Authoritarian regimes and civil-military relations : explaining counterbalancing in autocracies
How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Escribà Folch, Abel [verfasserIn] Böhmelt, Tobias [verfasserIn] Pilster, Ulrich [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2020 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Anmerkung: |
Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 576-579 |
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| Umfang: |
1 Online-Ressource ; Tabellen, Diagramme |
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Conflict management and peace science - Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage, 1980, 37(2020), 5 vom: Sept., Seite 559-580 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:37 ; year:2020 ; number:5 ; month:09 ; pages:559-580 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1177/0738894219836285 |
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| Katalog-ID: |
173246930X |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Authoritarian regimes and civil-military relations |b explaining counterbalancing in autocracies |c Abel Escribà-Folch (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Catalunya, Spain), Tobias Böhmelt (University of Essex, Colchester, UK), Ulrich Pilster (University of Essex, Colchester, UK) |
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| 520 | |a How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations. | ||
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10.1177/0738894219836285 doi (DE-627)173246930X (DE-599)KXP173246930X DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng RS fivr SF07 fivs SF02 fivs Escribà Folch, Abel verfasserin (DE-588)105630281X (DE-627)794578446 (DE-576)412589850 aut Authoritarian regimes and civil-military relations explaining counterbalancing in autocracies Abel Escribà-Folch (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Catalunya, Spain), Tobias Böhmelt (University of Essex, Colchester, UK), Ulrich Pilster (University of Essex, Colchester, UK) 2020 1 Online-Ressource Tabellen, Diagramme Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 576-579 How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations. 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10.1177/0738894219836285 doi (DE-627)173246930X (DE-599)KXP173246930X DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng RS fivr SF07 fivs SF02 fivs Escribà Folch, Abel verfasserin (DE-588)105630281X (DE-627)794578446 (DE-576)412589850 aut Authoritarian regimes and civil-military relations explaining counterbalancing in autocracies Abel Escribà-Folch (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Catalunya, Spain), Tobias Böhmelt (University of Essex, Colchester, UK), Ulrich Pilster (University of Essex, Colchester, UK) 2020 1 Online-Ressource Tabellen, Diagramme Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 576-579 How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations. (DE-588)4046584-6 (DE-627)106197576 (DE-576)209070137 Politisches System gnd (DE-588)4232076-8 (DE-627)104596988 (DE-576)210360801 Autoritarismus gnd (DE-588)4127888-4 (DE-627)105721344 (DE-576)209597410 Innere Sicherheit gnd (DE-588)4182674-7 (DE-627)104570679 (DE-576)21001329X Staatsschutz gnd Böhmelt, Tobias verfasserin (DE-588)1151057894 (DE-627)1011250969 (DE-576)338118179 aut Pilster, Ulrich verfasserin (DE-588)1186091819 (DE-627)1665369175 aut Enthalten in Conflict management and peace science Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage, 1980 37(2020), 5 vom: Sept., Seite 559-580 Online-Ressource (DE-627)387481516 (DE-600)2145757-8 (DE-576)112775640 1549-9219 nnns volume:37 year:2020 number:5 month:09 pages:559-580 https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894219836285 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_2470 ISIL_DE-615 ISIL_DE-F197 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_121 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2036 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2098 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2125 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2145 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2158 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2193 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2705 GBV_ILN_2889 GBV_ILN_2890 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_4753 (DE-627)1756134723 RS Ohne direkten Regionalbezug Ohne direkten Regionalbezug fivr (DE-627)1756135851 SF07 Militär und Gesellschaft/Staat Staat Militär und Gesellschaft/Staat fivs (DE-627)1756135762 SF02 Regierungssystem/Staatsorgane Staat Regierungssystem/Staatsorgane fivs (DE-627)1756185212 (DE-615)6609547 Verhältnis Militär - Gesellschaft fivt (DE-627)1756184992 (DE-615)6609628 Politische Zuverlässigkeit von Streitkräften fivt (DE-627)1756177031 (DE-615)6607483 Regierungssystem fivt (DE-627)1756236860 (DE-615)6604836 Autoritarismus fivt (DE-627)1756211620 (DE-615)6607599 Autoritäre Herrschaft fivt (DE-627)1756195013 (DE-615)6602126 Personalismus fivt (DE-627)1756145407 (DE-615)6603626 Innere Sicherheit fivt (DE-627)1756192383 (DE-615)6609484 Abwehr staatsgefährdender Tätigkeit fivt (DE-627)1756192065 (DE-615)6609693 Staatsschutz fivt AR 37 2020 5 9 559-580 2470 01 DE-615 375398941X 00 --%%-- --%%-- --%%-- --%%-- l01 15-09-20 2470 02 DE-F197 375607613X 00 --%%-- --%%-- --%%-- l l02 16-09-20 2470 01 DE-615 00 DEIBHSFK |
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10.1177/0738894219836285 doi (DE-627)173246930X (DE-599)KXP173246930X DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng RS fivr SF07 fivs SF02 fivs Escribà Folch, Abel verfasserin (DE-588)105630281X (DE-627)794578446 (DE-576)412589850 aut Authoritarian regimes and civil-military relations explaining counterbalancing in autocracies Abel Escribà-Folch (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Catalunya, Spain), Tobias Böhmelt (University of Essex, Colchester, UK), Ulrich Pilster (University of Essex, Colchester, UK) 2020 1 Online-Ressource Tabellen, Diagramme Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 576-579 How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations. (DE-588)4046584-6 (DE-627)106197576 (DE-576)209070137 Politisches System gnd (DE-588)4232076-8 (DE-627)104596988 (DE-576)210360801 Autoritarismus gnd (DE-588)4127888-4 (DE-627)105721344 (DE-576)209597410 Innere Sicherheit gnd (DE-588)4182674-7 (DE-627)104570679 (DE-576)21001329X Staatsschutz gnd Böhmelt, Tobias verfasserin (DE-588)1151057894 (DE-627)1011250969 (DE-576)338118179 aut Pilster, Ulrich verfasserin (DE-588)1186091819 (DE-627)1665369175 aut Enthalten in Conflict management and peace science Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage, 1980 37(2020), 5 vom: Sept., Seite 559-580 Online-Ressource (DE-627)387481516 (DE-600)2145757-8 (DE-576)112775640 1549-9219 nnns volume:37 year:2020 number:5 month:09 pages:559-580 https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894219836285 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_2470 ISIL_DE-615 ISIL_DE-F197 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_121 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2036 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2098 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2125 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2145 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2158 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2193 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2705 GBV_ILN_2889 GBV_ILN_2890 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_4753 (DE-627)1756134723 RS Ohne direkten Regionalbezug Ohne direkten Regionalbezug fivr (DE-627)1756135851 SF07 Militär und Gesellschaft/Staat Staat Militär und Gesellschaft/Staat fivs (DE-627)1756135762 SF02 Regierungssystem/Staatsorgane Staat Regierungssystem/Staatsorgane fivs (DE-627)1756185212 (DE-615)6609547 Verhältnis Militär - Gesellschaft fivt (DE-627)1756184992 (DE-615)6609628 Politische Zuverlässigkeit von Streitkräften fivt (DE-627)1756177031 (DE-615)6607483 Regierungssystem fivt (DE-627)1756236860 (DE-615)6604836 Autoritarismus fivt (DE-627)1756211620 (DE-615)6607599 Autoritäre Herrschaft fivt (DE-627)1756195013 (DE-615)6602126 Personalismus fivt (DE-627)1756145407 (DE-615)6603626 Innere Sicherheit fivt (DE-627)1756192383 (DE-615)6609484 Abwehr staatsgefährdender Tätigkeit fivt (DE-627)1756192065 (DE-615)6609693 Staatsschutz fivt AR 37 2020 5 9 559-580 2470 01 DE-615 375398941X 00 --%%-- --%%-- --%%-- --%%-- l01 15-09-20 2470 02 DE-F197 375607613X 00 --%%-- --%%-- --%%-- l l02 16-09-20 2470 01 DE-615 00 DEIBHSFK |
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10.1177/0738894219836285 doi (DE-627)173246930X (DE-599)KXP173246930X DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng RS fivr SF07 fivs SF02 fivs Escribà Folch, Abel verfasserin (DE-588)105630281X (DE-627)794578446 (DE-576)412589850 aut Authoritarian regimes and civil-military relations explaining counterbalancing in autocracies Abel Escribà-Folch (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Catalunya, Spain), Tobias Böhmelt (University of Essex, Colchester, UK), Ulrich Pilster (University of Essex, Colchester, UK) 2020 1 Online-Ressource Tabellen, Diagramme Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 576-579 How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations. (DE-588)4046584-6 (DE-627)106197576 (DE-576)209070137 Politisches System gnd (DE-588)4232076-8 (DE-627)104596988 (DE-576)210360801 Autoritarismus gnd (DE-588)4127888-4 (DE-627)105721344 (DE-576)209597410 Innere Sicherheit gnd (DE-588)4182674-7 (DE-627)104570679 (DE-576)21001329X Staatsschutz gnd Böhmelt, Tobias verfasserin (DE-588)1151057894 (DE-627)1011250969 (DE-576)338118179 aut Pilster, Ulrich verfasserin (DE-588)1186091819 (DE-627)1665369175 aut Enthalten in Conflict management and peace science Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage, 1980 37(2020), 5 vom: Sept., Seite 559-580 Online-Ressource (DE-627)387481516 (DE-600)2145757-8 (DE-576)112775640 1549-9219 nnns volume:37 year:2020 number:5 month:09 pages:559-580 https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894219836285 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_2470 ISIL_DE-615 ISIL_DE-F197 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_121 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2036 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2070 GBV_ILN_2086 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2098 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2125 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2145 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2158 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2193 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2705 GBV_ILN_2889 GBV_ILN_2890 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_4753 (DE-627)1756134723 RS Ohne direkten Regionalbezug Ohne direkten Regionalbezug fivr (DE-627)1756135851 SF07 Militär und Gesellschaft/Staat Staat Militär und Gesellschaft/Staat fivs (DE-627)1756135762 SF02 Regierungssystem/Staatsorgane Staat Regierungssystem/Staatsorgane fivs (DE-627)1756185212 (DE-615)6609547 Verhältnis Militär - Gesellschaft fivt (DE-627)1756184992 (DE-615)6609628 Politische Zuverlässigkeit von Streitkräften fivt (DE-627)1756177031 (DE-615)6607483 Regierungssystem fivt (DE-627)1756236860 (DE-615)6604836 Autoritarismus fivt (DE-627)1756211620 (DE-615)6607599 Autoritäre Herrschaft fivt (DE-627)1756195013 (DE-615)6602126 Personalismus fivt (DE-627)1756145407 (DE-615)6603626 Innere Sicherheit fivt (DE-627)1756192383 (DE-615)6609484 Abwehr staatsgefährdender Tätigkeit fivt (DE-627)1756192065 (DE-615)6609693 Staatsschutz fivt AR 37 2020 5 9 559-580 2470 01 DE-615 375398941X 00 --%%-- --%%-- --%%-- --%%-- l01 15-09-20 2470 02 DE-F197 375607613X 00 --%%-- --%%-- --%%-- l l02 16-09-20 2470 01 DE-615 00 DEIBHSFK |
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10.1177/0738894219836285 doi (DE-627)173246930X (DE-599)KXP173246930X DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng RS fivr SF07 fivs SF02 fivs Escribà Folch, Abel verfasserin (DE-588)105630281X (DE-627)794578446 (DE-576)412589850 aut Authoritarian regimes and civil-military relations explaining counterbalancing in autocracies Abel Escribà-Folch (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Catalunya, Spain), Tobias Böhmelt (University of Essex, Colchester, UK), Ulrich Pilster (University of Essex, Colchester, UK) 2020 1 Online-Ressource Tabellen, Diagramme Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 576-579 How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations. 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Authoritarian regimes and civil-military relations explaining counterbalancing in autocracies |
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Authoritarian regimes and civil-military relations explaining counterbalancing in autocracies Abel Escribà-Folch (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Catalunya, Spain), Tobias Böhmelt (University of Essex, Colchester, UK), Ulrich Pilster (University of Essex, Colchester, UK) |
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explaining counterbalancing in autocracies |
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authoritarian regimes and civil-military relationsexplaining counterbalancing in autocracies |
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Authoritarian regimes and civil-military relations explaining counterbalancing in autocracies |
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How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations. Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 576-579 |
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How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations. Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 576-579 |
| abstract_unstemmed |
How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations. Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 576-579 |
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Escribà F., Abel Folch, Abel Escribà- Escribà-Folch, Abel Folch, Abel Escribà Escribà, Abel Escribà Folch, Abel Regierungsform Regierungssystem Politisches System Autoritarismus Öffentliche Sicherheit Staatssicherheit Sicherheitspolitik <Innenpolitik> Innere Sicherheit Staatssicherheitsdienst Staatsschutz Böhmelt, Tobias Pilster, Ulrich |
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