Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects

The large scale of construction in mega projects leads to significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts; thus, the projects should also exhibit greater social responsibility. Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainab...
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Autor*in:	Jianbo Zhu [verfasserIn] Miao Fang [verfasserIn] Qianqian Shi [verfasserIn] Peng Wang [verfasserIn] Qian Li [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2018

Schlagwörter:	mega projects green supply chain cooperation mechanism evolution

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Sustainability - MDPI AG, 2009, 10(2018), 11, p 4306
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:10 ; year:2018 ; number:11, p 4306

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.3390/su10114306

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ018111211

Internformat


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allfields	10.3390/su10114306 doi (DE-627)DOAJ018111211 (DE-599)DOAJ2796efd87cc14f51b9aa81852c9c0d86 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TD194-195 TJ807-830 GE1-350 Jianbo Zhu verfasserin aut Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The large scale of construction in mega projects leads to significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts; thus, the projects should also exhibit greater social responsibility. Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainable development of mega projects. Because the green supply chain behavior during construction is mainly demonstrated by contractors, it is especially important to study the evolutionary trend of their behavior. Thus, to explore the cooperative relationship among contractors, this paper considers a lengthy construction period, multi-agent participation dynamics, and opportunistic behavior—all are key features of mega projects—and establishes an evolutionary game model. Specifically, a replicator dynamic equation is used to describe the long-term effects of the contractor’s decisions. Equilibrium determinants are then analyzed and simulated. The results show that the initial probabilities of the two types of contractors (main contractor and subcontractor) demonstrating opportunistic behaviors have a significant effect on the direction of evolution of the mega project. The main contractor, who dominates the subsidy allocation by the government and project owner, should pay attention to maintaining a balance in the income distribution between him or her and the subcontractor. Additionally, there is an optimal distribution coefficient for the subsidy that minimizes the overall probability of opportunistic behavior. This paper provides a point of reference for the decisions of the main contractor and the subcontractor in the green supply chain of mega projects. mega projects green supply chain cooperation mechanism evolution Environmental effects of industries and plants Renewable energy sources Environmental sciences Miao Fang verfasserin aut Qianqian Shi verfasserin aut Peng Wang verfasserin aut Qian Li verfasserin aut In Sustainability MDPI AG, 2009 10(2018), 11, p 4306 (DE-627)610604120 (DE-600)2518383-7 20711050 nnns volume:10 year:2018 number:11, p 4306 https://doi.org/10.3390/su10114306 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/2796efd87cc14f51b9aa81852c9c0d86 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/11/4306 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2018 11, p 4306
spelling	10.3390/su10114306 doi (DE-627)DOAJ018111211 (DE-599)DOAJ2796efd87cc14f51b9aa81852c9c0d86 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TD194-195 TJ807-830 GE1-350 Jianbo Zhu verfasserin aut Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The large scale of construction in mega projects leads to significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts; thus, the projects should also exhibit greater social responsibility. Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainable development of mega projects. Because the green supply chain behavior during construction is mainly demonstrated by contractors, it is especially important to study the evolutionary trend of their behavior. Thus, to explore the cooperative relationship among contractors, this paper considers a lengthy construction period, multi-agent participation dynamics, and opportunistic behavior—all are key features of mega projects—and establishes an evolutionary game model. Specifically, a replicator dynamic equation is used to describe the long-term effects of the contractor’s decisions. Equilibrium determinants are then analyzed and simulated. The results show that the initial probabilities of the two types of contractors (main contractor and subcontractor) demonstrating opportunistic behaviors have a significant effect on the direction of evolution of the mega project. The main contractor, who dominates the subsidy allocation by the government and project owner, should pay attention to maintaining a balance in the income distribution between him or her and the subcontractor. Additionally, there is an optimal distribution coefficient for the subsidy that minimizes the overall probability of opportunistic behavior. This paper provides a point of reference for the decisions of the main contractor and the subcontractor in the green supply chain of mega projects. mega projects green supply chain cooperation mechanism evolution Environmental effects of industries and plants Renewable energy sources Environmental sciences Miao Fang verfasserin aut Qianqian Shi verfasserin aut Peng Wang verfasserin aut Qian Li verfasserin aut In Sustainability MDPI AG, 2009 10(2018), 11, p 4306 (DE-627)610604120 (DE-600)2518383-7 20711050 nnns volume:10 year:2018 number:11, p 4306 https://doi.org/10.3390/su10114306 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/2796efd87cc14f51b9aa81852c9c0d86 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/11/4306 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2018 11, p 4306
allfields_unstemmed	10.3390/su10114306 doi (DE-627)DOAJ018111211 (DE-599)DOAJ2796efd87cc14f51b9aa81852c9c0d86 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TD194-195 TJ807-830 GE1-350 Jianbo Zhu verfasserin aut Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The large scale of construction in mega projects leads to significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts; thus, the projects should also exhibit greater social responsibility. Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainable development of mega projects. Because the green supply chain behavior during construction is mainly demonstrated by contractors, it is especially important to study the evolutionary trend of their behavior. Thus, to explore the cooperative relationship among contractors, this paper considers a lengthy construction period, multi-agent participation dynamics, and opportunistic behavior—all are key features of mega projects—and establishes an evolutionary game model. Specifically, a replicator dynamic equation is used to describe the long-term effects of the contractor’s decisions. Equilibrium determinants are then analyzed and simulated. The results show that the initial probabilities of the two types of contractors (main contractor and subcontractor) demonstrating opportunistic behaviors have a significant effect on the direction of evolution of the mega project. The main contractor, who dominates the subsidy allocation by the government and project owner, should pay attention to maintaining a balance in the income distribution between him or her and the subcontractor. Additionally, there is an optimal distribution coefficient for the subsidy that minimizes the overall probability of opportunistic behavior. This paper provides a point of reference for the decisions of the main contractor and the subcontractor in the green supply chain of mega projects. mega projects green supply chain cooperation mechanism evolution Environmental effects of industries and plants Renewable energy sources Environmental sciences Miao Fang verfasserin aut Qianqian Shi verfasserin aut Peng Wang verfasserin aut Qian Li verfasserin aut In Sustainability MDPI AG, 2009 10(2018), 11, p 4306 (DE-627)610604120 (DE-600)2518383-7 20711050 nnns volume:10 year:2018 number:11, p 4306 https://doi.org/10.3390/su10114306 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/2796efd87cc14f51b9aa81852c9c0d86 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/11/4306 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2018 11, p 4306
allfieldsGer	10.3390/su10114306 doi (DE-627)DOAJ018111211 (DE-599)DOAJ2796efd87cc14f51b9aa81852c9c0d86 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TD194-195 TJ807-830 GE1-350 Jianbo Zhu verfasserin aut Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The large scale of construction in mega projects leads to significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts; thus, the projects should also exhibit greater social responsibility. Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainable development of mega projects. Because the green supply chain behavior during construction is mainly demonstrated by contractors, it is especially important to study the evolutionary trend of their behavior. Thus, to explore the cooperative relationship among contractors, this paper considers a lengthy construction period, multi-agent participation dynamics, and opportunistic behavior—all are key features of mega projects—and establishes an evolutionary game model. Specifically, a replicator dynamic equation is used to describe the long-term effects of the contractor’s decisions. Equilibrium determinants are then analyzed and simulated. The results show that the initial probabilities of the two types of contractors (main contractor and subcontractor) demonstrating opportunistic behaviors have a significant effect on the direction of evolution of the mega project. The main contractor, who dominates the subsidy allocation by the government and project owner, should pay attention to maintaining a balance in the income distribution between him or her and the subcontractor. Additionally, there is an optimal distribution coefficient for the subsidy that minimizes the overall probability of opportunistic behavior. This paper provides a point of reference for the decisions of the main contractor and the subcontractor in the green supply chain of mega projects. mega projects green supply chain cooperation mechanism evolution Environmental effects of industries and plants Renewable energy sources Environmental sciences Miao Fang verfasserin aut Qianqian Shi verfasserin aut Peng Wang verfasserin aut Qian Li verfasserin aut In Sustainability MDPI AG, 2009 10(2018), 11, p 4306 (DE-627)610604120 (DE-600)2518383-7 20711050 nnns volume:10 year:2018 number:11, p 4306 https://doi.org/10.3390/su10114306 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/2796efd87cc14f51b9aa81852c9c0d86 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/11/4306 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2018 11, p 4306
allfieldsSound	10.3390/su10114306 doi (DE-627)DOAJ018111211 (DE-599)DOAJ2796efd87cc14f51b9aa81852c9c0d86 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TD194-195 TJ807-830 GE1-350 Jianbo Zhu verfasserin aut Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The large scale of construction in mega projects leads to significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts; thus, the projects should also exhibit greater social responsibility. Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainable development of mega projects. Because the green supply chain behavior during construction is mainly demonstrated by contractors, it is especially important to study the evolutionary trend of their behavior. Thus, to explore the cooperative relationship among contractors, this paper considers a lengthy construction period, multi-agent participation dynamics, and opportunistic behavior—all are key features of mega projects—and establishes an evolutionary game model. Specifically, a replicator dynamic equation is used to describe the long-term effects of the contractor’s decisions. Equilibrium determinants are then analyzed and simulated. The results show that the initial probabilities of the two types of contractors (main contractor and subcontractor) demonstrating opportunistic behaviors have a significant effect on the direction of evolution of the mega project. The main contractor, who dominates the subsidy allocation by the government and project owner, should pay attention to maintaining a balance in the income distribution between him or her and the subcontractor. Additionally, there is an optimal distribution coefficient for the subsidy that minimizes the overall probability of opportunistic behavior. This paper provides a point of reference for the decisions of the main contractor and the subcontractor in the green supply chain of mega projects. mega projects green supply chain cooperation mechanism evolution Environmental effects of industries and plants Renewable energy sources Environmental sciences Miao Fang verfasserin aut Qianqian Shi verfasserin aut Peng Wang verfasserin aut Qian Li verfasserin aut In Sustainability MDPI AG, 2009 10(2018), 11, p 4306 (DE-627)610604120 (DE-600)2518383-7 20711050 nnns volume:10 year:2018 number:11, p 4306 https://doi.org/10.3390/su10114306 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/2796efd87cc14f51b9aa81852c9c0d86 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/11/4306 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2018 11, p 4306
language	English
source	In Sustainability 10(2018), 11, p 4306 volume:10 year:2018 number:11, p 4306
sourceStr	In Sustainability 10(2018), 11, p 4306 volume:10 year:2018 number:11, p 4306
format_phy_str_mv	Article
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topic_facet	mega projects green supply chain cooperation mechanism evolution Environmental effects of industries and plants Renewable energy sources Environmental sciences
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container_title	Sustainability
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Jianbo Zhu @@aut@@ Miao Fang @@aut@@ Qianqian Shi @@aut@@ Peng Wang @@aut@@ Qian Li @@aut@@
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Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainable development of mega projects. Because the green supply chain behavior during construction is mainly demonstrated by contractors, it is especially important to study the evolutionary trend of their behavior. Thus, to explore the cooperative relationship among contractors, this paper considers a lengthy construction period, multi-agent participation dynamics, and opportunistic behavior—all are key features of mega projects—and establishes an evolutionary game model. Specifically, a replicator dynamic equation is used to describe the long-term effects of the contractor’s decisions. Equilibrium determinants are then analyzed and simulated. The results show that the initial probabilities of the two types of contractors (main contractor and subcontractor) demonstrating opportunistic behaviors have a significant effect on the direction of evolution of the mega project. The main contractor, who dominates the subsidy allocation by the government and project owner, should pay attention to maintaining a balance in the income distribution between him or her and the subcontractor. Additionally, there is an optimal distribution coefficient for the subsidy that minimizes the overall probability of opportunistic behavior. 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author	Jianbo Zhu
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title	Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects
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title_sort	contractor cooperation mechanism and evolution of the green supply chain in mega projects
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title_auth	Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects
abstract	The large scale of construction in mega projects leads to significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts; thus, the projects should also exhibit greater social responsibility. Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainable development of mega projects. Because the green supply chain behavior during construction is mainly demonstrated by contractors, it is especially important to study the evolutionary trend of their behavior. Thus, to explore the cooperative relationship among contractors, this paper considers a lengthy construction period, multi-agent participation dynamics, and opportunistic behavior—all are key features of mega projects—and establishes an evolutionary game model. Specifically, a replicator dynamic equation is used to describe the long-term effects of the contractor’s decisions. Equilibrium determinants are then analyzed and simulated. The results show that the initial probabilities of the two types of contractors (main contractor and subcontractor) demonstrating opportunistic behaviors have a significant effect on the direction of evolution of the mega project. The main contractor, who dominates the subsidy allocation by the government and project owner, should pay attention to maintaining a balance in the income distribution between him or her and the subcontractor. Additionally, there is an optimal distribution coefficient for the subsidy that minimizes the overall probability of opportunistic behavior. This paper provides a point of reference for the decisions of the main contractor and the subcontractor in the green supply chain of mega projects.
abstractGer	The large scale of construction in mega projects leads to significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts; thus, the projects should also exhibit greater social responsibility. Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainable development of mega projects. Because the green supply chain behavior during construction is mainly demonstrated by contractors, it is especially important to study the evolutionary trend of their behavior. Thus, to explore the cooperative relationship among contractors, this paper considers a lengthy construction period, multi-agent participation dynamics, and opportunistic behavior—all are key features of mega projects—and establishes an evolutionary game model. Specifically, a replicator dynamic equation is used to describe the long-term effects of the contractor’s decisions. Equilibrium determinants are then analyzed and simulated. The results show that the initial probabilities of the two types of contractors (main contractor and subcontractor) demonstrating opportunistic behaviors have a significant effect on the direction of evolution of the mega project. The main contractor, who dominates the subsidy allocation by the government and project owner, should pay attention to maintaining a balance in the income distribution between him or her and the subcontractor. Additionally, there is an optimal distribution coefficient for the subsidy that minimizes the overall probability of opportunistic behavior. This paper provides a point of reference for the decisions of the main contractor and the subcontractor in the green supply chain of mega projects.
abstract_unstemmed	The large scale of construction in mega projects leads to significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts; thus, the projects should also exhibit greater social responsibility. Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainable development of mega projects. Because the green supply chain behavior during construction is mainly demonstrated by contractors, it is especially important to study the evolutionary trend of their behavior. Thus, to explore the cooperative relationship among contractors, this paper considers a lengthy construction period, multi-agent participation dynamics, and opportunistic behavior—all are key features of mega projects—and establishes an evolutionary game model. Specifically, a replicator dynamic equation is used to describe the long-term effects of the contractor’s decisions. Equilibrium determinants are then analyzed and simulated. The results show that the initial probabilities of the two types of contractors (main contractor and subcontractor) demonstrating opportunistic behaviors have a significant effect on the direction of evolution of the mega project. The main contractor, who dominates the subsidy allocation by the government and project owner, should pay attention to maintaining a balance in the income distribution between him or her and the subcontractor. Additionally, there is an optimal distribution coefficient for the subsidy that minimizes the overall probability of opportunistic behavior. This paper provides a point of reference for the decisions of the main contractor and the subcontractor in the green supply chain of mega projects.
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title_short	Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects
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