Agency costs, board structure and institutional investors: case of India
Purpose - The author examines the role of board structure and institutional investors in dealing with the agency issues for the Indian firms by taking the data of NSE-500 nonfinancial firms for the period 2010–2019. Design/methodology/approach - The author applies dynamic panel data methodology to d...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Pankaj Chaudhary [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2022 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: AJAR (Asian Journal of Accounting Research) - Emerald Publishing, 2019, 7(2022), 1, Seite 44-58 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:7 ; year:2022 ; number:1 ; pages:44-58 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1108/AJAR-12-2020-0130 |
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Katalog-ID: |
DOAJ044092474 |
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Purpose - The author examines the role of board structure and institutional investors in dealing with the agency issues for the Indian firms by taking the data of NSE-500 nonfinancial firms for the period 2010–2019. Design/methodology/approach - The author applies dynamic panel data methodology to deal with endogeneity concerns prevalent in corporate finance variables. Findings - The agency view is consistent with the board size in the context of India. The author observed that the board size has a harmful effect on agency cost. A larger board size may create a coordination problem, or CEO may find it easy to thrust his or her decisions on board. The author also noticed that firms should have sizeable institutional ownership, particularly pressure-insensitive investors, in equity as they can reduce agency-related issues. Originality/value - This study focuses on one of the largest emerging economies, i.e. India. |
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Purpose - The author examines the role of board structure and institutional investors in dealing with the agency issues for the Indian firms by taking the data of NSE-500 nonfinancial firms for the period 2010–2019. Design/methodology/approach - The author applies dynamic panel data methodology to deal with endogeneity concerns prevalent in corporate finance variables. Findings - The agency view is consistent with the board size in the context of India. The author observed that the board size has a harmful effect on agency cost. A larger board size may create a coordination problem, or CEO may find it easy to thrust his or her decisions on board. The author also noticed that firms should have sizeable institutional ownership, particularly pressure-insensitive investors, in equity as they can reduce agency-related issues. Originality/value - This study focuses on one of the largest emerging economies, i.e. India. |
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