An Empirical Investigation of the Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements

This article investigates the impacts of decoupled and coupled program payments on farmland rental contract choices for a subset of U.S. crop farms using a principal-agent model. We consider cash and share contracts as well as hybrid contracts, which represent an increasingly prominent feature of U....
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Autor*in:	Feng Qiu [verfasserIn] Barry K. Goodwin [verfasserIn] Jean-Philippe Gervais [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2011

Schlagwörter:	benefit distribution contractual rearrangement hybrid contract leasing arrangements program payments

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics - Western Agricultural Economics Association, 2020, 36(2011), 3, Seite 536-551
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:36 ; year:2011 ; number:3 ; pages:536-551

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.22004/ag.econ.119179

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ032531494

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author	Feng Qiu
spellingShingle	Feng Qiu misc benefit distribution misc contractual rearrangement misc hybrid contract misc leasing arrangements misc program payments misc Agriculture misc S An Empirical Investigation of the Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements
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topic_title	An Empirical Investigation of the Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements benefit distribution contractual rearrangement hybrid contract leasing arrangements program payments
topic	misc benefit distribution misc contractual rearrangement misc hybrid contract misc leasing arrangements misc program payments misc Agriculture misc S
topic_unstemmed	misc benefit distribution misc contractual rearrangement misc hybrid contract misc leasing arrangements misc program payments misc Agriculture misc S
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title	An Empirical Investigation of the Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements
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title_full	An Empirical Investigation of the Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements
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title_sort	empirical investigation of the linkages between government payments and farmland leasing arrangements
title_auth	An Empirical Investigation of the Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements
abstract	This article investigates the impacts of decoupled and coupled program payments on farmland rental contract choices for a subset of U.S. crop farms using a principal-agent model. We consider cash and share contracts as well as hybrid contracts, which represent an increasingly prominent feature of U.S. agriculture. The conceptual framework suggests that restrictions on payments between contracting parties are ineffective and induce an offsetting contractual rearrangement. Empirical results from a multinomial logit model confirm that government support programs have large, significant effects on contract choices and that these effects vary by types of programs.
abstractGer	This article investigates the impacts of decoupled and coupled program payments on farmland rental contract choices for a subset of U.S. crop farms using a principal-agent model. We consider cash and share contracts as well as hybrid contracts, which represent an increasingly prominent feature of U.S. agriculture. The conceptual framework suggests that restrictions on payments between contracting parties are ineffective and induce an offsetting contractual rearrangement. Empirical results from a multinomial logit model confirm that government support programs have large, significant effects on contract choices and that these effects vary by types of programs.
abstract_unstemmed	This article investigates the impacts of decoupled and coupled program payments on farmland rental contract choices for a subset of U.S. crop farms using a principal-agent model. We consider cash and share contracts as well as hybrid contracts, which represent an increasingly prominent feature of U.S. agriculture. The conceptual framework suggests that restrictions on payments between contracting parties are ineffective and induce an offsetting contractual rearrangement. Empirical results from a multinomial logit model confirm that government support programs have large, significant effects on contract choices and that these effects vary by types of programs.
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title_short	An Empirical Investigation of the Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements
url	https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.119179 https://doaj.org/article/8c04a999b26f41be8ad34cfed2612d11 https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/119179 https://doaj.org/toc/1068-5502 https://doaj.org/toc/2327-8285
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We consider cash and share contracts as well as hybrid contracts, which represent an increasingly prominent feature of U.S. agriculture. The conceptual framework suggests that restrictions on payments between contracting parties are ineffective and induce an offsetting contractual rearrangement. 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Goodwin</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Jean-Philippe Gervais</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics</subfield><subfield code="d">Western Agricultural Economics Association, 2020</subfield><subfield code="g">36(2011), 3, Seite 536-551</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)389461717</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2148922-1</subfield><subfield code="x">23278285</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:36</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2011</subfield><subfield code="g">number:3</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:536-551</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield 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An Empirical Investigation of the Linkages between Government Payments and Farmland Leasing Arrangements

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