Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests
We investigate observed rent dissipation-the ratio of the total costs of rent seeking to the monetary value of the rent-in winner-take-all and share contests, where preferences are more general than usually assumed in the literature. With concave valuation of the rent, we find that contests can exhi...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Dickson, Alex [verfasserIn] Mackenzie, Ian A. [verfasserIn] Sekeris, Petros [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2022 |
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Rechteinformationen: |
Open Access Namensnennung 4.0 International ; CC BY 4.0 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Games - Basel : MDPI, 2010, 13(2022), 6 vom: Dez., Artikel-ID 83, Seite 1-11 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:13 ; year:2022 ; number:6 ; month:12 ; elocationid:83 ; pages:1-11 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.3390/g13060083 |
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Katalog-ID: |
1869732928 |
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10.3390/g13060083 doi (DE-627)1869732928 (DE-599)KXP1869732928 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng C72 D72 H40 jelc Dickson, Alex verfasserin (DE-588)1236853997 (DE-627)1762671417 aut Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests Alex Dickson, Ian A. MacKenzie and Petros G. Sekeris 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 We investigate observed rent dissipation-the ratio of the total costs of rent seeking to the monetary value of the rent-in winner-take-all and share contests, where preferences are more general than usually assumed in the literature. With concave valuation of the rent, we find that contests can exhibit observed over-dissipation if the contested rent is below a threshold and yet observed under-dissipation with large rents: the nature of preferences implies contestants are relatively effortful in contesting small rents. Considering more general preferences in contests thus allows us to reconcile the Tullock paradox-where rent-seeking levels are relatively small despite the contested rent being sizeable-with observed over-dissipation of rents in experimental settings, where contested rents are arguably small. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ rent seeking (dpeaa)DE-206 rent dissipation (dpeaa)DE-206 Tullock contests (dpeaa)DE-206 Mackenzie, Ian A. verfasserin (DE-588)136366864 (DE-627)579548546 (DE-576)300984502 aut Sekeris, Petros verfasserin (DE-588)1169078605 (DE-627)1032718366 (DE-576)511903189 aut Enthalten in Games Basel : MDPI, 2010 13(2022), 6 vom: Dez., Artikel-ID 83, Seite 1-11 Online-Ressource (DE-627)614096553 (DE-600)2527220-2 (DE-576)31395867X 2073-4336 nnns volume:13 year:2022 number:6 month:12 elocationid:83 pages:1-11 https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/13/6/83/pdf?version=1670912261 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060083 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 13 2022 6 12 83 1-11 26 01 0206 4404250894 x1z 08-11-23 2403 01 DE-LFER 4425026039 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 04-12-23 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060083 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/13/6/83/pdf?version=1670912261 |
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10.3390/g13060083 doi (DE-627)1869732928 (DE-599)KXP1869732928 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng C72 D72 H40 jelc Dickson, Alex verfasserin (DE-588)1236853997 (DE-627)1762671417 aut Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests Alex Dickson, Ian A. MacKenzie and Petros G. Sekeris 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 We investigate observed rent dissipation-the ratio of the total costs of rent seeking to the monetary value of the rent-in winner-take-all and share contests, where preferences are more general than usually assumed in the literature. With concave valuation of the rent, we find that contests can exhibit observed over-dissipation if the contested rent is below a threshold and yet observed under-dissipation with large rents: the nature of preferences implies contestants are relatively effortful in contesting small rents. Considering more general preferences in contests thus allows us to reconcile the Tullock paradox-where rent-seeking levels are relatively small despite the contested rent being sizeable-with observed over-dissipation of rents in experimental settings, where contested rents are arguably small. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ rent seeking (dpeaa)DE-206 rent dissipation (dpeaa)DE-206 Tullock contests (dpeaa)DE-206 Mackenzie, Ian A. verfasserin (DE-588)136366864 (DE-627)579548546 (DE-576)300984502 aut Sekeris, Petros verfasserin (DE-588)1169078605 (DE-627)1032718366 (DE-576)511903189 aut Enthalten in Games Basel : MDPI, 2010 13(2022), 6 vom: Dez., Artikel-ID 83, Seite 1-11 Online-Ressource (DE-627)614096553 (DE-600)2527220-2 (DE-576)31395867X 2073-4336 nnns volume:13 year:2022 number:6 month:12 elocationid:83 pages:1-11 https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/13/6/83/pdf?version=1670912261 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060083 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 13 2022 6 12 83 1-11 26 01 0206 4404250894 x1z 08-11-23 2403 01 DE-LFER 4425026039 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 04-12-23 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060083 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/13/6/83/pdf?version=1670912261 |
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10.3390/g13060083 doi (DE-627)1869732928 (DE-599)KXP1869732928 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng C72 D72 H40 jelc Dickson, Alex verfasserin (DE-588)1236853997 (DE-627)1762671417 aut Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests Alex Dickson, Ian A. MacKenzie and Petros G. Sekeris 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 We investigate observed rent dissipation-the ratio of the total costs of rent seeking to the monetary value of the rent-in winner-take-all and share contests, where preferences are more general than usually assumed in the literature. With concave valuation of the rent, we find that contests can exhibit observed over-dissipation if the contested rent is below a threshold and yet observed under-dissipation with large rents: the nature of preferences implies contestants are relatively effortful in contesting small rents. Considering more general preferences in contests thus allows us to reconcile the Tullock paradox-where rent-seeking levels are relatively small despite the contested rent being sizeable-with observed over-dissipation of rents in experimental settings, where contested rents are arguably small. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ rent seeking (dpeaa)DE-206 rent dissipation (dpeaa)DE-206 Tullock contests (dpeaa)DE-206 Mackenzie, Ian A. verfasserin (DE-588)136366864 (DE-627)579548546 (DE-576)300984502 aut Sekeris, Petros verfasserin (DE-588)1169078605 (DE-627)1032718366 (DE-576)511903189 aut Enthalten in Games Basel : MDPI, 2010 13(2022), 6 vom: Dez., Artikel-ID 83, Seite 1-11 Online-Ressource (DE-627)614096553 (DE-600)2527220-2 (DE-576)31395867X 2073-4336 nnns volume:13 year:2022 number:6 month:12 elocationid:83 pages:1-11 https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/13/6/83/pdf?version=1670912261 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060083 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 13 2022 6 12 83 1-11 26 01 0206 4404250894 x1z 08-11-23 2403 01 DE-LFER 4425026039 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 04-12-23 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060083 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/13/6/83/pdf?version=1670912261 |
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10.3390/g13060083 doi (DE-627)1869732928 (DE-599)KXP1869732928 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng C72 D72 H40 jelc Dickson, Alex verfasserin (DE-588)1236853997 (DE-627)1762671417 aut Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests Alex Dickson, Ian A. MacKenzie and Petros G. Sekeris 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 We investigate observed rent dissipation-the ratio of the total costs of rent seeking to the monetary value of the rent-in winner-take-all and share contests, where preferences are more general than usually assumed in the literature. With concave valuation of the rent, we find that contests can exhibit observed over-dissipation if the contested rent is below a threshold and yet observed under-dissipation with large rents: the nature of preferences implies contestants are relatively effortful in contesting small rents. Considering more general preferences in contests thus allows us to reconcile the Tullock paradox-where rent-seeking levels are relatively small despite the contested rent being sizeable-with observed over-dissipation of rents in experimental settings, where contested rents are arguably small. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ rent seeking (dpeaa)DE-206 rent dissipation (dpeaa)DE-206 Tullock contests (dpeaa)DE-206 Mackenzie, Ian A. verfasserin (DE-588)136366864 (DE-627)579548546 (DE-576)300984502 aut Sekeris, Petros verfasserin (DE-588)1169078605 (DE-627)1032718366 (DE-576)511903189 aut Enthalten in Games Basel : MDPI, 2010 13(2022), 6 vom: Dez., Artikel-ID 83, Seite 1-11 Online-Ressource (DE-627)614096553 (DE-600)2527220-2 (DE-576)31395867X 2073-4336 nnns volume:13 year:2022 number:6 month:12 elocationid:83 pages:1-11 https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/13/6/83/pdf?version=1670912261 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060083 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 13 2022 6 12 83 1-11 26 01 0206 4404250894 x1z 08-11-23 2403 01 DE-LFER 4425026039 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 04-12-23 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060083 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/13/6/83/pdf?version=1670912261 |
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Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests Alex Dickson, Ian A. MacKenzie and Petros G. Sekeris |
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Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests |
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We investigate observed rent dissipation-the ratio of the total costs of rent seeking to the monetary value of the rent-in winner-take-all and share contests, where preferences are more general than usually assumed in the literature. With concave valuation of the rent, we find that contests can exhibit observed over-dissipation if the contested rent is below a threshold and yet observed under-dissipation with large rents: the nature of preferences implies contestants are relatively effortful in contesting small rents. Considering more general preferences in contests thus allows us to reconcile the Tullock paradox-where rent-seeking levels are relatively small despite the contested rent being sizeable-with observed over-dissipation of rents in experimental settings, where contested rents are arguably small. |
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We investigate observed rent dissipation-the ratio of the total costs of rent seeking to the monetary value of the rent-in winner-take-all and share contests, where preferences are more general than usually assumed in the literature. With concave valuation of the rent, we find that contests can exhibit observed over-dissipation if the contested rent is below a threshold and yet observed under-dissipation with large rents: the nature of preferences implies contestants are relatively effortful in contesting small rents. Considering more general preferences in contests thus allows us to reconcile the Tullock paradox-where rent-seeking levels are relatively small despite the contested rent being sizeable-with observed over-dissipation of rents in experimental settings, where contested rents are arguably small. |
abstract_unstemmed |
We investigate observed rent dissipation-the ratio of the total costs of rent seeking to the monetary value of the rent-in winner-take-all and share contests, where preferences are more general than usually assumed in the literature. With concave valuation of the rent, we find that contests can exhibit observed over-dissipation if the contested rent is below a threshold and yet observed under-dissipation with large rents: the nature of preferences implies contestants are relatively effortful in contesting small rents. Considering more general preferences in contests thus allows us to reconcile the Tullock paradox-where rent-seeking levels are relatively small despite the contested rent being sizeable-with observed over-dissipation of rents in experimental settings, where contested rents are arguably small. |
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Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests |
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