Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Low Probability of Intercept Performance Optimization for Multistatic Radar System
In this paper, the problem of Stackelberg game-theoretic low probability of intercept (LPI) performance optimization in multistatic radar system is investigated. The goal of the proposed LPI optimization strategy is to minimize the transmitted power of each radar while satisfying a predetermined sig...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Chenguang Shi [verfasserIn] Wei Qiu [verfasserIn] Fei Wang [verfasserIn] Sana Salous [verfasserIn] Jianjiang Zhou [verfasserIn] |
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E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
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2019 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: Electronics - MDPI AG, 2013, 8(2019), 4, p 397 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:8 ; year:2019 ; number:4, p 397 |
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DOI / URN: |
10.3390/electronics8040397 |
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Katalog-ID: |
DOAJ022754466 |
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10.3390/electronics8040397 doi (DE-627)DOAJ022754466 (DE-599)DOAJ992f2df024f944a987db2842a96d1e49 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK7800-8360 Chenguang Shi verfasserin aut Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Low Probability of Intercept Performance Optimization for Multistatic Radar System 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In this paper, the problem of Stackelberg game-theoretic low probability of intercept (LPI) performance optimization in multistatic radar system is investigated. The goal of the proposed LPI optimization strategy is to minimize the transmitted power of each radar while satisfying a predetermined signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement for target detection. Firstly, a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game is adopted to formulate the LPI optimization problem of multistatic radar system. In the considered game model, the hostile intercept receiver plays a role of leader, who decides the prices of power resource first through the maximization of its own utility function. The multiple radars are followers to compete with each other in a non-cooperative game according to the imposed prices from the intercept receiver subsequently. Then, the Nash equilibrium (NE) for the considered game model is derived, and the existence and uniqueness of the NE are analytically proved. Furthermore, a pricing-based distributed iterative power control algorithm is proposed. Finally, some simulation examples are provided to demonstrate that the proposed scheme has remarkable potential to enhance the LPI performance of the multistatic radar system. low probability of intercept (LPI) Stackelberg game power control Nash equilibrium (NE) multistatic radar system Electronics Wei Qiu verfasserin aut Fei Wang verfasserin aut Sana Salous verfasserin aut Jianjiang Zhou verfasserin aut In Electronics MDPI AG, 2013 8(2019), 4, p 397 (DE-627)718626478 (DE-600)2662127-7 20799292 nnns volume:8 year:2019 number:4, p 397 https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics8040397 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/992f2df024f944a987db2842a96d1e49 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/8/4/397 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2079-9292 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2019 4, p 397 |
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10.3390/electronics8040397 doi (DE-627)DOAJ022754466 (DE-599)DOAJ992f2df024f944a987db2842a96d1e49 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK7800-8360 Chenguang Shi verfasserin aut Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Low Probability of Intercept Performance Optimization for Multistatic Radar System 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In this paper, the problem of Stackelberg game-theoretic low probability of intercept (LPI) performance optimization in multistatic radar system is investigated. The goal of the proposed LPI optimization strategy is to minimize the transmitted power of each radar while satisfying a predetermined signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement for target detection. Firstly, a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game is adopted to formulate the LPI optimization problem of multistatic radar system. In the considered game model, the hostile intercept receiver plays a role of leader, who decides the prices of power resource first through the maximization of its own utility function. The multiple radars are followers to compete with each other in a non-cooperative game according to the imposed prices from the intercept receiver subsequently. Then, the Nash equilibrium (NE) for the considered game model is derived, and the existence and uniqueness of the NE are analytically proved. Furthermore, a pricing-based distributed iterative power control algorithm is proposed. Finally, some simulation examples are provided to demonstrate that the proposed scheme has remarkable potential to enhance the LPI performance of the multistatic radar system. low probability of intercept (LPI) Stackelberg game power control Nash equilibrium (NE) multistatic radar system Electronics Wei Qiu verfasserin aut Fei Wang verfasserin aut Sana Salous verfasserin aut Jianjiang Zhou verfasserin aut In Electronics MDPI AG, 2013 8(2019), 4, p 397 (DE-627)718626478 (DE-600)2662127-7 20799292 nnns volume:8 year:2019 number:4, p 397 https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics8040397 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/992f2df024f944a987db2842a96d1e49 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/8/4/397 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2079-9292 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2019 4, p 397 |
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10.3390/electronics8040397 doi (DE-627)DOAJ022754466 (DE-599)DOAJ992f2df024f944a987db2842a96d1e49 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK7800-8360 Chenguang Shi verfasserin aut Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Low Probability of Intercept Performance Optimization for Multistatic Radar System 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In this paper, the problem of Stackelberg game-theoretic low probability of intercept (LPI) performance optimization in multistatic radar system is investigated. The goal of the proposed LPI optimization strategy is to minimize the transmitted power of each radar while satisfying a predetermined signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement for target detection. Firstly, a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game is adopted to formulate the LPI optimization problem of multistatic radar system. In the considered game model, the hostile intercept receiver plays a role of leader, who decides the prices of power resource first through the maximization of its own utility function. The multiple radars are followers to compete with each other in a non-cooperative game according to the imposed prices from the intercept receiver subsequently. Then, the Nash equilibrium (NE) for the considered game model is derived, and the existence and uniqueness of the NE are analytically proved. Furthermore, a pricing-based distributed iterative power control algorithm is proposed. Finally, some simulation examples are provided to demonstrate that the proposed scheme has remarkable potential to enhance the LPI performance of the multistatic radar system. low probability of intercept (LPI) Stackelberg game power control Nash equilibrium (NE) multistatic radar system Electronics Wei Qiu verfasserin aut Fei Wang verfasserin aut Sana Salous verfasserin aut Jianjiang Zhou verfasserin aut In Electronics MDPI AG, 2013 8(2019), 4, p 397 (DE-627)718626478 (DE-600)2662127-7 20799292 nnns volume:8 year:2019 number:4, p 397 https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics8040397 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/992f2df024f944a987db2842a96d1e49 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/8/4/397 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2079-9292 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2019 4, p 397 |
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10.3390/electronics8040397 doi (DE-627)DOAJ022754466 (DE-599)DOAJ992f2df024f944a987db2842a96d1e49 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK7800-8360 Chenguang Shi verfasserin aut Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Low Probability of Intercept Performance Optimization for Multistatic Radar System 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In this paper, the problem of Stackelberg game-theoretic low probability of intercept (LPI) performance optimization in multistatic radar system is investigated. The goal of the proposed LPI optimization strategy is to minimize the transmitted power of each radar while satisfying a predetermined signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement for target detection. Firstly, a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game is adopted to formulate the LPI optimization problem of multistatic radar system. In the considered game model, the hostile intercept receiver plays a role of leader, who decides the prices of power resource first through the maximization of its own utility function. The multiple radars are followers to compete with each other in a non-cooperative game according to the imposed prices from the intercept receiver subsequently. Then, the Nash equilibrium (NE) for the considered game model is derived, and the existence and uniqueness of the NE are analytically proved. Furthermore, a pricing-based distributed iterative power control algorithm is proposed. Finally, some simulation examples are provided to demonstrate that the proposed scheme has remarkable potential to enhance the LPI performance of the multistatic radar system. low probability of intercept (LPI) Stackelberg game power control Nash equilibrium (NE) multistatic radar system Electronics Wei Qiu verfasserin aut Fei Wang verfasserin aut Sana Salous verfasserin aut Jianjiang Zhou verfasserin aut In Electronics MDPI AG, 2013 8(2019), 4, p 397 (DE-627)718626478 (DE-600)2662127-7 20799292 nnns volume:8 year:2019 number:4, p 397 https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics8040397 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/992f2df024f944a987db2842a96d1e49 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/8/4/397 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2079-9292 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2019 4, p 397 |
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10.3390/electronics8040397 doi (DE-627)DOAJ022754466 (DE-599)DOAJ992f2df024f944a987db2842a96d1e49 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK7800-8360 Chenguang Shi verfasserin aut Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Low Probability of Intercept Performance Optimization for Multistatic Radar System 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In this paper, the problem of Stackelberg game-theoretic low probability of intercept (LPI) performance optimization in multistatic radar system is investigated. The goal of the proposed LPI optimization strategy is to minimize the transmitted power of each radar while satisfying a predetermined signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement for target detection. Firstly, a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game is adopted to formulate the LPI optimization problem of multistatic radar system. In the considered game model, the hostile intercept receiver plays a role of leader, who decides the prices of power resource first through the maximization of its own utility function. The multiple radars are followers to compete with each other in a non-cooperative game according to the imposed prices from the intercept receiver subsequently. Then, the Nash equilibrium (NE) for the considered game model is derived, and the existence and uniqueness of the NE are analytically proved. Furthermore, a pricing-based distributed iterative power control algorithm is proposed. Finally, some simulation examples are provided to demonstrate that the proposed scheme has remarkable potential to enhance the LPI performance of the multistatic radar system. low probability of intercept (LPI) Stackelberg game power control Nash equilibrium (NE) multistatic radar system Electronics Wei Qiu verfasserin aut Fei Wang verfasserin aut Sana Salous verfasserin aut Jianjiang Zhou verfasserin aut In Electronics MDPI AG, 2013 8(2019), 4, p 397 (DE-627)718626478 (DE-600)2662127-7 20799292 nnns volume:8 year:2019 number:4, p 397 https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics8040397 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/992f2df024f944a987db2842a96d1e49 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/8/4/397 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2079-9292 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2019 4, p 397 |
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The goal of the proposed LPI optimization strategy is to minimize the transmitted power of each radar while satisfying a predetermined signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement for target detection. Firstly, a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game is adopted to formulate the LPI optimization problem of multistatic radar system. In the considered game model, the hostile intercept receiver plays a role of leader, who decides the prices of power resource first through the maximization of its own utility function. The multiple radars are followers to compete with each other in a non-cooperative game according to the imposed prices from the intercept receiver subsequently. Then, the Nash equilibrium (NE) for the considered game model is derived, and the existence and uniqueness of the NE are analytically proved. Furthermore, a pricing-based distributed iterative power control algorithm is proposed. 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Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Low Probability of Intercept Performance Optimization for Multistatic Radar System |
abstract |
In this paper, the problem of Stackelberg game-theoretic low probability of intercept (LPI) performance optimization in multistatic radar system is investigated. The goal of the proposed LPI optimization strategy is to minimize the transmitted power of each radar while satisfying a predetermined signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement for target detection. Firstly, a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game is adopted to formulate the LPI optimization problem of multistatic radar system. In the considered game model, the hostile intercept receiver plays a role of leader, who decides the prices of power resource first through the maximization of its own utility function. The multiple radars are followers to compete with each other in a non-cooperative game according to the imposed prices from the intercept receiver subsequently. Then, the Nash equilibrium (NE) for the considered game model is derived, and the existence and uniqueness of the NE are analytically proved. Furthermore, a pricing-based distributed iterative power control algorithm is proposed. Finally, some simulation examples are provided to demonstrate that the proposed scheme has remarkable potential to enhance the LPI performance of the multistatic radar system. |
abstractGer |
In this paper, the problem of Stackelberg game-theoretic low probability of intercept (LPI) performance optimization in multistatic radar system is investigated. The goal of the proposed LPI optimization strategy is to minimize the transmitted power of each radar while satisfying a predetermined signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement for target detection. Firstly, a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game is adopted to formulate the LPI optimization problem of multistatic radar system. In the considered game model, the hostile intercept receiver plays a role of leader, who decides the prices of power resource first through the maximization of its own utility function. The multiple radars are followers to compete with each other in a non-cooperative game according to the imposed prices from the intercept receiver subsequently. Then, the Nash equilibrium (NE) for the considered game model is derived, and the existence and uniqueness of the NE are analytically proved. Furthermore, a pricing-based distributed iterative power control algorithm is proposed. Finally, some simulation examples are provided to demonstrate that the proposed scheme has remarkable potential to enhance the LPI performance of the multistatic radar system. |
abstract_unstemmed |
In this paper, the problem of Stackelberg game-theoretic low probability of intercept (LPI) performance optimization in multistatic radar system is investigated. The goal of the proposed LPI optimization strategy is to minimize the transmitted power of each radar while satisfying a predetermined signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirement for target detection. Firstly, a single-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game is adopted to formulate the LPI optimization problem of multistatic radar system. In the considered game model, the hostile intercept receiver plays a role of leader, who decides the prices of power resource first through the maximization of its own utility function. The multiple radars are followers to compete with each other in a non-cooperative game according to the imposed prices from the intercept receiver subsequently. Then, the Nash equilibrium (NE) for the considered game model is derived, and the existence and uniqueness of the NE are analytically proved. Furthermore, a pricing-based distributed iterative power control algorithm is proposed. Finally, some simulation examples are provided to demonstrate that the proposed scheme has remarkable potential to enhance the LPI performance of the multistatic radar system. |
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