Declaring income versus declaring taxes in tax compliance experiments : does the design of laboratory experiments affect the results?

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Muehlbacher, Stephan [verfasserIn] Hartmann, Andre [verfasserIn] Kirchler, Erich - 1954- [verfasserIn] Alm, James - 1950- [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2023

Schlagwörter:	audit probability experimental design fine rate Laboratory experiments tax compliance tax rate

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Economic and political studies - [London] : Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2013, 11(2023), 3, Seite 334-349
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:11 ; year:2023 ; number:3 ; pages:334-349

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Supplemental

DOI / URN:	10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244

Katalog-ID:	1854467921

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allfields	10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 doi (DE-627)1854467921 (DE-599)KXP1854467921 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Muehlbacher, Stephan verfasserin aut Declaring income versus declaring taxes in tax compliance experiments does the design of laboratory experiments affect the results? Stephan Muehlbacher, Andre Hartmann, Erich Kirchler and James Alm 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier audit probability (dpeaa)DE-206 experimental design (dpeaa)DE-206 fine rate (dpeaa)DE-206 Laboratory experiments (dpeaa)DE-206 tax compliance (dpeaa)DE-206 tax rate (dpeaa)DE-206 Hartmann, Andre verfasserin (DE-588)1205157808 (DE-627)1690559853 aut Kirchler, Erich 1954- verfasserin (DE-588)11579803X (DE-627)077479955 (DE-576)164719938 aut Alm, James 1950- verfasserin (DE-588)124675190 (DE-627)521529611 (DE-576)294441514 aut Enthalten in Economic and political studies [London] : Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2013 11(2023), 3, Seite 334-349 Online-Ressource (DE-627)745008585 (DE-600)2713711-9 (DE-576)381812138 2470-4024 nnns volume:11 year:2023 number:3 pages:334-349 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Resolving-System kostenfrei https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/suppl/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Resolving-System Supplemental kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 11 2023 3 334-349 26 01 0206 4363525746 x1z 07-08-23 2403 01 DE-LFER 4374533850 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 12-09-23 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 26 00 DE-206 Laboratory experiments are frequently criticised, in part because of the sensitivity of the results to specific features of the design. This paper addresses an important question regarding the key aspect of the experimental environment: How should the dependent variable - participants' choices - be operationalised? For the specific context of laboratory research on income tax compliance, we compare the effects of the two most common operationalisation types: the declaration of gross income versus the declaration of tax payment. It is found that compliance is higher when participants indicate their tax payment than when they declare their income. It is also discovered that the effects of the three policy parameters of the economic model (the tax rate, audit probability and fine rate) are stronger when participants declare their taxes than when they declare their income. These results are relevant for interpreting prior and future experimental evidence on tax compliance and can explain some contradictory previous findings. More broadly, this study suggests that the results of laboratory experiments may depend on specific features of the experimental design, which proposes a strong need for more systematic methodological research.
spelling	10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 doi (DE-627)1854467921 (DE-599)KXP1854467921 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Muehlbacher, Stephan verfasserin aut Declaring income versus declaring taxes in tax compliance experiments does the design of laboratory experiments affect the results? Stephan Muehlbacher, Andre Hartmann, Erich Kirchler and James Alm 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier audit probability (dpeaa)DE-206 experimental design (dpeaa)DE-206 fine rate (dpeaa)DE-206 Laboratory experiments (dpeaa)DE-206 tax compliance (dpeaa)DE-206 tax rate (dpeaa)DE-206 Hartmann, Andre verfasserin (DE-588)1205157808 (DE-627)1690559853 aut Kirchler, Erich 1954- verfasserin (DE-588)11579803X (DE-627)077479955 (DE-576)164719938 aut Alm, James 1950- verfasserin (DE-588)124675190 (DE-627)521529611 (DE-576)294441514 aut Enthalten in Economic and political studies [London] : Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2013 11(2023), 3, Seite 334-349 Online-Ressource (DE-627)745008585 (DE-600)2713711-9 (DE-576)381812138 2470-4024 nnns volume:11 year:2023 number:3 pages:334-349 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Resolving-System kostenfrei https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/suppl/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Resolving-System Supplemental kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 11 2023 3 334-349 26 01 0206 4363525746 x1z 07-08-23 2403 01 DE-LFER 4374533850 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 12-09-23 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 26 00 DE-206 Laboratory experiments are frequently criticised, in part because of the sensitivity of the results to specific features of the design. This paper addresses an important question regarding the key aspect of the experimental environment: How should the dependent variable - participants' choices - be operationalised? For the specific context of laboratory research on income tax compliance, we compare the effects of the two most common operationalisation types: the declaration of gross income versus the declaration of tax payment. It is found that compliance is higher when participants indicate their tax payment than when they declare their income. It is also discovered that the effects of the three policy parameters of the economic model (the tax rate, audit probability and fine rate) are stronger when participants declare their taxes than when they declare their income. These results are relevant for interpreting prior and future experimental evidence on tax compliance and can explain some contradictory previous findings. More broadly, this study suggests that the results of laboratory experiments may depend on specific features of the experimental design, which proposes a strong need for more systematic methodological research.
allfields_unstemmed	10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 doi (DE-627)1854467921 (DE-599)KXP1854467921 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Muehlbacher, Stephan verfasserin aut Declaring income versus declaring taxes in tax compliance experiments does the design of laboratory experiments affect the results? Stephan Muehlbacher, Andre Hartmann, Erich Kirchler and James Alm 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier audit probability (dpeaa)DE-206 experimental design (dpeaa)DE-206 fine rate (dpeaa)DE-206 Laboratory experiments (dpeaa)DE-206 tax compliance (dpeaa)DE-206 tax rate (dpeaa)DE-206 Hartmann, Andre verfasserin (DE-588)1205157808 (DE-627)1690559853 aut Kirchler, Erich 1954- verfasserin (DE-588)11579803X (DE-627)077479955 (DE-576)164719938 aut Alm, James 1950- verfasserin (DE-588)124675190 (DE-627)521529611 (DE-576)294441514 aut Enthalten in Economic and political studies [London] : Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2013 11(2023), 3, Seite 334-349 Online-Ressource (DE-627)745008585 (DE-600)2713711-9 (DE-576)381812138 2470-4024 nnns volume:11 year:2023 number:3 pages:334-349 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Resolving-System kostenfrei https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/suppl/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Resolving-System Supplemental kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 11 2023 3 334-349 26 01 0206 4363525746 x1z 07-08-23 2403 01 DE-LFER 4374533850 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 12-09-23 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 26 00 DE-206 Laboratory experiments are frequently criticised, in part because of the sensitivity of the results to specific features of the design. This paper addresses an important question regarding the key aspect of the experimental environment: How should the dependent variable - participants' choices - be operationalised? For the specific context of laboratory research on income tax compliance, we compare the effects of the two most common operationalisation types: the declaration of gross income versus the declaration of tax payment. It is found that compliance is higher when participants indicate their tax payment than when they declare their income. It is also discovered that the effects of the three policy parameters of the economic model (the tax rate, audit probability and fine rate) are stronger when participants declare their taxes than when they declare their income. These results are relevant for interpreting prior and future experimental evidence on tax compliance and can explain some contradictory previous findings. More broadly, this study suggests that the results of laboratory experiments may depend on specific features of the experimental design, which proposes a strong need for more systematic methodological research.
allfieldsGer	10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 doi (DE-627)1854467921 (DE-599)KXP1854467921 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Muehlbacher, Stephan verfasserin aut Declaring income versus declaring taxes in tax compliance experiments does the design of laboratory experiments affect the results? Stephan Muehlbacher, Andre Hartmann, Erich Kirchler and James Alm 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier audit probability (dpeaa)DE-206 experimental design (dpeaa)DE-206 fine rate (dpeaa)DE-206 Laboratory experiments (dpeaa)DE-206 tax compliance (dpeaa)DE-206 tax rate (dpeaa)DE-206 Hartmann, Andre verfasserin (DE-588)1205157808 (DE-627)1690559853 aut Kirchler, Erich 1954- verfasserin (DE-588)11579803X (DE-627)077479955 (DE-576)164719938 aut Alm, James 1950- verfasserin (DE-588)124675190 (DE-627)521529611 (DE-576)294441514 aut Enthalten in Economic and political studies [London] : Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2013 11(2023), 3, Seite 334-349 Online-Ressource (DE-627)745008585 (DE-600)2713711-9 (DE-576)381812138 2470-4024 nnns volume:11 year:2023 number:3 pages:334-349 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Resolving-System kostenfrei https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/suppl/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Resolving-System Supplemental kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 11 2023 3 334-349 26 01 0206 4363525746 x1z 07-08-23 2403 01 DE-LFER 4374533850 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 12-09-23 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 26 00 DE-206 Laboratory experiments are frequently criticised, in part because of the sensitivity of the results to specific features of the design. This paper addresses an important question regarding the key aspect of the experimental environment: How should the dependent variable - participants' choices - be operationalised? For the specific context of laboratory research on income tax compliance, we compare the effects of the two most common operationalisation types: the declaration of gross income versus the declaration of tax payment. It is found that compliance is higher when participants indicate their tax payment than when they declare their income. It is also discovered that the effects of the three policy parameters of the economic model (the tax rate, audit probability and fine rate) are stronger when participants declare their taxes than when they declare their income. These results are relevant for interpreting prior and future experimental evidence on tax compliance and can explain some contradictory previous findings. More broadly, this study suggests that the results of laboratory experiments may depend on specific features of the experimental design, which proposes a strong need for more systematic methodological research.
allfieldsSound	10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 doi (DE-627)1854467921 (DE-599)KXP1854467921 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Muehlbacher, Stephan verfasserin aut Declaring income versus declaring taxes in tax compliance experiments does the design of laboratory experiments affect the results? Stephan Muehlbacher, Andre Hartmann, Erich Kirchler and James Alm 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier audit probability (dpeaa)DE-206 experimental design (dpeaa)DE-206 fine rate (dpeaa)DE-206 Laboratory experiments (dpeaa)DE-206 tax compliance (dpeaa)DE-206 tax rate (dpeaa)DE-206 Hartmann, Andre verfasserin (DE-588)1205157808 (DE-627)1690559853 aut Kirchler, Erich 1954- verfasserin (DE-588)11579803X (DE-627)077479955 (DE-576)164719938 aut Alm, James 1950- verfasserin (DE-588)124675190 (DE-627)521529611 (DE-576)294441514 aut Enthalten in Economic and political studies [London] : Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2013 11(2023), 3, Seite 334-349 Online-Ressource (DE-627)745008585 (DE-600)2713711-9 (DE-576)381812138 2470-4024 nnns volume:11 year:2023 number:3 pages:334-349 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Resolving-System kostenfrei https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/suppl/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 Resolving-System Supplemental kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 11 2023 3 334-349 26 01 0206 4363525746 x1z 07-08-23 2403 01 DE-LFER 4374533850 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 12-09-23 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 26 00 DE-206 Laboratory experiments are frequently criticised, in part because of the sensitivity of the results to specific features of the design. This paper addresses an important question regarding the key aspect of the experimental environment: How should the dependent variable - participants' choices - be operationalised? For the specific context of laboratory research on income tax compliance, we compare the effects of the two most common operationalisation types: the declaration of gross income versus the declaration of tax payment. It is found that compliance is higher when participants indicate their tax payment than when they declare their income. It is also discovered that the effects of the three policy parameters of the economic model (the tax rate, audit probability and fine rate) are stronger when participants declare their taxes than when they declare their income. These results are relevant for interpreting prior and future experimental evidence on tax compliance and can explain some contradictory previous findings. More broadly, this study suggests that the results of laboratory experiments may depend on specific features of the experimental design, which proposes a strong need for more systematic methodological research.
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topic_title	26 00 DE-206 Laboratory experiments are frequently criticised, in part because of the sensitivity of the results to specific features of the design. This paper addresses an important question regarding the key aspect of the experimental environment: How should the dependent variable - participants' choices - be operationalised? For the specific context of laboratory research on income tax compliance, we compare the effects of the two most common operationalisation types: the declaration of gross income versus the declaration of tax payment. It is found that compliance is higher when participants indicate their tax payment than when they declare their income. It is also discovered that the effects of the three policy parameters of the economic model (the tax rate, audit probability and fine rate) are stronger when participants declare their taxes than when they declare their income. These results are relevant for interpreting prior and future experimental evidence on tax compliance and can explain some contradictory previous findings. More broadly, this study suggests that the results of laboratory experiments may depend on specific features of the experimental design, which proposes a strong need for more systematic methodological research Declaring income versus declaring taxes in tax compliance experiments does the design of laboratory experiments affect the results? Stephan Muehlbacher, Andre Hartmann, Erich Kirchler and James Alm audit probability (dpeaa)DE-206 experimental design (dpeaa)DE-206 fine rate (dpeaa)DE-206 Laboratory experiments (dpeaa)DE-206 tax compliance (dpeaa)DE-206 tax rate (dpeaa)DE-206
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title_full	Declaring income versus declaring taxes in tax compliance experiments does the design of laboratory experiments affect the results? Stephan Muehlbacher, Andre Hartmann, Erich Kirchler and James Alm
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title_short	Declaring income versus declaring taxes in tax compliance experiments
url	https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/suppl/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244
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in</subfield><subfield code="t">Economic and political studies</subfield><subfield code="d">[London] : Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2013</subfield><subfield code="g">11(2023), 3, Seite 334-349</subfield><subfield code="h">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)745008585</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2713711-9</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)381812138</subfield><subfield code="x">2470-4024</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:11</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2023</subfield><subfield code="g">number:3</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:334-349</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield 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"><subfield code="d">11</subfield><subfield code="j">2023</subfield><subfield code="e">3</subfield><subfield code="h">334-349</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="980" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">26</subfield><subfield code="1">01</subfield><subfield code="x">0206</subfield><subfield code="b">4363525746</subfield><subfield code="y">x1z</subfield><subfield code="z">07-08-23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="980" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">2403</subfield><subfield code="1">01</subfield><subfield code="x">DE-LFER</subfield><subfield code="b">4374533850</subfield><subfield code="c">00</subfield><subfield code="f">--%%--</subfield><subfield code="d">--%%--</subfield><subfield code="e">n</subfield><subfield code="j">--%%--</subfield><subfield code="y">l01</subfield><subfield code="z">12-09-23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="981" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">2403</subfield><subfield code="1">01</subfield><subfield code="x">DE-LFER</subfield><subfield code="r">https://doi.org/10.1080/20954816.2022.2121244</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="982" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">26</subfield><subfield code="1">00</subfield><subfield code="x">DE-206</subfield><subfield code="b">Laboratory experiments are frequently criticised, in part because of the sensitivity of the results to specific features of the design. This paper addresses an important question regarding the key aspect of the experimental environment: How should the dependent variable - participants' choices - be operationalised? For the specific context of laboratory research on income tax compliance, we compare the effects of the two most common operationalisation types: the declaration of gross income versus the declaration of tax payment. It is found that compliance is higher when participants indicate their tax payment than when they declare their income. It is also discovered that the effects of the three policy parameters of the economic model (the tax rate, audit probability and fine rate) are stronger when participants declare their taxes than when they declare their income. These results are relevant for interpreting prior and future experimental evidence on tax compliance and can explain some contradictory previous findings. More broadly, this study suggests that the results of laboratory experiments may depend on specific features of the experimental design, which proposes a strong need for more systematic methodological research.</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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Declaring income versus declaring taxes in tax compliance experiments : does the design of laboratory experiments affect the results?

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