Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules
Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should b...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Nynke Van Miltenburg [verfasserIn] Vincent Buskens [verfasserIn] Davide Barrera [verfasserIn] Werner Raub [verfasserIn] |
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E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2014 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: International Journal of the Commons - Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008, 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:8 ; year:2014 ; number:1 ; pages:47-78 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.18352/ijc.426 |
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Katalog-ID: |
DOAJ039243079 |
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10.18352/ijc.426 doi (DE-627)DOAJ039243079 (DE-599)DOAJbef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JF20-2112 Nynke Van Miltenburg verfasserin aut Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules 2014 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards. collective decision rule conditional cooperation public goods game reward Political institutions and public administration (General) Vincent Buskens verfasserin aut Davide Barrera verfasserin aut Werner Raub verfasserin aut In International Journal of the Commons Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 (DE-627)548639043 (DE-600)2394743-3 18750281 nnns volume:8 year:2014 number:1 pages:47-78 https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/bef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 kostenfrei https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1875-0281 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2014 1 47-78 |
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10.18352/ijc.426 doi (DE-627)DOAJ039243079 (DE-599)DOAJbef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JF20-2112 Nynke Van Miltenburg verfasserin aut Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules 2014 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards. collective decision rule conditional cooperation public goods game reward Political institutions and public administration (General) Vincent Buskens verfasserin aut Davide Barrera verfasserin aut Werner Raub verfasserin aut In International Journal of the Commons Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 (DE-627)548639043 (DE-600)2394743-3 18750281 nnns volume:8 year:2014 number:1 pages:47-78 https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/bef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 kostenfrei https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1875-0281 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2014 1 47-78 |
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10.18352/ijc.426 doi (DE-627)DOAJ039243079 (DE-599)DOAJbef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JF20-2112 Nynke Van Miltenburg verfasserin aut Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules 2014 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards. collective decision rule conditional cooperation public goods game reward Political institutions and public administration (General) Vincent Buskens verfasserin aut Davide Barrera verfasserin aut Werner Raub verfasserin aut In International Journal of the Commons Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 (DE-627)548639043 (DE-600)2394743-3 18750281 nnns volume:8 year:2014 number:1 pages:47-78 https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/bef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 kostenfrei https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1875-0281 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2014 1 47-78 |
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10.18352/ijc.426 doi (DE-627)DOAJ039243079 (DE-599)DOAJbef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JF20-2112 Nynke Van Miltenburg verfasserin aut Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules 2014 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards. collective decision rule conditional cooperation public goods game reward Political institutions and public administration (General) Vincent Buskens verfasserin aut Davide Barrera verfasserin aut Werner Raub verfasserin aut In International Journal of the Commons Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 (DE-627)548639043 (DE-600)2394743-3 18750281 nnns volume:8 year:2014 number:1 pages:47-78 https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/bef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 kostenfrei https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1875-0281 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2014 1 47-78 |
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10.18352/ijc.426 doi (DE-627)DOAJ039243079 (DE-599)DOAJbef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JF20-2112 Nynke Van Miltenburg verfasserin aut Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules 2014 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards. collective decision rule conditional cooperation public goods game reward Political institutions and public administration (General) Vincent Buskens verfasserin aut Davide Barrera verfasserin aut Werner Raub verfasserin aut In International Journal of the Commons Utrecht University Library Open Access Journals (Publishing Services), 2008 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 (DE-627)548639043 (DE-600)2394743-3 18750281 nnns volume:8 year:2014 number:1 pages:47-78 https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/bef1699c64914b7cbe31d4a864dc9114 kostenfrei https://www.thecommonsjournal.org/articles/426 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1875-0281 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2107 GBV_ILN_2949 GBV_ILN_2950 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2014 1 47-78 |
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English |
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In International Journal of the Commons 8(2014), 1, Seite 47-78 volume:8 year:2014 number:1 pages:47-78 |
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Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards. |
abstractGer |
Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards. |
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Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards. |
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We compare a setting where actors 'individually' decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors 'collectively' agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. 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