Comparative analysis of institutions to govern the groundwater commons in California

The management of groundwater, a common-pool resource, is a fundamental collective action problem that can lead to over-exploitation. Our paper examines the management of two groundwater basins in California’s Central Coast region whose geographic proximity, land use patterns, socioeconomic characte...
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Autor*in:	Ruth Langridge [verfasserIn] Christopher Ansell [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2018

Schlagwörter:	Groundwater management comparative study adjudicated groundwater basins special act groundwater districts polycentric facilitating conditions California

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Water Alternatives - Water Alternatives Association, 2008, 11(2018), 3, Seite 481-510
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:11 ; year:2018 ; number:3 ; pages:481-510

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc Journal toc

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ037110209

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allfieldsGer	(DE-627)DOAJ037110209 (DE-599)DOAJ650739ff7c0b4796be0c8be155f3e0fd DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TC1-978 Ruth Langridge verfasserin aut Comparative analysis of institutions to govern the groundwater commons in California 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The management of groundwater, a common-pool resource, is a fundamental collective action problem that can lead to over-exploitation. Our paper examines the management of two groundwater basins in California’s Central Coast region whose geographic proximity, land use patterns, socioeconomic characteristics, and timing of institutional formation provide an ideal basis for comparative study. However, each basin is governed by a distinctive institutional configuration. The Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency is a legislatively created Special Act District with a collective public management focus, while the Santa Paula Groundwater Basin is managed through a court adjudication with a rights-based focus. We compare the legal and administrative foundations of these institutional arrangements and examine their implications for the polycentric regulation of sustainable groundwater use. We find that while adjudication may specify groundwater rights, an approach that scholars argue can be critical for achieving sustainability, it also promotes insularity with a wider polycentric system and this ultimately limits its management strategies. The Special Act District, by contrast, does not encourage as clear an allocation of water rights, but does encourage a broad sustainability mission and wider polycentric engagement, though it still struggles with declining groundwater levels. Ultimately, neither institutional arrangement fully addresses the problem of groundwater sustainability. This suggests the need for further research on how institutional configurations and developmental pathways impact resource outcomes. Groundwater management comparative study adjudicated groundwater basins special act groundwater districts polycentric facilitating conditions California Hydraulic engineering Christopher Ansell verfasserin aut In Water Alternatives Water Alternatives Association, 2008 11(2018), 3, Seite 481-510 (DE-627)584836627 (DE-600)2463895-X 19650175 nnns volume:11 year:2018 number:3 pages:481-510 https://doaj.org/article/650739ff7c0b4796be0c8be155f3e0fd kostenfrei http://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/vol11/v11issue3/450-a11-3-3/file kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1965-0175 Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1965-0175 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 11 2018 3 481-510
allfieldsSound	(DE-627)DOAJ037110209 (DE-599)DOAJ650739ff7c0b4796be0c8be155f3e0fd DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TC1-978 Ruth Langridge verfasserin aut Comparative analysis of institutions to govern the groundwater commons in California 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The management of groundwater, a common-pool resource, is a fundamental collective action problem that can lead to over-exploitation. Our paper examines the management of two groundwater basins in California’s Central Coast region whose geographic proximity, land use patterns, socioeconomic characteristics, and timing of institutional formation provide an ideal basis for comparative study. However, each basin is governed by a distinctive institutional configuration. The Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency is a legislatively created Special Act District with a collective public management focus, while the Santa Paula Groundwater Basin is managed through a court adjudication with a rights-based focus. We compare the legal and administrative foundations of these institutional arrangements and examine their implications for the polycentric regulation of sustainable groundwater use. We find that while adjudication may specify groundwater rights, an approach that scholars argue can be critical for achieving sustainability, it also promotes insularity with a wider polycentric system and this ultimately limits its management strategies. The Special Act District, by contrast, does not encourage as clear an allocation of water rights, but does encourage a broad sustainability mission and wider polycentric engagement, though it still struggles with declining groundwater levels. Ultimately, neither institutional arrangement fully addresses the problem of groundwater sustainability. This suggests the need for further research on how institutional configurations and developmental pathways impact resource outcomes. Groundwater management comparative study adjudicated groundwater basins special act groundwater districts polycentric facilitating conditions California Hydraulic engineering Christopher Ansell verfasserin aut In Water Alternatives Water Alternatives Association, 2008 11(2018), 3, Seite 481-510 (DE-627)584836627 (DE-600)2463895-X 19650175 nnns volume:11 year:2018 number:3 pages:481-510 https://doaj.org/article/650739ff7c0b4796be0c8be155f3e0fd kostenfrei http://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/vol11/v11issue3/450-a11-3-3/file kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1965-0175 Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1965-0175 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 11 2018 3 481-510
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source	In Water Alternatives 11(2018), 3, Seite 481-510 volume:11 year:2018 number:3 pages:481-510
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callnumber-first	T - Technology
author	Ruth Langridge
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topic_title	TC1-978 Comparative analysis of institutions to govern the groundwater commons in California Groundwater management comparative study adjudicated groundwater basins special act groundwater districts polycentric facilitating conditions California
topic	misc TC1-978 misc Groundwater management misc comparative study misc adjudicated groundwater basins misc special act groundwater districts misc polycentric misc facilitating conditions misc California misc Hydraulic engineering
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title	Comparative analysis of institutions to govern the groundwater commons in California
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title_full	Comparative analysis of institutions to govern the groundwater commons in California
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title_auth	Comparative analysis of institutions to govern the groundwater commons in California
abstract	The management of groundwater, a common-pool resource, is a fundamental collective action problem that can lead to over-exploitation. Our paper examines the management of two groundwater basins in California’s Central Coast region whose geographic proximity, land use patterns, socioeconomic characteristics, and timing of institutional formation provide an ideal basis for comparative study. However, each basin is governed by a distinctive institutional configuration. The Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency is a legislatively created Special Act District with a collective public management focus, while the Santa Paula Groundwater Basin is managed through a court adjudication with a rights-based focus. We compare the legal and administrative foundations of these institutional arrangements and examine their implications for the polycentric regulation of sustainable groundwater use. We find that while adjudication may specify groundwater rights, an approach that scholars argue can be critical for achieving sustainability, it also promotes insularity with a wider polycentric system and this ultimately limits its management strategies. The Special Act District, by contrast, does not encourage as clear an allocation of water rights, but does encourage a broad sustainability mission and wider polycentric engagement, though it still struggles with declining groundwater levels. Ultimately, neither institutional arrangement fully addresses the problem of groundwater sustainability. This suggests the need for further research on how institutional configurations and developmental pathways impact resource outcomes.
abstractGer	The management of groundwater, a common-pool resource, is a fundamental collective action problem that can lead to over-exploitation. Our paper examines the management of two groundwater basins in California’s Central Coast region whose geographic proximity, land use patterns, socioeconomic characteristics, and timing of institutional formation provide an ideal basis for comparative study. However, each basin is governed by a distinctive institutional configuration. The Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency is a legislatively created Special Act District with a collective public management focus, while the Santa Paula Groundwater Basin is managed through a court adjudication with a rights-based focus. We compare the legal and administrative foundations of these institutional arrangements and examine their implications for the polycentric regulation of sustainable groundwater use. We find that while adjudication may specify groundwater rights, an approach that scholars argue can be critical for achieving sustainability, it also promotes insularity with a wider polycentric system and this ultimately limits its management strategies. The Special Act District, by contrast, does not encourage as clear an allocation of water rights, but does encourage a broad sustainability mission and wider polycentric engagement, though it still struggles with declining groundwater levels. Ultimately, neither institutional arrangement fully addresses the problem of groundwater sustainability. This suggests the need for further research on how institutional configurations and developmental pathways impact resource outcomes.
abstract_unstemmed	The management of groundwater, a common-pool resource, is a fundamental collective action problem that can lead to over-exploitation. Our paper examines the management of two groundwater basins in California’s Central Coast region whose geographic proximity, land use patterns, socioeconomic characteristics, and timing of institutional formation provide an ideal basis for comparative study. However, each basin is governed by a distinctive institutional configuration. The Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency is a legislatively created Special Act District with a collective public management focus, while the Santa Paula Groundwater Basin is managed through a court adjudication with a rights-based focus. We compare the legal and administrative foundations of these institutional arrangements and examine their implications for the polycentric regulation of sustainable groundwater use. We find that while adjudication may specify groundwater rights, an approach that scholars argue can be critical for achieving sustainability, it also promotes insularity with a wider polycentric system and this ultimately limits its management strategies. The Special Act District, by contrast, does not encourage as clear an allocation of water rights, but does encourage a broad sustainability mission and wider polycentric engagement, though it still struggles with declining groundwater levels. Ultimately, neither institutional arrangement fully addresses the problem of groundwater sustainability. This suggests the need for further research on how institutional configurations and developmental pathways impact resource outcomes.
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title_short	Comparative analysis of institutions to govern the groundwater commons in California
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Comparative analysis of institutions to govern the groundwater commons in California

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