What does It Mean to Harm a Person?
The central task of my reflections is to deal with the question what harming a person could mean. In the first part of the reflections, I will be critically concerned with current ways of dealing with the concept of human dignity, and why it is no longer plausible to uphold these regulations, whereb...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Stefan Lorenz Sorgner [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch ; Italienisch |
| Erschienen: |
2020 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies - Associazione Culturale Humana.Mente, 2015, 13(2020), 37 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:13 ; year:2020 ; number:37 |
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DOAJ035278099 |
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| 520 | |a The central task of my reflections is to deal with the question what harming a person could mean. In the first part of the reflections, I will be critically concerned with current ways of dealing with the concept of human dignity, and why it is no longer plausible to uphold these regulations, whereby I will particularly focus on the legal dimension. It will come out that the person-object-dichotomy cannot simply be upheld in its traditional manner. Given the plausibility of these reflections, the legal implication that it ought to be legally prohibited to treat another person merely as a means becomes implausible, too, as it rests on the aforementioned distinction between persons and objects. As an alternative, it will be suggested that legally we ought to separate ontological insights clearly from normative ones. In the following part, I will focus on the moral status of personhood, and develop some philosophical reflections which could be upheld on the basis of a posthuman paradigm-shift. Thereby, I will develop a gradual concept of personhood which implies several levels of personhood depending on the corresponding capacity of suffering, which needs to be established empirically. Once, the direction of an alternative concept of personhood becomes clearer, which implies that some animals become person and which provides some reasons for holding that some sufficiently developed embodied AIs could also deserve personhood, the question can be reflected upon further what it could mean to harm a person. The issue of harming, however, is so complex that I merely plan to raise some questions which need to be confronted when clarifying the concept of harming. I do not attempt to propose a definite concept of harming, but stress that the concept is closely related to cultural circumstances, so that there is a permanent need to engage with the concept, redefine it, and adapt it to the current cultural situation. Not proposing a clear concept of harm is not a shortcoming, but rather a necessity. | ||
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(DE-627)DOAJ035278099 (DE-599)DOAJ1b1364fa27744b41b22c17d3b53cbcd0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng ita B1-5802 Stefan Lorenz Sorgner verfasserin aut What does It Mean to Harm a Person? 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The central task of my reflections is to deal with the question what harming a person could mean. In the first part of the reflections, I will be critically concerned with current ways of dealing with the concept of human dignity, and why it is no longer plausible to uphold these regulations, whereby I will particularly focus on the legal dimension. It will come out that the person-object-dichotomy cannot simply be upheld in its traditional manner. Given the plausibility of these reflections, the legal implication that it ought to be legally prohibited to treat another person merely as a means becomes implausible, too, as it rests on the aforementioned distinction between persons and objects. As an alternative, it will be suggested that legally we ought to separate ontological insights clearly from normative ones. In the following part, I will focus on the moral status of personhood, and develop some philosophical reflections which could be upheld on the basis of a posthuman paradigm-shift. Thereby, I will develop a gradual concept of personhood which implies several levels of personhood depending on the corresponding capacity of suffering, which needs to be established empirically. Once, the direction of an alternative concept of personhood becomes clearer, which implies that some animals become person and which provides some reasons for holding that some sufficiently developed embodied AIs could also deserve personhood, the question can be reflected upon further what it could mean to harm a person. The issue of harming, however, is so complex that I merely plan to raise some questions which need to be confronted when clarifying the concept of harming. I do not attempt to propose a definite concept of harming, but stress that the concept is closely related to cultural circumstances, so that there is a permanent need to engage with the concept, redefine it, and adapt it to the current cultural situation. Not proposing a clear concept of harm is not a shortcoming, but rather a necessity. Personhood Philosophy (General) In Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies Associazione Culturale Humana.Mente, 2015 13(2020), 37 (DE-627)771394608 (DE-600)2740381-6 19721293 nnns volume:13 year:2020 number:37 https://doaj.org/article/1b1364fa27744b41b22c17d3b53cbcd0 kostenfrei https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/322 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1972-1293 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 13 2020 37 |
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(DE-627)DOAJ035278099 (DE-599)DOAJ1b1364fa27744b41b22c17d3b53cbcd0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng ita B1-5802 Stefan Lorenz Sorgner verfasserin aut What does It Mean to Harm a Person? 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The central task of my reflections is to deal with the question what harming a person could mean. In the first part of the reflections, I will be critically concerned with current ways of dealing with the concept of human dignity, and why it is no longer plausible to uphold these regulations, whereby I will particularly focus on the legal dimension. It will come out that the person-object-dichotomy cannot simply be upheld in its traditional manner. Given the plausibility of these reflections, the legal implication that it ought to be legally prohibited to treat another person merely as a means becomes implausible, too, as it rests on the aforementioned distinction between persons and objects. As an alternative, it will be suggested that legally we ought to separate ontological insights clearly from normative ones. In the following part, I will focus on the moral status of personhood, and develop some philosophical reflections which could be upheld on the basis of a posthuman paradigm-shift. Thereby, I will develop a gradual concept of personhood which implies several levels of personhood depending on the corresponding capacity of suffering, which needs to be established empirically. Once, the direction of an alternative concept of personhood becomes clearer, which implies that some animals become person and which provides some reasons for holding that some sufficiently developed embodied AIs could also deserve personhood, the question can be reflected upon further what it could mean to harm a person. The issue of harming, however, is so complex that I merely plan to raise some questions which need to be confronted when clarifying the concept of harming. I do not attempt to propose a definite concept of harming, but stress that the concept is closely related to cultural circumstances, so that there is a permanent need to engage with the concept, redefine it, and adapt it to the current cultural situation. Not proposing a clear concept of harm is not a shortcoming, but rather a necessity. Personhood Philosophy (General) In Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies Associazione Culturale Humana.Mente, 2015 13(2020), 37 (DE-627)771394608 (DE-600)2740381-6 19721293 nnns volume:13 year:2020 number:37 https://doaj.org/article/1b1364fa27744b41b22c17d3b53cbcd0 kostenfrei https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/322 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1972-1293 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 13 2020 37 |
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(DE-627)DOAJ035278099 (DE-599)DOAJ1b1364fa27744b41b22c17d3b53cbcd0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng ita B1-5802 Stefan Lorenz Sorgner verfasserin aut What does It Mean to Harm a Person? 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The central task of my reflections is to deal with the question what harming a person could mean. In the first part of the reflections, I will be critically concerned with current ways of dealing with the concept of human dignity, and why it is no longer plausible to uphold these regulations, whereby I will particularly focus on the legal dimension. It will come out that the person-object-dichotomy cannot simply be upheld in its traditional manner. Given the plausibility of these reflections, the legal implication that it ought to be legally prohibited to treat another person merely as a means becomes implausible, too, as it rests on the aforementioned distinction between persons and objects. As an alternative, it will be suggested that legally we ought to separate ontological insights clearly from normative ones. In the following part, I will focus on the moral status of personhood, and develop some philosophical reflections which could be upheld on the basis of a posthuman paradigm-shift. Thereby, I will develop a gradual concept of personhood which implies several levels of personhood depending on the corresponding capacity of suffering, which needs to be established empirically. Once, the direction of an alternative concept of personhood becomes clearer, which implies that some animals become person and which provides some reasons for holding that some sufficiently developed embodied AIs could also deserve personhood, the question can be reflected upon further what it could mean to harm a person. The issue of harming, however, is so complex that I merely plan to raise some questions which need to be confronted when clarifying the concept of harming. I do not attempt to propose a definite concept of harming, but stress that the concept is closely related to cultural circumstances, so that there is a permanent need to engage with the concept, redefine it, and adapt it to the current cultural situation. Not proposing a clear concept of harm is not a shortcoming, but rather a necessity. Personhood Philosophy (General) In Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies Associazione Culturale Humana.Mente, 2015 13(2020), 37 (DE-627)771394608 (DE-600)2740381-6 19721293 nnns volume:13 year:2020 number:37 https://doaj.org/article/1b1364fa27744b41b22c17d3b53cbcd0 kostenfrei https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/322 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1972-1293 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 13 2020 37 |
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(DE-627)DOAJ035278099 (DE-599)DOAJ1b1364fa27744b41b22c17d3b53cbcd0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng ita B1-5802 Stefan Lorenz Sorgner verfasserin aut What does It Mean to Harm a Person? 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The central task of my reflections is to deal with the question what harming a person could mean. In the first part of the reflections, I will be critically concerned with current ways of dealing with the concept of human dignity, and why it is no longer plausible to uphold these regulations, whereby I will particularly focus on the legal dimension. It will come out that the person-object-dichotomy cannot simply be upheld in its traditional manner. Given the plausibility of these reflections, the legal implication that it ought to be legally prohibited to treat another person merely as a means becomes implausible, too, as it rests on the aforementioned distinction between persons and objects. As an alternative, it will be suggested that legally we ought to separate ontological insights clearly from normative ones. In the following part, I will focus on the moral status of personhood, and develop some philosophical reflections which could be upheld on the basis of a posthuman paradigm-shift. Thereby, I will develop a gradual concept of personhood which implies several levels of personhood depending on the corresponding capacity of suffering, which needs to be established empirically. Once, the direction of an alternative concept of personhood becomes clearer, which implies that some animals become person and which provides some reasons for holding that some sufficiently developed embodied AIs could also deserve personhood, the question can be reflected upon further what it could mean to harm a person. The issue of harming, however, is so complex that I merely plan to raise some questions which need to be confronted when clarifying the concept of harming. I do not attempt to propose a definite concept of harming, but stress that the concept is closely related to cultural circumstances, so that there is a permanent need to engage with the concept, redefine it, and adapt it to the current cultural situation. Not proposing a clear concept of harm is not a shortcoming, but rather a necessity. Personhood Philosophy (General) In Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies Associazione Culturale Humana.Mente, 2015 13(2020), 37 (DE-627)771394608 (DE-600)2740381-6 19721293 nnns volume:13 year:2020 number:37 https://doaj.org/article/1b1364fa27744b41b22c17d3b53cbcd0 kostenfrei https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/322 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1972-1293 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 13 2020 37 |
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(DE-627)DOAJ035278099 (DE-599)DOAJ1b1364fa27744b41b22c17d3b53cbcd0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng ita B1-5802 Stefan Lorenz Sorgner verfasserin aut What does It Mean to Harm a Person? 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The central task of my reflections is to deal with the question what harming a person could mean. In the first part of the reflections, I will be critically concerned with current ways of dealing with the concept of human dignity, and why it is no longer plausible to uphold these regulations, whereby I will particularly focus on the legal dimension. It will come out that the person-object-dichotomy cannot simply be upheld in its traditional manner. Given the plausibility of these reflections, the legal implication that it ought to be legally prohibited to treat another person merely as a means becomes implausible, too, as it rests on the aforementioned distinction between persons and objects. As an alternative, it will be suggested that legally we ought to separate ontological insights clearly from normative ones. In the following part, I will focus on the moral status of personhood, and develop some philosophical reflections which could be upheld on the basis of a posthuman paradigm-shift. Thereby, I will develop a gradual concept of personhood which implies several levels of personhood depending on the corresponding capacity of suffering, which needs to be established empirically. Once, the direction of an alternative concept of personhood becomes clearer, which implies that some animals become person and which provides some reasons for holding that some sufficiently developed embodied AIs could also deserve personhood, the question can be reflected upon further what it could mean to harm a person. The issue of harming, however, is so complex that I merely plan to raise some questions which need to be confronted when clarifying the concept of harming. I do not attempt to propose a definite concept of harming, but stress that the concept is closely related to cultural circumstances, so that there is a permanent need to engage with the concept, redefine it, and adapt it to the current cultural situation. Not proposing a clear concept of harm is not a shortcoming, but rather a necessity. Personhood Philosophy (General) In Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies Associazione Culturale Humana.Mente, 2015 13(2020), 37 (DE-627)771394608 (DE-600)2740381-6 19721293 nnns volume:13 year:2020 number:37 https://doaj.org/article/1b1364fa27744b41b22c17d3b53cbcd0 kostenfrei https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/322 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1972-1293 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 13 2020 37 |
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Thereby, I will develop a gradual concept of personhood which implies several levels of personhood depending on the corresponding capacity of suffering, which needs to be established empirically. Once, the direction of an alternative concept of personhood becomes clearer, which implies that some animals become person and which provides some reasons for holding that some sufficiently developed embodied AIs could also deserve personhood, the question can be reflected upon further what it could mean to harm a person. The issue of harming, however, is so complex that I merely plan to raise some questions which need to be confronted when clarifying the concept of harming. I do not attempt to propose a definite concept of harming, but stress that the concept is closely related to cultural circumstances, so that there is a permanent need to engage with the concept, redefine it, and adapt it to the current cultural situation. 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The central task of my reflections is to deal with the question what harming a person could mean. In the first part of the reflections, I will be critically concerned with current ways of dealing with the concept of human dignity, and why it is no longer plausible to uphold these regulations, whereby I will particularly focus on the legal dimension. It will come out that the person-object-dichotomy cannot simply be upheld in its traditional manner. Given the plausibility of these reflections, the legal implication that it ought to be legally prohibited to treat another person merely as a means becomes implausible, too, as it rests on the aforementioned distinction between persons and objects. As an alternative, it will be suggested that legally we ought to separate ontological insights clearly from normative ones. In the following part, I will focus on the moral status of personhood, and develop some philosophical reflections which could be upheld on the basis of a posthuman paradigm-shift. Thereby, I will develop a gradual concept of personhood which implies several levels of personhood depending on the corresponding capacity of suffering, which needs to be established empirically. Once, the direction of an alternative concept of personhood becomes clearer, which implies that some animals become person and which provides some reasons for holding that some sufficiently developed embodied AIs could also deserve personhood, the question can be reflected upon further what it could mean to harm a person. The issue of harming, however, is so complex that I merely plan to raise some questions which need to be confronted when clarifying the concept of harming. I do not attempt to propose a definite concept of harming, but stress that the concept is closely related to cultural circumstances, so that there is a permanent need to engage with the concept, redefine it, and adapt it to the current cultural situation. Not proposing a clear concept of harm is not a shortcoming, but rather a necessity. |
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The central task of my reflections is to deal with the question what harming a person could mean. In the first part of the reflections, I will be critically concerned with current ways of dealing with the concept of human dignity, and why it is no longer plausible to uphold these regulations, whereby I will particularly focus on the legal dimension. It will come out that the person-object-dichotomy cannot simply be upheld in its traditional manner. Given the plausibility of these reflections, the legal implication that it ought to be legally prohibited to treat another person merely as a means becomes implausible, too, as it rests on the aforementioned distinction between persons and objects. As an alternative, it will be suggested that legally we ought to separate ontological insights clearly from normative ones. In the following part, I will focus on the moral status of personhood, and develop some philosophical reflections which could be upheld on the basis of a posthuman paradigm-shift. Thereby, I will develop a gradual concept of personhood which implies several levels of personhood depending on the corresponding capacity of suffering, which needs to be established empirically. Once, the direction of an alternative concept of personhood becomes clearer, which implies that some animals become person and which provides some reasons for holding that some sufficiently developed embodied AIs could also deserve personhood, the question can be reflected upon further what it could mean to harm a person. The issue of harming, however, is so complex that I merely plan to raise some questions which need to be confronted when clarifying the concept of harming. I do not attempt to propose a definite concept of harming, but stress that the concept is closely related to cultural circumstances, so that there is a permanent need to engage with the concept, redefine it, and adapt it to the current cultural situation. Not proposing a clear concept of harm is not a shortcoming, but rather a necessity. |
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The central task of my reflections is to deal with the question what harming a person could mean. In the first part of the reflections, I will be critically concerned with current ways of dealing with the concept of human dignity, and why it is no longer plausible to uphold these regulations, whereby I will particularly focus on the legal dimension. It will come out that the person-object-dichotomy cannot simply be upheld in its traditional manner. Given the plausibility of these reflections, the legal implication that it ought to be legally prohibited to treat another person merely as a means becomes implausible, too, as it rests on the aforementioned distinction between persons and objects. As an alternative, it will be suggested that legally we ought to separate ontological insights clearly from normative ones. In the following part, I will focus on the moral status of personhood, and develop some philosophical reflections which could be upheld on the basis of a posthuman paradigm-shift. Thereby, I will develop a gradual concept of personhood which implies several levels of personhood depending on the corresponding capacity of suffering, which needs to be established empirically. Once, the direction of an alternative concept of personhood becomes clearer, which implies that some animals become person and which provides some reasons for holding that some sufficiently developed embodied AIs could also deserve personhood, the question can be reflected upon further what it could mean to harm a person. The issue of harming, however, is so complex that I merely plan to raise some questions which need to be confronted when clarifying the concept of harming. I do not attempt to propose a definite concept of harming, but stress that the concept is closely related to cultural circumstances, so that there is a permanent need to engage with the concept, redefine it, and adapt it to the current cultural situation. Not proposing a clear concept of harm is not a shortcoming, but rather a necessity. |
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