Capital regulations, supervision and the international harmonization of bank capital ratios

In recent decades, despite the Basel Committee’s effort to develop internationally uniform regulatory capital standards, the capital ratios of banks across countries continue to exhibit significant differences. This paper examines the fundamental question of whether, given a uniform regulatory capit...
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Autor*in:	Kevin T. Jacques [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2017

Schlagwörter:	1988 and revised Basel Accords bank supervision international harmonization of capital requirements risk-based capital ratio

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Banks and Bank Systems - LLC "CPC "Business Perspectives", 2019, 12(2017), 1, Seite 175-183
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:12 ; year:2017 ; number:1 ; pages:175-183

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.21511/bbs.12(1-1).2017.11

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ033761108

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author	Kevin T. Jacques
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topic_title	HG1501-3550 Capital regulations, supervision and the international harmonization of bank capital ratios 1988 and revised Basel Accords bank supervision international harmonization of capital requirements risk-based capital ratio
topic	misc HG1501-3550 misc 1988 and revised Basel Accords misc bank supervision misc international harmonization of capital requirements misc risk-based capital ratio misc Banking
topic_unstemmed	misc HG1501-3550 misc 1988 and revised Basel Accords misc bank supervision misc international harmonization of capital requirements misc risk-based capital ratio misc Banking
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title	Capital regulations, supervision and the international harmonization of bank capital ratios
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title_sort	capital regulations, supervision and the international harmonization of bank capital ratios
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title_auth	Capital regulations, supervision and the international harmonization of bank capital ratios
abstract	In recent decades, despite the Basel Committee’s effort to develop internationally uniform regulatory capital standards, the capital ratios of banks across countries continue to exhibit significant differences. This paper examines the fundamental question of whether, given a uniform regulatory capital standard, regulators should expect similar banks to exhibit similar risk-based capital ratios. More specifically, this study develops a one-period theoretical model to examine the level playing field argument in light of not only uniform regulatory capital standards but also differences in bank supervision. The results of the theoretical model suggest that even with an internationally uniform risk-based capital requirement, it is unreasonable to expect banks in different countries to hold similar capital ratios. This occurs, in part, because regulators have discretion in how they apply the risk-based capital standards. Furthermore, the results suggest that a necessary condition for banks to exhibit similar capital ratios is that uniform capital requirements must be accompanied by a uniform stringency and application of regulatory supervision.
abstractGer	In recent decades, despite the Basel Committee’s effort to develop internationally uniform regulatory capital standards, the capital ratios of banks across countries continue to exhibit significant differences. This paper examines the fundamental question of whether, given a uniform regulatory capital standard, regulators should expect similar banks to exhibit similar risk-based capital ratios. More specifically, this study develops a one-period theoretical model to examine the level playing field argument in light of not only uniform regulatory capital standards but also differences in bank supervision. The results of the theoretical model suggest that even with an internationally uniform risk-based capital requirement, it is unreasonable to expect banks in different countries to hold similar capital ratios. This occurs, in part, because regulators have discretion in how they apply the risk-based capital standards. Furthermore, the results suggest that a necessary condition for banks to exhibit similar capital ratios is that uniform capital requirements must be accompanied by a uniform stringency and application of regulatory supervision.
abstract_unstemmed	In recent decades, despite the Basel Committee’s effort to develop internationally uniform regulatory capital standards, the capital ratios of banks across countries continue to exhibit significant differences. This paper examines the fundamental question of whether, given a uniform regulatory capital standard, regulators should expect similar banks to exhibit similar risk-based capital ratios. More specifically, this study develops a one-period theoretical model to examine the level playing field argument in light of not only uniform regulatory capital standards but also differences in bank supervision. The results of the theoretical model suggest that even with an internationally uniform risk-based capital requirement, it is unreasonable to expect banks in different countries to hold similar capital ratios. This occurs, in part, because regulators have discretion in how they apply the risk-based capital standards. Furthermore, the results suggest that a necessary condition for banks to exhibit similar capital ratios is that uniform capital requirements must be accompanied by a uniform stringency and application of regulatory supervision.
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title_short	Capital regulations, supervision and the international harmonization of bank capital ratios
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score	7.400769

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Capital regulations, supervision and the international harmonization of bank capital ratios

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