Stopping Mass Atrocities: Targeting the Dictator

The international community has determined it carries the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes if a state is unable or unwilling to do so. These crimes are often perpetrated in authoritarian regimes where they are legitimized through an exclusionary ideology. A comparative case s...
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Autor*in:	Maartje Weerdesteijn [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2015

Schlagwörter:	dictator foreign policy mass atrocity Pol Pot rationality Slobodan Milosevic

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Politics and Governance - Cogitatio, 2014, 3(2015), 3, Seite 53-66
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:3 ; year:2015 ; number:3 ; pages:53-66

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.17645/pag.v3i3.289

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ030569737

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spelling	10.17645/pag.v3i3.289 doi (DE-627)DOAJ030569737 (DE-599)DOAJ2e74078bb827438ead1320ed7fd417f3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JA1-92 Maartje Weerdesteijn verfasserin aut Stopping Mass Atrocities: Targeting the Dictator 2015 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The international community has determined it carries the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes if a state is unable or unwilling to do so. These crimes are often perpetrated in authoritarian regimes where they are legitimized through an exclusionary ideology. A comparative case study of Pol Pot and Milosevic indicates that whether the leader truly believes in the ideology he puts forward or merely uses it instrumentally to manipulate the population, is an important variable, which affects the manner in which third parties can respond effectively to these crimes. While Pol Pot was motivated by his ideological zeal, Milosevic used ideology to create a climate in which mass atrocities could be perpetrated in order to garner further power and prestige. In Max Weber’s terminology, Milosevic was guided by instrumental rationality while Pol Pot acted on the basis of value rationality. This case study compares two crucial moments—Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and NATO’s bombing of Serbia when the crisis in Kosovo escalated—to analyze the responsiveness of the two leaders. It is argued that ideological leaders are less responsive than non-ideological leaders to foreign policy measures targeted to stop or mitigate the occurrence of atrocities. dictator foreign policy mass atrocity Pol Pot rationality Slobodan Milosevic Political science (General) In Politics and Governance Cogitatio, 2014 3(2015), 3, Seite 53-66 (DE-627)786672994 (DE-600)2771763-X 21832463 nnns volume:3 year:2015 number:3 pages:53-66 https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v3i3.289 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/2e74078bb827438ead1320ed7fd417f3 kostenfrei https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/289 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2183-2463 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 3 2015 3 53-66
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allfieldsGer	10.17645/pag.v3i3.289 doi (DE-627)DOAJ030569737 (DE-599)DOAJ2e74078bb827438ead1320ed7fd417f3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JA1-92 Maartje Weerdesteijn verfasserin aut Stopping Mass Atrocities: Targeting the Dictator 2015 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The international community has determined it carries the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes if a state is unable or unwilling to do so. These crimes are often perpetrated in authoritarian regimes where they are legitimized through an exclusionary ideology. A comparative case study of Pol Pot and Milosevic indicates that whether the leader truly believes in the ideology he puts forward or merely uses it instrumentally to manipulate the population, is an important variable, which affects the manner in which third parties can respond effectively to these crimes. While Pol Pot was motivated by his ideological zeal, Milosevic used ideology to create a climate in which mass atrocities could be perpetrated in order to garner further power and prestige. In Max Weber’s terminology, Milosevic was guided by instrumental rationality while Pol Pot acted on the basis of value rationality. This case study compares two crucial moments—Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and NATO’s bombing of Serbia when the crisis in Kosovo escalated—to analyze the responsiveness of the two leaders. It is argued that ideological leaders are less responsive than non-ideological leaders to foreign policy measures targeted to stop or mitigate the occurrence of atrocities. dictator foreign policy mass atrocity Pol Pot rationality Slobodan Milosevic Political science (General) In Politics and Governance Cogitatio, 2014 3(2015), 3, Seite 53-66 (DE-627)786672994 (DE-600)2771763-X 21832463 nnns volume:3 year:2015 number:3 pages:53-66 https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v3i3.289 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/2e74078bb827438ead1320ed7fd417f3 kostenfrei https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/289 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2183-2463 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 3 2015 3 53-66
allfieldsSound	10.17645/pag.v3i3.289 doi (DE-627)DOAJ030569737 (DE-599)DOAJ2e74078bb827438ead1320ed7fd417f3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JA1-92 Maartje Weerdesteijn verfasserin aut Stopping Mass Atrocities: Targeting the Dictator 2015 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The international community has determined it carries the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes if a state is unable or unwilling to do so. These crimes are often perpetrated in authoritarian regimes where they are legitimized through an exclusionary ideology. A comparative case study of Pol Pot and Milosevic indicates that whether the leader truly believes in the ideology he puts forward or merely uses it instrumentally to manipulate the population, is an important variable, which affects the manner in which third parties can respond effectively to these crimes. While Pol Pot was motivated by his ideological zeal, Milosevic used ideology to create a climate in which mass atrocities could be perpetrated in order to garner further power and prestige. In Max Weber’s terminology, Milosevic was guided by instrumental rationality while Pol Pot acted on the basis of value rationality. This case study compares two crucial moments—Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and NATO’s bombing of Serbia when the crisis in Kosovo escalated—to analyze the responsiveness of the two leaders. It is argued that ideological leaders are less responsive than non-ideological leaders to foreign policy measures targeted to stop or mitigate the occurrence of atrocities. dictator foreign policy mass atrocity Pol Pot rationality Slobodan Milosevic Political science (General) In Politics and Governance Cogitatio, 2014 3(2015), 3, Seite 53-66 (DE-627)786672994 (DE-600)2771763-X 21832463 nnns volume:3 year:2015 number:3 pages:53-66 https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v3i3.289 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/2e74078bb827438ead1320ed7fd417f3 kostenfrei https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/289 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2183-2463 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 3 2015 3 53-66
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callnumber-first	J - Political Science
author	Maartje Weerdesteijn
spellingShingle	Maartje Weerdesteijn misc JA1-92 misc dictator misc foreign policy misc mass atrocity misc Pol Pot misc rationality misc Slobodan Milosevic misc Political science (General) Stopping Mass Atrocities: Targeting the Dictator
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topic_title	JA1-92 Stopping Mass Atrocities: Targeting the Dictator dictator foreign policy mass atrocity Pol Pot rationality Slobodan Milosevic
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title	Stopping Mass Atrocities: Targeting the Dictator
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title_sort	stopping mass atrocities: targeting the dictator
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title_auth	Stopping Mass Atrocities: Targeting the Dictator
abstract	The international community has determined it carries the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes if a state is unable or unwilling to do so. These crimes are often perpetrated in authoritarian regimes where they are legitimized through an exclusionary ideology. A comparative case study of Pol Pot and Milosevic indicates that whether the leader truly believes in the ideology he puts forward or merely uses it instrumentally to manipulate the population, is an important variable, which affects the manner in which third parties can respond effectively to these crimes. While Pol Pot was motivated by his ideological zeal, Milosevic used ideology to create a climate in which mass atrocities could be perpetrated in order to garner further power and prestige. In Max Weber’s terminology, Milosevic was guided by instrumental rationality while Pol Pot acted on the basis of value rationality. This case study compares two crucial moments—Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and NATO’s bombing of Serbia when the crisis in Kosovo escalated—to analyze the responsiveness of the two leaders. It is argued that ideological leaders are less responsive than non-ideological leaders to foreign policy measures targeted to stop or mitigate the occurrence of atrocities.
abstractGer	The international community has determined it carries the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes if a state is unable or unwilling to do so. These crimes are often perpetrated in authoritarian regimes where they are legitimized through an exclusionary ideology. A comparative case study of Pol Pot and Milosevic indicates that whether the leader truly believes in the ideology he puts forward or merely uses it instrumentally to manipulate the population, is an important variable, which affects the manner in which third parties can respond effectively to these crimes. While Pol Pot was motivated by his ideological zeal, Milosevic used ideology to create a climate in which mass atrocities could be perpetrated in order to garner further power and prestige. In Max Weber’s terminology, Milosevic was guided by instrumental rationality while Pol Pot acted on the basis of value rationality. This case study compares two crucial moments—Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and NATO’s bombing of Serbia when the crisis in Kosovo escalated—to analyze the responsiveness of the two leaders. It is argued that ideological leaders are less responsive than non-ideological leaders to foreign policy measures targeted to stop or mitigate the occurrence of atrocities.
abstract_unstemmed	The international community has determined it carries the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes if a state is unable or unwilling to do so. These crimes are often perpetrated in authoritarian regimes where they are legitimized through an exclusionary ideology. A comparative case study of Pol Pot and Milosevic indicates that whether the leader truly believes in the ideology he puts forward or merely uses it instrumentally to manipulate the population, is an important variable, which affects the manner in which third parties can respond effectively to these crimes. While Pol Pot was motivated by his ideological zeal, Milosevic used ideology to create a climate in which mass atrocities could be perpetrated in order to garner further power and prestige. In Max Weber’s terminology, Milosevic was guided by instrumental rationality while Pol Pot acted on the basis of value rationality. This case study compares two crucial moments—Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and NATO’s bombing of Serbia when the crisis in Kosovo escalated—to analyze the responsiveness of the two leaders. It is argued that ideological leaders are less responsive than non-ideological leaders to foreign policy measures targeted to stop or mitigate the occurrence of atrocities.
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