Capital regulations, supervision and the international harmonization of bank capital ratios
In recent decades, despite the Basel Committee’s effort to develop internationally uniform regulatory capital standards, the capital ratios of banks across countries continue to exhibit significant differences. This paper examines the fundamental question of whether, given a uniform regulatory capit...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Kevin T. Jacques [verfasserIn] |
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E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2017 |
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Schlagwörter: |
1988 and revised Basel Accords |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: Banks and Bank Systems - LLC "CPC "Business Perspectives", 2019, 12(2017), 1, Seite 175-183 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:12 ; year:2017 ; number:1 ; pages:175-183 |
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Link aufrufen |
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DOI / URN: |
10.21511/bbs.12(1-1).2017.11 |
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Katalog-ID: |
DOAJ033761108 |
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10.21511/bbs.12(1-1).2017.11 doi (DE-627)DOAJ033761108 (DE-599)DOAJ6650a992f1ca437c8c7b01e1b1549d7d DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng HG1501-3550 Kevin T. Jacques verfasserin aut Capital regulations, supervision and the international harmonization of bank capital ratios 2017 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In recent decades, despite the Basel Committee’s effort to develop internationally uniform regulatory capital standards, the capital ratios of banks across countries continue to exhibit significant differences. This paper examines the fundamental question of whether, given a uniform regulatory capital standard, regulators should expect similar banks to exhibit similar risk-based capital ratios. More specifically, this study develops a one-period theoretical model to examine the level playing field argument in light of not only uniform regulatory capital standards but also differences in bank supervision. The results of the theoretical model suggest that even with an internationally uniform risk-based capital requirement, it is unreasonable to expect banks in different countries to hold similar capital ratios. This occurs, in part, because regulators have discretion in how they apply the risk-based capital standards. Furthermore, the results suggest that a necessary condition for banks to exhibit similar capital ratios is that uniform capital requirements must be accompanied by a uniform stringency and application of regulatory supervision. 1988 and revised Basel Accords bank supervision international harmonization of capital requirements risk-based capital ratio Banking In Banks and Bank Systems LLC "CPC "Business Perspectives", 2019 12(2017), 1, Seite 175-183 (DE-627)585798397 (DE-600)2467160-5 19917074 nnns volume:12 year:2017 number:1 pages:175-183 https://doi.org/10.21511/bbs.12(1-1).2017.11 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/6650a992f1ca437c8c7b01e1b1549d7d kostenfrei https://businessperspectives.org/images/pdf/applications/publishing/templates/article/assets/8673/BBS_2017_01_cont_Jacques.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1816-7403 Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1991-7074 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 12 2017 1 175-183 |
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10.21511/bbs.12(1-1).2017.11 doi (DE-627)DOAJ033761108 (DE-599)DOAJ6650a992f1ca437c8c7b01e1b1549d7d DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng HG1501-3550 Kevin T. Jacques verfasserin aut Capital regulations, supervision and the international harmonization of bank capital ratios 2017 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In recent decades, despite the Basel Committee’s effort to develop internationally uniform regulatory capital standards, the capital ratios of banks across countries continue to exhibit significant differences. This paper examines the fundamental question of whether, given a uniform regulatory capital standard, regulators should expect similar banks to exhibit similar risk-based capital ratios. More specifically, this study develops a one-period theoretical model to examine the level playing field argument in light of not only uniform regulatory capital standards but also differences in bank supervision. The results of the theoretical model suggest that even with an internationally uniform risk-based capital requirement, it is unreasonable to expect banks in different countries to hold similar capital ratios. This occurs, in part, because regulators have discretion in how they apply the risk-based capital standards. Furthermore, the results suggest that a necessary condition for banks to exhibit similar capital ratios is that uniform capital requirements must be accompanied by a uniform stringency and application of regulatory supervision. 1988 and revised Basel Accords bank supervision international harmonization of capital requirements risk-based capital ratio Banking In Banks and Bank Systems LLC "CPC "Business Perspectives", 2019 12(2017), 1, Seite 175-183 (DE-627)585798397 (DE-600)2467160-5 19917074 nnns volume:12 year:2017 number:1 pages:175-183 https://doi.org/10.21511/bbs.12(1-1).2017.11 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/6650a992f1ca437c8c7b01e1b1549d7d kostenfrei https://businessperspectives.org/images/pdf/applications/publishing/templates/article/assets/8673/BBS_2017_01_cont_Jacques.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1816-7403 Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1991-7074 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 12 2017 1 175-183 |
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Capital regulations, supervision and the international harmonization of bank capital ratios |
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In recent decades, despite the Basel Committee’s effort to develop internationally uniform regulatory capital standards, the capital ratios of banks across countries continue to exhibit significant differences. This paper examines the fundamental question of whether, given a uniform regulatory capital standard, regulators should expect similar banks to exhibit similar risk-based capital ratios. More specifically, this study develops a one-period theoretical model to examine the level playing field argument in light of not only uniform regulatory capital standards but also differences in bank supervision. The results of the theoretical model suggest that even with an internationally uniform risk-based capital requirement, it is unreasonable to expect banks in different countries to hold similar capital ratios. This occurs, in part, because regulators have discretion in how they apply the risk-based capital standards. Furthermore, the results suggest that a necessary condition for banks to exhibit similar capital ratios is that uniform capital requirements must be accompanied by a uniform stringency and application of regulatory supervision. |
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In recent decades, despite the Basel Committee’s effort to develop internationally uniform regulatory capital standards, the capital ratios of banks across countries continue to exhibit significant differences. This paper examines the fundamental question of whether, given a uniform regulatory capital standard, regulators should expect similar banks to exhibit similar risk-based capital ratios. More specifically, this study develops a one-period theoretical model to examine the level playing field argument in light of not only uniform regulatory capital standards but also differences in bank supervision. The results of the theoretical model suggest that even with an internationally uniform risk-based capital requirement, it is unreasonable to expect banks in different countries to hold similar capital ratios. This occurs, in part, because regulators have discretion in how they apply the risk-based capital standards. Furthermore, the results suggest that a necessary condition for banks to exhibit similar capital ratios is that uniform capital requirements must be accompanied by a uniform stringency and application of regulatory supervision. |
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In recent decades, despite the Basel Committee’s effort to develop internationally uniform regulatory capital standards, the capital ratios of banks across countries continue to exhibit significant differences. This paper examines the fundamental question of whether, given a uniform regulatory capital standard, regulators should expect similar banks to exhibit similar risk-based capital ratios. More specifically, this study develops a one-period theoretical model to examine the level playing field argument in light of not only uniform regulatory capital standards but also differences in bank supervision. The results of the theoretical model suggest that even with an internationally uniform risk-based capital requirement, it is unreasonable to expect banks in different countries to hold similar capital ratios. This occurs, in part, because regulators have discretion in how they apply the risk-based capital standards. Furthermore, the results suggest that a necessary condition for banks to exhibit similar capital ratios is that uniform capital requirements must be accompanied by a uniform stringency and application of regulatory supervision. |
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|
score |
7.400769 |