Labor unions and debt covenant violations

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Li, Guangzi [verfasserIn] Lian, Yili [verfasserIn] Zhang, Yi [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2024

Schlagwörter:	covenant violation debt covenant earnings management Labor union union election

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: The European journal of finance - London [u.a.] : Taylor & Francis Group, 1995, 30(2024), 9, Seite 1030-1047
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:30 ; year:2024 ; number:9 ; pages:1030-1047

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen

DOI / URN:	10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438

Katalog-ID:	1891269348

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982			\|2 26 \|1 00 \|x DE-206 \|b This study examines the relationship between labor unions and firms’ decisions to violate debt covenants. We find that firms with high unionization rates are more likely to violate debt covenants than firms with low unionization rates. This relationship is stronger for firms with larger cash reserves. Our analysis also reveals that debt covenant violations lead to a lower probability of a strike. Additionally, we find that high-unionization firms are in better financial condition prior to covenant violations than low-unionization firms. Our study confirms the existing literature by showing that long-term abnormal stock returns after covenant violations are significantly positive. However, our results also show that high-unionization firms experience smaller stock returns compared to low-unionization firms. Furthermore, we provide evidence that high-unionization firms tend to manipulate earnings downward before covenant violations. These findings suggest that firms may strategically violate debt covenants to gain bargaining flexibility and force labor unions to make concessions in subsequent negotiations.

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allfields	10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 doi (DE-627)1891269348 (DE-599)KXP1891269348 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Li, Guangzi verfasserin (DE-588)1135923221 (DE-627)890925690 (DE-576)490158153 aut Labor unions and debt covenant violations Guangzi Li, Yili Lian and Yi Zhang 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier covenant violation (dpeaa)DE-206 debt covenant (dpeaa)DE-206 earnings management (dpeaa)DE-206 Labor union (dpeaa)DE-206 union election (dpeaa)DE-206 Lian, Yili verfasserin (DE-588)1138462357 (DE-627)89603481X (DE-576)492560110 aut Zhang, Yi verfasserin (DE-588)1277374627 (DE-627)1830477668 aut Enthalten in The European journal of finance London [u.a.] : Taylor & Francis Group, 1995 30(2024), 9, Seite 1030-1047 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320413462 (DE-600)2001610-4 (DE-576)104508914 1466-4364 nnns volume:30 year:2024 number:9 pages:1030-1047 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 30 2024 9 1030-1047 26 01 0206 453884862X x1z 14-06-24 26 00 DE-206 This study examines the relationship between labor unions and firms’ decisions to violate debt covenants. We find that firms with high unionization rates are more likely to violate debt covenants than firms with low unionization rates. This relationship is stronger for firms with larger cash reserves. Our analysis also reveals that debt covenant violations lead to a lower probability of a strike. Additionally, we find that high-unionization firms are in better financial condition prior to covenant violations than low-unionization firms. Our study confirms the existing literature by showing that long-term abnormal stock returns after covenant violations are significantly positive. However, our results also show that high-unionization firms experience smaller stock returns compared to low-unionization firms. Furthermore, we provide evidence that high-unionization firms tend to manipulate earnings downward before covenant violations. These findings suggest that firms may strategically violate debt covenants to gain bargaining flexibility and force labor unions to make concessions in subsequent negotiations.
spelling	10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 doi (DE-627)1891269348 (DE-599)KXP1891269348 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Li, Guangzi verfasserin (DE-588)1135923221 (DE-627)890925690 (DE-576)490158153 aut Labor unions and debt covenant violations Guangzi Li, Yili Lian and Yi Zhang 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier covenant violation (dpeaa)DE-206 debt covenant (dpeaa)DE-206 earnings management (dpeaa)DE-206 Labor union (dpeaa)DE-206 union election (dpeaa)DE-206 Lian, Yili verfasserin (DE-588)1138462357 (DE-627)89603481X (DE-576)492560110 aut Zhang, Yi verfasserin (DE-588)1277374627 (DE-627)1830477668 aut Enthalten in The European journal of finance London [u.a.] : Taylor & Francis Group, 1995 30(2024), 9, Seite 1030-1047 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320413462 (DE-600)2001610-4 (DE-576)104508914 1466-4364 nnns volume:30 year:2024 number:9 pages:1030-1047 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 30 2024 9 1030-1047 26 01 0206 453884862X x1z 14-06-24 26 00 DE-206 This study examines the relationship between labor unions and firms’ decisions to violate debt covenants. We find that firms with high unionization rates are more likely to violate debt covenants than firms with low unionization rates. This relationship is stronger for firms with larger cash reserves. Our analysis also reveals that debt covenant violations lead to a lower probability of a strike. Additionally, we find that high-unionization firms are in better financial condition prior to covenant violations than low-unionization firms. Our study confirms the existing literature by showing that long-term abnormal stock returns after covenant violations are significantly positive. However, our results also show that high-unionization firms experience smaller stock returns compared to low-unionization firms. Furthermore, we provide evidence that high-unionization firms tend to manipulate earnings downward before covenant violations. These findings suggest that firms may strategically violate debt covenants to gain bargaining flexibility and force labor unions to make concessions in subsequent negotiations.
allfields_unstemmed	10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 doi (DE-627)1891269348 (DE-599)KXP1891269348 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Li, Guangzi verfasserin (DE-588)1135923221 (DE-627)890925690 (DE-576)490158153 aut Labor unions and debt covenant violations Guangzi Li, Yili Lian and Yi Zhang 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier covenant violation (dpeaa)DE-206 debt covenant (dpeaa)DE-206 earnings management (dpeaa)DE-206 Labor union (dpeaa)DE-206 union election (dpeaa)DE-206 Lian, Yili verfasserin (DE-588)1138462357 (DE-627)89603481X (DE-576)492560110 aut Zhang, Yi verfasserin (DE-588)1277374627 (DE-627)1830477668 aut Enthalten in The European journal of finance London [u.a.] : Taylor & Francis Group, 1995 30(2024), 9, Seite 1030-1047 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320413462 (DE-600)2001610-4 (DE-576)104508914 1466-4364 nnns volume:30 year:2024 number:9 pages:1030-1047 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 30 2024 9 1030-1047 26 01 0206 453884862X x1z 14-06-24 26 00 DE-206 This study examines the relationship between labor unions and firms’ decisions to violate debt covenants. We find that firms with high unionization rates are more likely to violate debt covenants than firms with low unionization rates. This relationship is stronger for firms with larger cash reserves. Our analysis also reveals that debt covenant violations lead to a lower probability of a strike. Additionally, we find that high-unionization firms are in better financial condition prior to covenant violations than low-unionization firms. Our study confirms the existing literature by showing that long-term abnormal stock returns after covenant violations are significantly positive. However, our results also show that high-unionization firms experience smaller stock returns compared to low-unionization firms. Furthermore, we provide evidence that high-unionization firms tend to manipulate earnings downward before covenant violations. These findings suggest that firms may strategically violate debt covenants to gain bargaining flexibility and force labor unions to make concessions in subsequent negotiations.
allfieldsGer	10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 doi (DE-627)1891269348 (DE-599)KXP1891269348 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Li, Guangzi verfasserin (DE-588)1135923221 (DE-627)890925690 (DE-576)490158153 aut Labor unions and debt covenant violations Guangzi Li, Yili Lian and Yi Zhang 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier covenant violation (dpeaa)DE-206 debt covenant (dpeaa)DE-206 earnings management (dpeaa)DE-206 Labor union (dpeaa)DE-206 union election (dpeaa)DE-206 Lian, Yili verfasserin (DE-588)1138462357 (DE-627)89603481X (DE-576)492560110 aut Zhang, Yi verfasserin (DE-588)1277374627 (DE-627)1830477668 aut Enthalten in The European journal of finance London [u.a.] : Taylor & Francis Group, 1995 30(2024), 9, Seite 1030-1047 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320413462 (DE-600)2001610-4 (DE-576)104508914 1466-4364 nnns volume:30 year:2024 number:9 pages:1030-1047 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 30 2024 9 1030-1047 26 01 0206 453884862X x1z 14-06-24 26 00 DE-206 This study examines the relationship between labor unions and firms’ decisions to violate debt covenants. We find that firms with high unionization rates are more likely to violate debt covenants than firms with low unionization rates. This relationship is stronger for firms with larger cash reserves. Our analysis also reveals that debt covenant violations lead to a lower probability of a strike. Additionally, we find that high-unionization firms are in better financial condition prior to covenant violations than low-unionization firms. Our study confirms the existing literature by showing that long-term abnormal stock returns after covenant violations are significantly positive. However, our results also show that high-unionization firms experience smaller stock returns compared to low-unionization firms. Furthermore, we provide evidence that high-unionization firms tend to manipulate earnings downward before covenant violations. These findings suggest that firms may strategically violate debt covenants to gain bargaining flexibility and force labor unions to make concessions in subsequent negotiations.
allfieldsSound	10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 doi (DE-627)1891269348 (DE-599)KXP1891269348 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Li, Guangzi verfasserin (DE-588)1135923221 (DE-627)890925690 (DE-576)490158153 aut Labor unions and debt covenant violations Guangzi Li, Yili Lian and Yi Zhang 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier covenant violation (dpeaa)DE-206 debt covenant (dpeaa)DE-206 earnings management (dpeaa)DE-206 Labor union (dpeaa)DE-206 union election (dpeaa)DE-206 Lian, Yili verfasserin (DE-588)1138462357 (DE-627)89603481X (DE-576)492560110 aut Zhang, Yi verfasserin (DE-588)1277374627 (DE-627)1830477668 aut Enthalten in The European journal of finance London [u.a.] : Taylor & Francis Group, 1995 30(2024), 9, Seite 1030-1047 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320413462 (DE-600)2001610-4 (DE-576)104508914 1466-4364 nnns volume:30 year:2024 number:9 pages:1030-1047 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 30 2024 9 1030-1047 26 01 0206 453884862X x1z 14-06-24 26 00 DE-206 This study examines the relationship between labor unions and firms’ decisions to violate debt covenants. We find that firms with high unionization rates are more likely to violate debt covenants than firms with low unionization rates. This relationship is stronger for firms with larger cash reserves. Our analysis also reveals that debt covenant violations lead to a lower probability of a strike. Additionally, we find that high-unionization firms are in better financial condition prior to covenant violations than low-unionization firms. Our study confirms the existing literature by showing that long-term abnormal stock returns after covenant violations are significantly positive. However, our results also show that high-unionization firms experience smaller stock returns compared to low-unionization firms. Furthermore, we provide evidence that high-unionization firms tend to manipulate earnings downward before covenant violations. These findings suggest that firms may strategically violate debt covenants to gain bargaining flexibility and force labor unions to make concessions in subsequent negotiations.
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We find that firms with high unionization rates are more likely to violate debt covenants than firms with low unionization rates. This relationship is stronger for firms with larger cash reserves. Our analysis also reveals that debt covenant violations lead to a lower probability of a strike. Additionally, we find that high-unionization firms are in better financial condition prior to covenant violations than low-unionization firms. Our study confirms the existing literature by showing that long-term abnormal stock returns after covenant violations are significantly positive. However, our results also show that high-unionization firms experience smaller stock returns compared to low-unionization firms. Furthermore, we provide evidence that high-unionization firms tend to manipulate earnings downward before covenant violations. 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author	Li, Guangzi
spellingShingle	Li, Guangzi misc covenant violation misc debt covenant misc earnings management misc Labor union misc union election Labor unions and debt covenant violations
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topic_title	26 00 DE-206 This study examines the relationship between labor unions and firms’ decisions to violate debt covenants. We find that firms with high unionization rates are more likely to violate debt covenants than firms with low unionization rates. This relationship is stronger for firms with larger cash reserves. Our analysis also reveals that debt covenant violations lead to a lower probability of a strike. Additionally, we find that high-unionization firms are in better financial condition prior to covenant violations than low-unionization firms. Our study confirms the existing literature by showing that long-term abnormal stock returns after covenant violations are significantly positive. However, our results also show that high-unionization firms experience smaller stock returns compared to low-unionization firms. Furthermore, we provide evidence that high-unionization firms tend to manipulate earnings downward before covenant violations. These findings suggest that firms may strategically violate debt covenants to gain bargaining flexibility and force labor unions to make concessions in subsequent negotiations Labor unions and debt covenant violations Guangzi Li, Yili Lian and Yi Zhang covenant violation (dpeaa)DE-206 debt covenant (dpeaa)DE-206 earnings management (dpeaa)DE-206 Labor union (dpeaa)DE-206 union election (dpeaa)DE-206
topic	misc covenant violation misc debt covenant misc earnings management misc Labor union misc union election
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title	Labor unions and debt covenant violations
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title_full	Labor unions and debt covenant violations Guangzi Li, Yili Lian and Yi Zhang
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title_short	Labor unions and debt covenant violations
url	https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438 https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2023.2259438
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GND_str_mv	Guangzi, Li Guanzi, L. Li Guangzi Li, Guangzi Yili, Lian Lian Yili Lian, Yili Zhang Yi Yi, Zhang Zhang, Yi
GND_txt_mv	Guangzi, Li Guanzi, L. Li Guangzi Li, Guangzi Yili, Lian Lian Yili Lian, Yili Zhang Yi Yi, Zhang Zhang, Yi
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up_date	2024-08-27T03:38:21.092Z
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code="a">GBV_ILN_100</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_224</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_647</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_702</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2001</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2025</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2026</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2034</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2055</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2088</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2093</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2111</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2190</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2336</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2470</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2507</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2548</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4035</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4046</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4246</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4249</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4393</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">30</subfield><subfield code="j">2024</subfield><subfield code="e">9</subfield><subfield code="h">1030-1047</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="980" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">26</subfield><subfield code="1">01</subfield><subfield code="x">0206</subfield><subfield code="b">453884862X</subfield><subfield code="y">x1z</subfield><subfield code="z">14-06-24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="982" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">26</subfield><subfield code="1">00</subfield><subfield code="x">DE-206</subfield><subfield code="b">This study examines the relationship between labor unions and firms’ decisions to violate debt covenants. We find that firms with high unionization rates are more likely to violate debt covenants than firms with low unionization rates. This relationship is stronger for firms with larger cash reserves. Our analysis also reveals that debt covenant violations lead to a lower probability of a strike. Additionally, we find that high-unionization firms are in better financial condition prior to covenant violations than low-unionization firms. Our study confirms the existing literature by showing that long-term abnormal stock returns after covenant violations are significantly positive. However, our results also show that high-unionization firms experience smaller stock returns compared to low-unionization firms. Furthermore, we provide evidence that high-unionization firms tend to manipulate earnings downward before covenant violations. These findings suggest that firms may strategically violate debt covenants to gain bargaining flexibility and force labor unions to make concessions in subsequent negotiations.</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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Labor unions and debt covenant violations

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