Moral Luck from Bernard Williams’ Point of View
Moral luck is an important issue in meta- ethics. Its conflict to principle of control make challenges to moral moral assessment, moral judgment and moral responsibility. Bernard Williams is the first philosopher who uses the expression "moral luck" and tries to show that the contradiction...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Zahra Khazai ; Fatemeh Tamaddon [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch ; Persisch |
Erschienen: |
2016 |
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Schlagwörter: |
Moral luck; Bernard Williams; Epistemic luck; Luck; Morality |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: Journal of Philosophical Investigations - University of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen Languages, 2015, 10(2016), 18, Seite 189-218 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:10 ; year:2016 ; number:18 ; pages:189-218 |
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DOAJ000529699 |
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(DE-627)DOAJ000529699 (DE-599)DOAJ2a157acd319549248cd566b6a06f5c77 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng per B1-5802 Zahra Khazai ; Fatemeh Tamaddon verfasserin aut Moral Luck from Bernard Williams’ Point of View 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Moral luck is an important issue in meta- ethics. Its conflict to principle of control make challenges to moral moral assessment, moral judgment and moral responsibility. Bernard Williams is the first philosopher who uses the expression "moral luck" and tries to show that the contradiction between “moral” and “luck” is not so serious. Against Kantian’s idea and also our intuitions Williams doesn’t believe that morality is immune of luck and that unlike other values, is accessible to all people. If moral value is accessible to all, according to his idea, it should be not only immune of luck but also supreme. Giving some examples, Williams by concepts like justification, regret and retrospective, shows that morality hasn’t these characteristics. Dividing moral luck into four types: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal, Thomas Nagel puts Williams' moral luck under the first type and criticizes it. This study seeks to explain Bernard Williams’ viewpoint on moral luck. At first it clears types of moral luck, principle of control and its contradiction with moral luck, then after explaining Williams’ account of moral luck criticizes it. Nagel’s criticisms and others show that although they accept the existence of moral luck and also their account is compatible to williams’ but they deny williams’ success in defending of this phenomenon. Finally, despite of all critiques, it seems that Williams’ failure in defense of moral luck didn’t decrease the importance of this matter, but made some stronger ideas were appeared by Thomas Nagel in this regard. Moral luck; Bernard Williams; Epistemic luck; Luck; Morality Philosophy (General) In Journal of Philosophical Investigations University of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen Languages, 2015 10(2016), 18, Seite 189-218 (DE-627)1029475903 (DE-600)2940539-7 24234419 nnns volume:10 year:2016 number:18 pages:189-218 https://doaj.org/article/2a157acd319549248cd566b6a06f5c77 kostenfrei http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_5230.html kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2251-7960 Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2423-4419 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2016 18 189-218 |
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(DE-627)DOAJ000529699 (DE-599)DOAJ2a157acd319549248cd566b6a06f5c77 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng per B1-5802 Zahra Khazai ; Fatemeh Tamaddon verfasserin aut Moral Luck from Bernard Williams’ Point of View 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Moral luck is an important issue in meta- ethics. Its conflict to principle of control make challenges to moral moral assessment, moral judgment and moral responsibility. Bernard Williams is the first philosopher who uses the expression "moral luck" and tries to show that the contradiction between “moral” and “luck” is not so serious. Against Kantian’s idea and also our intuitions Williams doesn’t believe that morality is immune of luck and that unlike other values, is accessible to all people. If moral value is accessible to all, according to his idea, it should be not only immune of luck but also supreme. Giving some examples, Williams by concepts like justification, regret and retrospective, shows that morality hasn’t these characteristics. Dividing moral luck into four types: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal, Thomas Nagel puts Williams' moral luck under the first type and criticizes it. This study seeks to explain Bernard Williams’ viewpoint on moral luck. At first it clears types of moral luck, principle of control and its contradiction with moral luck, then after explaining Williams’ account of moral luck criticizes it. Nagel’s criticisms and others show that although they accept the existence of moral luck and also their account is compatible to williams’ but they deny williams’ success in defending of this phenomenon. Finally, despite of all critiques, it seems that Williams’ failure in defense of moral luck didn’t decrease the importance of this matter, but made some stronger ideas were appeared by Thomas Nagel in this regard. Moral luck; Bernard Williams; Epistemic luck; Luck; Morality Philosophy (General) In Journal of Philosophical Investigations University of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen Languages, 2015 10(2016), 18, Seite 189-218 (DE-627)1029475903 (DE-600)2940539-7 24234419 nnns volume:10 year:2016 number:18 pages:189-218 https://doaj.org/article/2a157acd319549248cd566b6a06f5c77 kostenfrei http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_5230.html kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2251-7960 Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2423-4419 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2016 18 189-218 |
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(DE-627)DOAJ000529699 (DE-599)DOAJ2a157acd319549248cd566b6a06f5c77 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng per B1-5802 Zahra Khazai ; Fatemeh Tamaddon verfasserin aut Moral Luck from Bernard Williams’ Point of View 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Moral luck is an important issue in meta- ethics. Its conflict to principle of control make challenges to moral moral assessment, moral judgment and moral responsibility. Bernard Williams is the first philosopher who uses the expression "moral luck" and tries to show that the contradiction between “moral” and “luck” is not so serious. Against Kantian’s idea and also our intuitions Williams doesn’t believe that morality is immune of luck and that unlike other values, is accessible to all people. If moral value is accessible to all, according to his idea, it should be not only immune of luck but also supreme. Giving some examples, Williams by concepts like justification, regret and retrospective, shows that morality hasn’t these characteristics. Dividing moral luck into four types: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal, Thomas Nagel puts Williams' moral luck under the first type and criticizes it. This study seeks to explain Bernard Williams’ viewpoint on moral luck. At first it clears types of moral luck, principle of control and its contradiction with moral luck, then after explaining Williams’ account of moral luck criticizes it. Nagel’s criticisms and others show that although they accept the existence of moral luck and also their account is compatible to williams’ but they deny williams’ success in defending of this phenomenon. Finally, despite of all critiques, it seems that Williams’ failure in defense of moral luck didn’t decrease the importance of this matter, but made some stronger ideas were appeared by Thomas Nagel in this regard. Moral luck; Bernard Williams; Epistemic luck; Luck; Morality Philosophy (General) In Journal of Philosophical Investigations University of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen Languages, 2015 10(2016), 18, Seite 189-218 (DE-627)1029475903 (DE-600)2940539-7 24234419 nnns volume:10 year:2016 number:18 pages:189-218 https://doaj.org/article/2a157acd319549248cd566b6a06f5c77 kostenfrei http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_5230.html kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2251-7960 Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2423-4419 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2016 18 189-218 |
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(DE-627)DOAJ000529699 (DE-599)DOAJ2a157acd319549248cd566b6a06f5c77 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng per B1-5802 Zahra Khazai ; Fatemeh Tamaddon verfasserin aut Moral Luck from Bernard Williams’ Point of View 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Moral luck is an important issue in meta- ethics. Its conflict to principle of control make challenges to moral moral assessment, moral judgment and moral responsibility. Bernard Williams is the first philosopher who uses the expression "moral luck" and tries to show that the contradiction between “moral” and “luck” is not so serious. Against Kantian’s idea and also our intuitions Williams doesn’t believe that morality is immune of luck and that unlike other values, is accessible to all people. If moral value is accessible to all, according to his idea, it should be not only immune of luck but also supreme. Giving some examples, Williams by concepts like justification, regret and retrospective, shows that morality hasn’t these characteristics. Dividing moral luck into four types: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal, Thomas Nagel puts Williams' moral luck under the first type and criticizes it. This study seeks to explain Bernard Williams’ viewpoint on moral luck. At first it clears types of moral luck, principle of control and its contradiction with moral luck, then after explaining Williams’ account of moral luck criticizes it. Nagel’s criticisms and others show that although they accept the existence of moral luck and also their account is compatible to williams’ but they deny williams’ success in defending of this phenomenon. Finally, despite of all critiques, it seems that Williams’ failure in defense of moral luck didn’t decrease the importance of this matter, but made some stronger ideas were appeared by Thomas Nagel in this regard. Moral luck; Bernard Williams; Epistemic luck; Luck; Morality Philosophy (General) In Journal of Philosophical Investigations University of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen Languages, 2015 10(2016), 18, Seite 189-218 (DE-627)1029475903 (DE-600)2940539-7 24234419 nnns volume:10 year:2016 number:18 pages:189-218 https://doaj.org/article/2a157acd319549248cd566b6a06f5c77 kostenfrei http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_5230.html kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2251-7960 Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2423-4419 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2016 18 189-218 |
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(DE-627)DOAJ000529699 (DE-599)DOAJ2a157acd319549248cd566b6a06f5c77 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng per B1-5802 Zahra Khazai ; Fatemeh Tamaddon verfasserin aut Moral Luck from Bernard Williams’ Point of View 2016 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Moral luck is an important issue in meta- ethics. Its conflict to principle of control make challenges to moral moral assessment, moral judgment and moral responsibility. Bernard Williams is the first philosopher who uses the expression "moral luck" and tries to show that the contradiction between “moral” and “luck” is not so serious. Against Kantian’s idea and also our intuitions Williams doesn’t believe that morality is immune of luck and that unlike other values, is accessible to all people. If moral value is accessible to all, according to his idea, it should be not only immune of luck but also supreme. Giving some examples, Williams by concepts like justification, regret and retrospective, shows that morality hasn’t these characteristics. Dividing moral luck into four types: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal, Thomas Nagel puts Williams' moral luck under the first type and criticizes it. This study seeks to explain Bernard Williams’ viewpoint on moral luck. At first it clears types of moral luck, principle of control and its contradiction with moral luck, then after explaining Williams’ account of moral luck criticizes it. Nagel’s criticisms and others show that although they accept the existence of moral luck and also their account is compatible to williams’ but they deny williams’ success in defending of this phenomenon. Finally, despite of all critiques, it seems that Williams’ failure in defense of moral luck didn’t decrease the importance of this matter, but made some stronger ideas were appeared by Thomas Nagel in this regard. Moral luck; Bernard Williams; Epistemic luck; Luck; Morality Philosophy (General) In Journal of Philosophical Investigations University of Tabriz, Faculty of Literature and Forigen Languages, 2015 10(2016), 18, Seite 189-218 (DE-627)1029475903 (DE-600)2940539-7 24234419 nnns volume:10 year:2016 number:18 pages:189-218 https://doaj.org/article/2a157acd319549248cd566b6a06f5c77 kostenfrei http://philosophy.tabrizu.ac.ir/article_5230.html kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2251-7960 Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2423-4419 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2016 18 189-218 |
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Moral luck is an important issue in meta- ethics. Its conflict to principle of control make challenges to moral moral assessment, moral judgment and moral responsibility. Bernard Williams is the first philosopher who uses the expression "moral luck" and tries to show that the contradiction between “moral” and “luck” is not so serious. Against Kantian’s idea and also our intuitions Williams doesn’t believe that morality is immune of luck and that unlike other values, is accessible to all people. If moral value is accessible to all, according to his idea, it should be not only immune of luck but also supreme. Giving some examples, Williams by concepts like justification, regret and retrospective, shows that morality hasn’t these characteristics. Dividing moral luck into four types: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal, Thomas Nagel puts Williams' moral luck under the first type and criticizes it. This study seeks to explain Bernard Williams’ viewpoint on moral luck. At first it clears types of moral luck, principle of control and its contradiction with moral luck, then after explaining Williams’ account of moral luck criticizes it. Nagel’s criticisms and others show that although they accept the existence of moral luck and also their account is compatible to williams’ but they deny williams’ success in defending of this phenomenon. Finally, despite of all critiques, it seems that Williams’ failure in defense of moral luck didn’t decrease the importance of this matter, but made some stronger ideas were appeared by Thomas Nagel in this regard. |
abstractGer |
Moral luck is an important issue in meta- ethics. Its conflict to principle of control make challenges to moral moral assessment, moral judgment and moral responsibility. Bernard Williams is the first philosopher who uses the expression "moral luck" and tries to show that the contradiction between “moral” and “luck” is not so serious. Against Kantian’s idea and also our intuitions Williams doesn’t believe that morality is immune of luck and that unlike other values, is accessible to all people. If moral value is accessible to all, according to his idea, it should be not only immune of luck but also supreme. Giving some examples, Williams by concepts like justification, regret and retrospective, shows that morality hasn’t these characteristics. Dividing moral luck into four types: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal, Thomas Nagel puts Williams' moral luck under the first type and criticizes it. This study seeks to explain Bernard Williams’ viewpoint on moral luck. At first it clears types of moral luck, principle of control and its contradiction with moral luck, then after explaining Williams’ account of moral luck criticizes it. Nagel’s criticisms and others show that although they accept the existence of moral luck and also their account is compatible to williams’ but they deny williams’ success in defending of this phenomenon. Finally, despite of all critiques, it seems that Williams’ failure in defense of moral luck didn’t decrease the importance of this matter, but made some stronger ideas were appeared by Thomas Nagel in this regard. |
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Moral luck is an important issue in meta- ethics. Its conflict to principle of control make challenges to moral moral assessment, moral judgment and moral responsibility. Bernard Williams is the first philosopher who uses the expression "moral luck" and tries to show that the contradiction between “moral” and “luck” is not so serious. Against Kantian’s idea and also our intuitions Williams doesn’t believe that morality is immune of luck and that unlike other values, is accessible to all people. If moral value is accessible to all, according to his idea, it should be not only immune of luck but also supreme. Giving some examples, Williams by concepts like justification, regret and retrospective, shows that morality hasn’t these characteristics. Dividing moral luck into four types: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal, Thomas Nagel puts Williams' moral luck under the first type and criticizes it. This study seeks to explain Bernard Williams’ viewpoint on moral luck. At first it clears types of moral luck, principle of control and its contradiction with moral luck, then after explaining Williams’ account of moral luck criticizes it. Nagel’s criticisms and others show that although they accept the existence of moral luck and also their account is compatible to williams’ but they deny williams’ success in defending of this phenomenon. Finally, despite of all critiques, it seems that Williams’ failure in defense of moral luck didn’t decrease the importance of this matter, but made some stronger ideas were appeared by Thomas Nagel in this regard. |
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score |
7.398546 |