On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
MacKenzie, Andrew [verfasserIn] Trudeau, Christian [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
E-Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2023 |
|---|
| Rechteinformationen: |
Open Access Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell 4.0 International ; CC BY-NC 4.0 |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Theoretical economics - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006, 18(2023), 3 vom: Juli, Seite 1181-1223 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:18 ; year:2023 ; number:3 ; month:07 ; pages:1181-1223 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.3982/TE4289A |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
1856110451 |
|---|
| LEADER | 01000caa a2200265 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 1856110451 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20240610133606.0 | ||
| 007 | cr uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 230814s2023 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.3982/TE4289A |2 doi | |
| 024 | 7 | |a 10419/296437 |2 hdl | |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)1856110451 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)KXP1856110451 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rda | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a MacKenzie, Andrew |e verfasserin |0 (DE-588)102749529X |0 (DE-627)729210200 |0 (DE-576)373271034 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion |c Andrew Mackenzie, Christian Trudeau |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2023 | |
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a Computermedien |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Online-Ressource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 506 | 0 | |q DE-206 |a Open Access |e Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights |u http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |
| 520 | |a We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production efficient and envy-free allocations can be implemented in dominant strategies, this can moreover be done while funding production through voluntary payments. | ||
| 540 | |q DE-206 |a Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell 4.0 International |f CC BY-NC 4.0 |2 cc |u https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Costly inclusion |7 (dpeaa)DE-206 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a free-rider problem |7 (dpeaa)DE-206 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Groves mechanism |7 (dpeaa)DE-206 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a labor markets |7 (dpeaa)DE-206 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a pivot mechanism |7 (dpeaa)DE-206 | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Vickrey auction |7 (dpeaa)DE-206 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Trudeau, Christian |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Theoretical economics |d Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006 |g 18(2023), 3 vom: Juli, Seite 1181-1223 |h Online-Ressource |w (DE-627)507184807 |w (DE-600)2220447-7 |w (DE-576)28129948X |x 1555-7561 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:18 |g year:2023 |g number:3 |g month:07 |g pages:1181-1223 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.3982/TE4289A |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A |x Resolving-System |z kostenfrei |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296437 |x Resolving-System |z kostenfrei |
| 912 | |a GBV_USEFLAG_U | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_26 | ||
| 912 | |a ISIL_DE-206 | ||
| 912 | |a SYSFLAG_1 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_KXP | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_11 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_20 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_22 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_23 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_24 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_31 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_39 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_40 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_60 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_62 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_63 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_65 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_69 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_70 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_73 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_95 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_105 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_110 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_151 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_161 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_171 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_184 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_206 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_213 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_224 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_230 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_285 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_293 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_370 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_602 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_636 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2004 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2005 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2006 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2007 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2009 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2010 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2011 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2014 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2026 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2027 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2034 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2037 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2038 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2044 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2048 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2050 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2055 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2056 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2057 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2059 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2061 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2068 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2088 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2106 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2108 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2110 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2111 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2118 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2122 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2129 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2143 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2144 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2147 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2148 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2152 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2232 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2336 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2470 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2507 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2522 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4012 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4035 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4037 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4046 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4112 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4125 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4126 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4242 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4249 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4251 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4305 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4306 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4307 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4313 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4322 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4323 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4324 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4325 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4326 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4333 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4334 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4335 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4336 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4338 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4367 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4700 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2403 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2403 | ||
| 912 | |a ISIL_DE-LFER | ||
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| 952 | |d 18 |j 2023 |e 3 |c 7 |h 1181-1223 | ||
| 980 | |2 26 |1 01 |x 0206 |b 4365905791 |y x1z |z 14-08-23 | ||
| 980 | |2 2403 |1 01 |x DE-LFER |b 4375624027 |c 00 |f --%%-- |d --%%-- |e n |j --%%-- |y l01 |z 13-09-23 | ||
| 981 | |2 2403 |1 01 |x DE-LFER |r https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A | ||
| author_variant |
a m am c t ct |
|---|---|
| matchkey_str |
article:15557561:2023----::nrvsehnssocsl |
| hierarchy_sort_str |
2023 |
| publishDate |
2023 |
| allfields |
10.3982/TE4289A doi 10419/296437 hdl (DE-627)1856110451 (DE-599)KXP1856110451 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng MacKenzie, Andrew verfasserin (DE-588)102749529X (DE-627)729210200 (DE-576)373271034 aut On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion Andrew Mackenzie, Christian Trudeau 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production efficient and envy-free allocations can be implemented in dominant strategies, this can moreover be done while funding production through voluntary payments. DE-206 Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell 4.0 International CC BY-NC 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Costly inclusion (dpeaa)DE-206 free-rider problem (dpeaa)DE-206 Groves mechanism (dpeaa)DE-206 labor markets (dpeaa)DE-206 pivot mechanism (dpeaa)DE-206 Vickrey auction (dpeaa)DE-206 Trudeau, Christian verfasserin aut Enthalten in Theoretical economics Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006 18(2023), 3 vom: Juli, Seite 1181-1223 Online-Ressource (DE-627)507184807 (DE-600)2220447-7 (DE-576)28129948X 1555-7561 nnns volume:18 year:2023 number:3 month:07 pages:1181-1223 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.3982/TE4289A Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A Resolving-System kostenfrei https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296437 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 18 2023 3 7 1181-1223 26 01 0206 4365905791 x1z 14-08-23 2403 01 DE-LFER 4375624027 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 13-09-23 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A |
| spelling |
10.3982/TE4289A doi 10419/296437 hdl (DE-627)1856110451 (DE-599)KXP1856110451 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng MacKenzie, Andrew verfasserin (DE-588)102749529X (DE-627)729210200 (DE-576)373271034 aut On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion Andrew Mackenzie, Christian Trudeau 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production efficient and envy-free allocations can be implemented in dominant strategies, this can moreover be done while funding production through voluntary payments. DE-206 Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell 4.0 International CC BY-NC 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Costly inclusion (dpeaa)DE-206 free-rider problem (dpeaa)DE-206 Groves mechanism (dpeaa)DE-206 labor markets (dpeaa)DE-206 pivot mechanism (dpeaa)DE-206 Vickrey auction (dpeaa)DE-206 Trudeau, Christian verfasserin aut Enthalten in Theoretical economics Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006 18(2023), 3 vom: Juli, Seite 1181-1223 Online-Ressource (DE-627)507184807 (DE-600)2220447-7 (DE-576)28129948X 1555-7561 nnns volume:18 year:2023 number:3 month:07 pages:1181-1223 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.3982/TE4289A Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A Resolving-System kostenfrei https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296437 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 18 2023 3 7 1181-1223 26 01 0206 4365905791 x1z 14-08-23 2403 01 DE-LFER 4375624027 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 13-09-23 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A |
| allfields_unstemmed |
10.3982/TE4289A doi 10419/296437 hdl (DE-627)1856110451 (DE-599)KXP1856110451 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng MacKenzie, Andrew verfasserin (DE-588)102749529X (DE-627)729210200 (DE-576)373271034 aut On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion Andrew Mackenzie, Christian Trudeau 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production efficient and envy-free allocations can be implemented in dominant strategies, this can moreover be done while funding production through voluntary payments. DE-206 Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell 4.0 International CC BY-NC 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Costly inclusion (dpeaa)DE-206 free-rider problem (dpeaa)DE-206 Groves mechanism (dpeaa)DE-206 labor markets (dpeaa)DE-206 pivot mechanism (dpeaa)DE-206 Vickrey auction (dpeaa)DE-206 Trudeau, Christian verfasserin aut Enthalten in Theoretical economics Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006 18(2023), 3 vom: Juli, Seite 1181-1223 Online-Ressource (DE-627)507184807 (DE-600)2220447-7 (DE-576)28129948X 1555-7561 nnns volume:18 year:2023 number:3 month:07 pages:1181-1223 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.3982/TE4289A Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A Resolving-System kostenfrei https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296437 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 18 2023 3 7 1181-1223 26 01 0206 4365905791 x1z 14-08-23 2403 01 DE-LFER 4375624027 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 13-09-23 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A |
| allfieldsGer |
10.3982/TE4289A doi 10419/296437 hdl (DE-627)1856110451 (DE-599)KXP1856110451 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng MacKenzie, Andrew verfasserin (DE-588)102749529X (DE-627)729210200 (DE-576)373271034 aut On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion Andrew Mackenzie, Christian Trudeau 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production efficient and envy-free allocations can be implemented in dominant strategies, this can moreover be done while funding production through voluntary payments. DE-206 Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell 4.0 International CC BY-NC 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Costly inclusion (dpeaa)DE-206 free-rider problem (dpeaa)DE-206 Groves mechanism (dpeaa)DE-206 labor markets (dpeaa)DE-206 pivot mechanism (dpeaa)DE-206 Vickrey auction (dpeaa)DE-206 Trudeau, Christian verfasserin aut Enthalten in Theoretical economics Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006 18(2023), 3 vom: Juli, Seite 1181-1223 Online-Ressource (DE-627)507184807 (DE-600)2220447-7 (DE-576)28129948X 1555-7561 nnns volume:18 year:2023 number:3 month:07 pages:1181-1223 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.3982/TE4289A Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A Resolving-System kostenfrei https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296437 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 18 2023 3 7 1181-1223 26 01 0206 4365905791 x1z 14-08-23 2403 01 DE-LFER 4375624027 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 13-09-23 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A |
| allfieldsSound |
10.3982/TE4289A doi 10419/296437 hdl (DE-627)1856110451 (DE-599)KXP1856110451 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng MacKenzie, Andrew verfasserin (DE-588)102749529X (DE-627)729210200 (DE-576)373271034 aut On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion Andrew Mackenzie, Christian Trudeau 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production efficient and envy-free allocations can be implemented in dominant strategies, this can moreover be done while funding production through voluntary payments. DE-206 Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell 4.0 International CC BY-NC 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Costly inclusion (dpeaa)DE-206 free-rider problem (dpeaa)DE-206 Groves mechanism (dpeaa)DE-206 labor markets (dpeaa)DE-206 pivot mechanism (dpeaa)DE-206 Vickrey auction (dpeaa)DE-206 Trudeau, Christian verfasserin aut Enthalten in Theoretical economics Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006 18(2023), 3 vom: Juli, Seite 1181-1223 Online-Ressource (DE-627)507184807 (DE-600)2220447-7 (DE-576)28129948X 1555-7561 nnns volume:18 year:2023 number:3 month:07 pages:1181-1223 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.3982/TE4289A Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A Resolving-System kostenfrei https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296437 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 18 2023 3 7 1181-1223 26 01 0206 4365905791 x1z 14-08-23 2403 01 DE-LFER 4375624027 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 13-09-23 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A |
| language |
English |
| source |
Enthalten in Theoretical economics 18(2023), 3 vom: Juli, Seite 1181-1223 volume:18 year:2023 number:3 month:07 pages:1181-1223 |
| sourceStr |
Enthalten in Theoretical economics 18(2023), 3 vom: Juli, Seite 1181-1223 volume:18 year:2023 number:3 month:07 pages:1181-1223 |
| format_phy_str_mv |
Article |
| building |
26:1 2403:0 |
| institution |
findex.gbv.de |
| selectbib_iln_str_mv |
26@1z 2403@01 |
| topic_facet |
Costly inclusion free-rider problem Groves mechanism labor markets pivot mechanism Vickrey auction |
| isfreeaccess_bool |
true |
| container_title |
Theoretical economics |
| authorswithroles_txt_mv |
MacKenzie, Andrew @@aut@@ Trudeau, Christian @@aut@@ |
| publishDateDaySort_date |
2023-07-01T00:00:00Z |
| hierarchy_top_id |
507184807 |
| id |
1856110451 |
| language_de |
englisch |
| fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a2200265 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">1856110451</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20240610133606.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230814s2023 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.3982/TE4289A</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10419/296437</subfield><subfield code="2">hdl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)1856110451</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)KXP1856110451</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MacKenzie, Andrew</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)102749529X</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-627)729210200</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-576)373271034</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion</subfield><subfield code="c">Andrew Mackenzie, Christian Trudeau</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2023</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="506" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="q">DE-206</subfield><subfield code="a">Open Access</subfield><subfield code="e">Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights</subfield><subfield code="u">http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production efficient and envy-free allocations can be implemented in dominant strategies, this can moreover be done while funding production through voluntary payments.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="q">DE-206</subfield><subfield code="a">Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell 4.0 International</subfield><subfield code="f">CC BY-NC 4.0</subfield><subfield code="2">cc</subfield><subfield code="u">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Costly inclusion</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">free-rider problem</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Groves mechanism</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">labor markets</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">pivot mechanism</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Vickrey auction</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Trudeau, Christian</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Theoretical economics</subfield><subfield code="d">Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006</subfield><subfield code="g">18(2023), 3 vom: Juli, Seite 1181-1223</subfield><subfield code="h">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)507184807</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2220447-7</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)28129948X</subfield><subfield code="x">1555-7561</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:18</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2023</subfield><subfield code="g">number:3</subfield><subfield code="g">month:07</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:1181-1223</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.3982/TE4289A</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A</subfield><subfield code="x">Resolving-System</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296437</subfield><subfield code="x">Resolving-System</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_U</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ISIL_DE-206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_KXP</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_62</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_65</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_69</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_73</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_95</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_105</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_161</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_171</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_184</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_224</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_230</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_293</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_602</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_636</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2004</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2010</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2026</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2027</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2034</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2038</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2044</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2048</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2050</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2055</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2056</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2057</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2059</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2061</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2068</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2088</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2106</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2108</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2111</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2118</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2122</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2129</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2143</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2144</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2147</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2148</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2152</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2232</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2336</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2470</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2507</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2522</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4035</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4046</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4242</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4249</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4251</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4307</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4322</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4326</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4333</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4334</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4335</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4336</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4367</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2403</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2403</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ISIL_DE-LFER</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">18</subfield><subfield code="j">2023</subfield><subfield code="e">3</subfield><subfield code="c">7</subfield><subfield code="h">1181-1223</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="980" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">26</subfield><subfield code="1">01</subfield><subfield code="x">0206</subfield><subfield code="b">4365905791</subfield><subfield code="y">x1z</subfield><subfield code="z">14-08-23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="980" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">2403</subfield><subfield code="1">01</subfield><subfield code="x">DE-LFER</subfield><subfield code="b">4375624027</subfield><subfield code="c">00</subfield><subfield code="f">--%%--</subfield><subfield code="d">--%%--</subfield><subfield code="e">n</subfield><subfield code="j">--%%--</subfield><subfield code="y">l01</subfield><subfield code="z">13-09-23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="981" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">2403</subfield><subfield code="1">01</subfield><subfield code="x">DE-LFER</subfield><subfield code="r">https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| standort_str_mv |
--%%-- |
| standort_iln_str_mv |
2403:--%%-- DE-LFER:--%%-- |
| author |
MacKenzie, Andrew |
| spellingShingle |
MacKenzie, Andrew misc Costly inclusion misc free-rider problem misc Groves mechanism misc labor markets misc pivot mechanism misc Vickrey auction On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion |
| authorStr |
MacKenzie, Andrew |
| ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv |
@@773@@(DE-627)507184807 |
| format |
electronic Article |
| delete_txt_mv |
keep |
| author_role |
aut aut |
| typewithnormlink_str_mv |
DifferentiatedPerson@(DE-588)102749529X Person@(DE-588)102749529X |
| collection |
KXP GVK SWB |
| remote_str |
true |
| last_changed_iln_str_mv |
26@14-08-23 2403@13-09-23 |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| issn |
1555-7561 |
| topic_title |
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion Andrew Mackenzie, Christian Trudeau Costly inclusion (dpeaa)DE-206 free-rider problem (dpeaa)DE-206 Groves mechanism (dpeaa)DE-206 labor markets (dpeaa)DE-206 pivot mechanism (dpeaa)DE-206 Vickrey auction (dpeaa)DE-206 |
| topic |
misc Costly inclusion misc free-rider problem misc Groves mechanism misc labor markets misc pivot mechanism misc Vickrey auction |
| topic_unstemmed |
misc Costly inclusion misc free-rider problem misc Groves mechanism misc labor markets misc pivot mechanism misc Vickrey auction |
| topic_browse |
misc Costly inclusion misc free-rider problem misc Groves mechanism misc labor markets misc pivot mechanism misc Vickrey auction |
| format_facet |
Elektronische Aufsätze Aufsätze Elektronische Ressource |
| standort_txtP_mv |
--%%-- |
| format_main_str_mv |
Text Zeitschrift/Artikel |
| carriertype_str_mv |
cr |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
Theoretical economics |
| normlinkwithtype_str_mv |
(DE-588)102749529X@DifferentiatedPerson (DE-588)102749529X@Person |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
507184807 |
| signature |
--%%-- |
| signature_str_mv |
--%%-- |
| hierarchy_top_title |
Theoretical economics |
| isfreeaccess_txt |
true |
| familylinks_str_mv |
(DE-627)507184807 (DE-600)2220447-7 (DE-576)28129948X |
| normlinkwithrole_str_mv |
(DE-588)102749529X@@aut@@ |
| title |
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion |
| ctrlnum |
(DE-627)1856110451 (DE-599)KXP1856110451 |
| title_full |
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion Andrew Mackenzie, Christian Trudeau |
| author_sort |
MacKenzie, Andrew |
| journal |
Theoretical economics |
| journalStr |
Theoretical economics |
| callnumber-first-code |
- |
| lang_code |
eng |
| isOA_bool |
true |
| recordtype |
marc |
| publishDateSort |
2023 |
| contenttype_str_mv |
txt |
| container_start_page |
1181 |
| author_browse |
MacKenzie, Andrew Trudeau, Christian |
| selectkey |
26:x 2403:l |
| container_volume |
18 |
| format_se |
Elektronische Aufsätze |
| author-letter |
MacKenzie, Andrew |
| doi_str_mv |
10.3982/TE4289A |
| normlink |
102749529X 729210200 373271034 |
| normlink_prefix_str_mv |
(DE-588)102749529X (DE-627)729210200 (DE-576)373271034 |
| author2-role |
verfasserin |
| title_sort |
on groves mechanisms for costly inclusion |
| title_auth |
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion |
| abstract |
We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production efficient and envy-free allocations can be implemented in dominant strategies, this can moreover be done while funding production through voluntary payments. |
| abstractGer |
We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production efficient and envy-free allocations can be implemented in dominant strategies, this can moreover be done while funding production through voluntary payments. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production efficient and envy-free allocations can be implemented in dominant strategies, this can moreover be done while funding production through voluntary payments. |
| collection_details |
GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER |
| container_issue |
3 |
| title_short |
On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion |
| url |
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.3982/TE4289A https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296437 |
| ausleihindikator_str_mv |
26 2403:n |
| rolewithnormlink_str_mv |
@@aut@@(DE-588)102749529X |
| remote_bool |
true |
| author2 |
Trudeau, Christian |
| author2Str |
Trudeau, Christian |
| ppnlink |
507184807 |
| GND_str_mv |
Mac Kenzie, Andrew Mac Kenzie, Andrew Kenneth Kenzie, Andrew Mac Mackenzie, Andrew MacKenzie, Andrew Kenneth McKenzie, Andrew Kenneth McKenzie, Andrew MacKenzie, Andrew |
| GND_txt_mv |
Mac Kenzie, Andrew Mac Kenzie, Andrew Kenneth Kenzie, Andrew Mac Mackenzie, Andrew MacKenzie, Andrew Kenneth McKenzie, Andrew Kenneth McKenzie, Andrew MacKenzie, Andrew |
| GND_txtF_mv |
Mac Kenzie, Andrew Mac Kenzie, Andrew Kenneth Kenzie, Andrew Mac Mackenzie, Andrew MacKenzie, Andrew Kenneth McKenzie, Andrew Kenneth McKenzie, Andrew MacKenzie, Andrew |
| mediatype_str_mv |
c |
| isOA_txt |
true |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| doi_str |
10.3982/TE4289A |
| callnumber-a |
--%%-- |
| up_date |
2024-07-04T20:49:31.186Z |
| _version_ |
1803683020078579712 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a2200265 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">1856110451</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20240610133606.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230814s2023 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.3982/TE4289A</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10419/296437</subfield><subfield code="2">hdl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)1856110451</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)KXP1856110451</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MacKenzie, Andrew</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)102749529X</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-627)729210200</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-576)373271034</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion</subfield><subfield code="c">Andrew Mackenzie, Christian Trudeau</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2023</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="506" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="q">DE-206</subfield><subfield code="a">Open Access</subfield><subfield code="e">Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights</subfield><subfield code="u">http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that the agents cover the costs through voluntary payments, and (ii) the class of cost functions for which there are envy-free Groves mechanisms. It follows directly from our results that whenever production efficient and envy-free allocations can be implemented in dominant strategies, this can moreover be done while funding production through voluntary payments.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="q">DE-206</subfield><subfield code="a">Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell 4.0 International</subfield><subfield code="f">CC BY-NC 4.0</subfield><subfield code="2">cc</subfield><subfield code="u">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Costly inclusion</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">free-rider problem</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Groves mechanism</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">labor markets</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">pivot mechanism</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Vickrey auction</subfield><subfield code="7">(dpeaa)DE-206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Trudeau, Christian</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Theoretical economics</subfield><subfield code="d">Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], 2006</subfield><subfield code="g">18(2023), 3 vom: Juli, Seite 1181-1223</subfield><subfield code="h">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)507184807</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2220447-7</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)28129948X</subfield><subfield code="x">1555-7561</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:18</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2023</subfield><subfield code="g">number:3</subfield><subfield code="g">month:07</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:1181-1223</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.3982/TE4289A</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A</subfield><subfield code="x">Resolving-System</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296437</subfield><subfield code="x">Resolving-System</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_U</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_26</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ISIL_DE-206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_KXP</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_62</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_65</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_69</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_73</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_95</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_105</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_161</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_171</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_184</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_224</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_230</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_293</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_602</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_636</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2004</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2010</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2026</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2027</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2034</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2038</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2044</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2048</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2050</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2055</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2056</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2057</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2059</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2061</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2068</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2088</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2106</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2108</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2111</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2118</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2122</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2129</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2143</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2144</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2147</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2148</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2152</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2232</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2336</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2470</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2507</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2522</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4035</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4046</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4242</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4249</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4251</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4307</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4322</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4326</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4333</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4334</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4335</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4336</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4367</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2403</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2403</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ISIL_DE-LFER</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">18</subfield><subfield code="j">2023</subfield><subfield code="e">3</subfield><subfield code="c">7</subfield><subfield code="h">1181-1223</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="980" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">26</subfield><subfield code="1">01</subfield><subfield code="x">0206</subfield><subfield code="b">4365905791</subfield><subfield code="y">x1z</subfield><subfield code="z">14-08-23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="980" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">2403</subfield><subfield code="1">01</subfield><subfield code="x">DE-LFER</subfield><subfield code="b">4375624027</subfield><subfield code="c">00</subfield><subfield code="f">--%%--</subfield><subfield code="d">--%%--</subfield><subfield code="e">n</subfield><subfield code="j">--%%--</subfield><subfield code="y">l01</subfield><subfield code="z">13-09-23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="981" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">2403</subfield><subfield code="1">01</subfield><subfield code="x">DE-LFER</subfield><subfield code="r">https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4289A</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| score |
7.4019136 |