Instantiation

What is it, metaphysically, for a universal to be instantiated in a concrete particular? Philosophical controversy has been ongoing since the beginning of philosophy itself. I here contribute a novel account of instantiation developed on the basis of Aristotelian premises (but departing from the mai...
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Autor*in:	Anna Marmodoro [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2021

Schlagwörter:	properties objects universals instantiation aristotle plato

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Metaphysics - Ubiquity Press, 2018, 4(2021), 1
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:4 ; year:2021 ; number:1

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.5334/met.62

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ019277830

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520			\|a What is it, metaphysically, for a universal to be instantiated in a concrete particular? Philosophical controversy has been ongoing since the beginning of philosophy itself. I here contribute a novel account of instantiation developed on the basis of Aristotelian premises (but departing from the mainstream interpretation according to which Aristotelian universals are instantiated by ‘combining’ hylomorphically with matter). The key stance is that for Aristotle each substance is one, i.e. single (in addition to also being a non-recurrent particular). I show that for Aristotle, the oneness of substances is primitively assumed, and, importantly, cannot be derived from composition of parts, not even holistic composition. Parts undermine oneness. It follows that instantiated properties are 'not parts' of substances. However, if not parts of the substances they are in, what are they? Aristotle shows they are 'qualifications' of the substances they are in. Don’t qualifications undermine the singleness of a substance? I show that Aristotle makes sure they do not. The way he does it is new, then and now. Instantiated properties are ‘hybrid’ entities: they sacrifice their own discreteness 'qua' properties, while adopting the discreteness of the metaphysical subject they qualify, i.e. the substance. But then, how can a universal quality recur in many substances, if, when instantiated, it assimilates the discreteness of each of these substances? This is a key Aristotelian stance: 'the quality recurs, not its qualifications'. Qualities are abstracted from their instances in similar objects, e.g. ‘wisdom’ is abstracted from many ‘wise’ people; ‘wisdom’ is individuated bottom-up from its instances, by abstraction.
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abstract	What is it, metaphysically, for a universal to be instantiated in a concrete particular? Philosophical controversy has been ongoing since the beginning of philosophy itself. I here contribute a novel account of instantiation developed on the basis of Aristotelian premises (but departing from the mainstream interpretation according to which Aristotelian universals are instantiated by ‘combining’ hylomorphically with matter). The key stance is that for Aristotle each substance is one, i.e. single (in addition to also being a non-recurrent particular). I show that for Aristotle, the oneness of substances is primitively assumed, and, importantly, cannot be derived from composition of parts, not even holistic composition. Parts undermine oneness. It follows that instantiated properties are 'not parts' of substances. However, if not parts of the substances they are in, what are they? Aristotle shows they are 'qualifications' of the substances they are in. Don’t qualifications undermine the singleness of a substance? I show that Aristotle makes sure they do not. The way he does it is new, then and now. Instantiated properties are ‘hybrid’ entities: they sacrifice their own discreteness 'qua' properties, while adopting the discreteness of the metaphysical subject they qualify, i.e. the substance. But then, how can a universal quality recur in many substances, if, when instantiated, it assimilates the discreteness of each of these substances? This is a key Aristotelian stance: 'the quality recurs, not its qualifications'. Qualities are abstracted from their instances in similar objects, e.g. ‘wisdom’ is abstracted from many ‘wise’ people; ‘wisdom’ is individuated bottom-up from its instances, by abstraction.
abstractGer	What is it, metaphysically, for a universal to be instantiated in a concrete particular? Philosophical controversy has been ongoing since the beginning of philosophy itself. I here contribute a novel account of instantiation developed on the basis of Aristotelian premises (but departing from the mainstream interpretation according to which Aristotelian universals are instantiated by ‘combining’ hylomorphically with matter). The key stance is that for Aristotle each substance is one, i.e. single (in addition to also being a non-recurrent particular). I show that for Aristotle, the oneness of substances is primitively assumed, and, importantly, cannot be derived from composition of parts, not even holistic composition. Parts undermine oneness. It follows that instantiated properties are 'not parts' of substances. However, if not parts of the substances they are in, what are they? Aristotle shows they are 'qualifications' of the substances they are in. Don’t qualifications undermine the singleness of a substance? I show that Aristotle makes sure they do not. The way he does it is new, then and now. Instantiated properties are ‘hybrid’ entities: they sacrifice their own discreteness 'qua' properties, while adopting the discreteness of the metaphysical subject they qualify, i.e. the substance. But then, how can a universal quality recur in many substances, if, when instantiated, it assimilates the discreteness of each of these substances? This is a key Aristotelian stance: 'the quality recurs, not its qualifications'. Qualities are abstracted from their instances in similar objects, e.g. ‘wisdom’ is abstracted from many ‘wise’ people; ‘wisdom’ is individuated bottom-up from its instances, by abstraction.
abstract_unstemmed	What is it, metaphysically, for a universal to be instantiated in a concrete particular? Philosophical controversy has been ongoing since the beginning of philosophy itself. I here contribute a novel account of instantiation developed on the basis of Aristotelian premises (but departing from the mainstream interpretation according to which Aristotelian universals are instantiated by ‘combining’ hylomorphically with matter). The key stance is that for Aristotle each substance is one, i.e. single (in addition to also being a non-recurrent particular). I show that for Aristotle, the oneness of substances is primitively assumed, and, importantly, cannot be derived from composition of parts, not even holistic composition. Parts undermine oneness. It follows that instantiated properties are 'not parts' of substances. However, if not parts of the substances they are in, what are they? Aristotle shows they are 'qualifications' of the substances they are in. Don’t qualifications undermine the singleness of a substance? I show that Aristotle makes sure they do not. The way he does it is new, then and now. Instantiated properties are ‘hybrid’ entities: they sacrifice their own discreteness 'qua' properties, while adopting the discreteness of the metaphysical subject they qualify, i.e. the substance. But then, how can a universal quality recur in many substances, if, when instantiated, it assimilates the discreteness of each of these substances? This is a key Aristotelian stance: 'the quality recurs, not its qualifications'. Qualities are abstracted from their instances in similar objects, e.g. ‘wisdom’ is abstracted from many ‘wise’ people; ‘wisdom’ is individuated bottom-up from its instances, by abstraction.
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score	7.398567

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