Does a least-preferred candidate win a seat? : a comparison of three electoral systems

In this paper, the differences between two variations of proportional representation (PR), open-list PR and closed-list PR, are analyzed in terms of their ability to accurately reflect voter preference. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is also included in the comparison as a benchmark. We cons...
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Autor*in:	Hizen, Yoichi [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2015

Umfang:	graph. Darst.

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Economies - Basel : MDPI, 2013, 3(2015), 1 vom: März, Seite 2-36
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:3 ; year:2015 ; number:1 ; month:03 ; pages:2-36

Links:	Volltext Volltext

DOI / URN:	10.3390/economies3010002

Katalog-ID:	827781962

Internformat


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spelling	10.3390/economies3010002 doi 10419/167717 hdl (DE-627)827781962 (DE-576)9827781960 (DE-599)GBV827781962 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng D27 jelc Hizen, Yoichi verfasserin aut Does a least-preferred candidate win a seat? a comparison of three electoral systems Yoichi Hizen 2015 graph. Darst. Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In this paper, the differences between two variations of proportional representation (PR), open-list PR and closed-list PR, are analyzed in terms of their ability to accurately reflect voter preference. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is also included in the comparison as a benchmark. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a candidate who is least preferred by voters in the sense that replacing the least-preferred candidate in the set of winners with any loser is Pareto improving, and our focus is on whether the least-preferred candidate wins under each electoral system. We demonstrate that the least-preferred candidate never wins under the SNTV, but can win under open-list PR, although this is less likely than winning under closed-list PR. In Economies Basel : MDPI, 2013 3(2015), 1 vom: März, Seite 2-36 Online-Ressource (DE-627)737287551 (DE-600)2704214-5 (DE-576)379466600 2227-7099 nnns volume:3 year:2015 number:1 month:03 pages:2-36 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167717 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/economies3010002 Resolving-System Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER zbwolc20150726 AR 3 2015 1 3 2-36 26 01 0206 1548950599 z1k 22-06-15 2403 01 DE-LFER 3475385473 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 12-05-19 2403 01 DE-LFER http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167717 26 00 DE-206 56 open list 26 00 DE-206 56 closed list 26 00 DE-206 56 proportional representation 26 00 DE-206 56 single nontransferable vote 26 00 DE-206 56 voting equilibria
allfields_unstemmed	10.3390/economies3010002 doi 10419/167717 hdl (DE-627)827781962 (DE-576)9827781960 (DE-599)GBV827781962 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng D27 jelc Hizen, Yoichi verfasserin aut Does a least-preferred candidate win a seat? a comparison of three electoral systems Yoichi Hizen 2015 graph. Darst. Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In this paper, the differences between two variations of proportional representation (PR), open-list PR and closed-list PR, are analyzed in terms of their ability to accurately reflect voter preference. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is also included in the comparison as a benchmark. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a candidate who is least preferred by voters in the sense that replacing the least-preferred candidate in the set of winners with any loser is Pareto improving, and our focus is on whether the least-preferred candidate wins under each electoral system. We demonstrate that the least-preferred candidate never wins under the SNTV, but can win under open-list PR, although this is less likely than winning under closed-list PR. In Economies Basel : MDPI, 2013 3(2015), 1 vom: März, Seite 2-36 Online-Ressource (DE-627)737287551 (DE-600)2704214-5 (DE-576)379466600 2227-7099 nnns volume:3 year:2015 number:1 month:03 pages:2-36 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167717 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/economies3010002 Resolving-System Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER zbwolc20150726 AR 3 2015 1 3 2-36 26 01 0206 1548950599 z1k 22-06-15 2403 01 DE-LFER 3475385473 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 12-05-19 2403 01 DE-LFER http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167717 26 00 DE-206 56 open list 26 00 DE-206 56 closed list 26 00 DE-206 56 proportional representation 26 00 DE-206 56 single nontransferable vote 26 00 DE-206 56 voting equilibria
allfieldsGer	10.3390/economies3010002 doi 10419/167717 hdl (DE-627)827781962 (DE-576)9827781960 (DE-599)GBV827781962 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng D27 jelc Hizen, Yoichi verfasserin aut Does a least-preferred candidate win a seat? a comparison of three electoral systems Yoichi Hizen 2015 graph. Darst. Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In this paper, the differences between two variations of proportional representation (PR), open-list PR and closed-list PR, are analyzed in terms of their ability to accurately reflect voter preference. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is also included in the comparison as a benchmark. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a candidate who is least preferred by voters in the sense that replacing the least-preferred candidate in the set of winners with any loser is Pareto improving, and our focus is on whether the least-preferred candidate wins under each electoral system. We demonstrate that the least-preferred candidate never wins under the SNTV, but can win under open-list PR, although this is less likely than winning under closed-list PR. In Economies Basel : MDPI, 2013 3(2015), 1 vom: März, Seite 2-36 Online-Ressource (DE-627)737287551 (DE-600)2704214-5 (DE-576)379466600 2227-7099 nnns volume:3 year:2015 number:1 month:03 pages:2-36 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167717 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/economies3010002 Resolving-System Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER zbwolc20150726 AR 3 2015 1 3 2-36 26 01 0206 1548950599 z1k 22-06-15 2403 01 DE-LFER 3475385473 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 12-05-19 2403 01 DE-LFER http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167717 26 00 DE-206 56 open list 26 00 DE-206 56 closed list 26 00 DE-206 56 proportional representation 26 00 DE-206 56 single nontransferable vote 26 00 DE-206 56 voting equilibria
allfieldsSound	10.3390/economies3010002 doi 10419/167717 hdl (DE-627)827781962 (DE-576)9827781960 (DE-599)GBV827781962 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng D27 jelc Hizen, Yoichi verfasserin aut Does a least-preferred candidate win a seat? a comparison of three electoral systems Yoichi Hizen 2015 graph. Darst. Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In this paper, the differences between two variations of proportional representation (PR), open-list PR and closed-list PR, are analyzed in terms of their ability to accurately reflect voter preference. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is also included in the comparison as a benchmark. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a candidate who is least preferred by voters in the sense that replacing the least-preferred candidate in the set of winners with any loser is Pareto improving, and our focus is on whether the least-preferred candidate wins under each electoral system. We demonstrate that the least-preferred candidate never wins under the SNTV, but can win under open-list PR, although this is less likely than winning under closed-list PR. In Economies Basel : MDPI, 2013 3(2015), 1 vom: März, Seite 2-36 Online-Ressource (DE-627)737287551 (DE-600)2704214-5 (DE-576)379466600 2227-7099 nnns volume:3 year:2015 number:1 month:03 pages:2-36 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167717 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/economies3010002 Resolving-System Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER zbwolc20150726 AR 3 2015 1 3 2-36 26 01 0206 1548950599 z1k 22-06-15 2403 01 DE-LFER 3475385473 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 12-05-19 2403 01 DE-LFER http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167717 26 00 DE-206 56 open list 26 00 DE-206 56 closed list 26 00 DE-206 56 proportional representation 26 00 DE-206 56 single nontransferable vote 26 00 DE-206 56 voting equilibria
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author	Hizen, Yoichi
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topic_title	D27 jelc 26 00 DE-206 56 open list 26 00 DE-206 56 closed list 26 00 DE-206 56 proportional representation 26 00 DE-206 56 single nontransferable vote 26 00 DE-206 56 voting equilibria Does a least-preferred candidate win a seat? a comparison of three electoral systems Yoichi Hizen
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title	Does a least-preferred candidate win a seat? a comparison of three electoral systems
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title_full	Does a least-preferred candidate win a seat? a comparison of three electoral systems Yoichi Hizen
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title_sub	a comparison of three electoral systems
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title_sort	does a least-preferred candidate win a seat?a comparison of three electoral systems
title_auth	Does a least-preferred candidate win a seat? a comparison of three electoral systems
abstract	In this paper, the differences between two variations of proportional representation (PR), open-list PR and closed-list PR, are analyzed in terms of their ability to accurately reflect voter preference. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is also included in the comparison as a benchmark. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a candidate who is least preferred by voters in the sense that replacing the least-preferred candidate in the set of winners with any loser is Pareto improving, and our focus is on whether the least-preferred candidate wins under each electoral system. We demonstrate that the least-preferred candidate never wins under the SNTV, but can win under open-list PR, although this is less likely than winning under closed-list PR.
abstractGer	In this paper, the differences between two variations of proportional representation (PR), open-list PR and closed-list PR, are analyzed in terms of their ability to accurately reflect voter preference. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is also included in the comparison as a benchmark. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a candidate who is least preferred by voters in the sense that replacing the least-preferred candidate in the set of winners with any loser is Pareto improving, and our focus is on whether the least-preferred candidate wins under each electoral system. We demonstrate that the least-preferred candidate never wins under the SNTV, but can win under open-list PR, although this is less likely than winning under closed-list PR.
abstract_unstemmed	In this paper, the differences between two variations of proportional representation (PR), open-list PR and closed-list PR, are analyzed in terms of their ability to accurately reflect voter preference. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is also included in the comparison as a benchmark. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a candidate who is least preferred by voters in the sense that replacing the least-preferred candidate in the set of winners with any loser is Pareto improving, and our focus is on whether the least-preferred candidate wins under each electoral system. We demonstrate that the least-preferred candidate never wins under the SNTV, but can win under open-list PR, although this is less likely than winning under closed-list PR.
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title_short	Does a least-preferred candidate win a seat?
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167717 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/economies3010002
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Does a least-preferred candidate win a seat? : a comparison of three electoral systems

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