Convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in India

The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has been a churning of possible diverse antitrust abuses and, as competition law grapples to incorporate these new market structures, there is another churn that is slowly emerging as a major concern - that of convergence of competition policy and public interest. This is an area in antitrust literature which is yet to receive sufficient attention. The core of antitrust intervention - that competition benefits consumers - is undisputed and perhaps axiomatic but what is not axiomatic is that monopolistic market structures can also lead to enhancing public welfare. Emergent trends towards monopolistic markets suggest a rethink of competition policy and law and their convergence for public interest. The focus of this article is on the importance of convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in new and emergent markets. It raises questions: Is there convergence or divergence between policy and law and public interest? What is public interest? Do consumers represent public interest and, if so, which set of consumers? Are innovation and technological development, which are part of public interest, also in the ambit of competition policy or are they in the realm of competition law? This is another question which has become acute in recent times. In India and the BRICS group, where usage of internet on smart phones is high, the convergence between competition policy, law and public interest suggests antitrust intervention is guided by public interest. Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Gouri, Geeta [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2020

Rechteinformationen:	Open Access Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell - Keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International ; CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Russian journal of economics - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 2015, 6(2020), 3, Seite 277-293
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:6 ; year:2020 ; number:3 ; pages:277-293

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen

DOI / URN:	10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303

Katalog-ID:	1741543150

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allfields	10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 doi (DE-627)1741543150 (DE-599)KXP1741543150 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng K20 K21 K23 jelc Gouri, Geeta verfasserin (DE-588)170738566 (DE-627)060866756 (DE-576)131595253 aut Convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in India Geeta Gouri 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has been a churning of possible diverse antitrust abuses and, as competition law grapples to incorporate these new market structures, there is another churn that is slowly emerging as a major concern - that of convergence of competition policy and public interest. This is an area in antitrust literature which is yet to receive sufficient attention. The core of antitrust intervention - that competition benefits consumers - is undisputed and perhaps axiomatic but what is not axiomatic is that monopolistic market structures can also lead to enhancing public welfare. Emergent trends towards monopolistic markets suggest a rethink of competition policy and law and their convergence for public interest. The focus of this article is on the importance of convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in new and emergent markets. It raises questions: Is there convergence or divergence between policy and law and public interest? What is public interest? Do consumers represent public interest and, if so, which set of consumers? Are innovation and technological development, which are part of public interest, also in the ambit of competition policy or are they in the realm of competition law? This is another question which has become acute in recent times. In India and the BRICS group, where usage of internet on smart phones is high, the convergence between competition policy, law and public interest suggests antitrust intervention is guided by public interest. DE-206 Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell - Keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Enthalten in Russian journal of economics Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 2015 6(2020), 3, Seite 277-293 Online-Ressource (DE-627)83559100X (DE-600)2834987-8 (DE-576)445587393 2405-4739 nnns volume:6 year:2020 number:3 pages:277-293 https://rujec.org/article/51303/download/pdf/455941 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 6 2020 3 277-293 26 01 0206 3815389542 x1z 01-12-20 2403 01 DE-LFER 3831122253 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 06-01-21 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 2403 01 DE-LFER https://rujec.org/article/51303/download/pdf/455941 26 00 DE-206 56 competition policy 26 00 DE-206 56 competition law 26 00 DE-206 56 public interest 26 00 DE-206 56 welfare 26 00 DE-206 56 platform markets 26 00 DE-206 56 market of ideas
spelling	10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 doi (DE-627)1741543150 (DE-599)KXP1741543150 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng K20 K21 K23 jelc Gouri, Geeta verfasserin (DE-588)170738566 (DE-627)060866756 (DE-576)131595253 aut Convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in India Geeta Gouri 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has been a churning of possible diverse antitrust abuses and, as competition law grapples to incorporate these new market structures, there is another churn that is slowly emerging as a major concern - that of convergence of competition policy and public interest. This is an area in antitrust literature which is yet to receive sufficient attention. The core of antitrust intervention - that competition benefits consumers - is undisputed and perhaps axiomatic but what is not axiomatic is that monopolistic market structures can also lead to enhancing public welfare. Emergent trends towards monopolistic markets suggest a rethink of competition policy and law and their convergence for public interest. The focus of this article is on the importance of convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in new and emergent markets. It raises questions: Is there convergence or divergence between policy and law and public interest? What is public interest? Do consumers represent public interest and, if so, which set of consumers? Are innovation and technological development, which are part of public interest, also in the ambit of competition policy or are they in the realm of competition law? This is another question which has become acute in recent times. In India and the BRICS group, where usage of internet on smart phones is high, the convergence between competition policy, law and public interest suggests antitrust intervention is guided by public interest. DE-206 Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell - Keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Enthalten in Russian journal of economics Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 2015 6(2020), 3, Seite 277-293 Online-Ressource (DE-627)83559100X (DE-600)2834987-8 (DE-576)445587393 2405-4739 nnns volume:6 year:2020 number:3 pages:277-293 https://rujec.org/article/51303/download/pdf/455941 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 6 2020 3 277-293 26 01 0206 3815389542 x1z 01-12-20 2403 01 DE-LFER 3831122253 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 06-01-21 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 2403 01 DE-LFER https://rujec.org/article/51303/download/pdf/455941 26 00 DE-206 56 competition policy 26 00 DE-206 56 competition law 26 00 DE-206 56 public interest 26 00 DE-206 56 welfare 26 00 DE-206 56 platform markets 26 00 DE-206 56 market of ideas
allfields_unstemmed	10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 doi (DE-627)1741543150 (DE-599)KXP1741543150 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng K20 K21 K23 jelc Gouri, Geeta verfasserin (DE-588)170738566 (DE-627)060866756 (DE-576)131595253 aut Convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in India Geeta Gouri 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has been a churning of possible diverse antitrust abuses and, as competition law grapples to incorporate these new market structures, there is another churn that is slowly emerging as a major concern - that of convergence of competition policy and public interest. This is an area in antitrust literature which is yet to receive sufficient attention. The core of antitrust intervention - that competition benefits consumers - is undisputed and perhaps axiomatic but what is not axiomatic is that monopolistic market structures can also lead to enhancing public welfare. Emergent trends towards monopolistic markets suggest a rethink of competition policy and law and their convergence for public interest. The focus of this article is on the importance of convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in new and emergent markets. It raises questions: Is there convergence or divergence between policy and law and public interest? What is public interest? Do consumers represent public interest and, if so, which set of consumers? Are innovation and technological development, which are part of public interest, also in the ambit of competition policy or are they in the realm of competition law? This is another question which has become acute in recent times. In India and the BRICS group, where usage of internet on smart phones is high, the convergence between competition policy, law and public interest suggests antitrust intervention is guided by public interest. DE-206 Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell - Keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Enthalten in Russian journal of economics Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 2015 6(2020), 3, Seite 277-293 Online-Ressource (DE-627)83559100X (DE-600)2834987-8 (DE-576)445587393 2405-4739 nnns volume:6 year:2020 number:3 pages:277-293 https://rujec.org/article/51303/download/pdf/455941 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 6 2020 3 277-293 26 01 0206 3815389542 x1z 01-12-20 2403 01 DE-LFER 3831122253 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 06-01-21 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 2403 01 DE-LFER https://rujec.org/article/51303/download/pdf/455941 26 00 DE-206 56 competition policy 26 00 DE-206 56 competition law 26 00 DE-206 56 public interest 26 00 DE-206 56 welfare 26 00 DE-206 56 platform markets 26 00 DE-206 56 market of ideas
allfieldsGer	10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 doi (DE-627)1741543150 (DE-599)KXP1741543150 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng K20 K21 K23 jelc Gouri, Geeta verfasserin (DE-588)170738566 (DE-627)060866756 (DE-576)131595253 aut Convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in India Geeta Gouri 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has been a churning of possible diverse antitrust abuses and, as competition law grapples to incorporate these new market structures, there is another churn that is slowly emerging as a major concern - that of convergence of competition policy and public interest. This is an area in antitrust literature which is yet to receive sufficient attention. The core of antitrust intervention - that competition benefits consumers - is undisputed and perhaps axiomatic but what is not axiomatic is that monopolistic market structures can also lead to enhancing public welfare. Emergent trends towards monopolistic markets suggest a rethink of competition policy and law and their convergence for public interest. The focus of this article is on the importance of convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in new and emergent markets. It raises questions: Is there convergence or divergence between policy and law and public interest? What is public interest? Do consumers represent public interest and, if so, which set of consumers? Are innovation and technological development, which are part of public interest, also in the ambit of competition policy or are they in the realm of competition law? This is another question which has become acute in recent times. In India and the BRICS group, where usage of internet on smart phones is high, the convergence between competition policy, law and public interest suggests antitrust intervention is guided by public interest. DE-206 Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell - Keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Enthalten in Russian journal of economics Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 2015 6(2020), 3, Seite 277-293 Online-Ressource (DE-627)83559100X (DE-600)2834987-8 (DE-576)445587393 2405-4739 nnns volume:6 year:2020 number:3 pages:277-293 https://rujec.org/article/51303/download/pdf/455941 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 6 2020 3 277-293 26 01 0206 3815389542 x1z 01-12-20 2403 01 DE-LFER 3831122253 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 06-01-21 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 2403 01 DE-LFER https://rujec.org/article/51303/download/pdf/455941 26 00 DE-206 56 competition policy 26 00 DE-206 56 competition law 26 00 DE-206 56 public interest 26 00 DE-206 56 welfare 26 00 DE-206 56 platform markets 26 00 DE-206 56 market of ideas
allfieldsSound	10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 doi (DE-627)1741543150 (DE-599)KXP1741543150 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng K20 K21 K23 jelc Gouri, Geeta verfasserin (DE-588)170738566 (DE-627)060866756 (DE-576)131595253 aut Convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in India Geeta Gouri 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has been a churning of possible diverse antitrust abuses and, as competition law grapples to incorporate these new market structures, there is another churn that is slowly emerging as a major concern - that of convergence of competition policy and public interest. This is an area in antitrust literature which is yet to receive sufficient attention. The core of antitrust intervention - that competition benefits consumers - is undisputed and perhaps axiomatic but what is not axiomatic is that monopolistic market structures can also lead to enhancing public welfare. Emergent trends towards monopolistic markets suggest a rethink of competition policy and law and their convergence for public interest. The focus of this article is on the importance of convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in new and emergent markets. It raises questions: Is there convergence or divergence between policy and law and public interest? What is public interest? Do consumers represent public interest and, if so, which set of consumers? Are innovation and technological development, which are part of public interest, also in the ambit of competition policy or are they in the realm of competition law? This is another question which has become acute in recent times. In India and the BRICS group, where usage of internet on smart phones is high, the convergence between competition policy, law and public interest suggests antitrust intervention is guided by public interest. DE-206 Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell - Keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Enthalten in Russian journal of economics Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 2015 6(2020), 3, Seite 277-293 Online-Ressource (DE-627)83559100X (DE-600)2834987-8 (DE-576)445587393 2405-4739 nnns volume:6 year:2020 number:3 pages:277-293 https://rujec.org/article/51303/download/pdf/455941 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 6 2020 3 277-293 26 01 0206 3815389542 x1z 01-12-20 2403 01 DE-LFER 3831122253 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 06-01-21 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.6.51303 2403 01 DE-LFER https://rujec.org/article/51303/download/pdf/455941 26 00 DE-206 56 competition policy 26 00 DE-206 56 competition law 26 00 DE-206 56 public interest 26 00 DE-206 56 welfare 26 00 DE-206 56 platform markets 26 00 DE-206 56 market of ideas
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title_full	Convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in India Geeta Gouri
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title_auth	Convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in India
abstract	The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has been a churning of possible diverse antitrust abuses and, as competition law grapples to incorporate these new market structures, there is another churn that is slowly emerging as a major concern - that of convergence of competition policy and public interest. This is an area in antitrust literature which is yet to receive sufficient attention. The core of antitrust intervention - that competition benefits consumers - is undisputed and perhaps axiomatic but what is not axiomatic is that monopolistic market structures can also lead to enhancing public welfare. Emergent trends towards monopolistic markets suggest a rethink of competition policy and law and their convergence for public interest. The focus of this article is on the importance of convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in new and emergent markets. It raises questions: Is there convergence or divergence between policy and law and public interest? What is public interest? Do consumers represent public interest and, if so, which set of consumers? Are innovation and technological development, which are part of public interest, also in the ambit of competition policy or are they in the realm of competition law? This is another question which has become acute in recent times. In India and the BRICS group, where usage of internet on smart phones is high, the convergence between competition policy, law and public interest suggests antitrust intervention is guided by public interest.
abstractGer	The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has been a churning of possible diverse antitrust abuses and, as competition law grapples to incorporate these new market structures, there is another churn that is slowly emerging as a major concern - that of convergence of competition policy and public interest. This is an area in antitrust literature which is yet to receive sufficient attention. The core of antitrust intervention - that competition benefits consumers - is undisputed and perhaps axiomatic but what is not axiomatic is that monopolistic market structures can also lead to enhancing public welfare. Emergent trends towards monopolistic markets suggest a rethink of competition policy and law and their convergence for public interest. The focus of this article is on the importance of convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in new and emergent markets. It raises questions: Is there convergence or divergence between policy and law and public interest? What is public interest? Do consumers represent public interest and, if so, which set of consumers? Are innovation and technological development, which are part of public interest, also in the ambit of competition policy or are they in the realm of competition law? This is another question which has become acute in recent times. In India and the BRICS group, where usage of internet on smart phones is high, the convergence between competition policy, law and public interest suggests antitrust intervention is guided by public interest.
abstract_unstemmed	The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has been a churning of possible diverse antitrust abuses and, as competition law grapples to incorporate these new market structures, there is another churn that is slowly emerging as a major concern - that of convergence of competition policy and public interest. This is an area in antitrust literature which is yet to receive sufficient attention. The core of antitrust intervention - that competition benefits consumers - is undisputed and perhaps axiomatic but what is not axiomatic is that monopolistic market structures can also lead to enhancing public welfare. Emergent trends towards monopolistic markets suggest a rethink of competition policy and law and their convergence for public interest. The focus of this article is on the importance of convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in new and emergent markets. It raises questions: Is there convergence or divergence between policy and law and public interest? What is public interest? Do consumers represent public interest and, if so, which set of consumers? Are innovation and technological development, which are part of public interest, also in the ambit of competition policy or are they in the realm of competition law? This is another question which has become acute in recent times. In India and the BRICS group, where usage of internet on smart phones is high, the convergence between competition policy, law and public interest suggests antitrust intervention is guided by public interest.
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Convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in India

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