Countercyclical central government transfers incentivize local government overborrowing : theory and evidence
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Liu, Yan [verfasserIn] Wu, Guowei [verfasserIn] Chen, Xiong [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2024 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Economic modelling - Amsterdam : Elsevier [u.a.], 1984, 132(2024) vom: März, Artikel-ID 106625, Seite 1-21 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:132 ; year:2024 ; month:03 ; elocationid:106625 ; pages:1-21 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106625 |
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| Katalog-ID: |
1891266691 |
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| 982 | |2 26 |1 00 |x DE-206 |b Local governments in China have strong incentives to overborrow, leading to unsustainable local debt. Recent research suggests that higher central government transfers serve as a key incentive for local governments to overborrow. This paper constructs a theoretical model and shows that it is the countercyclicality of central government transfers, that is, the negative correlation between transfers and local revenues, that act as the main incentive for local governments to overborrow. We test the model predictions using hand-collected provincial data on local government debt and budgets. The empirical evidence strongly supports the prediction that the negative correlation-not the magnitude-of central government transfers is the main driver of the incentive for local governments to borrow excessively. The countercyclical nature of central government transfers provides insurance against local government debt service, thereby increasing the incentive for local governments to borrow. The findings suggest the need to change the central government transfer policy framework. | ||
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10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106625 doi (DE-627)1891266691 (DE-599)KXP1891266691 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Liu, Yan verfasserin (DE-588)1209161877 (DE-627)1696460662 aut Countercyclical central government transfers incentivize local government overborrowing theory and evidence Yan Liu, Guowei Wu, Chen Xiong 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Central government transfer (dpeaa)DE-206 Local government debt (dpeaa)DE-206 Local government fiscal structure (dpeaa)DE-206 Wu, Guowei verfasserin (DE-588)1280946652 (DE-627)1835099963 aut Chen, Xiong verfasserin (DE-588)1177707233 (DE-627)1048863441 (DE-576)51743475X aut Enthalten in Economic modelling Amsterdam : Elsevier [u.a.], 1984 132(2024) vom: März, Artikel-ID 106625, Seite 1-21 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320507459 (DE-600)2013002-8 (DE-576)094056749 0264-9993 nnns volume:132 year:2024 month:03 elocationid:106625 pages:1-21 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999323004376/pdfft?md5=7336dbf8606e65fdc633bc622b53a967&pid=1-s2.0-S0264999323004376-main.pdf Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106625 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 132 2024 3 106625 1-21 26 01 0206 4538842885 x1z 14-06-24 26 00 DE-206 Local governments in China have strong incentives to overborrow, leading to unsustainable local debt. Recent research suggests that higher central government transfers serve as a key incentive for local governments to overborrow. This paper constructs a theoretical model and shows that it is the countercyclicality of central government transfers, that is, the negative correlation between transfers and local revenues, that act as the main incentive for local governments to overborrow. We test the model predictions using hand-collected provincial data on local government debt and budgets. The empirical evidence strongly supports the prediction that the negative correlation-not the magnitude-of central government transfers is the main driver of the incentive for local governments to borrow excessively. The countercyclical nature of central government transfers provides insurance against local government debt service, thereby increasing the incentive for local governments to borrow. The findings suggest the need to change the central government transfer policy framework. |
| spelling |
10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106625 doi (DE-627)1891266691 (DE-599)KXP1891266691 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Liu, Yan verfasserin (DE-588)1209161877 (DE-627)1696460662 aut Countercyclical central government transfers incentivize local government overborrowing theory and evidence Yan Liu, Guowei Wu, Chen Xiong 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Central government transfer (dpeaa)DE-206 Local government debt (dpeaa)DE-206 Local government fiscal structure (dpeaa)DE-206 Wu, Guowei verfasserin (DE-588)1280946652 (DE-627)1835099963 aut Chen, Xiong verfasserin (DE-588)1177707233 (DE-627)1048863441 (DE-576)51743475X aut Enthalten in Economic modelling Amsterdam : Elsevier [u.a.], 1984 132(2024) vom: März, Artikel-ID 106625, Seite 1-21 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320507459 (DE-600)2013002-8 (DE-576)094056749 0264-9993 nnns volume:132 year:2024 month:03 elocationid:106625 pages:1-21 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999323004376/pdfft?md5=7336dbf8606e65fdc633bc622b53a967&pid=1-s2.0-S0264999323004376-main.pdf Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106625 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 132 2024 3 106625 1-21 26 01 0206 4538842885 x1z 14-06-24 26 00 DE-206 Local governments in China have strong incentives to overborrow, leading to unsustainable local debt. Recent research suggests that higher central government transfers serve as a key incentive for local governments to overborrow. This paper constructs a theoretical model and shows that it is the countercyclicality of central government transfers, that is, the negative correlation between transfers and local revenues, that act as the main incentive for local governments to overborrow. We test the model predictions using hand-collected provincial data on local government debt and budgets. The empirical evidence strongly supports the prediction that the negative correlation-not the magnitude-of central government transfers is the main driver of the incentive for local governments to borrow excessively. The countercyclical nature of central government transfers provides insurance against local government debt service, thereby increasing the incentive for local governments to borrow. The findings suggest the need to change the central government transfer policy framework. |
| allfields_unstemmed |
10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106625 doi (DE-627)1891266691 (DE-599)KXP1891266691 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Liu, Yan verfasserin (DE-588)1209161877 (DE-627)1696460662 aut Countercyclical central government transfers incentivize local government overborrowing theory and evidence Yan Liu, Guowei Wu, Chen Xiong 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Central government transfer (dpeaa)DE-206 Local government debt (dpeaa)DE-206 Local government fiscal structure (dpeaa)DE-206 Wu, Guowei verfasserin (DE-588)1280946652 (DE-627)1835099963 aut Chen, Xiong verfasserin (DE-588)1177707233 (DE-627)1048863441 (DE-576)51743475X aut Enthalten in Economic modelling Amsterdam : Elsevier [u.a.], 1984 132(2024) vom: März, Artikel-ID 106625, Seite 1-21 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320507459 (DE-600)2013002-8 (DE-576)094056749 0264-9993 nnns volume:132 year:2024 month:03 elocationid:106625 pages:1-21 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999323004376/pdfft?md5=7336dbf8606e65fdc633bc622b53a967&pid=1-s2.0-S0264999323004376-main.pdf Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106625 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 132 2024 3 106625 1-21 26 01 0206 4538842885 x1z 14-06-24 26 00 DE-206 Local governments in China have strong incentives to overborrow, leading to unsustainable local debt. Recent research suggests that higher central government transfers serve as a key incentive for local governments to overborrow. This paper constructs a theoretical model and shows that it is the countercyclicality of central government transfers, that is, the negative correlation between transfers and local revenues, that act as the main incentive for local governments to overborrow. We test the model predictions using hand-collected provincial data on local government debt and budgets. The empirical evidence strongly supports the prediction that the negative correlation-not the magnitude-of central government transfers is the main driver of the incentive for local governments to borrow excessively. The countercyclical nature of central government transfers provides insurance against local government debt service, thereby increasing the incentive for local governments to borrow. The findings suggest the need to change the central government transfer policy framework. |
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10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106625 doi (DE-627)1891266691 (DE-599)KXP1891266691 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Liu, Yan verfasserin (DE-588)1209161877 (DE-627)1696460662 aut Countercyclical central government transfers incentivize local government overborrowing theory and evidence Yan Liu, Guowei Wu, Chen Xiong 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Central government transfer (dpeaa)DE-206 Local government debt (dpeaa)DE-206 Local government fiscal structure (dpeaa)DE-206 Wu, Guowei verfasserin (DE-588)1280946652 (DE-627)1835099963 aut Chen, Xiong verfasserin (DE-588)1177707233 (DE-627)1048863441 (DE-576)51743475X aut Enthalten in Economic modelling Amsterdam : Elsevier [u.a.], 1984 132(2024) vom: März, Artikel-ID 106625, Seite 1-21 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320507459 (DE-600)2013002-8 (DE-576)094056749 0264-9993 nnns volume:132 year:2024 month:03 elocationid:106625 pages:1-21 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999323004376/pdfft?md5=7336dbf8606e65fdc633bc622b53a967&pid=1-s2.0-S0264999323004376-main.pdf Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106625 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 132 2024 3 106625 1-21 26 01 0206 4538842885 x1z 14-06-24 26 00 DE-206 Local governments in China have strong incentives to overborrow, leading to unsustainable local debt. Recent research suggests that higher central government transfers serve as a key incentive for local governments to overborrow. This paper constructs a theoretical model and shows that it is the countercyclicality of central government transfers, that is, the negative correlation between transfers and local revenues, that act as the main incentive for local governments to overborrow. We test the model predictions using hand-collected provincial data on local government debt and budgets. The empirical evidence strongly supports the prediction that the negative correlation-not the magnitude-of central government transfers is the main driver of the incentive for local governments to borrow excessively. The countercyclical nature of central government transfers provides insurance against local government debt service, thereby increasing the incentive for local governments to borrow. The findings suggest the need to change the central government transfer policy framework. |
| allfieldsSound |
10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106625 doi (DE-627)1891266691 (DE-599)KXP1891266691 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Liu, Yan verfasserin (DE-588)1209161877 (DE-627)1696460662 aut Countercyclical central government transfers incentivize local government overborrowing theory and evidence Yan Liu, Guowei Wu, Chen Xiong 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Central government transfer (dpeaa)DE-206 Local government debt (dpeaa)DE-206 Local government fiscal structure (dpeaa)DE-206 Wu, Guowei verfasserin (DE-588)1280946652 (DE-627)1835099963 aut Chen, Xiong verfasserin (DE-588)1177707233 (DE-627)1048863441 (DE-576)51743475X aut Enthalten in Economic modelling Amsterdam : Elsevier [u.a.], 1984 132(2024) vom: März, Artikel-ID 106625, Seite 1-21 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320507459 (DE-600)2013002-8 (DE-576)094056749 0264-9993 nnns volume:132 year:2024 month:03 elocationid:106625 pages:1-21 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999323004376/pdfft?md5=7336dbf8606e65fdc633bc622b53a967&pid=1-s2.0-S0264999323004376-main.pdf Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106625 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 132 2024 3 106625 1-21 26 01 0206 4538842885 x1z 14-06-24 26 00 DE-206 Local governments in China have strong incentives to overborrow, leading to unsustainable local debt. Recent research suggests that higher central government transfers serve as a key incentive for local governments to overborrow. This paper constructs a theoretical model and shows that it is the countercyclicality of central government transfers, that is, the negative correlation between transfers and local revenues, that act as the main incentive for local governments to overborrow. We test the model predictions using hand-collected provincial data on local government debt and budgets. The empirical evidence strongly supports the prediction that the negative correlation-not the magnitude-of central government transfers is the main driver of the incentive for local governments to borrow excessively. The countercyclical nature of central government transfers provides insurance against local government debt service, thereby increasing the incentive for local governments to borrow. The findings suggest the need to change the central government transfer policy framework. |
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code="x">DE-206</subfield><subfield code="b">Local governments in China have strong incentives to overborrow, leading to unsustainable local debt. Recent research suggests that higher central government transfers serve as a key incentive for local governments to overborrow. This paper constructs a theoretical model and shows that it is the countercyclicality of central government transfers, that is, the negative correlation between transfers and local revenues, that act as the main incentive for local governments to overborrow. We test the model predictions using hand-collected provincial data on local government debt and budgets. The empirical evidence strongly supports the prediction that the negative correlation-not the magnitude-of central government transfers is the main driver of the incentive for local governments to borrow excessively. The countercyclical nature of central government transfers provides insurance against local government debt service, thereby increasing the incentive for local governments to borrow. The findings suggest the need to change the central government transfer policy framework.</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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26 00 DE-206 Local governments in China have strong incentives to overborrow, leading to unsustainable local debt. Recent research suggests that higher central government transfers serve as a key incentive for local governments to overborrow. This paper constructs a theoretical model and shows that it is the countercyclicality of central government transfers, that is, the negative correlation between transfers and local revenues, that act as the main incentive for local governments to overborrow. We test the model predictions using hand-collected provincial data on local government debt and budgets. The empirical evidence strongly supports the prediction that the negative correlation-not the magnitude-of central government transfers is the main driver of the incentive for local governments to borrow excessively. The countercyclical nature of central government transfers provides insurance against local government debt service, thereby increasing the incentive for local governments to borrow. The findings suggest the need to change the central government transfer policy framework Countercyclical central government transfers incentivize local government overborrowing theory and evidence Yan Liu, Guowei Wu, Chen Xiong Central government transfer (dpeaa)DE-206 Local government debt (dpeaa)DE-206 Local government fiscal structure (dpeaa)DE-206 |
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code="x">DE-206</subfield><subfield code="b">Local governments in China have strong incentives to overborrow, leading to unsustainable local debt. Recent research suggests that higher central government transfers serve as a key incentive for local governments to overborrow. This paper constructs a theoretical model and shows that it is the countercyclicality of central government transfers, that is, the negative correlation between transfers and local revenues, that act as the main incentive for local governments to overborrow. We test the model predictions using hand-collected provincial data on local government debt and budgets. The empirical evidence strongly supports the prediction that the negative correlation-not the magnitude-of central government transfers is the main driver of the incentive for local governments to borrow excessively. The countercyclical nature of central government transfers provides insurance against local government debt service, thereby increasing the incentive for local governments to borrow. The findings suggest the need to change the central government transfer policy framework.</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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7.3975677 |