Independent audit committee, risk management committee, and audit fees

This study aims to analyze the role of an independent audit committee on the relationship between the Risk Management Committee (RMC) and audit fees. We use 510 observations from 216 different companies indexed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2014-2016. This study uses ordinary least square anal...
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Autor*in:	Larasati, Dyah Ayu [verfasserIn] Ratri, Melinda Cahyaning [verfasserIn] Nasih, Mohammad [verfasserIn] Harymawan, Iman [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2019

Rechteinformationen:	Open Access Namensnennung 4.0 International ; CC BY 4.0

Schlagwörter:	risk management committee board risk committee independent audit committee audit fees

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Cogent business & management - London : Taylor & Francis, 2014, 6(2019), Artikel-ID 1707042, Seite 1-15
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:6 ; year:2019 ; elocationid:1707042 ; pages:1-15

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen

DOI / URN:	10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042

Katalog-ID:	1771770384

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allfields	10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 doi 10419/244775 hdl (DE-627)1771770384 (DE-599)KXP1771770384 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng G32 G34 jelc Larasati, Dyah Ayu verfasserin aut Independent audit committee, risk management committee, and audit fees Dyah Ayu Larasati, Melinda Cahyaning Ratri, Mohammad Nasih and Iman Harymawan 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 This study aims to analyze the role of an independent audit committee on the relationship between the Risk Management Committee (RMC) and audit fees. We use 510 observations from 216 different companies indexed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2014-2016. This study uses ordinary least square analysis to prove our hypotheses. We find that participation of the independent commissioner as an audit committee member will strengthen the relationship between RMC and audit fee. Consistent with the demand side of audit theory, our study shows that the existence of a stand-alone risk management committee and a more independent commissioner sitting on the audit committee will demand higher audit coverage. As a result, it will increase the audit fee. It occurs since the existence of a more independent audit committees could be able to objectively assess the risk as recommended by the RMC and respond to it by increasing the demand on audit coverage for higher audit quality, and hence increase the fees paid to the external auditor. These findings could contribute to the regulatory bodies in Indonesia in terms of providing empirical evidence on the relationship between board governance structure and audit pricing within non-financial industries companies. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ risk management committee (dpeaa)DE-206 board risk committee (dpeaa)DE-206 independent audit committee (dpeaa)DE-206 audit fees (dpeaa)DE-206 Ratri, Melinda Cahyaning verfasserin (DE-588)1211761541 (DE-627)1700420542 aut Nasih, Mohammad verfasserin (DE-588)1211761444 (DE-627)1700420216 aut Harymawan, Iman verfasserin (DE-588)1168848881 (DE-627)1032623950 (DE-576)511777191 aut Enthalten in Cogent business & management London : Taylor & Francis, 2014 6(2019), Artikel-ID 1707042, Seite 1-15 Online-Ressource (DE-627)837953715 (DE-600)2837523-3 (DE-576)446658456 2331-1975 nnns volume:6 year:2019 elocationid:1707042 pages:1-15 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042?needAccess=true Verlag kostenfrei http://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 Resolving-System kostenfrei http://hdl.handle.net/10419/244775 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 6 2019 1707042 1-15 26 01 0206 3981268180 x1z 24-09-21 2403 01 DE-LFER 3985395918 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 08-10-21 2403 01 DE-LFER http://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042?needAccess=true
spelling	10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 doi 10419/244775 hdl (DE-627)1771770384 (DE-599)KXP1771770384 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng G32 G34 jelc Larasati, Dyah Ayu verfasserin aut Independent audit committee, risk management committee, and audit fees Dyah Ayu Larasati, Melinda Cahyaning Ratri, Mohammad Nasih and Iman Harymawan 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 This study aims to analyze the role of an independent audit committee on the relationship between the Risk Management Committee (RMC) and audit fees. We use 510 observations from 216 different companies indexed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2014-2016. This study uses ordinary least square analysis to prove our hypotheses. We find that participation of the independent commissioner as an audit committee member will strengthen the relationship between RMC and audit fee. Consistent with the demand side of audit theory, our study shows that the existence of a stand-alone risk management committee and a more independent commissioner sitting on the audit committee will demand higher audit coverage. As a result, it will increase the audit fee. It occurs since the existence of a more independent audit committees could be able to objectively assess the risk as recommended by the RMC and respond to it by increasing the demand on audit coverage for higher audit quality, and hence increase the fees paid to the external auditor. These findings could contribute to the regulatory bodies in Indonesia in terms of providing empirical evidence on the relationship between board governance structure and audit pricing within non-financial industries companies. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ risk management committee (dpeaa)DE-206 board risk committee (dpeaa)DE-206 independent audit committee (dpeaa)DE-206 audit fees (dpeaa)DE-206 Ratri, Melinda Cahyaning verfasserin (DE-588)1211761541 (DE-627)1700420542 aut Nasih, Mohammad verfasserin (DE-588)1211761444 (DE-627)1700420216 aut Harymawan, Iman verfasserin (DE-588)1168848881 (DE-627)1032623950 (DE-576)511777191 aut Enthalten in Cogent business & management London : Taylor & Francis, 2014 6(2019), Artikel-ID 1707042, Seite 1-15 Online-Ressource (DE-627)837953715 (DE-600)2837523-3 (DE-576)446658456 2331-1975 nnns volume:6 year:2019 elocationid:1707042 pages:1-15 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042?needAccess=true Verlag kostenfrei http://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 Resolving-System kostenfrei http://hdl.handle.net/10419/244775 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 6 2019 1707042 1-15 26 01 0206 3981268180 x1z 24-09-21 2403 01 DE-LFER 3985395918 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 08-10-21 2403 01 DE-LFER http://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042?needAccess=true
allfields_unstemmed	10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 doi 10419/244775 hdl (DE-627)1771770384 (DE-599)KXP1771770384 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng G32 G34 jelc Larasati, Dyah Ayu verfasserin aut Independent audit committee, risk management committee, and audit fees Dyah Ayu Larasati, Melinda Cahyaning Ratri, Mohammad Nasih and Iman Harymawan 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 This study aims to analyze the role of an independent audit committee on the relationship between the Risk Management Committee (RMC) and audit fees. We use 510 observations from 216 different companies indexed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2014-2016. This study uses ordinary least square analysis to prove our hypotheses. We find that participation of the independent commissioner as an audit committee member will strengthen the relationship between RMC and audit fee. Consistent with the demand side of audit theory, our study shows that the existence of a stand-alone risk management committee and a more independent commissioner sitting on the audit committee will demand higher audit coverage. As a result, it will increase the audit fee. It occurs since the existence of a more independent audit committees could be able to objectively assess the risk as recommended by the RMC and respond to it by increasing the demand on audit coverage for higher audit quality, and hence increase the fees paid to the external auditor. These findings could contribute to the regulatory bodies in Indonesia in terms of providing empirical evidence on the relationship between board governance structure and audit pricing within non-financial industries companies. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ risk management committee (dpeaa)DE-206 board risk committee (dpeaa)DE-206 independent audit committee (dpeaa)DE-206 audit fees (dpeaa)DE-206 Ratri, Melinda Cahyaning verfasserin (DE-588)1211761541 (DE-627)1700420542 aut Nasih, Mohammad verfasserin (DE-588)1211761444 (DE-627)1700420216 aut Harymawan, Iman verfasserin (DE-588)1168848881 (DE-627)1032623950 (DE-576)511777191 aut Enthalten in Cogent business & management London : Taylor & Francis, 2014 6(2019), Artikel-ID 1707042, Seite 1-15 Online-Ressource (DE-627)837953715 (DE-600)2837523-3 (DE-576)446658456 2331-1975 nnns volume:6 year:2019 elocationid:1707042 pages:1-15 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042?needAccess=true Verlag kostenfrei http://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 Resolving-System kostenfrei http://hdl.handle.net/10419/244775 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 6 2019 1707042 1-15 26 01 0206 3981268180 x1z 24-09-21 2403 01 DE-LFER 3985395918 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 08-10-21 2403 01 DE-LFER http://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042?needAccess=true
allfieldsGer	10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 doi 10419/244775 hdl (DE-627)1771770384 (DE-599)KXP1771770384 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng G32 G34 jelc Larasati, Dyah Ayu verfasserin aut Independent audit committee, risk management committee, and audit fees Dyah Ayu Larasati, Melinda Cahyaning Ratri, Mohammad Nasih and Iman Harymawan 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 This study aims to analyze the role of an independent audit committee on the relationship between the Risk Management Committee (RMC) and audit fees. We use 510 observations from 216 different companies indexed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2014-2016. This study uses ordinary least square analysis to prove our hypotheses. We find that participation of the independent commissioner as an audit committee member will strengthen the relationship between RMC and audit fee. Consistent with the demand side of audit theory, our study shows that the existence of a stand-alone risk management committee and a more independent commissioner sitting on the audit committee will demand higher audit coverage. As a result, it will increase the audit fee. It occurs since the existence of a more independent audit committees could be able to objectively assess the risk as recommended by the RMC and respond to it by increasing the demand on audit coverage for higher audit quality, and hence increase the fees paid to the external auditor. These findings could contribute to the regulatory bodies in Indonesia in terms of providing empirical evidence on the relationship between board governance structure and audit pricing within non-financial industries companies. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ risk management committee (dpeaa)DE-206 board risk committee (dpeaa)DE-206 independent audit committee (dpeaa)DE-206 audit fees (dpeaa)DE-206 Ratri, Melinda Cahyaning verfasserin (DE-588)1211761541 (DE-627)1700420542 aut Nasih, Mohammad verfasserin (DE-588)1211761444 (DE-627)1700420216 aut Harymawan, Iman verfasserin (DE-588)1168848881 (DE-627)1032623950 (DE-576)511777191 aut Enthalten in Cogent business & management London : Taylor & Francis, 2014 6(2019), Artikel-ID 1707042, Seite 1-15 Online-Ressource (DE-627)837953715 (DE-600)2837523-3 (DE-576)446658456 2331-1975 nnns volume:6 year:2019 elocationid:1707042 pages:1-15 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042?needAccess=true Verlag kostenfrei http://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 Resolving-System kostenfrei http://hdl.handle.net/10419/244775 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 6 2019 1707042 1-15 26 01 0206 3981268180 x1z 24-09-21 2403 01 DE-LFER 3985395918 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 08-10-21 2403 01 DE-LFER http://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042?needAccess=true
allfieldsSound	10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 doi 10419/244775 hdl (DE-627)1771770384 (DE-599)KXP1771770384 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng G32 G34 jelc Larasati, Dyah Ayu verfasserin aut Independent audit committee, risk management committee, and audit fees Dyah Ayu Larasati, Melinda Cahyaning Ratri, Mohammad Nasih and Iman Harymawan 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 This study aims to analyze the role of an independent audit committee on the relationship between the Risk Management Committee (RMC) and audit fees. We use 510 observations from 216 different companies indexed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2014-2016. This study uses ordinary least square analysis to prove our hypotheses. We find that participation of the independent commissioner as an audit committee member will strengthen the relationship between RMC and audit fee. Consistent with the demand side of audit theory, our study shows that the existence of a stand-alone risk management committee and a more independent commissioner sitting on the audit committee will demand higher audit coverage. As a result, it will increase the audit fee. It occurs since the existence of a more independent audit committees could be able to objectively assess the risk as recommended by the RMC and respond to it by increasing the demand on audit coverage for higher audit quality, and hence increase the fees paid to the external auditor. These findings could contribute to the regulatory bodies in Indonesia in terms of providing empirical evidence on the relationship between board governance structure and audit pricing within non-financial industries companies. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ risk management committee (dpeaa)DE-206 board risk committee (dpeaa)DE-206 independent audit committee (dpeaa)DE-206 audit fees (dpeaa)DE-206 Ratri, Melinda Cahyaning verfasserin (DE-588)1211761541 (DE-627)1700420542 aut Nasih, Mohammad verfasserin (DE-588)1211761444 (DE-627)1700420216 aut Harymawan, Iman verfasserin (DE-588)1168848881 (DE-627)1032623950 (DE-576)511777191 aut Enthalten in Cogent business & management London : Taylor & Francis, 2014 6(2019), Artikel-ID 1707042, Seite 1-15 Online-Ressource (DE-627)837953715 (DE-600)2837523-3 (DE-576)446658456 2331-1975 nnns volume:6 year:2019 elocationid:1707042 pages:1-15 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042?needAccess=true Verlag kostenfrei http://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 Resolving-System kostenfrei http://hdl.handle.net/10419/244775 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 6 2019 1707042 1-15 26 01 0206 3981268180 x1z 24-09-21 2403 01 DE-LFER 3985395918 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 08-10-21 2403 01 DE-LFER http://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042?needAccess=true
language	English
source	Enthalten in Cogent business & management 6(2019), Artikel-ID 1707042, Seite 1-15 volume:6 year:2019 elocationid:1707042 pages:1-15
sourceStr	Enthalten in Cogent business & management 6(2019), Artikel-ID 1707042, Seite 1-15 volume:6 year:2019 elocationid:1707042 pages:1-15
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topic_facet	risk management committee board risk committee independent audit committee audit fees
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container_title	Cogent business & management
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Larasati, Dyah Ayu @@aut@@ Ratri, Melinda Cahyaning @@aut@@ Nasih, Mohammad @@aut@@ Harymawan, Iman @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2019-01-01T00:00:00Z
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title	Independent audit committee, risk management committee, and audit fees
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title_full	Independent audit committee, risk management committee, and audit fees Dyah Ayu Larasati, Melinda Cahyaning Ratri, Mohammad Nasih and Iman Harymawan
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title_auth	Independent audit committee, risk management committee, and audit fees
abstract	This study aims to analyze the role of an independent audit committee on the relationship between the Risk Management Committee (RMC) and audit fees. We use 510 observations from 216 different companies indexed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2014-2016. This study uses ordinary least square analysis to prove our hypotheses. We find that participation of the independent commissioner as an audit committee member will strengthen the relationship between RMC and audit fee. Consistent with the demand side of audit theory, our study shows that the existence of a stand-alone risk management committee and a more independent commissioner sitting on the audit committee will demand higher audit coverage. As a result, it will increase the audit fee. It occurs since the existence of a more independent audit committees could be able to objectively assess the risk as recommended by the RMC and respond to it by increasing the demand on audit coverage for higher audit quality, and hence increase the fees paid to the external auditor. These findings could contribute to the regulatory bodies in Indonesia in terms of providing empirical evidence on the relationship between board governance structure and audit pricing within non-financial industries companies.
abstractGer	This study aims to analyze the role of an independent audit committee on the relationship between the Risk Management Committee (RMC) and audit fees. We use 510 observations from 216 different companies indexed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2014-2016. This study uses ordinary least square analysis to prove our hypotheses. We find that participation of the independent commissioner as an audit committee member will strengthen the relationship between RMC and audit fee. Consistent with the demand side of audit theory, our study shows that the existence of a stand-alone risk management committee and a more independent commissioner sitting on the audit committee will demand higher audit coverage. As a result, it will increase the audit fee. It occurs since the existence of a more independent audit committees could be able to objectively assess the risk as recommended by the RMC and respond to it by increasing the demand on audit coverage for higher audit quality, and hence increase the fees paid to the external auditor. These findings could contribute to the regulatory bodies in Indonesia in terms of providing empirical evidence on the relationship between board governance structure and audit pricing within non-financial industries companies.
abstract_unstemmed	This study aims to analyze the role of an independent audit committee on the relationship between the Risk Management Committee (RMC) and audit fees. We use 510 observations from 216 different companies indexed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2014-2016. This study uses ordinary least square analysis to prove our hypotheses. We find that participation of the independent commissioner as an audit committee member will strengthen the relationship between RMC and audit fee. Consistent with the demand side of audit theory, our study shows that the existence of a stand-alone risk management committee and a more independent commissioner sitting on the audit committee will demand higher audit coverage. As a result, it will increase the audit fee. It occurs since the existence of a more independent audit committees could be able to objectively assess the risk as recommended by the RMC and respond to it by increasing the demand on audit coverage for higher audit quality, and hence increase the fees paid to the external auditor. These findings could contribute to the regulatory bodies in Indonesia in terms of providing empirical evidence on the relationship between board governance structure and audit pricing within non-financial industries companies.
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title_short	Independent audit committee, risk management committee, and audit fees
url	https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042?needAccess=true http://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2019.1707042 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/244775
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