives (e.g. nucleolus and Shapley value). We show that it considers the bargaining power of the nodes, but it may not belong to the core. Originality/value: Finding a fair and self-enforcing scheme for incentive alignment, and specifically profit allocation, is essential to ensure the long-term sustainability of collaborative supply chains. Fernández, Isabel verfasserin (DE-588)1047636158 (DE-627)778717577 (DE-576)401438864 aut Rosillo, Rafael verfasserin aut Parreño, José verfasserin aut García, Nazario verfasserin aut Müller, David 1973- verfasserin des bezugswerks (DE-588)131631799 (DE-627)512030820 (DE-576)298637537 ant Enthalten in Journal of industrial engineering and management Terrassa : Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC), 2008 11(2018), 3, Seite 535-541 Online-Ressource (DE-627)600307298 (DE-600)2495074-9 (DE-576)306841037 2013-0953 nnns volume:11 year:2018 number:3 pages:535-541 Kommentar zu Müller, David, 1973 - A reply to Ponte et al (2016) Supply chain collaboration 2018 (DE-627)103982871X http://hdl.handle.net/10419/188880 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext https://doi.org/10.3926/jiem.2671 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/download/2671/870 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Verlag Terms of use 46 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 11 2018 3 535-541 26 01 0206 1824400926 x1k 06-11-18 26 00 DE-206 56 beer game 26 00 DE-206 56 game theory 26 00 DE-206 56 Gately point 26 00 DE-206 56 incentive alignment 26 00 DE-206 56 profit allocation 26 00 DE-206 56 supply chain collaboration |
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10.3926/jiem.2671 doi 10419/188880 hdl (DE-627)1039859461 (DE-599)GBV1039859461 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Ponte, Borja verfasserin aut A reply to Mueller (2018) Supply chain collaboration further insights into incentive alignment in the Beer Game scenario Borja Ponte, Isabel Fernández, Rafael Rosillo, José Parreño, Nazario García 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Purpose: We expand a previous discussion in this journal by proposing a new solution concept, based on game theory, for profit allocation with the aim of aligning incentives in collaborative supply chains. Design/methodology/approach: Through the Gately's notion of propensity to disrupt, we minimize the desire of the nodes to leave the grand coalition in the search of a self-enforcing allocation mechanism. Findings: We discuss the benefits and limitations of this solution in comparison with more established alternatives (e.g. nucleolus and Shapley value). We show that it considers the bargaining power of the nodes, but it may not belong to the core. Originality/value: Finding a fair and self-enforcing scheme for incentive alignment, and specifically profit allocation, is essential to ensure the long-term sustainability of collaborative supply chains. Fernández, Isabel verfasserin (DE-588)1047636158 (DE-627)778717577 (DE-576)401438864 aut Rosillo, Rafael verfasserin aut Parreño, José verfasserin aut García, Nazario verfasserin aut Müller, David 1973- verfasserin des bezugswerks (DE-588)131631799 (DE-627)512030820 (DE-576)298637537 ant Enthalten in Journal of industrial engineering and management Terrassa : Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC), 2008 11(2018), 3, Seite 535-541 Online-Ressource (DE-627)600307298 (DE-600)2495074-9 (DE-576)306841037 2013-0953 nnns volume:11 year:2018 number:3 pages:535-541 Kommentar zu Müller, David, 1973 - A reply to Ponte et al (2016) Supply chain collaboration 2018 (DE-627)103982871X http://hdl.handle.net/10419/188880 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext https://doi.org/10.3926/jiem.2671 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/download/2671/870 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Verlag Terms of use 46 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 11 2018 3 535-541 26 01 0206 1824400926 x1k 06-11-18 26 00 DE-206 56 beer game 26 00 DE-206 56 game theory 26 00 DE-206 56 Gately point 26 00 DE-206 56 incentive alignment 26 00 DE-206 56 profit allocation 26 00 DE-206 56 supply chain collaboration |
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10.3926/jiem.2671 doi 10419/188880 hdl (DE-627)1039859461 (DE-599)GBV1039859461 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Ponte, Borja verfasserin aut A reply to Mueller (2018) Supply chain collaboration further insights into incentive alignment in the Beer Game scenario Borja Ponte, Isabel Fernández, Rafael Rosillo, José Parreño, Nazario García 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Purpose: We expand a previous discussion in this journal by proposing a new solution concept, based on game theory, for profit allocation with the aim of aligning incentives in collaborative supply chains. Design/methodology/approach: Through the Gately's notion of propensity to disrupt, we minimize the desire of the nodes to leave the grand coalition in the search of a self-enforcing allocation mechanism. Findings: We discuss the benefits and limitations of this solution in comparison with more established alternatives (e.g. nucleolus and Shapley value). We show that it considers the bargaining power of the nodes, but it may not belong to the core. Originality/value: Finding a fair and self-enforcing scheme for incentive alignment, and specifically profit allocation, is essential to ensure the long-term sustainability of collaborative supply chains. Fernández, Isabel verfasserin (DE-588)1047636158 (DE-627)778717577 (DE-576)401438864 aut Rosillo, Rafael verfasserin aut Parreño, José verfasserin aut García, Nazario verfasserin aut Müller, David 1973- verfasserin des bezugswerks (DE-588)131631799 (DE-627)512030820 (DE-576)298637537 ant Enthalten in Journal of industrial engineering and management Terrassa : Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC), 2008 11(2018), 3, Seite 535-541 Online-Ressource (DE-627)600307298 (DE-600)2495074-9 (DE-576)306841037 2013-0953 nnns volume:11 year:2018 number:3 pages:535-541 Kommentar zu Müller, David, 1973 - A reply to Ponte et al (2016) Supply chain collaboration 2018 (DE-627)103982871X http://hdl.handle.net/10419/188880 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext https://doi.org/10.3926/jiem.2671 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/download/2671/870 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Verlag Terms of use 46 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 11 2018 3 535-541 26 01 0206 1824400926 x1k 06-11-18 26 00 DE-206 56 beer game 26 00 DE-206 56 game theory 26 00 DE-206 56 Gately point 26 00 DE-206 56 incentive alignment 26 00 DE-206 56 profit allocation 26 00 DE-206 56 supply chain collaboration |
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10.3926/jiem.2671 doi 10419/188880 hdl (DE-627)1039859461 (DE-599)GBV1039859461 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Ponte, Borja verfasserin aut A reply to Mueller (2018) Supply chain collaboration further insights into incentive alignment in the Beer Game scenario Borja Ponte, Isabel Fernández, Rafael Rosillo, José Parreño, Nazario García 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Purpose: We expand a previous discussion in this journal by proposing a new solution concept, based on game theory, for profit allocation with the aim of aligning incentives in collaborative supply chains. Design/methodology/approach: Through the Gately's notion of propensity to disrupt, we minimize the desire of the nodes to leave the grand coalition in the search of a self-enforcing allocation mechanism. Findings: We discuss the benefits and limitations of this solution in comparison with more established alternatives (e.g. nucleolus and Shapley value). We show that it considers the bargaining power of the nodes, but it may not belong to the core. Originality/value: Finding a fair and self-enforcing scheme for incentive alignment, and specifically profit allocation, is essential to ensure the long-term sustainability of collaborative supply chains. Fernández, Isabel verfasserin (DE-588)1047636158 (DE-627)778717577 (DE-576)401438864 aut Rosillo, Rafael verfasserin aut Parreño, José verfasserin aut García, Nazario verfasserin aut Müller, David 1973- verfasserin des bezugswerks (DE-588)131631799 (DE-627)512030820 (DE-576)298637537 ant Enthalten in Journal of industrial engineering and management Terrassa : Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC), 2008 11(2018), 3, Seite 535-541 Online-Ressource (DE-627)600307298 (DE-600)2495074-9 (DE-576)306841037 2013-0953 nnns volume:11 year:2018 number:3 pages:535-541 Kommentar zu Müller, David, 1973 - A reply to Ponte et al (2016) Supply chain collaboration 2018 (DE-627)103982871X http://hdl.handle.net/10419/188880 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext https://doi.org/10.3926/jiem.2671 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/download/2671/870 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Verlag Terms of use 46 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 11 2018 3 535-541 26 01 0206 1824400926 x1k 06-11-18 26 00 DE-206 56 beer game 26 00 DE-206 56 game theory 26 00 DE-206 56 Gately point 26 00 DE-206 56 incentive alignment 26 00 DE-206 56 profit allocation 26 00 DE-206 56 supply chain collaboration |
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A reply to Mueller (2018) Supply chain collaboration further insights into incentive alignment in the Beer Game scenario |
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A reply to Mueller (2018) Supply chain collaboration further insights into incentive alignment in the Beer Game scenario Borja Ponte, Isabel Fernández, Rafael Rosillo, José Parreño, Nazario García |
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A reply to Mueller (2018) Supply chain collaboration further insights into incentive alignment in the Beer Game scenario |
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Purpose: We expand a previous discussion in this journal by proposing a new solution concept, based on game theory, for profit allocation with the aim of aligning incentives in collaborative supply chains. Design/methodology/approach: Through the Gately's notion of propensity to disrupt, we minimize the desire of the nodes to leave the grand coalition in the search of a self-enforcing allocation mechanism. Findings: We discuss the benefits and limitations of this solution in comparison with more established alternatives (e.g. nucleolus and Shapley value). We show that it considers the bargaining power of the nodes, but it may not belong to the core. Originality/value: Finding a fair and self-enforcing scheme for incentive alignment, and specifically profit allocation, is essential to ensure the long-term sustainability of collaborative supply chains. A reply to Ponte et al (2016) Supply chain collaboration |
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Purpose: We expand a previous discussion in this journal by proposing a new solution concept, based on game theory, for profit allocation with the aim of aligning incentives in collaborative supply chains. Design/methodology/approach: Through the Gately's notion of propensity to disrupt, we minimize the desire of the nodes to leave the grand coalition in the search of a self-enforcing allocation mechanism. Findings: We discuss the benefits and limitations of this solution in comparison with more established alternatives (e.g. nucleolus and Shapley value). We show that it considers the bargaining power of the nodes, but it may not belong to the core. Originality/value: Finding a fair and self-enforcing scheme for incentive alignment, and specifically profit allocation, is essential to ensure the long-term sustainability of collaborative supply chains. A reply to Ponte et al (2016) Supply chain collaboration |
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Purpose: We expand a previous discussion in this journal by proposing a new solution concept, based on game theory, for profit allocation with the aim of aligning incentives in collaborative supply chains. Design/methodology/approach: Through the Gately's notion of propensity to disrupt, we minimize the desire of the nodes to leave the grand coalition in the search of a self-enforcing allocation mechanism. Findings: We discuss the benefits and limitations of this solution in comparison with more established alternatives (e.g. nucleolus and Shapley value). We show that it considers the bargaining power of the nodes, but it may not belong to the core. Originality/value: Finding a fair and self-enforcing scheme for incentive alignment, and specifically profit allocation, is essential to ensure the long-term sustainability of collaborative supply chains. A reply to Ponte et al (2016) Supply chain collaboration |
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