Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules

Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should b...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Nynke Van Miltenburg [verfasserIn] Vincent Buskens [verfasserIn] Davide Barrera [verfasserIn] Werner Raub [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2014

Schlagwörter:	collective decision rule conditional cooperation public goods game reward

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: International Journal of the Commons - Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008, 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:8 ; year:2014 ; number:1 ; pages:47-78

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.18352/ijc.426

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ039243079

Internformat


LEADER	01000caa a22002652 4500
001	DOAJ039243079
003	DE-627
005	20230308030153.0
007	cr uuu---uuuuu
008	230227s2014 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c
024	7		\|a 10.18352/ijc.426 \|2 doi
035			\|a (DE-627)DOAJ039243079
035			\|a (DE-599)DOAJbef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114
040			\|a DE-627 \|b ger \|c DE-627 \|e rakwb
041			\|a eng
050		0	\|a JF20-2112
100	0		\|a Nynke Van Miltenburg \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
245	1	0	\|a Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules
264		1	\|c 2014
336			\|a Text \|b txt \|2 rdacontent
337			\|a Computermedien \|b c \|2 rdamedia
338			\|a Online-Ressource \|b cr \|2 rdacarrier
520			\|a Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards.
650		4	\|a collective decision rule
650		4	\|a conditional cooperation
650		4	\|a public goods game
650		4	\|a reward
653		0	\|a Political institutions and public administration (General)
700	0		\|a Vincent Buskens \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
700	0		\|a Davide Barrera \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
700	0		\|a Werner Raub \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
773	0	8	\|i In \|t International Journal of the Commons \|d Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008 \|g 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 \|w (DE-627)548639043 \|w (DE-600)2394743-3 \|x 18750281 \|7 nnns
773	1	8	\|g volume:8 \|g year:2014 \|g number:1 \|g pages:47-78
856	4	0	\|u https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426 \|z kostenfrei
856	4	0	\|u https://doaj.org/article/bef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 \|z kostenfrei
856	4	0	\|u https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/426 \|z kostenfrei
856	4	2	\|u https://doaj.org/toc/1875-0281 \|y Journal toc \|z kostenfrei
912			\|a GBV_USEFLAG_A
912			\|a SYSFLAG_A
912			\|a GBV_DOAJ
912			\|a GBV_ILN_11
912			\|a GBV_ILN_20
912			\|a GBV_ILN_22
912			\|a GBV_ILN_23
912			\|a GBV_ILN_24
912			\|a GBV_ILN_31
912			\|a GBV_ILN_39
912			\|a GBV_ILN_40
912			\|a GBV_ILN_60
912			\|a GBV_ILN_62
912			\|a GBV_ILN_63
912			\|a GBV_ILN_65
912			\|a GBV_ILN_69
912			\|a GBV_ILN_70
912			\|a GBV_ILN_73
912			\|a GBV_ILN_95
912			\|a GBV_ILN_105
912			\|a GBV_ILN_110
912			\|a GBV_ILN_151
912			\|a GBV_ILN_161
912			\|a GBV_ILN_206
912			\|a GBV_ILN_213
912			\|a GBV_ILN_230
912			\|a GBV_ILN_285
912			\|a GBV_ILN_293
912			\|a GBV_ILN_370
912			\|a GBV_ILN_602
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2001
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2003
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2005
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2006
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2008
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2009
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2010
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2014
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2015
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2018
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2020
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2021
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2026
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2027
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2044
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2050
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2056
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2057
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2061
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2107
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2949
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2950
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4012
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4035
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4037
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4046
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4112
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4125
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4126
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4242
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4249
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4251
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4305
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4306
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4307
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4313
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4322
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4323
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4324
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4325
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4326
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4335
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4338
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4346
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4367
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4393
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4700
951			\|a AR
952			\|d 8 \|j 2014 \|e 1 \|h 47-78

Indexfelder

author_variant	n v m nvm v b vb d b db w r wr
matchkey_str	article:18750281:2014----::mlmniguihetnrwriteulcodgmtefetfniiul
hierarchy_sort_str	2014
callnumber-subject-code	JF
publishDate	2014
allfields	10.18352/ijc.426 doi (DE-627)DOAJ039243079 (DE-599)DOAJbef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JF20-2112 Nynke Van Miltenburg verfasserin aut Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules 2014 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards. collective decision rule conditional cooperation public goods game reward Political institutions and public administration (General) Vincent Buskens verfasserin aut Davide Barrera verfasserin aut Werner Raub verfasserin aut In International Journal of the Commons Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 (DE-627)548639043 (DE-600)2394743-3 18750281 nnns volume:8 year:2014 number:1 pages:47-78 https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/bef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 kostenfrei https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1875-0281 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2014 1 47-78
spelling	10.18352/ijc.426 doi (DE-627)DOAJ039243079 (DE-599)DOAJbef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JF20-2112 Nynke Van Miltenburg verfasserin aut Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules 2014 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards. collective decision rule conditional cooperation public goods game reward Political institutions and public administration (General) Vincent Buskens verfasserin aut Davide Barrera verfasserin aut Werner Raub verfasserin aut In International Journal of the Commons Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 (DE-627)548639043 (DE-600)2394743-3 18750281 nnns volume:8 year:2014 number:1 pages:47-78 https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/bef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 kostenfrei https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1875-0281 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2014 1 47-78
allfields_unstemmed	10.18352/ijc.426 doi (DE-627)DOAJ039243079 (DE-599)DOAJbef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JF20-2112 Nynke Van Miltenburg verfasserin aut Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules 2014 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards. collective decision rule conditional cooperation public goods game reward Political institutions and public administration (General) Vincent Buskens verfasserin aut Davide Barrera verfasserin aut Werner Raub verfasserin aut In International Journal of the Commons Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 (DE-627)548639043 (DE-600)2394743-3 18750281 nnns volume:8 year:2014 number:1 pages:47-78 https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/bef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 kostenfrei https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1875-0281 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2014 1 47-78
allfieldsGer	10.18352/ijc.426 doi (DE-627)DOAJ039243079 (DE-599)DOAJbef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JF20-2112 Nynke Van Miltenburg verfasserin aut Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules 2014 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards. collective decision rule conditional cooperation public goods game reward Political institutions and public administration (General) Vincent Buskens verfasserin aut Davide Barrera verfasserin aut Werner Raub verfasserin aut In International Journal of the Commons Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 (DE-627)548639043 (DE-600)2394743-3 18750281 nnns volume:8 year:2014 number:1 pages:47-78 https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/bef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 kostenfrei https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1875-0281 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2014 1 47-78
allfieldsSound	10.18352/ijc.426 doi (DE-627)DOAJ039243079 (DE-599)DOAJbef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JF20-2112 Nynke Van Miltenburg verfasserin aut Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules 2014 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards. collective decision rule conditional cooperation public goods game reward Political institutions and public administration (General) Vincent Buskens verfasserin aut Davide Barrera verfasserin aut Werner Raub verfasserin aut In International Journal of the Commons Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 (DE-627)548639043 (DE-600)2394743-3 18750281 nnns volume:8 year:2014 number:1 pages:47-78 https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/bef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 kostenfrei https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1875-0281 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2014 1 47-78
language	English
source	In International Journal of the Commons 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 volume:8 year:2014 number:1 pages:47-78
sourceStr	In International Journal of the Commons 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 volume:8 year:2014 number:1 pages:47-78
format_phy_str_mv	Article
institution	findex.gbv.de
topic_facet	collective decision rule conditional cooperation public goods game reward Political institutions and public administration (General)
isfreeaccess_bool	true
container_title	International Journal of the Commons
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Nynke Van Miltenburg @@aut@@ Vincent Buskens @@aut@@ Davide Barrera @@aut@@ Werner Raub @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2014-01-01T00:00:00Z
hierarchy_top_id	548639043
id	DOAJ039243079
language_de	englisch
fullrecord	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">DOAJ039243079</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230308030153.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230227s2014 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.18352/ijc.426</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)DOAJ039243079</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)DOAJbef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">JF20-2112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nynke Van Miltenburg</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">collective decision rule</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">conditional cooperation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">public goods game</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">reward</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Political institutions and public administration (General)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Vincent Buskens</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Davide Barrera</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Werner Raub</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">International Journal of the Commons</subfield><subfield code="d">Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008</subfield><subfield code="g">8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)548639043</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2394743-3</subfield><subfield code="x">18750281</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:8</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2014</subfield><subfield code="g">number:1</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:47-78</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/article/bef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/426</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/toc/1875-0281</subfield><subfield code="y">Journal toc</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_DOAJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_62</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_65</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_69</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_73</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_95</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_105</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_161</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_230</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_293</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_602</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2001</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2003</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2008</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2010</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2018</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2020</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2021</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2026</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2027</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2044</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2050</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2056</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2057</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2061</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2107</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2949</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2950</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4035</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4046</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4242</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4249</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4251</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4307</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4322</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4326</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4335</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4346</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4367</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4393</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">8</subfield><subfield code="j">2014</subfield><subfield code="e">1</subfield><subfield code="h">47-78</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
callnumber-first	J - Political Science
author	Nynke Van Miltenburg
spellingShingle	Nynke Van Miltenburg misc JF20-2112 misc collective decision rule misc conditional cooperation misc public goods game misc reward misc Political institutions and public administration (General) Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules
authorStr	Nynke Van Miltenburg
ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv	@@773@@(DE-627)548639043
format	electronic Article
delete_txt_mv	keep
author_role	aut aut aut aut
collection	DOAJ
remote_str	true
callnumber-label	JF20-2112
illustrated	Not Illustrated
issn	18750281
topic_title	JF20-2112 Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules collective decision rule conditional cooperation public goods game reward
topic	misc JF20-2112 misc collective decision rule misc conditional cooperation misc public goods game misc reward misc Political institutions and public administration (General)
topic_unstemmed	misc JF20-2112 misc collective decision rule misc conditional cooperation misc public goods game misc reward misc Political institutions and public administration (General)
topic_browse	misc JF20-2112 misc collective decision rule misc conditional cooperation misc public goods game misc reward misc Political institutions and public administration (General)
format_facet	Elektronische Aufsätze Aufsätze Elektronische Ressource
format_main_str_mv	Text Zeitschrift/Artikel
carriertype_str_mv	cr
hierarchy_parent_title	International Journal of the Commons
hierarchy_parent_id	548639043
hierarchy_top_title	International Journal of the Commons
isfreeaccess_txt	true
familylinks_str_mv	(DE-627)548639043 (DE-600)2394743-3
title	Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules
ctrlnum	(DE-627)DOAJ039243079 (DE-599)DOAJbef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114
title_full	Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules
author_sort	Nynke Van Miltenburg
journal	International Journal of the Commons
journalStr	International Journal of the Commons
callnumber-first-code	J
lang_code	eng
isOA_bool	true
recordtype	marc
publishDateSort	2014
contenttype_str_mv	txt
container_start_page	47
author_browse	Nynke Van Miltenburg Vincent Buskens Davide Barrera Werner Raub
container_volume	8
class	JF20-2112
format_se	Elektronische Aufsätze
author-letter	Nynke Van Miltenburg
doi_str_mv	10.18352/ijc.426
author2-role	verfasserin
title_sort	implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules
callnumber	JF20-2112
title_auth	Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules
abstract	Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards.
abstractGer	Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards.
abstract_unstemmed	Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards.
collection_details	GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700
container_issue	1
title_short	Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules
url	https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426 https://doaj.org/article/bef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/426 https://doaj.org/toc/1875-0281
remote_bool	true
author2	Vincent Buskens Davide Barrera Werner Raub
author2Str	Vincent Buskens Davide Barrera Werner Raub
ppnlink	548639043
callnumber-subject	JF - Public Administration
mediatype_str_mv	c
isOA_txt	true
hochschulschrift_bool	false
doi_str	10.18352/ijc.426
callnumber-a	JF20-2112
up_date	2024-07-03T22:23:00.095Z
_version_	1803598304483737600
fullrecord_marcxml	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">DOAJ039243079</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230308030153.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230227s2014 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.18352/ijc.426</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)DOAJ039243079</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)DOAJbef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">JF20-2112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nynke Van Miltenburg</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">collective decision rule</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">conditional cooperation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">public goods game</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">reward</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Political institutions and public administration (General)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Vincent Buskens</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Davide Barrera</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Werner Raub</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">International Journal of the Commons</subfield><subfield code="d">Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008</subfield><subfield code="g">8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)548639043</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2394743-3</subfield><subfield code="x">18750281</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:8</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2014</subfield><subfield code="g">number:1</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:47-78</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/article/bef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/426</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/toc/1875-0281</subfield><subfield code="y">Journal toc</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_DOAJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_62</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_65</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_69</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_73</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_95</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_105</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_161</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_230</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_293</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_602</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2001</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2003</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2008</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2010</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2018</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2020</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2021</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2026</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2027</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2044</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2050</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2056</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2057</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2061</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2107</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2949</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2950</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4035</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4046</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4242</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4249</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4251</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4307</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4322</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4326</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4335</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4346</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4367</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4393</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">8</subfield><subfield code="j">2014</subfield><subfield code="e">1</subfield><subfield code="h">47-78</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
score	7.3995066

Nicht das Richtige dabei?

Schreiben Sie uns!

Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules

Nicht das Richtige dabei?

Zugang & Verfügbarkeit

Vorhandene Bände

Nicht das Richtige dabei?