Bargaining and rent seeking : asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Imai, Haruo [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2024

Schlagwörter:	Bargaining Rent-seeking SSPE

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Economics letters - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1978, 240(2024) vom: Juli, Artikel-ID 111776, Seite 1-4
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:240 ; year:2024 ; month:07 ; elocationid:111776 ; pages:1-4

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen

DOI / URN:	10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111776

Katalog-ID:	1906412626

Internformat


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982			\|2 26 \|1 00 \|x DE-206 \|b We consider a Baron-Ferejon-type bargaining model with recognition probabilities determined by a Tullock contest. The contest is conducted once-and-for-all before bargaining a la Yildirim (2010). It is known that for ex-ante symmetric players, there are no symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in pure investment strategies. Here, we show the existence of an asymmetric SSPE, when players are sufficiently patient.

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allfields	10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111776 doi (DE-627)1906412626 (DE-599)KXP1906412626 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Imai, Haruo verfasserin (DE-588)170311791 (DE-627)060382813 (DE-576)131209043 aut Bargaining and rent seeking asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels Haruo Imai 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Bargaining (dpeaa)DE-206 Rent-seeking (dpeaa)DE-206 SSPE (dpeaa)DE-206 Enthalten in Economics letters Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1978 240(2024) vom: Juli, Artikel-ID 111776, Seite 1-4 Online-Ressource (DE-627)253781477 (DE-600)1460581-8 (DE-576)072794240 0165-1765 nnns volume:240 year:2024 month:07 elocationid:111776 pages:1-4 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517652400260X/pdfft?md5=eaa422eea719f081a5b0ab9bf670cb9c&pid=1-s2.0-S016517652400260X-main.pdf Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111776 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4155 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4315 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4598 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 240 2024 7 111776 1-4 26 01 0206 4600826442 x1z 22-10-24 26 00 DE-206 We consider a Baron-Ferejon-type bargaining model with recognition probabilities determined by a Tullock contest. The contest is conducted once-and-for-all before bargaining a la Yildirim (2010). It is known that for ex-ante symmetric players, there are no symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in pure investment strategies. Here, we show the existence of an asymmetric SSPE, when players are sufficiently patient.
spelling	10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111776 doi (DE-627)1906412626 (DE-599)KXP1906412626 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Imai, Haruo verfasserin (DE-588)170311791 (DE-627)060382813 (DE-576)131209043 aut Bargaining and rent seeking asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels Haruo Imai 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Bargaining (dpeaa)DE-206 Rent-seeking (dpeaa)DE-206 SSPE (dpeaa)DE-206 Enthalten in Economics letters Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1978 240(2024) vom: Juli, Artikel-ID 111776, Seite 1-4 Online-Ressource (DE-627)253781477 (DE-600)1460581-8 (DE-576)072794240 0165-1765 nnns volume:240 year:2024 month:07 elocationid:111776 pages:1-4 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517652400260X/pdfft?md5=eaa422eea719f081a5b0ab9bf670cb9c&pid=1-s2.0-S016517652400260X-main.pdf Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111776 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4155 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4315 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4598 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 240 2024 7 111776 1-4 26 01 0206 4600826442 x1z 22-10-24 26 00 DE-206 We consider a Baron-Ferejon-type bargaining model with recognition probabilities determined by a Tullock contest. The contest is conducted once-and-for-all before bargaining a la Yildirim (2010). It is known that for ex-ante symmetric players, there are no symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in pure investment strategies. Here, we show the existence of an asymmetric SSPE, when players are sufficiently patient.
allfields_unstemmed	10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111776 doi (DE-627)1906412626 (DE-599)KXP1906412626 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Imai, Haruo verfasserin (DE-588)170311791 (DE-627)060382813 (DE-576)131209043 aut Bargaining and rent seeking asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels Haruo Imai 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Bargaining (dpeaa)DE-206 Rent-seeking (dpeaa)DE-206 SSPE (dpeaa)DE-206 Enthalten in Economics letters Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1978 240(2024) vom: Juli, Artikel-ID 111776, Seite 1-4 Online-Ressource (DE-627)253781477 (DE-600)1460581-8 (DE-576)072794240 0165-1765 nnns volume:240 year:2024 month:07 elocationid:111776 pages:1-4 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517652400260X/pdfft?md5=eaa422eea719f081a5b0ab9bf670cb9c&pid=1-s2.0-S016517652400260X-main.pdf Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111776 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4155 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4315 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4598 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 240 2024 7 111776 1-4 26 01 0206 4600826442 x1z 22-10-24 26 00 DE-206 We consider a Baron-Ferejon-type bargaining model with recognition probabilities determined by a Tullock contest. The contest is conducted once-and-for-all before bargaining a la Yildirim (2010). It is known that for ex-ante symmetric players, there are no symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in pure investment strategies. Here, we show the existence of an asymmetric SSPE, when players are sufficiently patient.
allfieldsGer	10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111776 doi (DE-627)1906412626 (DE-599)KXP1906412626 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Imai, Haruo verfasserin (DE-588)170311791 (DE-627)060382813 (DE-576)131209043 aut Bargaining and rent seeking asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels Haruo Imai 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Bargaining (dpeaa)DE-206 Rent-seeking (dpeaa)DE-206 SSPE (dpeaa)DE-206 Enthalten in Economics letters Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1978 240(2024) vom: Juli, Artikel-ID 111776, Seite 1-4 Online-Ressource (DE-627)253781477 (DE-600)1460581-8 (DE-576)072794240 0165-1765 nnns volume:240 year:2024 month:07 elocationid:111776 pages:1-4 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517652400260X/pdfft?md5=eaa422eea719f081a5b0ab9bf670cb9c&pid=1-s2.0-S016517652400260X-main.pdf Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111776 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4155 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4315 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4598 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 240 2024 7 111776 1-4 26 01 0206 4600826442 x1z 22-10-24 26 00 DE-206 We consider a Baron-Ferejon-type bargaining model with recognition probabilities determined by a Tullock contest. The contest is conducted once-and-for-all before bargaining a la Yildirim (2010). It is known that for ex-ante symmetric players, there are no symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in pure investment strategies. Here, we show the existence of an asymmetric SSPE, when players are sufficiently patient.
allfieldsSound	10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111776 doi (DE-627)1906412626 (DE-599)KXP1906412626 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Imai, Haruo verfasserin (DE-588)170311791 (DE-627)060382813 (DE-576)131209043 aut Bargaining and rent seeking asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels Haruo Imai 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Bargaining (dpeaa)DE-206 Rent-seeking (dpeaa)DE-206 SSPE (dpeaa)DE-206 Enthalten in Economics letters Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1978 240(2024) vom: Juli, Artikel-ID 111776, Seite 1-4 Online-Ressource (DE-627)253781477 (DE-600)1460581-8 (DE-576)072794240 0165-1765 nnns volume:240 year:2024 month:07 elocationid:111776 pages:1-4 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517652400260X/pdfft?md5=eaa422eea719f081a5b0ab9bf670cb9c&pid=1-s2.0-S016517652400260X-main.pdf Verlag kostenfrei https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111776 Resolving-System kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4029 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4116 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4155 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4311 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4314 GBV_ILN_4315 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4598 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 240 2024 7 111776 1-4 26 01 0206 4600826442 x1z 22-10-24 26 00 DE-206 We consider a Baron-Ferejon-type bargaining model with recognition probabilities determined by a Tullock contest. The contest is conducted once-and-for-all before bargaining a la Yildirim (2010). It is known that for ex-ante symmetric players, there are no symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in pure investment strategies. Here, we show the existence of an asymmetric SSPE, when players are sufficiently patient.
language	English
source	Enthalten in Economics letters 240(2024) vom: Juli, Artikel-ID 111776, Seite 1-4 volume:240 year:2024 month:07 elocationid:111776 pages:1-4
sourceStr	Enthalten in Economics letters 240(2024) vom: Juli, Artikel-ID 111776, Seite 1-4 volume:240 year:2024 month:07 elocationid:111776 pages:1-4
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topic_facet	Bargaining Rent-seeking SSPE
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container_title	Economics letters
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Imai, Haruo @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2024-07-01T00:00:00Z
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The contest is conducted once-and-for-all before bargaining a la Yildirim (2010). It is known that for ex-ante symmetric players, there are no symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in pure investment strategies. Here, we show the existence of an asymmetric SSPE, when players are sufficiently patient.</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
author	Imai, Haruo
spellingShingle	Imai, Haruo misc Bargaining misc Rent-seeking misc SSPE Bargaining and rent seeking asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels
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topic_title	26 00 DE-206 We consider a Baron-Ferejon-type bargaining model with recognition probabilities determined by a Tullock contest. The contest is conducted once-and-for-all before bargaining a la Yildirim (2010). It is known that for ex-ante symmetric players, there are no symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in pure investment strategies. Here, we show the existence of an asymmetric SSPE, when players are sufficiently patient Bargaining and rent seeking asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels Haruo Imai Bargaining (dpeaa)DE-206 Rent-seeking (dpeaa)DE-206 SSPE (dpeaa)DE-206
topic	misc Bargaining misc Rent-seeking misc SSPE
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title	Bargaining and rent seeking asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels
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title_full	Bargaining and rent seeking asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels Haruo Imai
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title_sort	bargaining and rent seekingasymmetric equilibria with two investment levels
title_auth	Bargaining and rent seeking asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels
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title_short	Bargaining and rent seeking
url	https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517652400260X/pdfft?md5=eaa422eea719f081a5b0ab9bf670cb9c&pid=1-s2.0-S016517652400260X-main.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111776
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ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="2">26</subfield><subfield code="1">00</subfield><subfield code="x">DE-206</subfield><subfield code="b">We consider a Baron-Ferejon-type bargaining model with recognition probabilities determined by a Tullock contest. The contest is conducted once-and-for-all before bargaining a la Yildirim (2010). It is known that for ex-ante symmetric players, there are no symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in pure investment strategies. Here, we show the existence of an asymmetric SSPE, when players are sufficiently patient.</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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Bargaining and rent seeking : asymmetric equilibria with two investment levels

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