The Relation Between Tobacco Tax Structure and Corruption in European Union Member States

<i<Background</i<: Taxing tobacco products is one of the most effective tobacco control measures, and most countries apply a combination of specific taxes, which comprise a fixed amount per cigarette or gram of hand-rolling tobacco, and ad valorem taxes, which increase in proportion to the cost of the product. Since specific taxes reduce price differentials across tobacco product ranges while ad valorem taxes amplify them, we hypothesised that tobacco companies seeking to minimise the effect of tax increases on sales across a range of products will tend to favour, and hence lobby for, ad valorem rather than specific taxes; and that relatively corrupt governments would be more susceptible to such lobbying and hence, more likely to favour ad valorem taxes. <i<Methods</i<: We searched for cigarette tax data and Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for current 28 EU Member States for the years 1995 to 2017/8. Trends in cigarette tax levels and the ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes at a national and mean EU level were analysed by visual inspection, the within-country relation between the ad valorem to specific tax ratio and CPI scores over time by time-series regression analysis, and at EU level, for which complete data were available from 1995 to 2017, using a multi-level regression model. <i<Results</i<: Within most Member States, the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio declined over the study period and was not significantly associated with corruption score. However, at an aggregate EU-level, our multi-level model indicated that reduced corruption was associated with a significant increase in the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio, by 0.04 (95% confidence interval: 0.003−0.077, <i<p</i< < 0.036) per unit increase in CPI score. <i<Conclusions</i<: The ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes declined in most EU Member States over the study period, with no evidence that those with higher levels of perceived corruption tended to favour ad valorem taxes. Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Ajay Shah [verfasserIn] Katie Eminson [verfasserIn] Ilze Bogdanovica [verfasserIn] John Britton [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2019

Schlagwörter:	tobacco tax European Union corruption

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health - MDPI AG, 2005, 16(2019), 16, p 2842
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:16 ; year:2019 ; number:16, p 2842

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.3390/ijerph16162842

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ008383855

Internformat


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allfields	10.3390/ijerph16162842 doi (DE-627)DOAJ008383855 (DE-599)DOAJfc9008e37e134555bad442fa6d70dab0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Ajay Shah verfasserin aut The Relation Between Tobacco Tax Structure and Corruption in European Union Member States 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier <i<Background</i<: Taxing tobacco products is one of the most effective tobacco control measures, and most countries apply a combination of specific taxes, which comprise a fixed amount per cigarette or gram of hand-rolling tobacco, and ad valorem taxes, which increase in proportion to the cost of the product. Since specific taxes reduce price differentials across tobacco product ranges while ad valorem taxes amplify them, we hypothesised that tobacco companies seeking to minimise the effect of tax increases on sales across a range of products will tend to favour, and hence lobby for, ad valorem rather than specific taxes; and that relatively corrupt governments would be more susceptible to such lobbying and hence, more likely to favour ad valorem taxes. <i<Methods</i<: We searched for cigarette tax data and Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for current 28 EU Member States for the years 1995 to 2017/8. Trends in cigarette tax levels and the ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes at a national and mean EU level were analysed by visual inspection, the within-country relation between the ad valorem to specific tax ratio and CPI scores over time by time-series regression analysis, and at EU level, for which complete data were available from 1995 to 2017, using a multi-level regression model. <i<Results</i<: Within most Member States, the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio declined over the study period and was not significantly associated with corruption score. However, at an aggregate EU-level, our multi-level model indicated that reduced corruption was associated with a significant increase in the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio, by 0.04 (95% confidence interval: 0.003−0.077, <i<p</i< < 0.036) per unit increase in CPI score. <i<Conclusions</i<: The ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes declined in most EU Member States over the study period, with no evidence that those with higher levels of perceived corruption tended to favour ad valorem taxes. tobacco tax European Union corruption Medicine R Katie Eminson verfasserin aut Ilze Bogdanovica verfasserin aut John Britton verfasserin aut In International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health MDPI AG, 2005 16(2019), 16, p 2842 (DE-627)477992463 (DE-600)2175195-X 16604601 nnns volume:16 year:2019 number:16, p 2842 https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16162842 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/fc9008e37e134555bad442fa6d70dab0 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/16/16/2842 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1660-4601 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 16 2019 16, p 2842
spelling	10.3390/ijerph16162842 doi (DE-627)DOAJ008383855 (DE-599)DOAJfc9008e37e134555bad442fa6d70dab0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Ajay Shah verfasserin aut The Relation Between Tobacco Tax Structure and Corruption in European Union Member States 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier <i<Background</i<: Taxing tobacco products is one of the most effective tobacco control measures, and most countries apply a combination of specific taxes, which comprise a fixed amount per cigarette or gram of hand-rolling tobacco, and ad valorem taxes, which increase in proportion to the cost of the product. Since specific taxes reduce price differentials across tobacco product ranges while ad valorem taxes amplify them, we hypothesised that tobacco companies seeking to minimise the effect of tax increases on sales across a range of products will tend to favour, and hence lobby for, ad valorem rather than specific taxes; and that relatively corrupt governments would be more susceptible to such lobbying and hence, more likely to favour ad valorem taxes. <i<Methods</i<: We searched for cigarette tax data and Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for current 28 EU Member States for the years 1995 to 2017/8. Trends in cigarette tax levels and the ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes at a national and mean EU level were analysed by visual inspection, the within-country relation between the ad valorem to specific tax ratio and CPI scores over time by time-series regression analysis, and at EU level, for which complete data were available from 1995 to 2017, using a multi-level regression model. <i<Results</i<: Within most Member States, the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio declined over the study period and was not significantly associated with corruption score. However, at an aggregate EU-level, our multi-level model indicated that reduced corruption was associated with a significant increase in the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio, by 0.04 (95% confidence interval: 0.003−0.077, <i<p</i< < 0.036) per unit increase in CPI score. <i<Conclusions</i<: The ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes declined in most EU Member States over the study period, with no evidence that those with higher levels of perceived corruption tended to favour ad valorem taxes. tobacco tax European Union corruption Medicine R Katie Eminson verfasserin aut Ilze Bogdanovica verfasserin aut John Britton verfasserin aut In International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health MDPI AG, 2005 16(2019), 16, p 2842 (DE-627)477992463 (DE-600)2175195-X 16604601 nnns volume:16 year:2019 number:16, p 2842 https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16162842 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/fc9008e37e134555bad442fa6d70dab0 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/16/16/2842 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1660-4601 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 16 2019 16, p 2842
allfields_unstemmed	10.3390/ijerph16162842 doi (DE-627)DOAJ008383855 (DE-599)DOAJfc9008e37e134555bad442fa6d70dab0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Ajay Shah verfasserin aut The Relation Between Tobacco Tax Structure and Corruption in European Union Member States 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier <i<Background</i<: Taxing tobacco products is one of the most effective tobacco control measures, and most countries apply a combination of specific taxes, which comprise a fixed amount per cigarette or gram of hand-rolling tobacco, and ad valorem taxes, which increase in proportion to the cost of the product. Since specific taxes reduce price differentials across tobacco product ranges while ad valorem taxes amplify them, we hypothesised that tobacco companies seeking to minimise the effect of tax increases on sales across a range of products will tend to favour, and hence lobby for, ad valorem rather than specific taxes; and that relatively corrupt governments would be more susceptible to such lobbying and hence, more likely to favour ad valorem taxes. <i<Methods</i<: We searched for cigarette tax data and Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for current 28 EU Member States for the years 1995 to 2017/8. Trends in cigarette tax levels and the ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes at a national and mean EU level were analysed by visual inspection, the within-country relation between the ad valorem to specific tax ratio and CPI scores over time by time-series regression analysis, and at EU level, for which complete data were available from 1995 to 2017, using a multi-level regression model. <i<Results</i<: Within most Member States, the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio declined over the study period and was not significantly associated with corruption score. However, at an aggregate EU-level, our multi-level model indicated that reduced corruption was associated with a significant increase in the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio, by 0.04 (95% confidence interval: 0.003−0.077, <i<p</i< < 0.036) per unit increase in CPI score. <i<Conclusions</i<: The ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes declined in most EU Member States over the study period, with no evidence that those with higher levels of perceived corruption tended to favour ad valorem taxes. tobacco tax European Union corruption Medicine R Katie Eminson verfasserin aut Ilze Bogdanovica verfasserin aut John Britton verfasserin aut In International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health MDPI AG, 2005 16(2019), 16, p 2842 (DE-627)477992463 (DE-600)2175195-X 16604601 nnns volume:16 year:2019 number:16, p 2842 https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16162842 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/fc9008e37e134555bad442fa6d70dab0 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/16/16/2842 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1660-4601 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 16 2019 16, p 2842
allfieldsGer	10.3390/ijerph16162842 doi (DE-627)DOAJ008383855 (DE-599)DOAJfc9008e37e134555bad442fa6d70dab0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Ajay Shah verfasserin aut The Relation Between Tobacco Tax Structure and Corruption in European Union Member States 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier <i<Background</i<: Taxing tobacco products is one of the most effective tobacco control measures, and most countries apply a combination of specific taxes, which comprise a fixed amount per cigarette or gram of hand-rolling tobacco, and ad valorem taxes, which increase in proportion to the cost of the product. Since specific taxes reduce price differentials across tobacco product ranges while ad valorem taxes amplify them, we hypothesised that tobacco companies seeking to minimise the effect of tax increases on sales across a range of products will tend to favour, and hence lobby for, ad valorem rather than specific taxes; and that relatively corrupt governments would be more susceptible to such lobbying and hence, more likely to favour ad valorem taxes. <i<Methods</i<: We searched for cigarette tax data and Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for current 28 EU Member States for the years 1995 to 2017/8. Trends in cigarette tax levels and the ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes at a national and mean EU level were analysed by visual inspection, the within-country relation between the ad valorem to specific tax ratio and CPI scores over time by time-series regression analysis, and at EU level, for which complete data were available from 1995 to 2017, using a multi-level regression model. <i<Results</i<: Within most Member States, the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio declined over the study period and was not significantly associated with corruption score. However, at an aggregate EU-level, our multi-level model indicated that reduced corruption was associated with a significant increase in the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio, by 0.04 (95% confidence interval: 0.003−0.077, <i<p</i< < 0.036) per unit increase in CPI score. <i<Conclusions</i<: The ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes declined in most EU Member States over the study period, with no evidence that those with higher levels of perceived corruption tended to favour ad valorem taxes. tobacco tax European Union corruption Medicine R Katie Eminson verfasserin aut Ilze Bogdanovica verfasserin aut John Britton verfasserin aut In International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health MDPI AG, 2005 16(2019), 16, p 2842 (DE-627)477992463 (DE-600)2175195-X 16604601 nnns volume:16 year:2019 number:16, p 2842 https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16162842 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/fc9008e37e134555bad442fa6d70dab0 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/16/16/2842 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1660-4601 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 16 2019 16, p 2842
allfieldsSound	10.3390/ijerph16162842 doi (DE-627)DOAJ008383855 (DE-599)DOAJfc9008e37e134555bad442fa6d70dab0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Ajay Shah verfasserin aut The Relation Between Tobacco Tax Structure and Corruption in European Union Member States 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier <i<Background</i<: Taxing tobacco products is one of the most effective tobacco control measures, and most countries apply a combination of specific taxes, which comprise a fixed amount per cigarette or gram of hand-rolling tobacco, and ad valorem taxes, which increase in proportion to the cost of the product. Since specific taxes reduce price differentials across tobacco product ranges while ad valorem taxes amplify them, we hypothesised that tobacco companies seeking to minimise the effect of tax increases on sales across a range of products will tend to favour, and hence lobby for, ad valorem rather than specific taxes; and that relatively corrupt governments would be more susceptible to such lobbying and hence, more likely to favour ad valorem taxes. <i<Methods</i<: We searched for cigarette tax data and Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for current 28 EU Member States for the years 1995 to 2017/8. Trends in cigarette tax levels and the ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes at a national and mean EU level were analysed by visual inspection, the within-country relation between the ad valorem to specific tax ratio and CPI scores over time by time-series regression analysis, and at EU level, for which complete data were available from 1995 to 2017, using a multi-level regression model. <i<Results</i<: Within most Member States, the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio declined over the study period and was not significantly associated with corruption score. However, at an aggregate EU-level, our multi-level model indicated that reduced corruption was associated with a significant increase in the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio, by 0.04 (95% confidence interval: 0.003−0.077, <i<p</i< < 0.036) per unit increase in CPI score. <i<Conclusions</i<: The ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes declined in most EU Member States over the study period, with no evidence that those with higher levels of perceived corruption tended to favour ad valorem taxes. tobacco tax European Union corruption Medicine R Katie Eminson verfasserin aut Ilze Bogdanovica verfasserin aut John Britton verfasserin aut In International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health MDPI AG, 2005 16(2019), 16, p 2842 (DE-627)477992463 (DE-600)2175195-X 16604601 nnns volume:16 year:2019 number:16, p 2842 https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16162842 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/fc9008e37e134555bad442fa6d70dab0 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/16/16/2842 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1660-4601 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 16 2019 16, p 2842
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source	In International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 16(2019), 16, p 2842 volume:16 year:2019 number:16, p 2842
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author	Ajay Shah
spellingShingle	Ajay Shah misc tobacco tax misc European Union misc corruption misc Medicine misc R The Relation Between Tobacco Tax Structure and Corruption in European Union Member States
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topic_title	The Relation Between Tobacco Tax Structure and Corruption in European Union Member States tobacco tax European Union corruption
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title	The Relation Between Tobacco Tax Structure and Corruption in European Union Member States
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title_full	The Relation Between Tobacco Tax Structure and Corruption in European Union Member States
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title_sort	relation between tobacco tax structure and corruption in european union member states
title_auth	The Relation Between Tobacco Tax Structure and Corruption in European Union Member States
abstract	<i<Background</i<: Taxing tobacco products is one of the most effective tobacco control measures, and most countries apply a combination of specific taxes, which comprise a fixed amount per cigarette or gram of hand-rolling tobacco, and ad valorem taxes, which increase in proportion to the cost of the product. Since specific taxes reduce price differentials across tobacco product ranges while ad valorem taxes amplify them, we hypothesised that tobacco companies seeking to minimise the effect of tax increases on sales across a range of products will tend to favour, and hence lobby for, ad valorem rather than specific taxes; and that relatively corrupt governments would be more susceptible to such lobbying and hence, more likely to favour ad valorem taxes. <i<Methods</i<: We searched for cigarette tax data and Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for current 28 EU Member States for the years 1995 to 2017/8. Trends in cigarette tax levels and the ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes at a national and mean EU level were analysed by visual inspection, the within-country relation between the ad valorem to specific tax ratio and CPI scores over time by time-series regression analysis, and at EU level, for which complete data were available from 1995 to 2017, using a multi-level regression model. <i<Results</i<: Within most Member States, the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio declined over the study period and was not significantly associated with corruption score. However, at an aggregate EU-level, our multi-level model indicated that reduced corruption was associated with a significant increase in the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio, by 0.04 (95% confidence interval: 0.003−0.077, <i<p</i< < 0.036) per unit increase in CPI score. <i<Conclusions</i<: The ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes declined in most EU Member States over the study period, with no evidence that those with higher levels of perceived corruption tended to favour ad valorem taxes.
abstractGer	<i<Background</i<: Taxing tobacco products is one of the most effective tobacco control measures, and most countries apply a combination of specific taxes, which comprise a fixed amount per cigarette or gram of hand-rolling tobacco, and ad valorem taxes, which increase in proportion to the cost of the product. Since specific taxes reduce price differentials across tobacco product ranges while ad valorem taxes amplify them, we hypothesised that tobacco companies seeking to minimise the effect of tax increases on sales across a range of products will tend to favour, and hence lobby for, ad valorem rather than specific taxes; and that relatively corrupt governments would be more susceptible to such lobbying and hence, more likely to favour ad valorem taxes. <i<Methods</i<: We searched for cigarette tax data and Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for current 28 EU Member States for the years 1995 to 2017/8. Trends in cigarette tax levels and the ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes at a national and mean EU level were analysed by visual inspection, the within-country relation between the ad valorem to specific tax ratio and CPI scores over time by time-series regression analysis, and at EU level, for which complete data were available from 1995 to 2017, using a multi-level regression model. <i<Results</i<: Within most Member States, the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio declined over the study period and was not significantly associated with corruption score. However, at an aggregate EU-level, our multi-level model indicated that reduced corruption was associated with a significant increase in the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio, by 0.04 (95% confidence interval: 0.003−0.077, <i<p</i< < 0.036) per unit increase in CPI score. <i<Conclusions</i<: The ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes declined in most EU Member States over the study period, with no evidence that those with higher levels of perceived corruption tended to favour ad valorem taxes.
abstract_unstemmed	<i<Background</i<: Taxing tobacco products is one of the most effective tobacco control measures, and most countries apply a combination of specific taxes, which comprise a fixed amount per cigarette or gram of hand-rolling tobacco, and ad valorem taxes, which increase in proportion to the cost of the product. Since specific taxes reduce price differentials across tobacco product ranges while ad valorem taxes amplify them, we hypothesised that tobacco companies seeking to minimise the effect of tax increases on sales across a range of products will tend to favour, and hence lobby for, ad valorem rather than specific taxes; and that relatively corrupt governments would be more susceptible to such lobbying and hence, more likely to favour ad valorem taxes. <i<Methods</i<: We searched for cigarette tax data and Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for current 28 EU Member States for the years 1995 to 2017/8. Trends in cigarette tax levels and the ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes at a national and mean EU level were analysed by visual inspection, the within-country relation between the ad valorem to specific tax ratio and CPI scores over time by time-series regression analysis, and at EU level, for which complete data were available from 1995 to 2017, using a multi-level regression model. <i<Results</i<: Within most Member States, the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio declined over the study period and was not significantly associated with corruption score. However, at an aggregate EU-level, our multi-level model indicated that reduced corruption was associated with a significant increase in the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio, by 0.04 (95% confidence interval: 0.003−0.077, <i<p</i< < 0.036) per unit increase in CPI score. <i<Conclusions</i<: The ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes declined in most EU Member States over the study period, with no evidence that those with higher levels of perceived corruption tended to favour ad valorem taxes.
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Trends in cigarette tax levels and the ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes at a national and mean EU level were analysed by visual inspection, the within-country relation between the ad valorem to specific tax ratio and CPI scores over time by time-series regression analysis, and at EU level, for which complete data were available from 1995 to 2017, using a multi-level regression model. <i<Results</i<: Within most Member States, the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio declined over the study period and was not significantly associated with corruption score. However, at an aggregate EU-level, our multi-level model indicated that reduced corruption was associated with a significant increase in the ad valorem to specific cigarette tax ratio, by 0.04 (95% confidence interval: 0.003−0.077, <i<p</i< &lt; 0.036) per unit increase in CPI score. <i<Conclusions</i<: The ratio of ad valorem to specific taxes declined in most EU Member States over the study period, with no evidence that those with higher levels of perceived corruption tended to favour ad valorem taxes.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">tobacco tax</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">European Union</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">corruption</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Medicine</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">R</subfield></datafield><datafield 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The Relation Between Tobacco Tax Structure and Corruption in European Union Member States

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