The influence of independence and compensation of the directors on family firms and real earnings management

This study investigates real earnings management in family firms and further examines the moderating effects of the independence and compensation of directors. Based on a sample of 106 non-financial public listed firms over 5 years in Saudi Arabia, the empirical results show that family firms are po...
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Autor*in:	Alhebri, Adeeb Abdulwahab [verfasserIn] Al-Duais, Shaker Dahan [verfasserIn] Almasawa, Amal Mohammed [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2021

Rechteinformationen:	Open Access Namensnennung 4.0 International ; CC BY 4.0

Schlagwörter:	director's compensation directors' independence family firms real earnings management

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Cogent economics & finance - Abingdon : Taylor & Francis, 2014, 9(2021), 1, Artikel-ID 1934977, Seite 1-17
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:9 ; year:2021 ; number:1 ; elocationid:1934977 ; pages:1-17

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen

DOI / URN:	10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977

Katalog-ID:	1800268505

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allfields	10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 doi 10419/270105 hdl (DE-627)1800268505 (DE-599)KXP1800268505 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Alhebri, Adeeb Abdulwahab verfasserin (DE-588)1245464507 (DE-627)1777112052 aut The influence of independence and compensation of the directors on family firms and real earnings management Adeeb Abdulwahab Alhebri, Shaker Dahan Al-Duais and Amal Mohammed Almasawa 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 This study investigates real earnings management in family firms and further examines the moderating effects of the independence and compensation of directors. Based on a sample of 106 non-financial public listed firms over 5 years in Saudi Arabia, the empirical results show that family firms are positively linked to real earnings management. This result supports the entrenchment hypothesis that family firms have lower earnings quality due to manipulation in real activities. Further, we found evidence that the proportion of independent directors and the compensation paid to directors both interacted in family firms to reduce real earnings management. Our findings suggest that increasing the proportion of independent directors and paying higher compensation to directors are one workable way for family firms to mitigate their real earnings management behaviour. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ director's compensation (dpeaa)DE-206 directors' independence (dpeaa)DE-206 family firms (dpeaa)DE-206 real earnings management (dpeaa)DE-206 Al-Duais, Shaker Dahan verfasserin (DE-588)1237276551 (DE-627)1763720330 aut Almasawa, Amal Mohammed verfasserin aut Enthalten in Cogent economics & finance Abingdon : Taylor & Francis, 2014 9(2021), 1, Artikel-ID 1934977, Seite 1-17 Online-Ressource (DE-627)786946385 (DE-600)2773198-4 (DE-576)407862285 2332-2039 nnns volume:9 year:2021 number:1 elocationid:1934977 pages:1-17 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Resolving-System kostenfrei https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epub/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Verlag kostenfrei https://hdl.handle.net/10419/270105 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 9 2021 1 1934977 1-17 26 01 0206 4122556775 x1z 26-04-22 2403 01 DE-LFER 4132987639 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 12-05-22 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977
spelling	10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 doi 10419/270105 hdl (DE-627)1800268505 (DE-599)KXP1800268505 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Alhebri, Adeeb Abdulwahab verfasserin (DE-588)1245464507 (DE-627)1777112052 aut The influence of independence and compensation of the directors on family firms and real earnings management Adeeb Abdulwahab Alhebri, Shaker Dahan Al-Duais and Amal Mohammed Almasawa 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 This study investigates real earnings management in family firms and further examines the moderating effects of the independence and compensation of directors. Based on a sample of 106 non-financial public listed firms over 5 years in Saudi Arabia, the empirical results show that family firms are positively linked to real earnings management. This result supports the entrenchment hypothesis that family firms have lower earnings quality due to manipulation in real activities. Further, we found evidence that the proportion of independent directors and the compensation paid to directors both interacted in family firms to reduce real earnings management. Our findings suggest that increasing the proportion of independent directors and paying higher compensation to directors are one workable way for family firms to mitigate their real earnings management behaviour. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ director's compensation (dpeaa)DE-206 directors' independence (dpeaa)DE-206 family firms (dpeaa)DE-206 real earnings management (dpeaa)DE-206 Al-Duais, Shaker Dahan verfasserin (DE-588)1237276551 (DE-627)1763720330 aut Almasawa, Amal Mohammed verfasserin aut Enthalten in Cogent economics & finance Abingdon : Taylor & Francis, 2014 9(2021), 1, Artikel-ID 1934977, Seite 1-17 Online-Ressource (DE-627)786946385 (DE-600)2773198-4 (DE-576)407862285 2332-2039 nnns volume:9 year:2021 number:1 elocationid:1934977 pages:1-17 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Resolving-System kostenfrei https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epub/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Verlag kostenfrei https://hdl.handle.net/10419/270105 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 9 2021 1 1934977 1-17 26 01 0206 4122556775 x1z 26-04-22 2403 01 DE-LFER 4132987639 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 12-05-22 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977
allfields_unstemmed	10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 doi 10419/270105 hdl (DE-627)1800268505 (DE-599)KXP1800268505 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Alhebri, Adeeb Abdulwahab verfasserin (DE-588)1245464507 (DE-627)1777112052 aut The influence of independence and compensation of the directors on family firms and real earnings management Adeeb Abdulwahab Alhebri, Shaker Dahan Al-Duais and Amal Mohammed Almasawa 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 This study investigates real earnings management in family firms and further examines the moderating effects of the independence and compensation of directors. Based on a sample of 106 non-financial public listed firms over 5 years in Saudi Arabia, the empirical results show that family firms are positively linked to real earnings management. This result supports the entrenchment hypothesis that family firms have lower earnings quality due to manipulation in real activities. Further, we found evidence that the proportion of independent directors and the compensation paid to directors both interacted in family firms to reduce real earnings management. Our findings suggest that increasing the proportion of independent directors and paying higher compensation to directors are one workable way for family firms to mitigate their real earnings management behaviour. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ director's compensation (dpeaa)DE-206 directors' independence (dpeaa)DE-206 family firms (dpeaa)DE-206 real earnings management (dpeaa)DE-206 Al-Duais, Shaker Dahan verfasserin (DE-588)1237276551 (DE-627)1763720330 aut Almasawa, Amal Mohammed verfasserin aut Enthalten in Cogent economics & finance Abingdon : Taylor & Francis, 2014 9(2021), 1, Artikel-ID 1934977, Seite 1-17 Online-Ressource (DE-627)786946385 (DE-600)2773198-4 (DE-576)407862285 2332-2039 nnns volume:9 year:2021 number:1 elocationid:1934977 pages:1-17 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Resolving-System kostenfrei https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epub/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Verlag kostenfrei https://hdl.handle.net/10419/270105 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 9 2021 1 1934977 1-17 26 01 0206 4122556775 x1z 26-04-22 2403 01 DE-LFER 4132987639 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 12-05-22 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977
allfieldsGer	10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 doi 10419/270105 hdl (DE-627)1800268505 (DE-599)KXP1800268505 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Alhebri, Adeeb Abdulwahab verfasserin (DE-588)1245464507 (DE-627)1777112052 aut The influence of independence and compensation of the directors on family firms and real earnings management Adeeb Abdulwahab Alhebri, Shaker Dahan Al-Duais and Amal Mohammed Almasawa 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 This study investigates real earnings management in family firms and further examines the moderating effects of the independence and compensation of directors. Based on a sample of 106 non-financial public listed firms over 5 years in Saudi Arabia, the empirical results show that family firms are positively linked to real earnings management. This result supports the entrenchment hypothesis that family firms have lower earnings quality due to manipulation in real activities. Further, we found evidence that the proportion of independent directors and the compensation paid to directors both interacted in family firms to reduce real earnings management. Our findings suggest that increasing the proportion of independent directors and paying higher compensation to directors are one workable way for family firms to mitigate their real earnings management behaviour. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ director's compensation (dpeaa)DE-206 directors' independence (dpeaa)DE-206 family firms (dpeaa)DE-206 real earnings management (dpeaa)DE-206 Al-Duais, Shaker Dahan verfasserin (DE-588)1237276551 (DE-627)1763720330 aut Almasawa, Amal Mohammed verfasserin aut Enthalten in Cogent economics & finance Abingdon : Taylor & Francis, 2014 9(2021), 1, Artikel-ID 1934977, Seite 1-17 Online-Ressource (DE-627)786946385 (DE-600)2773198-4 (DE-576)407862285 2332-2039 nnns volume:9 year:2021 number:1 elocationid:1934977 pages:1-17 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Resolving-System kostenfrei https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epub/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Verlag kostenfrei https://hdl.handle.net/10419/270105 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 9 2021 1 1934977 1-17 26 01 0206 4122556775 x1z 26-04-22 2403 01 DE-LFER 4132987639 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 12-05-22 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977
allfieldsSound	10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 doi 10419/270105 hdl (DE-627)1800268505 (DE-599)KXP1800268505 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Alhebri, Adeeb Abdulwahab verfasserin (DE-588)1245464507 (DE-627)1777112052 aut The influence of independence and compensation of the directors on family firms and real earnings management Adeeb Abdulwahab Alhebri, Shaker Dahan Al-Duais and Amal Mohammed Almasawa 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 This study investigates real earnings management in family firms and further examines the moderating effects of the independence and compensation of directors. Based on a sample of 106 non-financial public listed firms over 5 years in Saudi Arabia, the empirical results show that family firms are positively linked to real earnings management. This result supports the entrenchment hypothesis that family firms have lower earnings quality due to manipulation in real activities. Further, we found evidence that the proportion of independent directors and the compensation paid to directors both interacted in family firms to reduce real earnings management. Our findings suggest that increasing the proportion of independent directors and paying higher compensation to directors are one workable way for family firms to mitigate their real earnings management behaviour. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ director's compensation (dpeaa)DE-206 directors' independence (dpeaa)DE-206 family firms (dpeaa)DE-206 real earnings management (dpeaa)DE-206 Al-Duais, Shaker Dahan verfasserin (DE-588)1237276551 (DE-627)1763720330 aut Almasawa, Amal Mohammed verfasserin aut Enthalten in Cogent economics & finance Abingdon : Taylor & Francis, 2014 9(2021), 1, Artikel-ID 1934977, Seite 1-17 Online-Ressource (DE-627)786946385 (DE-600)2773198-4 (DE-576)407862285 2332-2039 nnns volume:9 year:2021 number:1 elocationid:1934977 pages:1-17 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Resolving-System kostenfrei https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epub/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 Verlag kostenfrei https://hdl.handle.net/10419/270105 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 9 2021 1 1934977 1-17 26 01 0206 4122556775 x1z 26-04-22 2403 01 DE-LFER 4132987639 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 12-05-22 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977
language	English
source	Enthalten in Cogent economics & finance 9(2021), 1, Artikel-ID 1934977, Seite 1-17 volume:9 year:2021 number:1 elocationid:1934977 pages:1-17
sourceStr	Enthalten in Cogent economics & finance 9(2021), 1, Artikel-ID 1934977, Seite 1-17 volume:9 year:2021 number:1 elocationid:1934977 pages:1-17
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topic_facet	director's compensation directors' independence family firms real earnings management
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container_title	Cogent economics & finance
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Alhebri, Adeeb Abdulwahab @@aut@@ Al-Duais, Shaker Dahan @@aut@@ Almasawa, Amal Mohammed @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2021-01-01T00:00:00Z
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author	Alhebri, Adeeb Abdulwahab
spellingShingle	Alhebri, Adeeb Abdulwahab misc director's compensation misc directors' independence misc family firms misc real earnings management The influence of independence and compensation of the directors on family firms and real earnings management
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topic_title	The influence of independence and compensation of the directors on family firms and real earnings management Adeeb Abdulwahab Alhebri, Shaker Dahan Al-Duais and Amal Mohammed Almasawa director's compensation (dpeaa)DE-206 directors' independence (dpeaa)DE-206 family firms (dpeaa)DE-206 real earnings management (dpeaa)DE-206
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title	The influence of independence and compensation of the directors on family firms and real earnings management
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title_full	The influence of independence and compensation of the directors on family firms and real earnings management Adeeb Abdulwahab Alhebri, Shaker Dahan Al-Duais and Amal Mohammed Almasawa
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title_sort	influence of independence and compensation of the directors on family firms and real earnings management
title_auth	The influence of independence and compensation of the directors on family firms and real earnings management
abstract	This study investigates real earnings management in family firms and further examines the moderating effects of the independence and compensation of directors. Based on a sample of 106 non-financial public listed firms over 5 years in Saudi Arabia, the empirical results show that family firms are positively linked to real earnings management. This result supports the entrenchment hypothesis that family firms have lower earnings quality due to manipulation in real activities. Further, we found evidence that the proportion of independent directors and the compensation paid to directors both interacted in family firms to reduce real earnings management. Our findings suggest that increasing the proportion of independent directors and paying higher compensation to directors are one workable way for family firms to mitigate their real earnings management behaviour.
abstractGer	This study investigates real earnings management in family firms and further examines the moderating effects of the independence and compensation of directors. Based on a sample of 106 non-financial public listed firms over 5 years in Saudi Arabia, the empirical results show that family firms are positively linked to real earnings management. This result supports the entrenchment hypothesis that family firms have lower earnings quality due to manipulation in real activities. Further, we found evidence that the proportion of independent directors and the compensation paid to directors both interacted in family firms to reduce real earnings management. Our findings suggest that increasing the proportion of independent directors and paying higher compensation to directors are one workable way for family firms to mitigate their real earnings management behaviour.
abstract_unstemmed	This study investigates real earnings management in family firms and further examines the moderating effects of the independence and compensation of directors. Based on a sample of 106 non-financial public listed firms over 5 years in Saudi Arabia, the empirical results show that family firms are positively linked to real earnings management. This result supports the entrenchment hypothesis that family firms have lower earnings quality due to manipulation in real activities. Further, we found evidence that the proportion of independent directors and the compensation paid to directors both interacted in family firms to reduce real earnings management. Our findings suggest that increasing the proportion of independent directors and paying higher compensation to directors are one workable way for family firms to mitigate their real earnings management behaviour.
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title_short	The influence of independence and compensation of the directors on family firms and real earnings management
url	https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epub/10.1080/23322039.2021.1934977 https://hdl.handle.net/10419/270105
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The influence of independence and compensation of the directors on family firms and real earnings management

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