Tax versus regulations : polluters' incentives for loosening industry emission targets
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Hirose, Kosuke [verfasserIn] Ishihara, Akifumi [verfasserIn] Matsumura, Toshihiro [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2024 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Energy economics - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1979, 136(2024) vom: Aug., Artikel-ID 107705, Seite 1-12 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:136 ; year:2024 ; month:08 ; elocationid:107705 ; pages:1-12 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107705 |
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| Katalog-ID: |
1899167439 |
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| 982 | |2 26 |1 00 |x DE-206 |b We investigate the political incentives of a polluter in affecting industry emission targets (relaxing emission restrictions) imposed by the government in a monopoly market. Specifically, we compare three typical environmental policies-two command-and-control regulations (an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per output unit), and an emission tax. We presume a policy to be most robust when a less strict emission target (i.e., an increase in the targeted emission level) imposed by the government on the industry increases the firm's profit least significantly among the three policies. This is because the firm has the least incentives for affecting emission targets. We find that the emission tax is the most robust if the government aims for a net-zero emission society. However, the emission tax is the least robust if the emission target is not ambitious or the government has weak resolve against political pressures from polluters. | ||
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10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107705 doi (DE-627)1899167439 (DE-599)KXP1899167439 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Hirose, Kosuke verfasserin aut Tax versus regulations polluters' incentives for loosening industry emission targets Kosuke Hirose, Akifumi Ishihara, Toshihiro Matsumura 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Emission cap (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission equivalence (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission intensity (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission tax (dpeaa)DE-206 Net-zero emission industry (dpeaa)DE-206 Profit ranking (dpeaa)DE-206 Ishihara, Akifumi verfasserin aut Matsumura, Toshihiro verfasserin (DE-588)171340272 (DE-627)061531006 (DE-576)132141612 aut Enthalten in Energy economics Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1979 136(2024) vom: Aug., Artikel-ID 107705, Seite 1-12 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320407675 (DE-600)2000893-4 (DE-576)259271071 1873-6181 nnns volume:136 year:2024 month:08 elocationid:107705 pages:1-12 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988324004134/pdfft?md5=44d1928d34ee1d0d3f7391dcc95fe66e&pid=1-s2.0-S0140988324004134-main.pdf Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107705 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 136 2024 8 107705 1-12 26 01 0206 4569106404 x1z 20-08-24 26 00 DE-206 We investigate the political incentives of a polluter in affecting industry emission targets (relaxing emission restrictions) imposed by the government in a monopoly market. Specifically, we compare three typical environmental policies-two command-and-control regulations (an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per output unit), and an emission tax. We presume a policy to be most robust when a less strict emission target (i.e., an increase in the targeted emission level) imposed by the government on the industry increases the firm's profit least significantly among the three policies. This is because the firm has the least incentives for affecting emission targets. We find that the emission tax is the most robust if the government aims for a net-zero emission society. However, the emission tax is the least robust if the emission target is not ambitious or the government has weak resolve against political pressures from polluters. |
| spelling |
10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107705 doi (DE-627)1899167439 (DE-599)KXP1899167439 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Hirose, Kosuke verfasserin aut Tax versus regulations polluters' incentives for loosening industry emission targets Kosuke Hirose, Akifumi Ishihara, Toshihiro Matsumura 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Emission cap (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission equivalence (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission intensity (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission tax (dpeaa)DE-206 Net-zero emission industry (dpeaa)DE-206 Profit ranking (dpeaa)DE-206 Ishihara, Akifumi verfasserin aut Matsumura, Toshihiro verfasserin (DE-588)171340272 (DE-627)061531006 (DE-576)132141612 aut Enthalten in Energy economics Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1979 136(2024) vom: Aug., Artikel-ID 107705, Seite 1-12 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320407675 (DE-600)2000893-4 (DE-576)259271071 1873-6181 nnns volume:136 year:2024 month:08 elocationid:107705 pages:1-12 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988324004134/pdfft?md5=44d1928d34ee1d0d3f7391dcc95fe66e&pid=1-s2.0-S0140988324004134-main.pdf Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107705 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 136 2024 8 107705 1-12 26 01 0206 4569106404 x1z 20-08-24 26 00 DE-206 We investigate the political incentives of a polluter in affecting industry emission targets (relaxing emission restrictions) imposed by the government in a monopoly market. Specifically, we compare three typical environmental policies-two command-and-control regulations (an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per output unit), and an emission tax. We presume a policy to be most robust when a less strict emission target (i.e., an increase in the targeted emission level) imposed by the government on the industry increases the firm's profit least significantly among the three policies. This is because the firm has the least incentives for affecting emission targets. We find that the emission tax is the most robust if the government aims for a net-zero emission society. However, the emission tax is the least robust if the emission target is not ambitious or the government has weak resolve against political pressures from polluters. |
| allfields_unstemmed |
10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107705 doi (DE-627)1899167439 (DE-599)KXP1899167439 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Hirose, Kosuke verfasserin aut Tax versus regulations polluters' incentives for loosening industry emission targets Kosuke Hirose, Akifumi Ishihara, Toshihiro Matsumura 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Emission cap (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission equivalence (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission intensity (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission tax (dpeaa)DE-206 Net-zero emission industry (dpeaa)DE-206 Profit ranking (dpeaa)DE-206 Ishihara, Akifumi verfasserin aut Matsumura, Toshihiro verfasserin (DE-588)171340272 (DE-627)061531006 (DE-576)132141612 aut Enthalten in Energy economics Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1979 136(2024) vom: Aug., Artikel-ID 107705, Seite 1-12 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320407675 (DE-600)2000893-4 (DE-576)259271071 1873-6181 nnns volume:136 year:2024 month:08 elocationid:107705 pages:1-12 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988324004134/pdfft?md5=44d1928d34ee1d0d3f7391dcc95fe66e&pid=1-s2.0-S0140988324004134-main.pdf Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107705 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 136 2024 8 107705 1-12 26 01 0206 4569106404 x1z 20-08-24 26 00 DE-206 We investigate the political incentives of a polluter in affecting industry emission targets (relaxing emission restrictions) imposed by the government in a monopoly market. Specifically, we compare three typical environmental policies-two command-and-control regulations (an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per output unit), and an emission tax. We presume a policy to be most robust when a less strict emission target (i.e., an increase in the targeted emission level) imposed by the government on the industry increases the firm's profit least significantly among the three policies. This is because the firm has the least incentives for affecting emission targets. We find that the emission tax is the most robust if the government aims for a net-zero emission society. However, the emission tax is the least robust if the emission target is not ambitious or the government has weak resolve against political pressures from polluters. |
| allfieldsGer |
10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107705 doi (DE-627)1899167439 (DE-599)KXP1899167439 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Hirose, Kosuke verfasserin aut Tax versus regulations polluters' incentives for loosening industry emission targets Kosuke Hirose, Akifumi Ishihara, Toshihiro Matsumura 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Emission cap (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission equivalence (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission intensity (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission tax (dpeaa)DE-206 Net-zero emission industry (dpeaa)DE-206 Profit ranking (dpeaa)DE-206 Ishihara, Akifumi verfasserin aut Matsumura, Toshihiro verfasserin (DE-588)171340272 (DE-627)061531006 (DE-576)132141612 aut Enthalten in Energy economics Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1979 136(2024) vom: Aug., Artikel-ID 107705, Seite 1-12 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320407675 (DE-600)2000893-4 (DE-576)259271071 1873-6181 nnns volume:136 year:2024 month:08 elocationid:107705 pages:1-12 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988324004134/pdfft?md5=44d1928d34ee1d0d3f7391dcc95fe66e&pid=1-s2.0-S0140988324004134-main.pdf Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107705 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 136 2024 8 107705 1-12 26 01 0206 4569106404 x1z 20-08-24 26 00 DE-206 We investigate the political incentives of a polluter in affecting industry emission targets (relaxing emission restrictions) imposed by the government in a monopoly market. Specifically, we compare three typical environmental policies-two command-and-control regulations (an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per output unit), and an emission tax. We presume a policy to be most robust when a less strict emission target (i.e., an increase in the targeted emission level) imposed by the government on the industry increases the firm's profit least significantly among the three policies. This is because the firm has the least incentives for affecting emission targets. We find that the emission tax is the most robust if the government aims for a net-zero emission society. However, the emission tax is the least robust if the emission target is not ambitious or the government has weak resolve against political pressures from polluters. |
| allfieldsSound |
10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107705 doi (DE-627)1899167439 (DE-599)KXP1899167439 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Hirose, Kosuke verfasserin aut Tax versus regulations polluters' incentives for loosening industry emission targets Kosuke Hirose, Akifumi Ishihara, Toshihiro Matsumura 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Emission cap (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission equivalence (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission intensity (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission tax (dpeaa)DE-206 Net-zero emission industry (dpeaa)DE-206 Profit ranking (dpeaa)DE-206 Ishihara, Akifumi verfasserin aut Matsumura, Toshihiro verfasserin (DE-588)171340272 (DE-627)061531006 (DE-576)132141612 aut Enthalten in Energy economics Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1979 136(2024) vom: Aug., Artikel-ID 107705, Seite 1-12 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320407675 (DE-600)2000893-4 (DE-576)259271071 1873-6181 nnns volume:136 year:2024 month:08 elocationid:107705 pages:1-12 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988324004134/pdfft?md5=44d1928d34ee1d0d3f7391dcc95fe66e&pid=1-s2.0-S0140988324004134-main.pdf Verlag lizenzpflichtig https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107705 Resolving-System lizenzpflichtig GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 136 2024 8 107705 1-12 26 01 0206 4569106404 x1z 20-08-24 26 00 DE-206 We investigate the political incentives of a polluter in affecting industry emission targets (relaxing emission restrictions) imposed by the government in a monopoly market. Specifically, we compare three typical environmental policies-two command-and-control regulations (an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per output unit), and an emission tax. We presume a policy to be most robust when a less strict emission target (i.e., an increase in the targeted emission level) imposed by the government on the industry increases the firm's profit least significantly among the three policies. This is because the firm has the least incentives for affecting emission targets. We find that the emission tax is the most robust if the government aims for a net-zero emission society. However, the emission tax is the least robust if the emission target is not ambitious or the government has weak resolve against political pressures from polluters. |
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26 00 DE-206 We investigate the political incentives of a polluter in affecting industry emission targets (relaxing emission restrictions) imposed by the government in a monopoly market. Specifically, we compare three typical environmental policies-two command-and-control regulations (an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per output unit), and an emission tax. We presume a policy to be most robust when a less strict emission target (i.e., an increase in the targeted emission level) imposed by the government on the industry increases the firm's profit least significantly among the three policies. This is because the firm has the least incentives for affecting emission targets. We find that the emission tax is the most robust if the government aims for a net-zero emission society. However, the emission tax is the least robust if the emission target is not ambitious or the government has weak resolve against political pressures from polluters Tax versus regulations polluters' incentives for loosening industry emission targets Kosuke Hirose, Akifumi Ishihara, Toshihiro Matsumura Emission cap (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission equivalence (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission intensity (dpeaa)DE-206 Emission tax (dpeaa)DE-206 Net-zero emission industry (dpeaa)DE-206 Profit ranking (dpeaa)DE-206 |
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code="a">GBV_ILN_4306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4307</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4322</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4326</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4328</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4333</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4334</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4393</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">136</subfield><subfield code="j">2024</subfield><subfield code="c">8</subfield><subfield code="i">107705</subfield><subfield code="h">1-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="980" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">26</subfield><subfield code="1">01</subfield><subfield code="x">0206</subfield><subfield code="b">4569106404</subfield><subfield code="y">x1z</subfield><subfield code="z">20-08-24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="982" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">26</subfield><subfield code="1">00</subfield><subfield code="x">DE-206</subfield><subfield code="b">We investigate the political incentives of a polluter in affecting industry emission targets (relaxing emission restrictions) imposed by the government in a monopoly market. Specifically, we compare three typical environmental policies-two command-and-control regulations (an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per output unit), and an emission tax. We presume a policy to be most robust when a less strict emission target (i.e., an increase in the targeted emission level) imposed by the government on the industry increases the firm's profit least significantly among the three policies. This is because the firm has the least incentives for affecting emission targets. We find that the emission tax is the most robust if the government aims for a net-zero emission society. However, the emission tax is the least robust if the emission target is not ambitious or the government has weak resolve against political pressures from polluters.</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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