Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty : an experiment

Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the gro...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Puzon, Klarizze Anne [verfasserIn] Willinger, Marc [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	March 2016

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Games - Basel : MDPI, 2010, 7(2016), 1 vom: März, Seite 1-11
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:7 ; year:2016 ; number:1 ; month:03 ; pages:1-11

Links:	Volltext Volltext

DOI / URN:	10.3390/g7010002

Katalog-ID:	857216864

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spelling	10.3390/g7010002 doi 10419/167967 hdl (DE-627)857216864 (DE-576)9857216862 (DE-599)GBV857216864 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng C72 C91 D72 P48 Q33 jelc Puzon, Klarizze Anne verfasserin aut Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty an experiment Klarizze Anne Puzon, Marc Willinger March 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the group determines how much of the common-pool resource to protect from second-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the unprotected resource. We consider two treatments: anarchy (consisting of the second stage only) and with a leader deciding in the first stage. We find that the existence of institutions is not always better than anarchy. This is aggravated when the resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource protection. When leaders are malevolent, i.e., they chose weak resource protection, outcomes are worse than when institutions are absent. Willinger, Marc verfasserin (DE-588)170793869 (DE-627)06092845X (DE-576)131646044 aut Enthalten in Games Basel : MDPI, 2010 7(2016), 1 vom: März, Seite 1-11 Online-Ressource (DE-627)614096553 (DE-600)2527220-2 (DE-576)31395867X 2073-4336 nnns volume:7 year:2016 number:1 month:03 pages:1-11 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167967 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g7010002 Resolving-System Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER zbwolc20160604 AR 7 2016 1 3 1-11 26 01 0206 1611188466 x1k 20-04-16 2403 01 DE-LFER 3475416263 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 13-05-19 2403 01 DE-LFER http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167967 26 00 DE-206 56 paradox of the plenty 26 00 DE-206 56 conflict 26 00 DE-206 56 governance 26 00 DE-206 56 natural resources 26 00 DE-206 56 laboratory experiments 26 00 DE-206 56 contests
allfields_unstemmed	10.3390/g7010002 doi 10419/167967 hdl (DE-627)857216864 (DE-576)9857216862 (DE-599)GBV857216864 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng C72 C91 D72 P48 Q33 jelc Puzon, Klarizze Anne verfasserin aut Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty an experiment Klarizze Anne Puzon, Marc Willinger March 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the group determines how much of the common-pool resource to protect from second-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the unprotected resource. We consider two treatments: anarchy (consisting of the second stage only) and with a leader deciding in the first stage. We find that the existence of institutions is not always better than anarchy. This is aggravated when the resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource protection. When leaders are malevolent, i.e., they chose weak resource protection, outcomes are worse than when institutions are absent. Willinger, Marc verfasserin (DE-588)170793869 (DE-627)06092845X (DE-576)131646044 aut Enthalten in Games Basel : MDPI, 2010 7(2016), 1 vom: März, Seite 1-11 Online-Ressource (DE-627)614096553 (DE-600)2527220-2 (DE-576)31395867X 2073-4336 nnns volume:7 year:2016 number:1 month:03 pages:1-11 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167967 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g7010002 Resolving-System Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER zbwolc20160604 AR 7 2016 1 3 1-11 26 01 0206 1611188466 x1k 20-04-16 2403 01 DE-LFER 3475416263 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 13-05-19 2403 01 DE-LFER http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167967 26 00 DE-206 56 paradox of the plenty 26 00 DE-206 56 conflict 26 00 DE-206 56 governance 26 00 DE-206 56 natural resources 26 00 DE-206 56 laboratory experiments 26 00 DE-206 56 contests
allfieldsGer	10.3390/g7010002 doi 10419/167967 hdl (DE-627)857216864 (DE-576)9857216862 (DE-599)GBV857216864 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng C72 C91 D72 P48 Q33 jelc Puzon, Klarizze Anne verfasserin aut Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty an experiment Klarizze Anne Puzon, Marc Willinger March 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the group determines how much of the common-pool resource to protect from second-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the unprotected resource. We consider two treatments: anarchy (consisting of the second stage only) and with a leader deciding in the first stage. We find that the existence of institutions is not always better than anarchy. This is aggravated when the resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource protection. When leaders are malevolent, i.e., they chose weak resource protection, outcomes are worse than when institutions are absent. Willinger, Marc verfasserin (DE-588)170793869 (DE-627)06092845X (DE-576)131646044 aut Enthalten in Games Basel : MDPI, 2010 7(2016), 1 vom: März, Seite 1-11 Online-Ressource (DE-627)614096553 (DE-600)2527220-2 (DE-576)31395867X 2073-4336 nnns volume:7 year:2016 number:1 month:03 pages:1-11 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167967 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g7010002 Resolving-System Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER zbwolc20160604 AR 7 2016 1 3 1-11 26 01 0206 1611188466 x1k 20-04-16 2403 01 DE-LFER 3475416263 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 13-05-19 2403 01 DE-LFER http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167967 26 00 DE-206 56 paradox of the plenty 26 00 DE-206 56 conflict 26 00 DE-206 56 governance 26 00 DE-206 56 natural resources 26 00 DE-206 56 laboratory experiments 26 00 DE-206 56 contests
allfieldsSound	10.3390/g7010002 doi 10419/167967 hdl (DE-627)857216864 (DE-576)9857216862 (DE-599)GBV857216864 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng C72 C91 D72 P48 Q33 jelc Puzon, Klarizze Anne verfasserin aut Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty an experiment Klarizze Anne Puzon, Marc Willinger March 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the group determines how much of the common-pool resource to protect from second-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the unprotected resource. We consider two treatments: anarchy (consisting of the second stage only) and with a leader deciding in the first stage. We find that the existence of institutions is not always better than anarchy. This is aggravated when the resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource protection. When leaders are malevolent, i.e., they chose weak resource protection, outcomes are worse than when institutions are absent. Willinger, Marc verfasserin (DE-588)170793869 (DE-627)06092845X (DE-576)131646044 aut Enthalten in Games Basel : MDPI, 2010 7(2016), 1 vom: März, Seite 1-11 Online-Ressource (DE-627)614096553 (DE-600)2527220-2 (DE-576)31395867X 2073-4336 nnns volume:7 year:2016 number:1 month:03 pages:1-11 http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167967 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g7010002 Resolving-System Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ILN_26 ISIL_DE-206 SYSFLAG_1 GBV_KXP GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_2403 GBV_ILN_2403 ISIL_DE-LFER zbwolc20160604 AR 7 2016 1 3 1-11 26 01 0206 1611188466 x1k 20-04-16 2403 01 DE-LFER 3475416263 00 --%%-- --%%-- n --%%-- l01 13-05-19 2403 01 DE-LFER http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167967 26 00 DE-206 56 paradox of the plenty 26 00 DE-206 56 conflict 26 00 DE-206 56 governance 26 00 DE-206 56 natural resources 26 00 DE-206 56 laboratory experiments 26 00 DE-206 56 contests
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title_full	Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty an experiment Klarizze Anne Puzon, Marc Willinger
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title_sort	malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plentyan experiment
title_auth	Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty an experiment
abstract	Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the group determines how much of the common-pool resource to protect from second-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the unprotected resource. We consider two treatments: anarchy (consisting of the second stage only) and with a leader deciding in the first stage. We find that the existence of institutions is not always better than anarchy. This is aggravated when the resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource protection. When leaders are malevolent, i.e., they chose weak resource protection, outcomes are worse than when institutions are absent.
abstractGer	Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the group determines how much of the common-pool resource to protect from second-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the unprotected resource. We consider two treatments: anarchy (consisting of the second stage only) and with a leader deciding in the first stage. We find that the existence of institutions is not always better than anarchy. This is aggravated when the resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource protection. When leaders are malevolent, i.e., they chose weak resource protection, outcomes are worse than when institutions are absent.
abstract_unstemmed	Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the group determines how much of the common-pool resource to protect from second-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the unprotected resource. We consider two treatments: anarchy (consisting of the second stage only) and with a leader deciding in the first stage. We find that the existence of institutions is not always better than anarchy. This is aggravated when the resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource protection. When leaders are malevolent, i.e., they chose weak resource protection, outcomes are worse than when institutions are absent.
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title_short	Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty
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fullrecord_marcxml	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a2200265 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">857216864</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20170909012252.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">160420s2016 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.3390/g7010002</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10419/167967</subfield><subfield code="2">hdl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)857216864</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-576)9857216862</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBV857216864</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">C72</subfield><subfield code="a">C91</subfield><subfield code="a">D72</subfield><subfield code="a">P48</subfield><subfield code="a">Q33</subfield><subfield code="2">jelc</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Puzon, Klarizze Anne</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty</subfield><subfield code="b">an experiment</subfield><subfield code="c">Klarizze Anne Puzon, Marc Willinger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">March 2016</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the group determines how much of the common-pool resource to protect from second-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the unprotected resource. We consider two treatments: anarchy (consisting of the second stage only) and with a leader deciding in the first stage. We find that the existence of institutions is not always better than anarchy. This is aggravated when the resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource protection. 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