Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development

In game theory, the bargaining problem is defined as an exchange of utilities between negotiators. Assumptions used in game theoretical solutions are often partially or fully not applicable in real situations. The outcome of the bargaining also depends on the parame...
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Autor*in:	Jan ČERVENKA [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2019

Schlagwörter:	game theory bargaining problem bargaining solution bargaining power

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: ACTA VŠFS - University of Finance and Administration, 2015, 13(2019), 1, Seite 79-93
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:13 ; year:2019 ; number:1 ; pages:79-93

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Katalog-ID:	DOAJ011315814

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allfields	(DE-627)DOAJ011315814 (DE-599)DOAJ0e18c333055c4927914932312da316f8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng HB71-74 Jan ČERVENKA verfasserin aut Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In game theory, the bargaining problem is defined as an exchange of utilities between negotiators. Assumptions used in game theoretical solutions are often partially or fully not applicable in real situations. The outcome of the bargaining also depends on the parameter called bargaining power. This parameter, although usually neglected or perceived only as static, determines to a large extent on which negotiator will succeed with his idea of the distribution of utilities. Paper focuses on the identification of the elements of bargaining power, the possibilities of their exploration and development. Bargaining power is described as a combination of facts and abilities that can be variable during bargaining. The paper analyses these facts and abilities, divides them into individual parts and suggests, how to influence them both immediately and in the long run. game theory bargaining problem bargaining solution bargaining power Economics as a science In ACTA VŠFS University of Finance and Administration, 2015 13(2019), 1, Seite 79-93 (DE-627)618799273 (DE-600)2539271-2 18027946 nnns volume:13 year:2019 number:1 pages:79-93 https://doaj.org/article/0e18c333055c4927914932312da316f8 kostenfrei https://www.vsfs.cz/periodika/acta-2019-1-05.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1802-792X Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1802-7946 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2863 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 13 2019 1 79-93
spelling	(DE-627)DOAJ011315814 (DE-599)DOAJ0e18c333055c4927914932312da316f8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng HB71-74 Jan ČERVENKA verfasserin aut Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In game theory, the bargaining problem is defined as an exchange of utilities between negotiators. Assumptions used in game theoretical solutions are often partially or fully not applicable in real situations. The outcome of the bargaining also depends on the parameter called bargaining power. This parameter, although usually neglected or perceived only as static, determines to a large extent on which negotiator will succeed with his idea of the distribution of utilities. Paper focuses on the identification of the elements of bargaining power, the possibilities of their exploration and development. Bargaining power is described as a combination of facts and abilities that can be variable during bargaining. The paper analyses these facts and abilities, divides them into individual parts and suggests, how to influence them both immediately and in the long run. game theory bargaining problem bargaining solution bargaining power Economics as a science In ACTA VŠFS University of Finance and Administration, 2015 13(2019), 1, Seite 79-93 (DE-627)618799273 (DE-600)2539271-2 18027946 nnns volume:13 year:2019 number:1 pages:79-93 https://doaj.org/article/0e18c333055c4927914932312da316f8 kostenfrei https://www.vsfs.cz/periodika/acta-2019-1-05.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1802-792X Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1802-7946 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2863 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 13 2019 1 79-93
allfields_unstemmed	(DE-627)DOAJ011315814 (DE-599)DOAJ0e18c333055c4927914932312da316f8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng HB71-74 Jan ČERVENKA verfasserin aut Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In game theory, the bargaining problem is defined as an exchange of utilities between negotiators. Assumptions used in game theoretical solutions are often partially or fully not applicable in real situations. The outcome of the bargaining also depends on the parameter called bargaining power. This parameter, although usually neglected or perceived only as static, determines to a large extent on which negotiator will succeed with his idea of the distribution of utilities. Paper focuses on the identification of the elements of bargaining power, the possibilities of their exploration and development. Bargaining power is described as a combination of facts and abilities that can be variable during bargaining. The paper analyses these facts and abilities, divides them into individual parts and suggests, how to influence them both immediately and in the long run. game theory bargaining problem bargaining solution bargaining power Economics as a science In ACTA VŠFS University of Finance and Administration, 2015 13(2019), 1, Seite 79-93 (DE-627)618799273 (DE-600)2539271-2 18027946 nnns volume:13 year:2019 number:1 pages:79-93 https://doaj.org/article/0e18c333055c4927914932312da316f8 kostenfrei https://www.vsfs.cz/periodika/acta-2019-1-05.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1802-792X Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1802-7946 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2863 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 13 2019 1 79-93
allfieldsGer	(DE-627)DOAJ011315814 (DE-599)DOAJ0e18c333055c4927914932312da316f8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng HB71-74 Jan ČERVENKA verfasserin aut Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In game theory, the bargaining problem is defined as an exchange of utilities between negotiators. Assumptions used in game theoretical solutions are often partially or fully not applicable in real situations. The outcome of the bargaining also depends on the parameter called bargaining power. This parameter, although usually neglected or perceived only as static, determines to a large extent on which negotiator will succeed with his idea of the distribution of utilities. Paper focuses on the identification of the elements of bargaining power, the possibilities of their exploration and development. Bargaining power is described as a combination of facts and abilities that can be variable during bargaining. The paper analyses these facts and abilities, divides them into individual parts and suggests, how to influence them both immediately and in the long run. game theory bargaining problem bargaining solution bargaining power Economics as a science In ACTA VŠFS University of Finance and Administration, 2015 13(2019), 1, Seite 79-93 (DE-627)618799273 (DE-600)2539271-2 18027946 nnns volume:13 year:2019 number:1 pages:79-93 https://doaj.org/article/0e18c333055c4927914932312da316f8 kostenfrei https://www.vsfs.cz/periodika/acta-2019-1-05.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1802-792X Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1802-7946 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2863 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 13 2019 1 79-93
allfieldsSound	(DE-627)DOAJ011315814 (DE-599)DOAJ0e18c333055c4927914932312da316f8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng HB71-74 Jan ČERVENKA verfasserin aut Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In game theory, the bargaining problem is defined as an exchange of utilities between negotiators. Assumptions used in game theoretical solutions are often partially or fully not applicable in real situations. The outcome of the bargaining also depends on the parameter called bargaining power. This parameter, although usually neglected or perceived only as static, determines to a large extent on which negotiator will succeed with his idea of the distribution of utilities. Paper focuses on the identification of the elements of bargaining power, the possibilities of their exploration and development. Bargaining power is described as a combination of facts and abilities that can be variable during bargaining. The paper analyses these facts and abilities, divides them into individual parts and suggests, how to influence them both immediately and in the long run. game theory bargaining problem bargaining solution bargaining power Economics as a science In ACTA VŠFS University of Finance and Administration, 2015 13(2019), 1, Seite 79-93 (DE-627)618799273 (DE-600)2539271-2 18027946 nnns volume:13 year:2019 number:1 pages:79-93 https://doaj.org/article/0e18c333055c4927914932312da316f8 kostenfrei https://www.vsfs.cz/periodika/acta-2019-1-05.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1802-792X Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1802-7946 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2863 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 13 2019 1 79-93
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callnumber-first	H - Social Science
author	Jan ČERVENKA
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title	Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development
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title_sort	bargaining power: significance, structure and development
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title_auth	Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development
abstract	In game theory, the bargaining problem is defined as an exchange of utilities between negotiators. Assumptions used in game theoretical solutions are often partially or fully not applicable in real situations. The outcome of the bargaining also depends on the parameter called bargaining power. This parameter, although usually neglected or perceived only as static, determines to a large extent on which negotiator will succeed with his idea of the distribution of utilities. Paper focuses on the identification of the elements of bargaining power, the possibilities of their exploration and development. Bargaining power is described as a combination of facts and abilities that can be variable during bargaining. The paper analyses these facts and abilities, divides them into individual parts and suggests, how to influence them both immediately and in the long run.
abstractGer	In game theory, the bargaining problem is defined as an exchange of utilities between negotiators. Assumptions used in game theoretical solutions are often partially or fully not applicable in real situations. The outcome of the bargaining also depends on the parameter called bargaining power. This parameter, although usually neglected or perceived only as static, determines to a large extent on which negotiator will succeed with his idea of the distribution of utilities. Paper focuses on the identification of the elements of bargaining power, the possibilities of their exploration and development. Bargaining power is described as a combination of facts and abilities that can be variable during bargaining. The paper analyses these facts and abilities, divides them into individual parts and suggests, how to influence them both immediately and in the long run.
abstract_unstemmed	In game theory, the bargaining problem is defined as an exchange of utilities between negotiators. Assumptions used in game theoretical solutions are often partially or fully not applicable in real situations. The outcome of the bargaining also depends on the parameter called bargaining power. This parameter, although usually neglected or perceived only as static, determines to a large extent on which negotiator will succeed with his idea of the distribution of utilities. Paper focuses on the identification of the elements of bargaining power, the possibilities of their exploration and development. Bargaining power is described as a combination of facts and abilities that can be variable during bargaining. The paper analyses these facts and abilities, divides them into individual parts and suggests, how to influence them both immediately and in the long run.
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title_short	Bargaining Power: Significance, Structure and Development
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