Corte al Congreso: Poder judicial y trámite legislativo en Colombia

Courts can have direct and indirect influence on the legislative process. Thus far, studies of the Colombian Congress have mainly focused on the Constitutional Court’s direct influence on the legislature. This article explores the court’s indirect influence. Through a case study of the 2012 Military...
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Autor*in:	Sandra Botero [verfasserIn] Laura Gamboa [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch ; Spanisch ; Portugiesisch

Erschienen:	2021

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Latin American Research Review - Cambridge University Press, 2017, 56(2021), 3
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:56 ; year:2021 ; number:3

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.25222/larr.757

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ027250989

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language	English Spanish Portuguese
source	In Latin American Research Review 56(2021), 3 volume:56 year:2021 number:3
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container_title	Latin American Research Review
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Sandra Botero @@aut@@ Laura Gamboa @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2021-01-01T00:00:00Z
hierarchy_top_id	331743531
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language_de	englisch spanisch portugiesisch
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topic_title	F1201-3799 Corte al Congreso: Poder judicial y trámite legislativo en Colombia
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title	Corte al Congreso: Poder judicial y trámite legislativo en Colombia
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title_full	Corte al Congreso: Poder judicial y trámite legislativo en Colombia
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title_auth	Corte al Congreso: Poder judicial y trámite legislativo en Colombia
abstract	Courts can have direct and indirect influence on the legislative process. Thus far, studies of the Colombian Congress have mainly focused on the Constitutional Court’s direct influence on the legislature. This article explores the court’s indirect influence. Through a case study of the 2012 Military Criminal Code Reform, it shows how the court changes legislators’ calculations and behavior when discussing a bill. Due to its independence and accessibility, the Constitutional Court provides minority coalitions in Congress with a wider array of strategies they may engage with. The article identifies and characterizes two obstruction tactics: to invite the court (by documenting, inciting, or maximizing procedural irregularities) and constitutionality challenges before the court. Together, these two strategies allow minority coalitions to block bills and advance their agenda. Resumen Las Cortes influyen de forma directa e indirecta en el proceso legislativo. Hasta el momento, los estudios sobre Congreso en Colombia se han enfocado mayoritariamente en la influencia directa de la Corte Constitucional. Este artículo explora su influencia indirecta. Usando la Reforma Penal Militar de 2012 como estudio de caso, mostramos cómo la Corte cambia los cálculos y comportamiento de los congresistas. Debido a su independencia y accesibilidad, la Corte Constitucional amplía el abanico de estrategias disponibles a las coaliciones minoritarias de oposición en el Congreso. Aquí identificamos dos prácticas de obstrucción: invitar a la Corte (mediante la motivación o aprovechamiento y la documentación de vicios de procedimiento), y demandas ante la Corte. Juntas, estas estrategias les permiten a oposiciones minoritarias bloquear leyes adversas y avanzar su agenda en el proceso de construcción de políticas públicas.
abstractGer	Courts can have direct and indirect influence on the legislative process. Thus far, studies of the Colombian Congress have mainly focused on the Constitutional Court’s direct influence on the legislature. This article explores the court’s indirect influence. Through a case study of the 2012 Military Criminal Code Reform, it shows how the court changes legislators’ calculations and behavior when discussing a bill. Due to its independence and accessibility, the Constitutional Court provides minority coalitions in Congress with a wider array of strategies they may engage with. The article identifies and characterizes two obstruction tactics: to invite the court (by documenting, inciting, or maximizing procedural irregularities) and constitutionality challenges before the court. Together, these two strategies allow minority coalitions to block bills and advance their agenda. Resumen Las Cortes influyen de forma directa e indirecta en el proceso legislativo. Hasta el momento, los estudios sobre Congreso en Colombia se han enfocado mayoritariamente en la influencia directa de la Corte Constitucional. Este artículo explora su influencia indirecta. Usando la Reforma Penal Militar de 2012 como estudio de caso, mostramos cómo la Corte cambia los cálculos y comportamiento de los congresistas. Debido a su independencia y accesibilidad, la Corte Constitucional amplía el abanico de estrategias disponibles a las coaliciones minoritarias de oposición en el Congreso. Aquí identificamos dos prácticas de obstrucción: invitar a la Corte (mediante la motivación o aprovechamiento y la documentación de vicios de procedimiento), y demandas ante la Corte. Juntas, estas estrategias les permiten a oposiciones minoritarias bloquear leyes adversas y avanzar su agenda en el proceso de construcción de políticas públicas.
abstract_unstemmed	Courts can have direct and indirect influence on the legislative process. Thus far, studies of the Colombian Congress have mainly focused on the Constitutional Court’s direct influence on the legislature. This article explores the court’s indirect influence. Through a case study of the 2012 Military Criminal Code Reform, it shows how the court changes legislators’ calculations and behavior when discussing a bill. Due to its independence and accessibility, the Constitutional Court provides minority coalitions in Congress with a wider array of strategies they may engage with. The article identifies and characterizes two obstruction tactics: to invite the court (by documenting, inciting, or maximizing procedural irregularities) and constitutionality challenges before the court. Together, these two strategies allow minority coalitions to block bills and advance their agenda. Resumen Las Cortes influyen de forma directa e indirecta en el proceso legislativo. Hasta el momento, los estudios sobre Congreso en Colombia se han enfocado mayoritariamente en la influencia directa de la Corte Constitucional. Este artículo explora su influencia indirecta. Usando la Reforma Penal Militar de 2012 como estudio de caso, mostramos cómo la Corte cambia los cálculos y comportamiento de los congresistas. Debido a su independencia y accesibilidad, la Corte Constitucional amplía el abanico de estrategias disponibles a las coaliciones minoritarias de oposición en el Congreso. Aquí identificamos dos prácticas de obstrucción: invitar a la Corte (mediante la motivación o aprovechamiento y la documentación de vicios de procedimiento), y demandas ante la Corte. Juntas, estas estrategias les permiten a oposiciones minoritarias bloquear leyes adversas y avanzar su agenda en el proceso de construcción de políticas públicas.
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Hasta el momento, los estudios sobre Congreso en Colombia se han enfocado mayoritariamente en la influencia directa de la Corte Constitucional. Este artículo explora su influencia indirecta. Usando la Reforma Penal Militar de 2012 como estudio de caso, mostramos cómo la Corte cambia los cálculos y comportamiento de los congresistas. Debido a su independencia y accesibilidad, la Corte Constitucional amplía el abanico de estrategias disponibles a las coaliciones minoritarias de oposición en el Congreso. Aquí identificamos dos prácticas de obstrucción: invitar a la Corte (mediante la motivación o aprovechamiento y la documentación de vicios de procedimiento), y demandas ante la Corte. Juntas, estas estrategias les permiten a oposiciones minoritarias bloquear leyes adversas y avanzar su agenda en el proceso de construcción de políticas públicas.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Latin America. 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