How Does Reasoning (Fail to) Contribute to Moral Judgment? : Dumbfounding and Disengagement

Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other people’s behavior, that moral reasoning is biased an...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Autor*in:

Hindriks, Frank A. [verfasserIn]

Format:

E-Artikel

Sprache:

Englisch

Erschienen:

2015

Schlagwörter:

Cognitive dissonance

Emotion

Moral disengagement

Moral dumbfounding

Moral reasoning

Reason

Übergeordnetes Werk:

Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1998, 18(2015), 2, Seite 237-250

Übergeordnetes Werk:

volume:18 ; year:2015 ; number:2 ; pages:237-250

Links:

Volltext

DOI / URN:

10.1007/s10677-015-9575-7

Katalog-ID:

1565677536

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