Can multi-peril insurance policies mitigate adverse selection?

The objective of this paper is to pursue an intuitive idea: for a consumer who represents an "unfavorable" health risk but an "excellent risk" as a driver, a multi-peril policy could be associated with a reduced selection effort on the part of the insurer. If this intuition shoul...
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Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Zweifel, Peter - 1946- [verfasserIn] Hofmann, Annette - 1977- [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2024

Rechteinformationen:	Open Access Namensnennung 4.0 International ; CC BY 4.0

Schlagwörter:	adverse selection consumer search effort insurer selection effort risk selection

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Risks - Basel : MDPI, 2013, 12(2024), 6 vom: Juni, Artikel-ID 102, Seite 1-16
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:12 ; year:2024 ; number:6 ; month:06 ; elocationid:102 ; pages:1-16

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen

DOI / URN:	10.3390/risks12060102

Katalog-ID:	1898509352

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allfields	10.3390/risks12060102 doi (DE-627)1898509352 (DE-599)KXP1898509352 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Zweifel, Peter 1946- verfasserin (DE-588)120982196 (DE-627)081009615 (DE-576)16368765X aut Can multi-peril insurance policies mitigate adverse selection? Peter Zweifel and Annette Hofmann 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 The objective of this paper is to pursue an intuitive idea: for a consumer who represents an "unfavorable" health risk but an "excellent risk" as a driver, a multi-peril policy could be associated with a reduced selection effort on the part of the insurer. If this intuition should be confirmed, it will serve to address the decade-long concern with risk selection both in the economic literature and on the part of policy makers. As an illustrative example, a two-peril model is developed in which consumers deploy effort in search of a policy offering them maximum coverage at the current market price while insurers deploy effort designed to stave off unfavorable risks. Two types of Nash equilibria are compared: one in which the insurer is confronted with high-risk and low-risk types, and another one where both types are a "better risk" with regard to a second peril. The difference in the insurer's selection effort directed at high-risk and low-risk types is indeed shown to be lower in the latter case, resulting in a mitigation of adverse selection. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ adverse selection (dpeaa)DE-206 consumer search effort (dpeaa)DE-206 insurer selection effort (dpeaa)DE-206 risk selection (dpeaa)DE-206 Hofmann, Annette 1977- verfasserin (DE-588)138834199 (DE-627)606157018 (DE-576)309292069 aut Enthalten in Risks Basel : MDPI, 2013 12(2024), 6 vom: Juni, Artikel-ID 102, Seite 1-16 Online-Ressource (DE-627)737288485 (DE-600)2704357-5 (DE-576)379467852 2227-9091 nnns volume:12 year:2024 number:6 month:06 elocationid:102 pages:1-16 https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/12/6/102/pdf?version=1719391955 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3390/risks12060102 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 12 2024 6 6 102 1-16 26 01 0206 4565652277 x1z 13-08-24 2403 01 DE-LFER 4574102292 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 03-09-24 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3390/risks12060102 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/12/6/102/pdf?version=1719391955
spelling	10.3390/risks12060102 doi (DE-627)1898509352 (DE-599)KXP1898509352 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Zweifel, Peter 1946- verfasserin (DE-588)120982196 (DE-627)081009615 (DE-576)16368765X aut Can multi-peril insurance policies mitigate adverse selection? Peter Zweifel and Annette Hofmann 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 The objective of this paper is to pursue an intuitive idea: for a consumer who represents an "unfavorable" health risk but an "excellent risk" as a driver, a multi-peril policy could be associated with a reduced selection effort on the part of the insurer. If this intuition should be confirmed, it will serve to address the decade-long concern with risk selection both in the economic literature and on the part of policy makers. As an illustrative example, a two-peril model is developed in which consumers deploy effort in search of a policy offering them maximum coverage at the current market price while insurers deploy effort designed to stave off unfavorable risks. Two types of Nash equilibria are compared: one in which the insurer is confronted with high-risk and low-risk types, and another one where both types are a "better risk" with regard to a second peril. The difference in the insurer's selection effort directed at high-risk and low-risk types is indeed shown to be lower in the latter case, resulting in a mitigation of adverse selection. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ adverse selection (dpeaa)DE-206 consumer search effort (dpeaa)DE-206 insurer selection effort (dpeaa)DE-206 risk selection (dpeaa)DE-206 Hofmann, Annette 1977- verfasserin (DE-588)138834199 (DE-627)606157018 (DE-576)309292069 aut Enthalten in Risks Basel : MDPI, 2013 12(2024), 6 vom: Juni, Artikel-ID 102, Seite 1-16 Online-Ressource (DE-627)737288485 (DE-600)2704357-5 (DE-576)379467852 2227-9091 nnns volume:12 year:2024 number:6 month:06 elocationid:102 pages:1-16 https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/12/6/102/pdf?version=1719391955 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3390/risks12060102 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 12 2024 6 6 102 1-16 26 01 0206 4565652277 x1z 13-08-24 2403 01 DE-LFER 4574102292 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 03-09-24 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3390/risks12060102 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/12/6/102/pdf?version=1719391955
allfields_unstemmed	10.3390/risks12060102 doi (DE-627)1898509352 (DE-599)KXP1898509352 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Zweifel, Peter 1946- verfasserin (DE-588)120982196 (DE-627)081009615 (DE-576)16368765X aut Can multi-peril insurance policies mitigate adverse selection? Peter Zweifel and Annette Hofmann 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 The objective of this paper is to pursue an intuitive idea: for a consumer who represents an "unfavorable" health risk but an "excellent risk" as a driver, a multi-peril policy could be associated with a reduced selection effort on the part of the insurer. If this intuition should be confirmed, it will serve to address the decade-long concern with risk selection both in the economic literature and on the part of policy makers. As an illustrative example, a two-peril model is developed in which consumers deploy effort in search of a policy offering them maximum coverage at the current market price while insurers deploy effort designed to stave off unfavorable risks. Two types of Nash equilibria are compared: one in which the insurer is confronted with high-risk and low-risk types, and another one where both types are a "better risk" with regard to a second peril. The difference in the insurer's selection effort directed at high-risk and low-risk types is indeed shown to be lower in the latter case, resulting in a mitigation of adverse selection. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ adverse selection (dpeaa)DE-206 consumer search effort (dpeaa)DE-206 insurer selection effort (dpeaa)DE-206 risk selection (dpeaa)DE-206 Hofmann, Annette 1977- verfasserin (DE-588)138834199 (DE-627)606157018 (DE-576)309292069 aut Enthalten in Risks Basel : MDPI, 2013 12(2024), 6 vom: Juni, Artikel-ID 102, Seite 1-16 Online-Ressource (DE-627)737288485 (DE-600)2704357-5 (DE-576)379467852 2227-9091 nnns volume:12 year:2024 number:6 month:06 elocationid:102 pages:1-16 https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/12/6/102/pdf?version=1719391955 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3390/risks12060102 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 12 2024 6 6 102 1-16 26 01 0206 4565652277 x1z 13-08-24 2403 01 DE-LFER 4574102292 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 03-09-24 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3390/risks12060102 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/12/6/102/pdf?version=1719391955
allfieldsGer	10.3390/risks12060102 doi (DE-627)1898509352 (DE-599)KXP1898509352 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Zweifel, Peter 1946- verfasserin (DE-588)120982196 (DE-627)081009615 (DE-576)16368765X aut Can multi-peril insurance policies mitigate adverse selection? Peter Zweifel and Annette Hofmann 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 The objective of this paper is to pursue an intuitive idea: for a consumer who represents an "unfavorable" health risk but an "excellent risk" as a driver, a multi-peril policy could be associated with a reduced selection effort on the part of the insurer. If this intuition should be confirmed, it will serve to address the decade-long concern with risk selection both in the economic literature and on the part of policy makers. As an illustrative example, a two-peril model is developed in which consumers deploy effort in search of a policy offering them maximum coverage at the current market price while insurers deploy effort designed to stave off unfavorable risks. Two types of Nash equilibria are compared: one in which the insurer is confronted with high-risk and low-risk types, and another one where both types are a "better risk" with regard to a second peril. The difference in the insurer's selection effort directed at high-risk and low-risk types is indeed shown to be lower in the latter case, resulting in a mitigation of adverse selection. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ adverse selection (dpeaa)DE-206 consumer search effort (dpeaa)DE-206 insurer selection effort (dpeaa)DE-206 risk selection (dpeaa)DE-206 Hofmann, Annette 1977- verfasserin (DE-588)138834199 (DE-627)606157018 (DE-576)309292069 aut Enthalten in Risks Basel : MDPI, 2013 12(2024), 6 vom: Juni, Artikel-ID 102, Seite 1-16 Online-Ressource (DE-627)737288485 (DE-600)2704357-5 (DE-576)379467852 2227-9091 nnns volume:12 year:2024 number:6 month:06 elocationid:102 pages:1-16 https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/12/6/102/pdf?version=1719391955 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3390/risks12060102 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 12 2024 6 6 102 1-16 26 01 0206 4565652277 x1z 13-08-24 2403 01 DE-LFER 4574102292 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 03-09-24 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3390/risks12060102 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/12/6/102/pdf?version=1719391955
allfieldsSound	10.3390/risks12060102 doi (DE-627)1898509352 (DE-599)KXP1898509352 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Zweifel, Peter 1946- verfasserin (DE-588)120982196 (DE-627)081009615 (DE-576)16368765X aut Can multi-peril insurance policies mitigate adverse selection? Peter Zweifel and Annette Hofmann 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier DE-206 Open Access Controlled Vocabulary for Access Rights http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 The objective of this paper is to pursue an intuitive idea: for a consumer who represents an "unfavorable" health risk but an "excellent risk" as a driver, a multi-peril policy could be associated with a reduced selection effort on the part of the insurer. If this intuition should be confirmed, it will serve to address the decade-long concern with risk selection both in the economic literature and on the part of policy makers. As an illustrative example, a two-peril model is developed in which consumers deploy effort in search of a policy offering them maximum coverage at the current market price while insurers deploy effort designed to stave off unfavorable risks. Two types of Nash equilibria are compared: one in which the insurer is confronted with high-risk and low-risk types, and another one where both types are a "better risk" with regard to a second peril. The difference in the insurer's selection effort directed at high-risk and low-risk types is indeed shown to be lower in the latter case, resulting in a mitigation of adverse selection. DE-206 Namensnennung 4.0 International CC BY 4.0 cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ adverse selection (dpeaa)DE-206 consumer search effort (dpeaa)DE-206 insurer selection effort (dpeaa)DE-206 risk selection (dpeaa)DE-206 Hofmann, Annette 1977- verfasserin (DE-588)138834199 (DE-627)606157018 (DE-576)309292069 aut Enthalten in Risks Basel : MDPI, 2013 12(2024), 6 vom: Juni, Artikel-ID 102, Seite 1-16 Online-Ressource (DE-627)737288485 (DE-600)2704357-5 (DE-576)379467852 2227-9091 nnns volume:12 year:2024 number:6 month:06 elocationid:102 pages:1-16 https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/12/6/102/pdf?version=1719391955 Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.3390/risks12060102 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER AR 12 2024 6 6 102 1-16 26 01 0206 4565652277 x1z 13-08-24 2403 01 DE-LFER 4574102292 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 03-09-24 2403 01 DE-LFER https://doi.org/10.3390/risks12060102 2403 01 DE-LFER https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/12/6/102/pdf?version=1719391955
language	English
source	Enthalten in Risks 12(2024), 6 vom: Juni, Artikel-ID 102, Seite 1-16 volume:12 year:2024 number:6 month:06 elocationid:102 pages:1-16
sourceStr	Enthalten in Risks 12(2024), 6 vom: Juni, Artikel-ID 102, Seite 1-16 volume:12 year:2024 number:6 month:06 elocationid:102 pages:1-16
format_phy_str_mv	Article
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institution	findex.gbv.de
selectbib_iln_str_mv	26@1z 2403@01
topic_facet	adverse selection consumer search effort insurer selection effort risk selection
isfreeaccess_bool	true
container_title	Risks
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Zweifel, Peter @@aut@@ Hofmann, Annette @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2024-06-01T00:00:00Z
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author	Zweifel, Peter 1946-
spellingShingle	Zweifel, Peter 1946- misc adverse selection misc consumer search effort misc insurer selection effort misc risk selection Can multi-peril insurance policies mitigate adverse selection?
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topic_title	Can multi-peril insurance policies mitigate adverse selection? Peter Zweifel and Annette Hofmann adverse selection (dpeaa)DE-206 consumer search effort (dpeaa)DE-206 insurer selection effort (dpeaa)DE-206 risk selection (dpeaa)DE-206
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title	Can multi-peril insurance policies mitigate adverse selection?
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title_full	Can multi-peril insurance policies mitigate adverse selection? Peter Zweifel and Annette Hofmann
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title_sort	can multi-peril insurance policies mitigate adverse selection?
title_auth	Can multi-peril insurance policies mitigate adverse selection?
abstract	The objective of this paper is to pursue an intuitive idea: for a consumer who represents an "unfavorable" health risk but an "excellent risk" as a driver, a multi-peril policy could be associated with a reduced selection effort on the part of the insurer. If this intuition should be confirmed, it will serve to address the decade-long concern with risk selection both in the economic literature and on the part of policy makers. As an illustrative example, a two-peril model is developed in which consumers deploy effort in search of a policy offering them maximum coverage at the current market price while insurers deploy effort designed to stave off unfavorable risks. Two types of Nash equilibria are compared: one in which the insurer is confronted with high-risk and low-risk types, and another one where both types are a "better risk" with regard to a second peril. The difference in the insurer's selection effort directed at high-risk and low-risk types is indeed shown to be lower in the latter case, resulting in a mitigation of adverse selection.
abstractGer	The objective of this paper is to pursue an intuitive idea: for a consumer who represents an "unfavorable" health risk but an "excellent risk" as a driver, a multi-peril policy could be associated with a reduced selection effort on the part of the insurer. If this intuition should be confirmed, it will serve to address the decade-long concern with risk selection both in the economic literature and on the part of policy makers. As an illustrative example, a two-peril model is developed in which consumers deploy effort in search of a policy offering them maximum coverage at the current market price while insurers deploy effort designed to stave off unfavorable risks. Two types of Nash equilibria are compared: one in which the insurer is confronted with high-risk and low-risk types, and another one where both types are a "better risk" with regard to a second peril. The difference in the insurer's selection effort directed at high-risk and low-risk types is indeed shown to be lower in the latter case, resulting in a mitigation of adverse selection.
abstract_unstemmed	The objective of this paper is to pursue an intuitive idea: for a consumer who represents an "unfavorable" health risk but an "excellent risk" as a driver, a multi-peril policy could be associated with a reduced selection effort on the part of the insurer. If this intuition should be confirmed, it will serve to address the decade-long concern with risk selection both in the economic literature and on the part of policy makers. As an illustrative example, a two-peril model is developed in which consumers deploy effort in search of a policy offering them maximum coverage at the current market price while insurers deploy effort designed to stave off unfavorable risks. Two types of Nash equilibria are compared: one in which the insurer is confronted with high-risk and low-risk types, and another one where both types are a "better risk" with regard to a second peril. The difference in the insurer's selection effort directed at high-risk and low-risk types is indeed shown to be lower in the latter case, resulting in a mitigation of adverse selection.
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title_short	Can multi-peril insurance policies mitigate adverse selection?
url	https://www.mdpi.com/2227-9091/12/6/102/pdf?version=1719391955 https://doi.org/10.3390/risks12060102
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