Corporate social responsibility and endogenous competition structure in an industry composed of firms with biased managers
Autor*in: |
Nakamura, Yasuhiko [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2022 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: International review of economics - Berlin : Springer, 2007, 69(2022), 2 vom: Juni, Seite 301-321 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:69 ; year:2022 ; number:2 ; month:06 ; pages:301-321 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1007/s12232-022-00393-5 |
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Katalog-ID: |
1844718042 |
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982 | |2 26 |1 00 |x DE-206 |b In this study, we revisit the endogenous choice between price and quantity contracts in a duopoly composed of asymmetric firms engaged in corporate social responsibility (CSR) with possibly biased managers. We find that Cournot competition can change to an equilibrium competition structure regardless of the degree of homogeneity between the goods produced by them and the degree of importance of their CSR. Furthermore, we show that Bertrand competition, in addition to Cournot competition, can be observed in equilibrium when the degrees of importance of CSR between firm owners are sufficiently asymmetric with each other. This result is supported by the manipulation of the types of managers with respect to the biased scale of the demand size in the market by their owners when the degree of importance of their CSR changes. |
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10.1007/s12232-022-00393-5 doi (DE-627)1844718042 (DE-599)KXP1844718042 (DE-He213)s12232-022-00393-5-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Nakamura, Yasuhiko verfasserin (DE-588)1143604970 (DE-627)1002866847 (DE-576)49506355X aut Corporate social responsibility and endogenous competition structure in an industry composed of firms with biased managers Yasuhiko Nakamura 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Aggressiveness (dpeaa)DE-206 Bertrand competition (dpeaa)DE-206 Biased expectations (dpeaa)DE-206 Corporate social responsibility (dpeaa)DE-206 Cournot competition (dpeaa)DE-206 Enthalten in International review of economics Berlin : Springer, 2007 69(2022), 2 vom: Juni, Seite 301-321 Online-Ressource (DE-627)570503671 (DE-600)2432807-8 (DE-576)283120665 1863-4613 nnns volume:69 year:2022 number:2 month:06 pages:301-321 https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12232-022-00393-5.pdf?pdf=button Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-022-00393-5 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 69 2022 2 6 301-321 26 01 0206 4318300382 x1z 05-05-23 26 00 DE-206 In this study, we revisit the endogenous choice between price and quantity contracts in a duopoly composed of asymmetric firms engaged in corporate social responsibility (CSR) with possibly biased managers. We find that Cournot competition can change to an equilibrium competition structure regardless of the degree of homogeneity between the goods produced by them and the degree of importance of their CSR. Furthermore, we show that Bertrand competition, in addition to Cournot competition, can be observed in equilibrium when the degrees of importance of CSR between firm owners are sufficiently asymmetric with each other. This result is supported by the manipulation of the types of managers with respect to the biased scale of the demand size in the market by their owners when the degree of importance of their CSR changes. |
spelling |
10.1007/s12232-022-00393-5 doi (DE-627)1844718042 (DE-599)KXP1844718042 (DE-He213)s12232-022-00393-5-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Nakamura, Yasuhiko verfasserin (DE-588)1143604970 (DE-627)1002866847 (DE-576)49506355X aut Corporate social responsibility and endogenous competition structure in an industry composed of firms with biased managers Yasuhiko Nakamura 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Aggressiveness (dpeaa)DE-206 Bertrand competition (dpeaa)DE-206 Biased expectations (dpeaa)DE-206 Corporate social responsibility (dpeaa)DE-206 Cournot competition (dpeaa)DE-206 Enthalten in International review of economics Berlin : Springer, 2007 69(2022), 2 vom: Juni, Seite 301-321 Online-Ressource (DE-627)570503671 (DE-600)2432807-8 (DE-576)283120665 1863-4613 nnns volume:69 year:2022 number:2 month:06 pages:301-321 https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12232-022-00393-5.pdf?pdf=button Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-022-00393-5 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 69 2022 2 6 301-321 26 01 0206 4318300382 x1z 05-05-23 26 00 DE-206 In this study, we revisit the endogenous choice between price and quantity contracts in a duopoly composed of asymmetric firms engaged in corporate social responsibility (CSR) with possibly biased managers. We find that Cournot competition can change to an equilibrium competition structure regardless of the degree of homogeneity between the goods produced by them and the degree of importance of their CSR. Furthermore, we show that Bertrand competition, in addition to Cournot competition, can be observed in equilibrium when the degrees of importance of CSR between firm owners are sufficiently asymmetric with each other. This result is supported by the manipulation of the types of managers with respect to the biased scale of the demand size in the market by their owners when the degree of importance of their CSR changes. |
allfields_unstemmed |
10.1007/s12232-022-00393-5 doi (DE-627)1844718042 (DE-599)KXP1844718042 (DE-He213)s12232-022-00393-5-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Nakamura, Yasuhiko verfasserin (DE-588)1143604970 (DE-627)1002866847 (DE-576)49506355X aut Corporate social responsibility and endogenous competition structure in an industry composed of firms with biased managers Yasuhiko Nakamura 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Aggressiveness (dpeaa)DE-206 Bertrand competition (dpeaa)DE-206 Biased expectations (dpeaa)DE-206 Corporate social responsibility (dpeaa)DE-206 Cournot competition (dpeaa)DE-206 Enthalten in International review of economics Berlin : Springer, 2007 69(2022), 2 vom: Juni, Seite 301-321 Online-Ressource (DE-627)570503671 (DE-600)2432807-8 (DE-576)283120665 1863-4613 nnns volume:69 year:2022 number:2 month:06 pages:301-321 https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12232-022-00393-5.pdf?pdf=button Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-022-00393-5 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 69 2022 2 6 301-321 26 01 0206 4318300382 x1z 05-05-23 26 00 DE-206 In this study, we revisit the endogenous choice between price and quantity contracts in a duopoly composed of asymmetric firms engaged in corporate social responsibility (CSR) with possibly biased managers. We find that Cournot competition can change to an equilibrium competition structure regardless of the degree of homogeneity between the goods produced by them and the degree of importance of their CSR. Furthermore, we show that Bertrand competition, in addition to Cournot competition, can be observed in equilibrium when the degrees of importance of CSR between firm owners are sufficiently asymmetric with each other. This result is supported by the manipulation of the types of managers with respect to the biased scale of the demand size in the market by their owners when the degree of importance of their CSR changes. |
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Enthalten in International review of economics 69(2022), 2 vom: Juni, Seite 301-321 volume:69 year:2022 number:2 month:06 pages:301-321 |
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Nakamura, Yasuhiko |
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Nakamura, Yasuhiko misc Aggressiveness misc Bertrand competition misc Biased expectations misc Corporate social responsibility misc Cournot competition Corporate social responsibility and endogenous competition structure in an industry composed of firms with biased managers |
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26 00 DE-206 In this study, we revisit the endogenous choice between price and quantity contracts in a duopoly composed of asymmetric firms engaged in corporate social responsibility (CSR) with possibly biased managers. We find that Cournot competition can change to an equilibrium competition structure regardless of the degree of homogeneity between the goods produced by them and the degree of importance of their CSR. Furthermore, we show that Bertrand competition, in addition to Cournot competition, can be observed in equilibrium when the degrees of importance of CSR between firm owners are sufficiently asymmetric with each other. This result is supported by the manipulation of the types of managers with respect to the biased scale of the demand size in the market by their owners when the degree of importance of their CSR changes Corporate social responsibility and endogenous competition structure in an industry composed of firms with biased managers Yasuhiko Nakamura Aggressiveness (dpeaa)DE-206 Bertrand competition (dpeaa)DE-206 Biased expectations (dpeaa)DE-206 Corporate social responsibility (dpeaa)DE-206 Cournot competition (dpeaa)DE-206 |
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Corporate social responsibility and endogenous competition structure in an industry composed of firms with biased managers |
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code="a">GBV_ILN_4393</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">69</subfield><subfield code="j">2022</subfield><subfield code="e">2</subfield><subfield code="c">6</subfield><subfield code="h">301-321</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="980" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">26</subfield><subfield code="1">01</subfield><subfield code="x">0206</subfield><subfield code="b">4318300382</subfield><subfield code="y">x1z</subfield><subfield code="z">05-05-23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="982" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">26</subfield><subfield code="1">00</subfield><subfield code="x">DE-206</subfield><subfield code="b">In this study, we revisit the endogenous choice between price and quantity contracts in a duopoly composed of asymmetric firms engaged in corporate social responsibility (CSR) with possibly biased managers. We find that Cournot competition can change to an equilibrium competition structure regardless of the degree of homogeneity between the goods produced by them and the degree of importance of their CSR. Furthermore, we show that Bertrand competition, in addition to Cournot competition, can be observed in equilibrium when the degrees of importance of CSR between firm owners are sufficiently asymmetric with each other. This result is supported by the manipulation of the types of managers with respect to the biased scale of the demand size in the market by their owners when the degree of importance of their CSR changes.</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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