Academic independent directors and corporate fraud : evidence from China

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Xiang, Rui [verfasserIn] Zhu, Wenyan [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2023

Schlagwörter:	board of directors corporate fraud corporate governance Independent academic director

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Asia-Pacific journal of accounting & economics - Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2000, 30(2023), 2, Seite 285-303
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:30 ; year:2023 ; number:2 ; pages:285-303

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen

DOI / URN:	10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594

Katalog-ID:	1845471962

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allfields	10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 doi (DE-627)1845471962 (DE-599)KXP1845471962 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Xiang, Rui verfasserin (DE-588)1289495068 (DE-627)1845472039 aut Academic independent directors and corporate fraud evidence from China Rui Xiang and Wenyan Zhu 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier board of directors (dpeaa)DE-206 corporate fraud (dpeaa)DE-206 corporate governance (dpeaa)DE-206 Independent academic director (dpeaa)DE-206 Zhu, Wenyan verfasserin (DE-588)1289495157 (DE-627)1845472071 aut Enthalten in Asia-Pacific journal of accounting & economics Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2000 30(2023), 2, Seite 285-303 Online-Ressource (DE-627)71858256X (DE-600)2659021-9 (DE-576)378914545 2164-2257 nnns volume:30 year:2023 number:2 pages:285-303 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 30 2023 2 285-303 AR 30 2023 2 285-303 26 01 0206 4322635830 x1z 16-05-23 26 00 DE-206 This paper examined the effect of academic independent directors on the incidence of corporate fraud in a sample of listed Chinese companies from 2007 to 2017. A significant inhibitory effect on fraudulent activities was found when academic directors were on the board, which was stronger when the academic directors were highly reputable or from legal and accounting backgrounds. Negative relationships between academic directors and the likelihood of fraud commission and positive relationships for the likelihood of fraud detection were also proven. This study highlighted the corporate fraud prevention effect that academic independent directors can have on company operations.
spelling	10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 doi (DE-627)1845471962 (DE-599)KXP1845471962 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Xiang, Rui verfasserin (DE-588)1289495068 (DE-627)1845472039 aut Academic independent directors and corporate fraud evidence from China Rui Xiang and Wenyan Zhu 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier board of directors (dpeaa)DE-206 corporate fraud (dpeaa)DE-206 corporate governance (dpeaa)DE-206 Independent academic director (dpeaa)DE-206 Zhu, Wenyan verfasserin (DE-588)1289495157 (DE-627)1845472071 aut Enthalten in Asia-Pacific journal of accounting & economics Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2000 30(2023), 2, Seite 285-303 Online-Ressource (DE-627)71858256X (DE-600)2659021-9 (DE-576)378914545 2164-2257 nnns volume:30 year:2023 number:2 pages:285-303 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 30 2023 2 285-303 AR 30 2023 2 285-303 26 01 0206 4322635830 x1z 16-05-23 26 00 DE-206 This paper examined the effect of academic independent directors on the incidence of corporate fraud in a sample of listed Chinese companies from 2007 to 2017. A significant inhibitory effect on fraudulent activities was found when academic directors were on the board, which was stronger when the academic directors were highly reputable or from legal and accounting backgrounds. Negative relationships between academic directors and the likelihood of fraud commission and positive relationships for the likelihood of fraud detection were also proven. This study highlighted the corporate fraud prevention effect that academic independent directors can have on company operations.
allfields_unstemmed	10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 doi (DE-627)1845471962 (DE-599)KXP1845471962 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Xiang, Rui verfasserin (DE-588)1289495068 (DE-627)1845472039 aut Academic independent directors and corporate fraud evidence from China Rui Xiang and Wenyan Zhu 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier board of directors (dpeaa)DE-206 corporate fraud (dpeaa)DE-206 corporate governance (dpeaa)DE-206 Independent academic director (dpeaa)DE-206 Zhu, Wenyan verfasserin (DE-588)1289495157 (DE-627)1845472071 aut Enthalten in Asia-Pacific journal of accounting & economics Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2000 30(2023), 2, Seite 285-303 Online-Ressource (DE-627)71858256X (DE-600)2659021-9 (DE-576)378914545 2164-2257 nnns volume:30 year:2023 number:2 pages:285-303 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 30 2023 2 285-303 AR 30 2023 2 285-303 26 01 0206 4322635830 x1z 16-05-23 26 00 DE-206 This paper examined the effect of academic independent directors on the incidence of corporate fraud in a sample of listed Chinese companies from 2007 to 2017. A significant inhibitory effect on fraudulent activities was found when academic directors were on the board, which was stronger when the academic directors were highly reputable or from legal and accounting backgrounds. Negative relationships between academic directors and the likelihood of fraud commission and positive relationships for the likelihood of fraud detection were also proven. This study highlighted the corporate fraud prevention effect that academic independent directors can have on company operations.
allfieldsGer	10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 doi (DE-627)1845471962 (DE-599)KXP1845471962 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Xiang, Rui verfasserin (DE-588)1289495068 (DE-627)1845472039 aut Academic independent directors and corporate fraud evidence from China Rui Xiang and Wenyan Zhu 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier board of directors (dpeaa)DE-206 corporate fraud (dpeaa)DE-206 corporate governance (dpeaa)DE-206 Independent academic director (dpeaa)DE-206 Zhu, Wenyan verfasserin (DE-588)1289495157 (DE-627)1845472071 aut Enthalten in Asia-Pacific journal of accounting & economics Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2000 30(2023), 2, Seite 285-303 Online-Ressource (DE-627)71858256X (DE-600)2659021-9 (DE-576)378914545 2164-2257 nnns volume:30 year:2023 number:2 pages:285-303 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 30 2023 2 285-303 AR 30 2023 2 285-303 26 01 0206 4322635830 x1z 16-05-23 26 00 DE-206 This paper examined the effect of academic independent directors on the incidence of corporate fraud in a sample of listed Chinese companies from 2007 to 2017. A significant inhibitory effect on fraudulent activities was found when academic directors were on the board, which was stronger when the academic directors were highly reputable or from legal and accounting backgrounds. Negative relationships between academic directors and the likelihood of fraud commission and positive relationships for the likelihood of fraud detection were also proven. This study highlighted the corporate fraud prevention effect that academic independent directors can have on company operations.
allfieldsSound	10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 doi (DE-627)1845471962 (DE-599)KXP1845471962 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Xiang, Rui verfasserin (DE-588)1289495068 (DE-627)1845472039 aut Academic independent directors and corporate fraud evidence from China Rui Xiang and Wenyan Zhu 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier board of directors (dpeaa)DE-206 corporate fraud (dpeaa)DE-206 corporate governance (dpeaa)DE-206 Independent academic director (dpeaa)DE-206 Zhu, Wenyan verfasserin (DE-588)1289495157 (DE-627)1845472071 aut Enthalten in Asia-Pacific journal of accounting & economics Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2000 30(2023), 2, Seite 285-303 Online-Ressource (DE-627)71858256X (DE-600)2659021-9 (DE-576)378914545 2164-2257 nnns volume:30 year:2023 number:2 pages:285-303 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2020.1848594 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 30 2023 2 285-303 AR 30 2023 2 285-303 26 01 0206 4322635830 x1z 16-05-23 26 00 DE-206 This paper examined the effect of academic independent directors on the incidence of corporate fraud in a sample of listed Chinese companies from 2007 to 2017. A significant inhibitory effect on fraudulent activities was found when academic directors were on the board, which was stronger when the academic directors were highly reputable or from legal and accounting backgrounds. Negative relationships between academic directors and the likelihood of fraud commission and positive relationships for the likelihood of fraud detection were also proven. This study highlighted the corporate fraud prevention effect that academic independent directors can have on company operations.
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topic_title	26 00 DE-206 This paper examined the effect of academic independent directors on the incidence of corporate fraud in a sample of listed Chinese companies from 2007 to 2017. A significant inhibitory effect on fraudulent activities was found when academic directors were on the board, which was stronger when the academic directors were highly reputable or from legal and accounting backgrounds. Negative relationships between academic directors and the likelihood of fraud commission and positive relationships for the likelihood of fraud detection were also proven. This study highlighted the corporate fraud prevention effect that academic independent directors can have on company operations Academic independent directors and corporate fraud evidence from China Rui Xiang and Wenyan Zhu board of directors (dpeaa)DE-206 corporate fraud (dpeaa)DE-206 corporate governance (dpeaa)DE-206 Independent academic director (dpeaa)DE-206
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title	Academic independent directors and corporate fraud evidence from China
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title_full	Academic independent directors and corporate fraud evidence from China Rui Xiang and Wenyan Zhu
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title_short	Academic independent directors and corporate fraud
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