Inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone : the signalling perspective
This article examines the factors contributing to the disparity in managers' disclosure tone from a signalling perspective. According to this viewpoint, managers intentionally choose their tone to convey information to the market. To determine the origin of tone inconsistency, we explored the a...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Pouryousof, Azam [verfasserIn] Nassirzadeh, Farzaneh [verfasserIn] Askarany, Davood [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2023 |
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Rechteinformationen: |
Open Access Namensnennung 4.0 International ; CC BY 4.0 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Risks - Basel : MDPI, 2013, 11(2023), 12 vom: Dez., Artikel-ID 205, Seite 1-14 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:11 ; year:2023 ; number:12 ; month:12 ; elocationid:205 ; pages:1-14 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.3390/risks11120205 |
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Katalog-ID: |
1877609897 |
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10.3390/risks11120205 doi (DE-627)1877609897 (DE-599)KXP1877609897 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Pouryousof, Azam verfasserin aut Inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone the signalling perspective Azam Pouryousof, Farzaneh Nassirzadeh and Davood Askarany 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 This article examines the factors contributing to the disparity in managers' disclosure tone from a signalling perspective. According to this viewpoint, managers intentionally choose their tone to convey information to the market. To determine the origin of tone inconsistency, we explored the association between future financial performance (as measured by the rate of return on assets (ROA) and rate of return on equity (ROE)) and future financial risk (as measured by the standard deviation of ROA and ROE) with the tone of management discussion and analyses (MD&As). The Loughran and McDonald dictionaries were utilised to assess managers' tone in the MD&As. Our dataset consisted of 1510 MD&As from 156 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, covering 2013 to 2022. Multiple regression analysis was employed, controlling for industry and year fixed effects. The findings revealed a significant relationship between future financial performance, future financial risk, and MD&A tone inconsistency. Thus, the biased tone observed in Iranian managers' MD&As can be explained by signalling theory. This study contributes to the existing literature by being the first to investigate signalling as a source of inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ written tone (dpeaa)DE-206 tone inconsistency (dpeaa)DE-206 signalling theory (dpeaa)DE-206 future returns (dpeaa)DE-206 future risk (dpeaa)DE-206 Nassirzadeh, Farzaneh verfasserin aut Askarany, Davood verfasserin aut Enthalten in Risks Basel : MDPI, 2013 11(2023), 12 vom: Dez., Artikel-ID 205, Seite 1-14 Online-Ressource (DE-627)737288485 (DE-600)2704357-5 (DE-576)379467852 2227-9091 nnns volume:11 year:2023 number:12 month:12 elocationid:205 pages:1-14 https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/11/12/205/pdf?version=1700551814 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11120205 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 11 2023 12 12 205 1-14 26 01 0206 4452819818 x1z 10-01-24 2403 01 DE-LFER 4476363881 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 05-02-24 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11120205 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/11/12/205/pdf?version=1700551814 |
spelling |
10.3390/risks11120205 doi (DE-627)1877609897 (DE-599)KXP1877609897 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Pouryousof, Azam verfasserin aut Inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone the signalling perspective Azam Pouryousof, Farzaneh Nassirzadeh and Davood Askarany 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 This article examines the factors contributing to the disparity in managers' disclosure tone from a signalling perspective. According to this viewpoint, managers intentionally choose their tone to convey information to the market. To determine the origin of tone inconsistency, we explored the association between future financial performance (as measured by the rate of return on assets (ROA) and rate of return on equity (ROE)) and future financial risk (as measured by the standard deviation of ROA and ROE) with the tone of management discussion and analyses (MD&As). The Loughran and McDonald dictionaries were utilised to assess managers' tone in the MD&As. Our dataset consisted of 1510 MD&As from 156 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, covering 2013 to 2022. Multiple regression analysis was employed, controlling for industry and year fixed effects. The findings revealed a significant relationship between future financial performance, future financial risk, and MD&A tone inconsistency. Thus, the biased tone observed in Iranian managers' MD&As can be explained by signalling theory. This study contributes to the existing literature by being the first to investigate signalling as a source of inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ written tone (dpeaa)DE-206 tone inconsistency (dpeaa)DE-206 signalling theory (dpeaa)DE-206 future returns (dpeaa)DE-206 future risk (dpeaa)DE-206 Nassirzadeh, Farzaneh verfasserin aut Askarany, Davood verfasserin aut Enthalten in Risks Basel : MDPI, 2013 11(2023), 12 vom: Dez., Artikel-ID 205, Seite 1-14 Online-Ressource (DE-627)737288485 (DE-600)2704357-5 (DE-576)379467852 2227-9091 nnns volume:11 year:2023 number:12 month:12 elocationid:205 pages:1-14 https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/11/12/205/pdf?version=1700551814 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11120205 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 11 2023 12 12 205 1-14 26 01 0206 4452819818 x1z 10-01-24 2403 01 DE-LFER 4476363881 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 05-02-24 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11120205 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/11/12/205/pdf?version=1700551814 |
allfields_unstemmed |
10.3390/risks11120205 doi (DE-627)1877609897 (DE-599)KXP1877609897 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Pouryousof, Azam verfasserin aut Inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone the signalling perspective Azam Pouryousof, Farzaneh Nassirzadeh and Davood Askarany 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 This article examines the factors contributing to the disparity in managers' disclosure tone from a signalling perspective. According to this viewpoint, managers intentionally choose their tone to convey information to the market. To determine the origin of tone inconsistency, we explored the association between future financial performance (as measured by the rate of return on assets (ROA) and rate of return on equity (ROE)) and future financial risk (as measured by the standard deviation of ROA and ROE) with the tone of management discussion and analyses (MD&As). The Loughran and McDonald dictionaries were utilised to assess managers' tone in the MD&As. Our dataset consisted of 1510 MD&As from 156 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, covering 2013 to 2022. Multiple regression analysis was employed, controlling for industry and year fixed effects. The findings revealed a significant relationship between future financial performance, future financial risk, and MD&A tone inconsistency. Thus, the biased tone observed in Iranian managers' MD&As can be explained by signalling theory. This study contributes to the existing literature by being the first to investigate signalling as a source of inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ written tone (dpeaa)DE-206 tone inconsistency (dpeaa)DE-206 signalling theory (dpeaa)DE-206 future returns (dpeaa)DE-206 future risk (dpeaa)DE-206 Nassirzadeh, Farzaneh verfasserin aut Askarany, Davood verfasserin aut Enthalten in Risks Basel : MDPI, 2013 11(2023), 12 vom: Dez., Artikel-ID 205, Seite 1-14 Online-Ressource (DE-627)737288485 (DE-600)2704357-5 (DE-576)379467852 2227-9091 nnns volume:11 year:2023 number:12 month:12 elocationid:205 pages:1-14 https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/11/12/205/pdf?version=1700551814 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11120205 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 11 2023 12 12 205 1-14 26 01 0206 4452819818 x1z 10-01-24 2403 01 DE-LFER 4476363881 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 05-02-24 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11120205 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/11/12/205/pdf?version=1700551814 |
allfieldsGer |
10.3390/risks11120205 doi (DE-627)1877609897 (DE-599)KXP1877609897 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Pouryousof, Azam verfasserin aut Inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone the signalling perspective Azam Pouryousof, Farzaneh Nassirzadeh and Davood Askarany 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 This article examines the factors contributing to the disparity in managers' disclosure tone from a signalling perspective. According to this viewpoint, managers intentionally choose their tone to convey information to the market. To determine the origin of tone inconsistency, we explored the association between future financial performance (as measured by the rate of return on assets (ROA) and rate of return on equity (ROE)) and future financial risk (as measured by the standard deviation of ROA and ROE) with the tone of management discussion and analyses (MD&As). The Loughran and McDonald dictionaries were utilised to assess managers' tone in the MD&As. Our dataset consisted of 1510 MD&As from 156 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, covering 2013 to 2022. Multiple regression analysis was employed, controlling for industry and year fixed effects. The findings revealed a significant relationship between future financial performance, future financial risk, and MD&A tone inconsistency. Thus, the biased tone observed in Iranian managers' MD&As can be explained by signalling theory. This study contributes to the existing literature by being the first to investigate signalling as a source of inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ written tone (dpeaa)DE-206 tone inconsistency (dpeaa)DE-206 signalling theory (dpeaa)DE-206 future returns (dpeaa)DE-206 future risk (dpeaa)DE-206 Nassirzadeh, Farzaneh verfasserin aut Askarany, Davood verfasserin aut Enthalten in Risks Basel : MDPI, 2013 11(2023), 12 vom: Dez., Artikel-ID 205, Seite 1-14 Online-Ressource (DE-627)737288485 (DE-600)2704357-5 (DE-576)379467852 2227-9091 nnns volume:11 year:2023 number:12 month:12 elocationid:205 pages:1-14 https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/11/12/205/pdf?version=1700551814 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11120205 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 11 2023 12 12 205 1-14 26 01 0206 4452819818 x1z 10-01-24 2403 01 DE-LFER 4476363881 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 05-02-24 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3390/risks11120205 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/11/12/205/pdf?version=1700551814 |
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Inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone the signalling perspective Azam Pouryousof, Farzaneh Nassirzadeh and Davood Askarany |
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Pouryousof, Azam |
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Pouryousof, Azam Nassirzadeh, Farzaneh Askarany, Davood |
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the signalling perspective |
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10.3390/risks11120205 |
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inconsistency in managers' disclosure tonethe signalling perspective |
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Inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone the signalling perspective |
abstract |
This article examines the factors contributing to the disparity in managers' disclosure tone from a signalling perspective. According to this viewpoint, managers intentionally choose their tone to convey information to the market. To determine the origin of tone inconsistency, we explored the association between future financial performance (as measured by the rate of return on assets (ROA) and rate of return on equity (ROE)) and future financial risk (as measured by the standard deviation of ROA and ROE) with the tone of management discussion and analyses (MD&As). The Loughran and McDonald dictionaries were utilised to assess managers' tone in the MD&As. Our dataset consisted of 1510 MD&As from 156 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, covering 2013 to 2022. Multiple regression analysis was employed, controlling for industry and year fixed effects. The findings revealed a significant relationship between future financial performance, future financial risk, and MD&A tone inconsistency. Thus, the biased tone observed in Iranian managers' MD&As can be explained by signalling theory. This study contributes to the existing literature by being the first to investigate signalling as a source of inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone. |
abstractGer |
This article examines the factors contributing to the disparity in managers' disclosure tone from a signalling perspective. According to this viewpoint, managers intentionally choose their tone to convey information to the market. To determine the origin of tone inconsistency, we explored the association between future financial performance (as measured by the rate of return on assets (ROA) and rate of return on equity (ROE)) and future financial risk (as measured by the standard deviation of ROA and ROE) with the tone of management discussion and analyses (MD&As). The Loughran and McDonald dictionaries were utilised to assess managers' tone in the MD&As. Our dataset consisted of 1510 MD&As from 156 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, covering 2013 to 2022. Multiple regression analysis was employed, controlling for industry and year fixed effects. The findings revealed a significant relationship between future financial performance, future financial risk, and MD&A tone inconsistency. Thus, the biased tone observed in Iranian managers' MD&As can be explained by signalling theory. This study contributes to the existing literature by being the first to investigate signalling as a source of inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone. |
abstract_unstemmed |
This article examines the factors contributing to the disparity in managers' disclosure tone from a signalling perspective. According to this viewpoint, managers intentionally choose their tone to convey information to the market. To determine the origin of tone inconsistency, we explored the association between future financial performance (as measured by the rate of return on assets (ROA) and rate of return on equity (ROE)) and future financial risk (as measured by the standard deviation of ROA and ROE) with the tone of management discussion and analyses (MD&As). The Loughran and McDonald dictionaries were utilised to assess managers' tone in the MD&As. Our dataset consisted of 1510 MD&As from 156 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, covering 2013 to 2022. Multiple regression analysis was employed, controlling for industry and year fixed effects. The findings revealed a significant relationship between future financial performance, future financial risk, and MD&A tone inconsistency. Thus, the biased tone observed in Iranian managers' MD&As can be explained by signalling theory. This study contributes to the existing literature by being the first to investigate signalling as a source of inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone. |
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Inconsistency in managers' disclosure tone |
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