Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment

We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier from other channels, and one retailer. The platform has a well-known brand that can influence consumers’ purchase decisions, and it provides good-quality products with high prices, while supplier from othe...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Di Xiao [verfasserIn] Qianqian Yang [verfasserIn] Qi Sun [verfasserIn] Huimin Fang [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2021

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Mathematical Problems in Engineering - Hindawi Limited, 2002, (2021)
Übergeordnetes Werk:	year:2021

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.1155/2021/7314687

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ014722925

Internformat


LEADER	01000caa a22002652 4500
001	DOAJ014722925
003	DE-627
005	20230503065228.0
007	cr uuu---uuuuu
008	230226s2021 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c
024	7		\|a 10.1155/2021/7314687 \|2 doi
035			\|a (DE-627)DOAJ014722925
035			\|a (DE-599)DOAJ1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870
040			\|a DE-627 \|b ger \|c DE-627 \|e rakwb
041			\|a eng
050		0	\|a TA1-2040
050		0	\|a QA1-939
100	0		\|a Di Xiao \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
245	1	0	\|a Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment
264		1	\|c 2021
336			\|a Text \|b txt \|2 rdacontent
337			\|a Computermedien \|b c \|2 rdamedia
338			\|a Online-Ressource \|b cr \|2 rdacarrier
520			\|a We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier from other channels, and one retailer. The platform has a well-known brand that can influence consumers’ purchase decisions, and it provides good-quality products with high prices, while supplier from other channels provides cheaper products but possibly with low quality, and there may even be some serious quality problems, sometimes leading to serious problems such as “free-riding” behavior by the retailer and reducing the profits of the supply chain members. First, we study the decisions of platform and retailer under centralized decision (CD) scenario, decentralized decision (DD) scenario, cost sharing contract (CS) scenario, and minimum order quantity contract (QC) scenario. Second, we found that channel conflicts have a negative impact on supply chain members under DD scenario; however, CS and QC scenarios can make the optimal empowerment level of platform the same as CD scenario and encourage retailer to order more products from platform. Finally, the improvement effect in QC and CS scenarios is affected by the substitutability of the two products, the coefficient of empowerment cost, and the reaction coefficient of product price on goodwill. Furthermore, we found that under QC scenario, only within an appropriate range can the platform and the retailer achieve a win-win situation.
653		0	\|a Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General)
653		0	\|a Mathematics
700	0		\|a Qianqian Yang \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
700	0		\|a Qi Sun \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
700	0		\|a Huimin Fang \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
773	0	8	\|i In \|t Mathematical Problems in Engineering \|d Hindawi Limited, 2002 \|g (2021) \|w (DE-627)320519937 \|w (DE-600)2014442-8 \|x 1024123X \|7 nnns
773	1	8	\|g year:2021
856	4	0	\|u https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687 \|z kostenfrei
856	4	0	\|u https://doaj.org/article/1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870 \|z kostenfrei
856	4	0	\|u http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687 \|z kostenfrei
856	4	2	\|u https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X \|y Journal toc \|z kostenfrei
856	4	2	\|u https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147 \|y Journal toc \|z kostenfrei
912			\|a GBV_USEFLAG_A
912			\|a SYSFLAG_A
912			\|a GBV_DOAJ
912			\|a SSG-OLC-PHA
912			\|a GBV_ILN_11
912			\|a GBV_ILN_20
912			\|a GBV_ILN_22
912			\|a GBV_ILN_23
912			\|a GBV_ILN_24
912			\|a GBV_ILN_31
912			\|a GBV_ILN_39
912			\|a GBV_ILN_40
912			\|a GBV_ILN_60
912			\|a GBV_ILN_62
912			\|a GBV_ILN_63
912			\|a GBV_ILN_65
912			\|a GBV_ILN_69
912			\|a GBV_ILN_70
912			\|a GBV_ILN_73
912			\|a GBV_ILN_95
912			\|a GBV_ILN_105
912			\|a GBV_ILN_110
912			\|a GBV_ILN_151
912			\|a GBV_ILN_161
912			\|a GBV_ILN_165
912			\|a GBV_ILN_170
912			\|a GBV_ILN_171
912			\|a GBV_ILN_206
912			\|a GBV_ILN_213
912			\|a GBV_ILN_224
912			\|a GBV_ILN_230
912			\|a GBV_ILN_285
912			\|a GBV_ILN_293
912			\|a GBV_ILN_370
912			\|a GBV_ILN_602
912			\|a GBV_ILN_636
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2003
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2005
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2009
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2011
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2014
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2027
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2055
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2088
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2108
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2111
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2119
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2336
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4012
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4037
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4112
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4125
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4126
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4249
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4305
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4306
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4307
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4313
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4322
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4323
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4324
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4325
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4326
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4335
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4338
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4367
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4700
951			\|a AR
952			\|j 2021

Indexfelder

author_variant	d x dx q y qy q s qs h f hf
matchkey_str	article:1024123X:2021----::etclhnecnlccodntosrtgoeomreupyhiud
hierarchy_sort_str	2021
callnumber-subject-code	TA
publishDate	2021
allfields	10.1155/2021/7314687 doi (DE-627)DOAJ014722925 (DE-599)DOAJ1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TA1-2040 QA1-939 Di Xiao verfasserin aut Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier from other channels, and one retailer. The platform has a well-known brand that can influence consumers’ purchase decisions, and it provides good-quality products with high prices, while supplier from other channels provides cheaper products but possibly with low quality, and there may even be some serious quality problems, sometimes leading to serious problems such as “free-riding” behavior by the retailer and reducing the profits of the supply chain members. First, we study the decisions of platform and retailer under centralized decision (CD) scenario, decentralized decision (DD) scenario, cost sharing contract (CS) scenario, and minimum order quantity contract (QC) scenario. Second, we found that channel conflicts have a negative impact on supply chain members under DD scenario; however, CS and QC scenarios can make the optimal empowerment level of platform the same as CD scenario and encourage retailer to order more products from platform. Finally, the improvement effect in QC and CS scenarios is affected by the substitutability of the two products, the coefficient of empowerment cost, and the reaction coefficient of product price on goodwill. Furthermore, we found that under QC scenario, only within an appropriate range can the platform and the retailer achieve a win-win situation. Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) Mathematics Qianqian Yang verfasserin aut Qi Sun verfasserin aut Huimin Fang verfasserin aut In Mathematical Problems in Engineering Hindawi Limited, 2002 (2021) (DE-627)320519937 (DE-600)2014442-8 1024123X nnns year:2021 https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870 kostenfrei http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 2021
spelling	10.1155/2021/7314687 doi (DE-627)DOAJ014722925 (DE-599)DOAJ1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TA1-2040 QA1-939 Di Xiao verfasserin aut Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier from other channels, and one retailer. The platform has a well-known brand that can influence consumers’ purchase decisions, and it provides good-quality products with high prices, while supplier from other channels provides cheaper products but possibly with low quality, and there may even be some serious quality problems, sometimes leading to serious problems such as “free-riding” behavior by the retailer and reducing the profits of the supply chain members. First, we study the decisions of platform and retailer under centralized decision (CD) scenario, decentralized decision (DD) scenario, cost sharing contract (CS) scenario, and minimum order quantity contract (QC) scenario. Second, we found that channel conflicts have a negative impact on supply chain members under DD scenario; however, CS and QC scenarios can make the optimal empowerment level of platform the same as CD scenario and encourage retailer to order more products from platform. Finally, the improvement effect in QC and CS scenarios is affected by the substitutability of the two products, the coefficient of empowerment cost, and the reaction coefficient of product price on goodwill. Furthermore, we found that under QC scenario, only within an appropriate range can the platform and the retailer achieve a win-win situation. Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) Mathematics Qianqian Yang verfasserin aut Qi Sun verfasserin aut Huimin Fang verfasserin aut In Mathematical Problems in Engineering Hindawi Limited, 2002 (2021) (DE-627)320519937 (DE-600)2014442-8 1024123X nnns year:2021 https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870 kostenfrei http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 2021
allfields_unstemmed	10.1155/2021/7314687 doi (DE-627)DOAJ014722925 (DE-599)DOAJ1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TA1-2040 QA1-939 Di Xiao verfasserin aut Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier from other channels, and one retailer. The platform has a well-known brand that can influence consumers’ purchase decisions, and it provides good-quality products with high prices, while supplier from other channels provides cheaper products but possibly with low quality, and there may even be some serious quality problems, sometimes leading to serious problems such as “free-riding” behavior by the retailer and reducing the profits of the supply chain members. First, we study the decisions of platform and retailer under centralized decision (CD) scenario, decentralized decision (DD) scenario, cost sharing contract (CS) scenario, and minimum order quantity contract (QC) scenario. Second, we found that channel conflicts have a negative impact on supply chain members under DD scenario; however, CS and QC scenarios can make the optimal empowerment level of platform the same as CD scenario and encourage retailer to order more products from platform. Finally, the improvement effect in QC and CS scenarios is affected by the substitutability of the two products, the coefficient of empowerment cost, and the reaction coefficient of product price on goodwill. Furthermore, we found that under QC scenario, only within an appropriate range can the platform and the retailer achieve a win-win situation. Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) Mathematics Qianqian Yang verfasserin aut Qi Sun verfasserin aut Huimin Fang verfasserin aut In Mathematical Problems in Engineering Hindawi Limited, 2002 (2021) (DE-627)320519937 (DE-600)2014442-8 1024123X nnns year:2021 https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870 kostenfrei http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 2021
allfieldsGer	10.1155/2021/7314687 doi (DE-627)DOAJ014722925 (DE-599)DOAJ1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TA1-2040 QA1-939 Di Xiao verfasserin aut Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier from other channels, and one retailer. The platform has a well-known brand that can influence consumers’ purchase decisions, and it provides good-quality products with high prices, while supplier from other channels provides cheaper products but possibly with low quality, and there may even be some serious quality problems, sometimes leading to serious problems such as “free-riding” behavior by the retailer and reducing the profits of the supply chain members. First, we study the decisions of platform and retailer under centralized decision (CD) scenario, decentralized decision (DD) scenario, cost sharing contract (CS) scenario, and minimum order quantity contract (QC) scenario. Second, we found that channel conflicts have a negative impact on supply chain members under DD scenario; however, CS and QC scenarios can make the optimal empowerment level of platform the same as CD scenario and encourage retailer to order more products from platform. Finally, the improvement effect in QC and CS scenarios is affected by the substitutability of the two products, the coefficient of empowerment cost, and the reaction coefficient of product price on goodwill. Furthermore, we found that under QC scenario, only within an appropriate range can the platform and the retailer achieve a win-win situation. Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) Mathematics Qianqian Yang verfasserin aut Qi Sun verfasserin aut Huimin Fang verfasserin aut In Mathematical Problems in Engineering Hindawi Limited, 2002 (2021) (DE-627)320519937 (DE-600)2014442-8 1024123X nnns year:2021 https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870 kostenfrei http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 2021
allfieldsSound	10.1155/2021/7314687 doi (DE-627)DOAJ014722925 (DE-599)DOAJ1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TA1-2040 QA1-939 Di Xiao verfasserin aut Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier from other channels, and one retailer. The platform has a well-known brand that can influence consumers’ purchase decisions, and it provides good-quality products with high prices, while supplier from other channels provides cheaper products but possibly with low quality, and there may even be some serious quality problems, sometimes leading to serious problems such as “free-riding” behavior by the retailer and reducing the profits of the supply chain members. First, we study the decisions of platform and retailer under centralized decision (CD) scenario, decentralized decision (DD) scenario, cost sharing contract (CS) scenario, and minimum order quantity contract (QC) scenario. Second, we found that channel conflicts have a negative impact on supply chain members under DD scenario; however, CS and QC scenarios can make the optimal empowerment level of platform the same as CD scenario and encourage retailer to order more products from platform. Finally, the improvement effect in QC and CS scenarios is affected by the substitutability of the two products, the coefficient of empowerment cost, and the reaction coefficient of product price on goodwill. Furthermore, we found that under QC scenario, only within an appropriate range can the platform and the retailer achieve a win-win situation. Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) Mathematics Qianqian Yang verfasserin aut Qi Sun verfasserin aut Huimin Fang verfasserin aut In Mathematical Problems in Engineering Hindawi Limited, 2002 (2021) (DE-627)320519937 (DE-600)2014442-8 1024123X nnns year:2021 https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870 kostenfrei http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 2021
language	English
source	In Mathematical Problems in Engineering (2021) year:2021
sourceStr	In Mathematical Problems in Engineering (2021) year:2021
format_phy_str_mv	Article
institution	findex.gbv.de
topic_facet	Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) Mathematics
isfreeaccess_bool	true
container_title	Mathematical Problems in Engineering
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Di Xiao @@aut@@ Qianqian Yang @@aut@@ Qi Sun @@aut@@ Huimin Fang @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2021-01-01T00:00:00Z
hierarchy_top_id	320519937
id	DOAJ014722925
language_de	englisch
fullrecord	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">DOAJ014722925</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230503065228.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230226s2021 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1155/2021/7314687</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)DOAJ014722925</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)DOAJ1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">TA1-2040</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">QA1-939</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Di Xiao</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2021</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier from other channels, and one retailer. The platform has a well-known brand that can influence consumers’ purchase decisions, and it provides good-quality products with high prices, while supplier from other channels provides cheaper products but possibly with low quality, and there may even be some serious quality problems, sometimes leading to serious problems such as “free-riding” behavior by the retailer and reducing the profits of the supply chain members. First, we study the decisions of platform and retailer under centralized decision (CD) scenario, decentralized decision (DD) scenario, cost sharing contract (CS) scenario, and minimum order quantity contract (QC) scenario. Second, we found that channel conflicts have a negative impact on supply chain members under DD scenario; however, CS and QC scenarios can make the optimal empowerment level of platform the same as CD scenario and encourage retailer to order more products from platform. Finally, the improvement effect in QC and CS scenarios is affected by the substitutability of the two products, the coefficient of empowerment cost, and the reaction coefficient of product price on goodwill. Furthermore, we found that under QC scenario, only within an appropriate range can the platform and the retailer achieve a win-win situation.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Mathematics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Qianqian Yang</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Qi Sun</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Huimin Fang</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">Mathematical Problems in Engineering</subfield><subfield code="d">Hindawi Limited, 2002</subfield><subfield code="g">(2021)</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)320519937</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2014442-8</subfield><subfield code="x">1024123X</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">year:2021</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/article/1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X</subfield><subfield code="y">Journal toc</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147</subfield><subfield code="y">Journal toc</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_DOAJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-PHA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_62</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_65</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_69</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_73</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_95</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_105</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_161</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_165</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_170</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_171</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_224</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_230</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_293</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_602</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_636</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2003</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2027</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2055</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2088</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2108</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2111</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2119</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2336</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4249</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4307</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4322</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4326</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4335</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4367</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="j">2021</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
callnumber-first	T - Technology
author	Di Xiao
spellingShingle	Di Xiao misc TA1-2040 misc QA1-939 misc Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) misc Mathematics Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment
authorStr	Di Xiao
ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv	@@773@@(DE-627)320519937
format	electronic Article
delete_txt_mv	keep
author_role	aut aut aut aut
collection	DOAJ
remote_str	true
callnumber-label	TA1-2040
illustrated	Not Illustrated
issn	1024123X
topic_title	TA1-2040 QA1-939 Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment
topic	misc TA1-2040 misc QA1-939 misc Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) misc Mathematics
topic_unstemmed	misc TA1-2040 misc QA1-939 misc Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) misc Mathematics
topic_browse	misc TA1-2040 misc QA1-939 misc Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) misc Mathematics
format_facet	Elektronische Aufsätze Aufsätze Elektronische Ressource
format_main_str_mv	Text Zeitschrift/Artikel
carriertype_str_mv	cr
hierarchy_parent_title	Mathematical Problems in Engineering
hierarchy_parent_id	320519937
hierarchy_top_title	Mathematical Problems in Engineering
isfreeaccess_txt	true
familylinks_str_mv	(DE-627)320519937 (DE-600)2014442-8
title	Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment
ctrlnum	(DE-627)DOAJ014722925 (DE-599)DOAJ1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870
title_full	Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment
author_sort	Di Xiao
journal	Mathematical Problems in Engineering
journalStr	Mathematical Problems in Engineering
callnumber-first-code	T
lang_code	eng
isOA_bool	true
recordtype	marc
publishDateSort	2021
contenttype_str_mv	txt
author_browse	Di Xiao Qianqian Yang Qi Sun Huimin Fang
class	TA1-2040 QA1-939
format_se	Elektronische Aufsätze
author-letter	Di Xiao
doi_str_mv	10.1155/2021/7314687
author2-role	verfasserin
title_sort	vertical channel conflict coordination strategy of e-commerce supply chain under platform brand empowerment
callnumber	TA1-2040
title_auth	Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment
abstract	We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier from other channels, and one retailer. The platform has a well-known brand that can influence consumers’ purchase decisions, and it provides good-quality products with high prices, while supplier from other channels provides cheaper products but possibly with low quality, and there may even be some serious quality problems, sometimes leading to serious problems such as “free-riding” behavior by the retailer and reducing the profits of the supply chain members. First, we study the decisions of platform and retailer under centralized decision (CD) scenario, decentralized decision (DD) scenario, cost sharing contract (CS) scenario, and minimum order quantity contract (QC) scenario. Second, we found that channel conflicts have a negative impact on supply chain members under DD scenario; however, CS and QC scenarios can make the optimal empowerment level of platform the same as CD scenario and encourage retailer to order more products from platform. Finally, the improvement effect in QC and CS scenarios is affected by the substitutability of the two products, the coefficient of empowerment cost, and the reaction coefficient of product price on goodwill. Furthermore, we found that under QC scenario, only within an appropriate range can the platform and the retailer achieve a win-win situation.
abstractGer	We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier from other channels, and one retailer. The platform has a well-known brand that can influence consumers’ purchase decisions, and it provides good-quality products with high prices, while supplier from other channels provides cheaper products but possibly with low quality, and there may even be some serious quality problems, sometimes leading to serious problems such as “free-riding” behavior by the retailer and reducing the profits of the supply chain members. First, we study the decisions of platform and retailer under centralized decision (CD) scenario, decentralized decision (DD) scenario, cost sharing contract (CS) scenario, and minimum order quantity contract (QC) scenario. Second, we found that channel conflicts have a negative impact on supply chain members under DD scenario; however, CS and QC scenarios can make the optimal empowerment level of platform the same as CD scenario and encourage retailer to order more products from platform. Finally, the improvement effect in QC and CS scenarios is affected by the substitutability of the two products, the coefficient of empowerment cost, and the reaction coefficient of product price on goodwill. Furthermore, we found that under QC scenario, only within an appropriate range can the platform and the retailer achieve a win-win situation.
abstract_unstemmed	We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier from other channels, and one retailer. The platform has a well-known brand that can influence consumers’ purchase decisions, and it provides good-quality products with high prices, while supplier from other channels provides cheaper products but possibly with low quality, and there may even be some serious quality problems, sometimes leading to serious problems such as “free-riding” behavior by the retailer and reducing the profits of the supply chain members. First, we study the decisions of platform and retailer under centralized decision (CD) scenario, decentralized decision (DD) scenario, cost sharing contract (CS) scenario, and minimum order quantity contract (QC) scenario. Second, we found that channel conflicts have a negative impact on supply chain members under DD scenario; however, CS and QC scenarios can make the optimal empowerment level of platform the same as CD scenario and encourage retailer to order more products from platform. Finally, the improvement effect in QC and CS scenarios is affected by the substitutability of the two products, the coefficient of empowerment cost, and the reaction coefficient of product price on goodwill. Furthermore, we found that under QC scenario, only within an appropriate range can the platform and the retailer achieve a win-win situation.
collection_details	GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700
title_short	Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment
url	https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687 https://doaj.org/article/1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870 http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687 https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147
remote_bool	true
author2	Qianqian Yang Qi Sun Huimin Fang
author2Str	Qianqian Yang Qi Sun Huimin Fang
ppnlink	320519937
callnumber-subject	TA - General and Civil Engineering
mediatype_str_mv	c
isOA_txt	true
hochschulschrift_bool	false
doi_str	10.1155/2021/7314687
callnumber-a	TA1-2040
up_date	2024-07-04T00:14:11.999Z
_version_	1803605300479000577
fullrecord_marcxml	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">DOAJ014722925</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230503065228.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230226s2021 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1155/2021/7314687</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)DOAJ014722925</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)DOAJ1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">TA1-2040</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">QA1-939</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Di Xiao</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2021</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">We develop a game model for a supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier from other channels, and one retailer. The platform has a well-known brand that can influence consumers’ purchase decisions, and it provides good-quality products with high prices, while supplier from other channels provides cheaper products but possibly with low quality, and there may even be some serious quality problems, sometimes leading to serious problems such as “free-riding” behavior by the retailer and reducing the profits of the supply chain members. First, we study the decisions of platform and retailer under centralized decision (CD) scenario, decentralized decision (DD) scenario, cost sharing contract (CS) scenario, and minimum order quantity contract (QC) scenario. Second, we found that channel conflicts have a negative impact on supply chain members under DD scenario; however, CS and QC scenarios can make the optimal empowerment level of platform the same as CD scenario and encourage retailer to order more products from platform. Finally, the improvement effect in QC and CS scenarios is affected by the substitutability of the two products, the coefficient of empowerment cost, and the reaction coefficient of product price on goodwill. Furthermore, we found that under QC scenario, only within an appropriate range can the platform and the retailer achieve a win-win situation.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Mathematics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Qianqian Yang</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Qi Sun</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Huimin Fang</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">Mathematical Problems in Engineering</subfield><subfield code="d">Hindawi Limited, 2002</subfield><subfield code="g">(2021)</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)320519937</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2014442-8</subfield><subfield code="x">1024123X</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">year:2021</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/article/1c8ec714a5004aa38a591795639b9870</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7314687</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X</subfield><subfield code="y">Journal toc</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147</subfield><subfield code="y">Journal toc</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_DOAJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-PHA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_62</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_65</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_69</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_73</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_95</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_105</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_161</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_165</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_170</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_171</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_224</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_230</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_293</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_602</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_636</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2003</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2027</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2055</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2088</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2108</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2111</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2119</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2336</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4249</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4307</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4322</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4326</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4335</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4367</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="j">2021</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
score	7.3993683

Nicht das Richtige dabei?

Schreiben Sie uns!

Vertical Channel Conflict Coordination Strategy of e-Commerce Supply Chain under Platform Brand Empowerment

Nicht das Richtige dabei?

Zugang & Verfügbarkeit

Vorhandene Bände

Nicht das Richtige dabei?