Games of supplier encroachment channel selection and e-tailer's information sharing

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Tang, Yanli [verfasserIn] Sethi, Suresh P. - 1945- [verfasserIn] Wang, Yulan [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2023

Schlagwörter:	agency channel direct channel information sharing supplier encroachment

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Production and operations management - London : Sage Publications, 1992, 32(2023), 11 vom: Nov., Seite 3650-3664
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:32 ; year:2023 ; number:11 ; month:11 ; pages:3650-3664

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen

DOI / URN:	10.1111/poms.14055

Katalog-ID:	1871311985

Internformat


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912			\|a GBV_ILN_213
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912			\|a GBV_ILN_2006
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912			\|a GBV_ILN_2009
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2010
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2011
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2014
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2015
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2020
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2021
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2025
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2026
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2027
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2031
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912			\|a GBV_ILN_2038
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912			\|a GBV_ILN_2044
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2048
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2049
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912			\|a GBV_ILN_2061
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2064
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2065
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2068
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2088
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912			\|a GBV_ILN_2098
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2106
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2108
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2110
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2111
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2112
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2113
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2118
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2119
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2122
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2129
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2143
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2144
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2147
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2148
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2152
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2153
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2190
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2232
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2336
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2470
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2472
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2507
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2522
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2548
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4035
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4037
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4046
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4112
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4125
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982			\|2 26 \|1 00 \|x DE-206 \|b We consider an e-tailer's upstream supplier who wants to encroach into retailing to earn additional revenue. The supplier needs to decide whether or not to enter the retail market by either selling to consumers on the e-tailer's platform by paying commission fees (agency encroachment) or opening an independent online/offline retail store (direct encroachment). The e-tailer has private demand information and decides whether or not to share it with the supplier. Two leadership scenarios—the supplier-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel before the e-tailer decides whether to share information) and the e-tailer-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel after the e-tailer decides whether to share information)—are examined. Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that the e-tailer has no incentive to share information under no encroachment and direct encroachment. Interestingly, this result holds in both leadership scenarios. Second, a medium commission rate gives rise to an equilibrium of agency encroachment with information sharing by the e-tailer. This equilibrium is more likely to sustain in the supplier-leads scenario than in the e-tailer-leads scenario. Third, agency encroachment brings the supplier the highest sales volume (at retail in the encroaching channel plus on wholesale to the e-tailer) when the two parties compete in quantity while direct encroachment does so for a price competition. Fourth, supplier encroachment always improves consumer surplus, but it is not necessarily welfare-improving. Last, we find that the e-tailer is more willing to share information to induce the supplier to encroach through his agency channel if he has a significant selling cost advantage over the supplier or can endogenously determine the commission rate.

Indexfelder

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matchkey_str	article:19375956:2023----::aeospleecocmncanleetoadties
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publishDate	2023
allfields	10.1111/poms.14055 doi (DE-627)1871311985 (DE-599)KXP1871311985 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Tang, Yanli verfasserin (DE-588)1158528221 (DE-627)1020548142 (DE-576)504133616 aut Games of supplier encroachment channel selection and e-tailer's information sharing Yanli Tang, Suresh P. Sethi, Yulan Wang 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier agency channel (dpeaa)DE-206 direct channel (dpeaa)DE-206 information sharing (dpeaa)DE-206 supplier encroachment (dpeaa)DE-206 Sethi, Suresh P. 1945- verfasserin (DE-588)123987202 (DE-627)085567337 (DE-576)163046913 aut Wang, Yulan verfasserin (DE-588)139556850 (DE-627)61133996X (DE-576)312258933 aut Enthalten in Production and operations management London : Sage Publications, 1992 32(2023), 11 vom: Nov., Seite 3650-3664 Online-Ressource (DE-627)39061310X (DE-600)2151364-8 (DE-576)252417674 1937-5956 nnns volume:32 year:2023 number:11 month:11 pages:3650-3664 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/poms.14055 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14055 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2098 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 32 2023 11 11 3650-3664 26 01 0206 4418530142 x1z 27-11-23 26 00 DE-206 We consider an e-tailer's upstream supplier who wants to encroach into retailing to earn additional revenue. The supplier needs to decide whether or not to enter the retail market by either selling to consumers on the e-tailer's platform by paying commission fees (agency encroachment) or opening an independent online/offline retail store (direct encroachment). The e-tailer has private demand information and decides whether or not to share it with the supplier. Two leadership scenarios—the supplier-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel before the e-tailer decides whether to share information) and the e-tailer-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel after the e-tailer decides whether to share information)—are examined. Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that the e-tailer has no incentive to share information under no encroachment and direct encroachment. Interestingly, this result holds in both leadership scenarios. Second, a medium commission rate gives rise to an equilibrium of agency encroachment with information sharing by the e-tailer. This equilibrium is more likely to sustain in the supplier-leads scenario than in the e-tailer-leads scenario. Third, agency encroachment brings the supplier the highest sales volume (at retail in the encroaching channel plus on wholesale to the e-tailer) when the two parties compete in quantity while direct encroachment does so for a price competition. Fourth, supplier encroachment always improves consumer surplus, but it is not necessarily welfare-improving. Last, we find that the e-tailer is more willing to share information to induce the supplier to encroach through his agency channel if he has a significant selling cost advantage over the supplier or can endogenously determine the commission rate.
spelling	10.1111/poms.14055 doi (DE-627)1871311985 (DE-599)KXP1871311985 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Tang, Yanli verfasserin (DE-588)1158528221 (DE-627)1020548142 (DE-576)504133616 aut Games of supplier encroachment channel selection and e-tailer's information sharing Yanli Tang, Suresh P. Sethi, Yulan Wang 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier agency channel (dpeaa)DE-206 direct channel (dpeaa)DE-206 information sharing (dpeaa)DE-206 supplier encroachment (dpeaa)DE-206 Sethi, Suresh P. 1945- verfasserin (DE-588)123987202 (DE-627)085567337 (DE-576)163046913 aut Wang, Yulan verfasserin (DE-588)139556850 (DE-627)61133996X (DE-576)312258933 aut Enthalten in Production and operations management London : Sage Publications, 1992 32(2023), 11 vom: Nov., Seite 3650-3664 Online-Ressource (DE-627)39061310X (DE-600)2151364-8 (DE-576)252417674 1937-5956 nnns volume:32 year:2023 number:11 month:11 pages:3650-3664 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/poms.14055 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14055 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2098 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 32 2023 11 11 3650-3664 26 01 0206 4418530142 x1z 27-11-23 26 00 DE-206 We consider an e-tailer's upstream supplier who wants to encroach into retailing to earn additional revenue. The supplier needs to decide whether or not to enter the retail market by either selling to consumers on the e-tailer's platform by paying commission fees (agency encroachment) or opening an independent online/offline retail store (direct encroachment). The e-tailer has private demand information and decides whether or not to share it with the supplier. Two leadership scenarios—the supplier-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel before the e-tailer decides whether to share information) and the e-tailer-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel after the e-tailer decides whether to share information)—are examined. Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that the e-tailer has no incentive to share information under no encroachment and direct encroachment. Interestingly, this result holds in both leadership scenarios. Second, a medium commission rate gives rise to an equilibrium of agency encroachment with information sharing by the e-tailer. This equilibrium is more likely to sustain in the supplier-leads scenario than in the e-tailer-leads scenario. Third, agency encroachment brings the supplier the highest sales volume (at retail in the encroaching channel plus on wholesale to the e-tailer) when the two parties compete in quantity while direct encroachment does so for a price competition. Fourth, supplier encroachment always improves consumer surplus, but it is not necessarily welfare-improving. Last, we find that the e-tailer is more willing to share information to induce the supplier to encroach through his agency channel if he has a significant selling cost advantage over the supplier or can endogenously determine the commission rate.
allfields_unstemmed	10.1111/poms.14055 doi (DE-627)1871311985 (DE-599)KXP1871311985 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Tang, Yanli verfasserin (DE-588)1158528221 (DE-627)1020548142 (DE-576)504133616 aut Games of supplier encroachment channel selection and e-tailer's information sharing Yanli Tang, Suresh P. Sethi, Yulan Wang 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier agency channel (dpeaa)DE-206 direct channel (dpeaa)DE-206 information sharing (dpeaa)DE-206 supplier encroachment (dpeaa)DE-206 Sethi, Suresh P. 1945- verfasserin (DE-588)123987202 (DE-627)085567337 (DE-576)163046913 aut Wang, Yulan verfasserin (DE-588)139556850 (DE-627)61133996X (DE-576)312258933 aut Enthalten in Production and operations management London : Sage Publications, 1992 32(2023), 11 vom: Nov., Seite 3650-3664 Online-Ressource (DE-627)39061310X (DE-600)2151364-8 (DE-576)252417674 1937-5956 nnns volume:32 year:2023 number:11 month:11 pages:3650-3664 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/poms.14055 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14055 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2098 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 32 2023 11 11 3650-3664 26 01 0206 4418530142 x1z 27-11-23 26 00 DE-206 We consider an e-tailer's upstream supplier who wants to encroach into retailing to earn additional revenue. The supplier needs to decide whether or not to enter the retail market by either selling to consumers on the e-tailer's platform by paying commission fees (agency encroachment) or opening an independent online/offline retail store (direct encroachment). The e-tailer has private demand information and decides whether or not to share it with the supplier. Two leadership scenarios—the supplier-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel before the e-tailer decides whether to share information) and the e-tailer-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel after the e-tailer decides whether to share information)—are examined. Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that the e-tailer has no incentive to share information under no encroachment and direct encroachment. Interestingly, this result holds in both leadership scenarios. Second, a medium commission rate gives rise to an equilibrium of agency encroachment with information sharing by the e-tailer. This equilibrium is more likely to sustain in the supplier-leads scenario than in the e-tailer-leads scenario. Third, agency encroachment brings the supplier the highest sales volume (at retail in the encroaching channel plus on wholesale to the e-tailer) when the two parties compete in quantity while direct encroachment does so for a price competition. Fourth, supplier encroachment always improves consumer surplus, but it is not necessarily welfare-improving. Last, we find that the e-tailer is more willing to share information to induce the supplier to encroach through his agency channel if he has a significant selling cost advantage over the supplier or can endogenously determine the commission rate.
allfieldsGer	10.1111/poms.14055 doi (DE-627)1871311985 (DE-599)KXP1871311985 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Tang, Yanli verfasserin (DE-588)1158528221 (DE-627)1020548142 (DE-576)504133616 aut Games of supplier encroachment channel selection and e-tailer's information sharing Yanli Tang, Suresh P. Sethi, Yulan Wang 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier agency channel (dpeaa)DE-206 direct channel (dpeaa)DE-206 information sharing (dpeaa)DE-206 supplier encroachment (dpeaa)DE-206 Sethi, Suresh P. 1945- verfasserin (DE-588)123987202 (DE-627)085567337 (DE-576)163046913 aut Wang, Yulan verfasserin (DE-588)139556850 (DE-627)61133996X (DE-576)312258933 aut Enthalten in Production and operations management London : Sage Publications, 1992 32(2023), 11 vom: Nov., Seite 3650-3664 Online-Ressource (DE-627)39061310X (DE-600)2151364-8 (DE-576)252417674 1937-5956 nnns volume:32 year:2023 number:11 month:11 pages:3650-3664 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/poms.14055 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14055 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2098 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 32 2023 11 11 3650-3664 26 01 0206 4418530142 x1z 27-11-23 26 00 DE-206 We consider an e-tailer's upstream supplier who wants to encroach into retailing to earn additional revenue. The supplier needs to decide whether or not to enter the retail market by either selling to consumers on the e-tailer's platform by paying commission fees (agency encroachment) or opening an independent online/offline retail store (direct encroachment). The e-tailer has private demand information and decides whether or not to share it with the supplier. Two leadership scenarios—the supplier-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel before the e-tailer decides whether to share information) and the e-tailer-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel after the e-tailer decides whether to share information)—are examined. Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that the e-tailer has no incentive to share information under no encroachment and direct encroachment. Interestingly, this result holds in both leadership scenarios. Second, a medium commission rate gives rise to an equilibrium of agency encroachment with information sharing by the e-tailer. This equilibrium is more likely to sustain in the supplier-leads scenario than in the e-tailer-leads scenario. Third, agency encroachment brings the supplier the highest sales volume (at retail in the encroaching channel plus on wholesale to the e-tailer) when the two parties compete in quantity while direct encroachment does so for a price competition. Fourth, supplier encroachment always improves consumer surplus, but it is not necessarily welfare-improving. Last, we find that the e-tailer is more willing to share information to induce the supplier to encroach through his agency channel if he has a significant selling cost advantage over the supplier or can endogenously determine the commission rate.
allfieldsSound	10.1111/poms.14055 doi (DE-627)1871311985 (DE-599)KXP1871311985 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Tang, Yanli verfasserin (DE-588)1158528221 (DE-627)1020548142 (DE-576)504133616 aut Games of supplier encroachment channel selection and e-tailer's information sharing Yanli Tang, Suresh P. Sethi, Yulan Wang 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier agency channel (dpeaa)DE-206 direct channel (dpeaa)DE-206 information sharing (dpeaa)DE-206 supplier encroachment (dpeaa)DE-206 Sethi, Suresh P. 1945- verfasserin (DE-588)123987202 (DE-627)085567337 (DE-576)163046913 aut Wang, Yulan verfasserin (DE-588)139556850 (DE-627)61133996X (DE-576)312258933 aut Enthalten in Production and operations management London : Sage Publications, 1992 32(2023), 11 vom: Nov., Seite 3650-3664 Online-Ressource (DE-627)39061310X (DE-600)2151364-8 (DE-576)252417674 1937-5956 nnns volume:32 year:2023 number:11 month:11 pages:3650-3664 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/poms.14055 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14055 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_266 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2039 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2098 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2144 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 32 2023 11 11 3650-3664 26 01 0206 4418530142 x1z 27-11-23 26 00 DE-206 We consider an e-tailer's upstream supplier who wants to encroach into retailing to earn additional revenue. The supplier needs to decide whether or not to enter the retail market by either selling to consumers on the e-tailer's platform by paying commission fees (agency encroachment) or opening an independent online/offline retail store (direct encroachment). The e-tailer has private demand information and decides whether or not to share it with the supplier. Two leadership scenarios—the supplier-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel before the e-tailer decides whether to share information) and the e-tailer-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel after the e-tailer decides whether to share information)—are examined. Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that the e-tailer has no incentive to share information under no encroachment and direct encroachment. Interestingly, this result holds in both leadership scenarios. Second, a medium commission rate gives rise to an equilibrium of agency encroachment with information sharing by the e-tailer. This equilibrium is more likely to sustain in the supplier-leads scenario than in the e-tailer-leads scenario. Third, agency encroachment brings the supplier the highest sales volume (at retail in the encroaching channel plus on wholesale to the e-tailer) when the two parties compete in quantity while direct encroachment does so for a price competition. Fourth, supplier encroachment always improves consumer surplus, but it is not necessarily welfare-improving. Last, we find that the e-tailer is more willing to share information to induce the supplier to encroach through his agency channel if he has a significant selling cost advantage over the supplier or can endogenously determine the commission rate.
language	English
source	Enthalten in Production and operations management 32(2023), 11 vom: Nov., Seite 3650-3664 volume:32 year:2023 number:11 month:11 pages:3650-3664
sourceStr	Enthalten in Production and operations management 32(2023), 11 vom: Nov., Seite 3650-3664 volume:32 year:2023 number:11 month:11 pages:3650-3664
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topic_facet	agency channel direct channel information sharing supplier encroachment
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isfreeaccess_bool	false
container_title	Production and operations management
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Tang, Yanli @@aut@@ Sethi, Suresh P. @@aut@@ Wang, Yulan @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2023-11-01T00:00:00Z
hierarchy_top_id	39061310X
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language_de	englisch
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The supplier needs to decide whether or not to enter the retail market by either selling to consumers on the e-tailer's platform by paying commission fees (agency encroachment) or opening an independent online/offline retail store (direct encroachment). The e-tailer has private demand information and decides whether or not to share it with the supplier. Two leadership scenarios—the supplier-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel before the e-tailer decides whether to share information) and the e-tailer-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel after the e-tailer decides whether to share information)—are examined. Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that the e-tailer has no incentive to share information under no encroachment and direct encroachment. Interestingly, this result holds in both leadership scenarios. Second, a medium commission rate gives rise to an equilibrium of agency encroachment with information sharing by the e-tailer. This equilibrium is more likely to sustain in the supplier-leads scenario than in the e-tailer-leads scenario. Third, agency encroachment brings the supplier the highest sales volume (at retail in the encroaching channel plus on wholesale to the e-tailer) when the two parties compete in quantity while direct encroachment does so for a price competition. Fourth, supplier encroachment always improves consumer surplus, but it is not necessarily welfare-improving. Last, we find that the e-tailer is more willing to share information to induce the supplier to encroach through his agency channel if he has a significant selling cost advantage over the supplier or can endogenously determine the commission rate.</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
author	Tang, Yanli
spellingShingle	Tang, Yanli misc agency channel misc direct channel misc information sharing misc supplier encroachment Games of supplier encroachment channel selection and e-tailer's information sharing
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topic_title	26 00 DE-206 We consider an e-tailer's upstream supplier who wants to encroach into retailing to earn additional revenue. The supplier needs to decide whether or not to enter the retail market by either selling to consumers on the e-tailer's platform by paying commission fees (agency encroachment) or opening an independent online/offline retail store (direct encroachment). The e-tailer has private demand information and decides whether or not to share it with the supplier. Two leadership scenarios—the supplier-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel before the e-tailer decides whether to share information) and the e-tailer-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel after the e-tailer decides whether to share information)—are examined. Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that the e-tailer has no incentive to share information under no encroachment and direct encroachment. Interestingly, this result holds in both leadership scenarios. Second, a medium commission rate gives rise to an equilibrium of agency encroachment with information sharing by the e-tailer. This equilibrium is more likely to sustain in the supplier-leads scenario than in the e-tailer-leads scenario. Third, agency encroachment brings the supplier the highest sales volume (at retail in the encroaching channel plus on wholesale to the e-tailer) when the two parties compete in quantity while direct encroachment does so for a price competition. Fourth, supplier encroachment always improves consumer surplus, but it is not necessarily welfare-improving. Last, we find that the e-tailer is more willing to share information to induce the supplier to encroach through his agency channel if he has a significant selling cost advantage over the supplier or can endogenously determine the commission rate Games of supplier encroachment channel selection and e-tailer's information sharing Yanli Tang, Suresh P. Sethi, Yulan Wang agency channel (dpeaa)DE-206 direct channel (dpeaa)DE-206 information sharing (dpeaa)DE-206 supplier encroachment (dpeaa)DE-206
topic	misc agency channel misc direct channel misc information sharing misc supplier encroachment
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title	Games of supplier encroachment channel selection and e-tailer's information sharing
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title_full	Games of supplier encroachment channel selection and e-tailer's information sharing Yanli Tang, Suresh P. Sethi, Yulan Wang
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title_short	Games of supplier encroachment channel selection and e-tailer's information sharing
url	https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1111/poms.14055 https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14055
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GND_str_mv	Yanli, Tang Tang Yanli Tang, Y. Tang, Yanli Sethi, S. P. Sethi, Suresh Pal Sethi, Suresh Sethi, S. Pal Sethi, Suresh Sethi, Suresh P. Yulan, Wang Yulan Wang Wang, Yulan
GND_txt_mv	Yanli, Tang Tang Yanli Tang, Y. Tang, Yanli Sethi, S. P. Sethi, Suresh Pal Sethi, Suresh Sethi, S. Pal Sethi, Suresh Sethi, Suresh P. Yulan, Wang Yulan Wang Wang, Yulan
GND_txtF_mv	Yanli, Tang Tang Yanli Tang, Y. Tang, Yanli Sethi, S. P. Sethi, Suresh Pal Sethi, Suresh Sethi, S. Pal Sethi, Suresh Sethi, Suresh P. Yulan, Wang Yulan Wang Wang, Yulan
mediatype_str_mv	c
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hochschulschrift_bool	false
doi_str	10.1111/poms.14055
up_date	2024-07-04T15:15:01.520Z
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code="2">26</subfield><subfield code="1">01</subfield><subfield code="x">0206</subfield><subfield code="b">4418530142</subfield><subfield code="y">x1z</subfield><subfield code="z">27-11-23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="982" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">26</subfield><subfield code="1">00</subfield><subfield code="x">DE-206</subfield><subfield code="b">We consider an e-tailer's upstream supplier who wants to encroach into retailing to earn additional revenue. The supplier needs to decide whether or not to enter the retail market by either selling to consumers on the e-tailer's platform by paying commission fees (agency encroachment) or opening an independent online/offline retail store (direct encroachment). The e-tailer has private demand information and decides whether or not to share it with the supplier. Two leadership scenarios—the supplier-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel before the e-tailer decides whether to share information) and the e-tailer-leads (i.e., the supplier selects the channel after the e-tailer decides whether to share information)—are examined. Our main findings are as follows. First, we show that the e-tailer has no incentive to share information under no encroachment and direct encroachment. Interestingly, this result holds in both leadership scenarios. Second, a medium commission rate gives rise to an equilibrium of agency encroachment with information sharing by the e-tailer. This equilibrium is more likely to sustain in the supplier-leads scenario than in the e-tailer-leads scenario. Third, agency encroachment brings the supplier the highest sales volume (at retail in the encroaching channel plus on wholesale to the e-tailer) when the two parties compete in quantity while direct encroachment does so for a price competition. Fourth, supplier encroachment always improves consumer surplus, but it is not necessarily welfare-improving. Last, we find that the e-tailer is more willing to share information to induce the supplier to encroach through his agency channel if he has a significant selling cost advantage over the supplier or can endogenously determine the commission rate.</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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