The Value-ladenness of Science and Argument from Underdetermination
The conflict between the impact of unscientific factors on science and its process, or in other words, “oriented science”, has a long history. But in recent decades, the issue has been reborn in more detail and with a focus on unscientific values as well as a focus on the natural sciences at the hea...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Gholamhossein Javadpoor [verfasserIn] |
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2021 |
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In: Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī - University of Qom, 2017, 23(2021), 2, Seite 75-98 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:23 ; year:2021 ; number:2 ; pages:75-98 |
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DOI / URN: |
10.22091/jptr.2021.7007.2550 |
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DOAJ044961030 |
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520 | |a The conflict between the impact of unscientific factors on science and its process, or in other words, “oriented science”, has a long history. But in recent decades, the issue has been reborn in more detail and with a focus on unscientific values as well as a focus on the natural sciences at the heart of the philosophy of science, with numerous proponents and opponents arguing for their claims. Opponents of influence, often influenced by the positivist discourse that governs science, considered the involvement of any unscientific factors, including contextual values, in conflict with the ideal of science (objectivity and accurate reporting of natural fact), and spoke of neutral or value-free science. Accordingly, to justify any hypothesis, theory or scientific explanation, only scientific criteria should be sufficient, including scientific values, scientific and logical rules and evidences. On the contrary, some introduced such an ideal as unattainable, undesirable, or based on incorrect principles, and considering the scientific and practical consequences of scientific theories and hypotheses, they argued in defense of the impact of unscientific values on the process of science, which is the most important; they are: “inaccuracy of distinction between scientific and non-scientific values”, “necessity of underdetermination of hypothesis or theory through empirical evidence”, and “avoidance of inductive risk”. Underdetermination is a common term in experimental science books as well as philosophy of science. From a descriptive view, since the predominant method in the processes of experimental sciences is induction, it often happens that the collection and analysis of certain data by induction does not lead to a single and unique result, and if we consider all scientific and epistemological factors and criteria, however, no definitive conclusion can be drawn, and although numerous cases have been excluded from the results and are not supported by evidence, there are still several hypotheses, theories, or explanations that are supported by scientific criteria in much the same way. So, often more than one theory, explanation, or law is consistent with a particular set of evidence. The question is what happens when researchers eventually choose one of these alternatives and reject the others? If, according to the assumption, all scientific and epistemic factors have not been able to present a definite final result, then a complete determination is born of the involvement of non-scientific factors. The most important challenge in advancing this argument is to defend the objectivity of science despite being influenced by non-scientific factors. This problem can be solved only by knowing the values objectively and believing that they are based on real things, and that such attitudes about the metaphysics of value is common and can be defended. Other problems such as confusion between scientific and practical fields and complete elimination of underdetermination through purely scientific components are not very serious and it seems that the elimination of transient underdetermination can be achieved only by the influence of non-scientific factors. Of course, unscientific factors include unscientific values, and in practice, this gap can be filled with non-valuable factors. In this case, the underdetermination is not a response to the ideal of "value-free science", but a trace of the ideal of "epistemic purity" in general (including purity of non-epistemic values and non-epistemic non-valuable factors). | ||
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650 | 4 | |a value-laden science | |
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10.22091/jptr.2021.7007.2550 doi (DE-627)DOAJ044961030 (DE-599)DOAJ44210e801a00447b85e37fa2ea12e5f0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb per BL51-65 Gholamhossein Javadpoor verfasserin aut The Value-ladenness of Science and Argument from Underdetermination 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The conflict between the impact of unscientific factors on science and its process, or in other words, “oriented science”, has a long history. But in recent decades, the issue has been reborn in more detail and with a focus on unscientific values as well as a focus on the natural sciences at the heart of the philosophy of science, with numerous proponents and opponents arguing for their claims. Opponents of influence, often influenced by the positivist discourse that governs science, considered the involvement of any unscientific factors, including contextual values, in conflict with the ideal of science (objectivity and accurate reporting of natural fact), and spoke of neutral or value-free science. Accordingly, to justify any hypothesis, theory or scientific explanation, only scientific criteria should be sufficient, including scientific values, scientific and logical rules and evidences. On the contrary, some introduced such an ideal as unattainable, undesirable, or based on incorrect principles, and considering the scientific and practical consequences of scientific theories and hypotheses, they argued in defense of the impact of unscientific values on the process of science, which is the most important; they are: “inaccuracy of distinction between scientific and non-scientific values”, “necessity of underdetermination of hypothesis or theory through empirical evidence”, and “avoidance of inductive risk”. Underdetermination is a common term in experimental science books as well as philosophy of science. From a descriptive view, since the predominant method in the processes of experimental sciences is induction, it often happens that the collection and analysis of certain data by induction does not lead to a single and unique result, and if we consider all scientific and epistemological factors and criteria, however, no definitive conclusion can be drawn, and although numerous cases have been excluded from the results and are not supported by evidence, there are still several hypotheses, theories, or explanations that are supported by scientific criteria in much the same way. So, often more than one theory, explanation, or law is consistent with a particular set of evidence. The question is what happens when researchers eventually choose one of these alternatives and reject the others? If, according to the assumption, all scientific and epistemic factors have not been able to present a definite final result, then a complete determination is born of the involvement of non-scientific factors. The most important challenge in advancing this argument is to defend the objectivity of science despite being influenced by non-scientific factors. This problem can be solved only by knowing the values objectively and believing that they are based on real things, and that such attitudes about the metaphysics of value is common and can be defended. Other problems such as confusion between scientific and practical fields and complete elimination of underdetermination through purely scientific components are not very serious and it seems that the elimination of transient underdetermination can be achieved only by the influence of non-scientific factors. Of course, unscientific factors include unscientific values, and in practice, this gap can be filled with non-valuable factors. In this case, the underdetermination is not a response to the ideal of "value-free science", but a trace of the ideal of "epistemic purity" in general (including purity of non-epistemic values and non-epistemic non-valuable factors). underdetermination value-free science value-laden science objectivity relativity scientific and non-scientific values Philosophy of religion. Psychology of religion. Religion in relation to other subjects In Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī University of Qom, 2017 23(2021), 2, Seite 75-98 (DE-627)1760629766 25382500 nnns volume:23 year:2021 number:2 pages:75-98 https://doi.org/10.22091/jptr.2021.7007.2550 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/44210e801a00447b85e37fa2ea12e5f0 kostenfrei http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1957_435f87e4ba3d9198dcf1156347b28c2c.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1735-9791 Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2538-2500 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4305 AR 23 2021 2 75-98 |
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10.22091/jptr.2021.7007.2550 doi (DE-627)DOAJ044961030 (DE-599)DOAJ44210e801a00447b85e37fa2ea12e5f0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb per BL51-65 Gholamhossein Javadpoor verfasserin aut The Value-ladenness of Science and Argument from Underdetermination 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The conflict between the impact of unscientific factors on science and its process, or in other words, “oriented science”, has a long history. But in recent decades, the issue has been reborn in more detail and with a focus on unscientific values as well as a focus on the natural sciences at the heart of the philosophy of science, with numerous proponents and opponents arguing for their claims. Opponents of influence, often influenced by the positivist discourse that governs science, considered the involvement of any unscientific factors, including contextual values, in conflict with the ideal of science (objectivity and accurate reporting of natural fact), and spoke of neutral or value-free science. Accordingly, to justify any hypothesis, theory or scientific explanation, only scientific criteria should be sufficient, including scientific values, scientific and logical rules and evidences. On the contrary, some introduced such an ideal as unattainable, undesirable, or based on incorrect principles, and considering the scientific and practical consequences of scientific theories and hypotheses, they argued in defense of the impact of unscientific values on the process of science, which is the most important; they are: “inaccuracy of distinction between scientific and non-scientific values”, “necessity of underdetermination of hypothesis or theory through empirical evidence”, and “avoidance of inductive risk”. Underdetermination is a common term in experimental science books as well as philosophy of science. From a descriptive view, since the predominant method in the processes of experimental sciences is induction, it often happens that the collection and analysis of certain data by induction does not lead to a single and unique result, and if we consider all scientific and epistemological factors and criteria, however, no definitive conclusion can be drawn, and although numerous cases have been excluded from the results and are not supported by evidence, there are still several hypotheses, theories, or explanations that are supported by scientific criteria in much the same way. So, often more than one theory, explanation, or law is consistent with a particular set of evidence. The question is what happens when researchers eventually choose one of these alternatives and reject the others? If, according to the assumption, all scientific and epistemic factors have not been able to present a definite final result, then a complete determination is born of the involvement of non-scientific factors. The most important challenge in advancing this argument is to defend the objectivity of science despite being influenced by non-scientific factors. This problem can be solved only by knowing the values objectively and believing that they are based on real things, and that such attitudes about the metaphysics of value is common and can be defended. Other problems such as confusion between scientific and practical fields and complete elimination of underdetermination through purely scientific components are not very serious and it seems that the elimination of transient underdetermination can be achieved only by the influence of non-scientific factors. Of course, unscientific factors include unscientific values, and in practice, this gap can be filled with non-valuable factors. In this case, the underdetermination is not a response to the ideal of "value-free science", but a trace of the ideal of "epistemic purity" in general (including purity of non-epistemic values and non-epistemic non-valuable factors). underdetermination value-free science value-laden science objectivity relativity scientific and non-scientific values Philosophy of religion. Psychology of religion. Religion in relation to other subjects In Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī University of Qom, 2017 23(2021), 2, Seite 75-98 (DE-627)1760629766 25382500 nnns volume:23 year:2021 number:2 pages:75-98 https://doi.org/10.22091/jptr.2021.7007.2550 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/44210e801a00447b85e37fa2ea12e5f0 kostenfrei http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1957_435f87e4ba3d9198dcf1156347b28c2c.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1735-9791 Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2538-2500 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4305 AR 23 2021 2 75-98 |
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10.22091/jptr.2021.7007.2550 doi (DE-627)DOAJ044961030 (DE-599)DOAJ44210e801a00447b85e37fa2ea12e5f0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb per BL51-65 Gholamhossein Javadpoor verfasserin aut The Value-ladenness of Science and Argument from Underdetermination 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The conflict between the impact of unscientific factors on science and its process, or in other words, “oriented science”, has a long history. But in recent decades, the issue has been reborn in more detail and with a focus on unscientific values as well as a focus on the natural sciences at the heart of the philosophy of science, with numerous proponents and opponents arguing for their claims. Opponents of influence, often influenced by the positivist discourse that governs science, considered the involvement of any unscientific factors, including contextual values, in conflict with the ideal of science (objectivity and accurate reporting of natural fact), and spoke of neutral or value-free science. Accordingly, to justify any hypothesis, theory or scientific explanation, only scientific criteria should be sufficient, including scientific values, scientific and logical rules and evidences. On the contrary, some introduced such an ideal as unattainable, undesirable, or based on incorrect principles, and considering the scientific and practical consequences of scientific theories and hypotheses, they argued in defense of the impact of unscientific values on the process of science, which is the most important; they are: “inaccuracy of distinction between scientific and non-scientific values”, “necessity of underdetermination of hypothesis or theory through empirical evidence”, and “avoidance of inductive risk”. Underdetermination is a common term in experimental science books as well as philosophy of science. From a descriptive view, since the predominant method in the processes of experimental sciences is induction, it often happens that the collection and analysis of certain data by induction does not lead to a single and unique result, and if we consider all scientific and epistemological factors and criteria, however, no definitive conclusion can be drawn, and although numerous cases have been excluded from the results and are not supported by evidence, there are still several hypotheses, theories, or explanations that are supported by scientific criteria in much the same way. So, often more than one theory, explanation, or law is consistent with a particular set of evidence. The question is what happens when researchers eventually choose one of these alternatives and reject the others? If, according to the assumption, all scientific and epistemic factors have not been able to present a definite final result, then a complete determination is born of the involvement of non-scientific factors. The most important challenge in advancing this argument is to defend the objectivity of science despite being influenced by non-scientific factors. This problem can be solved only by knowing the values objectively and believing that they are based on real things, and that such attitudes about the metaphysics of value is common and can be defended. Other problems such as confusion between scientific and practical fields and complete elimination of underdetermination through purely scientific components are not very serious and it seems that the elimination of transient underdetermination can be achieved only by the influence of non-scientific factors. Of course, unscientific factors include unscientific values, and in practice, this gap can be filled with non-valuable factors. In this case, the underdetermination is not a response to the ideal of "value-free science", but a trace of the ideal of "epistemic purity" in general (including purity of non-epistemic values and non-epistemic non-valuable factors). underdetermination value-free science value-laden science objectivity relativity scientific and non-scientific values Philosophy of religion. Psychology of religion. Religion in relation to other subjects In Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī University of Qom, 2017 23(2021), 2, Seite 75-98 (DE-627)1760629766 25382500 nnns volume:23 year:2021 number:2 pages:75-98 https://doi.org/10.22091/jptr.2021.7007.2550 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/44210e801a00447b85e37fa2ea12e5f0 kostenfrei http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1957_435f87e4ba3d9198dcf1156347b28c2c.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1735-9791 Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2538-2500 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4305 AR 23 2021 2 75-98 |
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10.22091/jptr.2021.7007.2550 doi (DE-627)DOAJ044961030 (DE-599)DOAJ44210e801a00447b85e37fa2ea12e5f0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb per BL51-65 Gholamhossein Javadpoor verfasserin aut The Value-ladenness of Science and Argument from Underdetermination 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The conflict between the impact of unscientific factors on science and its process, or in other words, “oriented science”, has a long history. But in recent decades, the issue has been reborn in more detail and with a focus on unscientific values as well as a focus on the natural sciences at the heart of the philosophy of science, with numerous proponents and opponents arguing for their claims. Opponents of influence, often influenced by the positivist discourse that governs science, considered the involvement of any unscientific factors, including contextual values, in conflict with the ideal of science (objectivity and accurate reporting of natural fact), and spoke of neutral or value-free science. Accordingly, to justify any hypothesis, theory or scientific explanation, only scientific criteria should be sufficient, including scientific values, scientific and logical rules and evidences. On the contrary, some introduced such an ideal as unattainable, undesirable, or based on incorrect principles, and considering the scientific and practical consequences of scientific theories and hypotheses, they argued in defense of the impact of unscientific values on the process of science, which is the most important; they are: “inaccuracy of distinction between scientific and non-scientific values”, “necessity of underdetermination of hypothesis or theory through empirical evidence”, and “avoidance of inductive risk”. Underdetermination is a common term in experimental science books as well as philosophy of science. From a descriptive view, since the predominant method in the processes of experimental sciences is induction, it often happens that the collection and analysis of certain data by induction does not lead to a single and unique result, and if we consider all scientific and epistemological factors and criteria, however, no definitive conclusion can be drawn, and although numerous cases have been excluded from the results and are not supported by evidence, there are still several hypotheses, theories, or explanations that are supported by scientific criteria in much the same way. So, often more than one theory, explanation, or law is consistent with a particular set of evidence. The question is what happens when researchers eventually choose one of these alternatives and reject the others? If, according to the assumption, all scientific and epistemic factors have not been able to present a definite final result, then a complete determination is born of the involvement of non-scientific factors. The most important challenge in advancing this argument is to defend the objectivity of science despite being influenced by non-scientific factors. This problem can be solved only by knowing the values objectively and believing that they are based on real things, and that such attitudes about the metaphysics of value is common and can be defended. Other problems such as confusion between scientific and practical fields and complete elimination of underdetermination through purely scientific components are not very serious and it seems that the elimination of transient underdetermination can be achieved only by the influence of non-scientific factors. Of course, unscientific factors include unscientific values, and in practice, this gap can be filled with non-valuable factors. In this case, the underdetermination is not a response to the ideal of "value-free science", but a trace of the ideal of "epistemic purity" in general (including purity of non-epistemic values and non-epistemic non-valuable factors). underdetermination value-free science value-laden science objectivity relativity scientific and non-scientific values Philosophy of religion. Psychology of religion. Religion in relation to other subjects In Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī University of Qom, 2017 23(2021), 2, Seite 75-98 (DE-627)1760629766 25382500 nnns volume:23 year:2021 number:2 pages:75-98 https://doi.org/10.22091/jptr.2021.7007.2550 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/44210e801a00447b85e37fa2ea12e5f0 kostenfrei http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1957_435f87e4ba3d9198dcf1156347b28c2c.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1735-9791 Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2538-2500 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4305 AR 23 2021 2 75-98 |
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10.22091/jptr.2021.7007.2550 doi (DE-627)DOAJ044961030 (DE-599)DOAJ44210e801a00447b85e37fa2ea12e5f0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb per BL51-65 Gholamhossein Javadpoor verfasserin aut The Value-ladenness of Science and Argument from Underdetermination 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The conflict between the impact of unscientific factors on science and its process, or in other words, “oriented science”, has a long history. But in recent decades, the issue has been reborn in more detail and with a focus on unscientific values as well as a focus on the natural sciences at the heart of the philosophy of science, with numerous proponents and opponents arguing for their claims. Opponents of influence, often influenced by the positivist discourse that governs science, considered the involvement of any unscientific factors, including contextual values, in conflict with the ideal of science (objectivity and accurate reporting of natural fact), and spoke of neutral or value-free science. Accordingly, to justify any hypothesis, theory or scientific explanation, only scientific criteria should be sufficient, including scientific values, scientific and logical rules and evidences. On the contrary, some introduced such an ideal as unattainable, undesirable, or based on incorrect principles, and considering the scientific and practical consequences of scientific theories and hypotheses, they argued in defense of the impact of unscientific values on the process of science, which is the most important; they are: “inaccuracy of distinction between scientific and non-scientific values”, “necessity of underdetermination of hypothesis or theory through empirical evidence”, and “avoidance of inductive risk”. Underdetermination is a common term in experimental science books as well as philosophy of science. From a descriptive view, since the predominant method in the processes of experimental sciences is induction, it often happens that the collection and analysis of certain data by induction does not lead to a single and unique result, and if we consider all scientific and epistemological factors and criteria, however, no definitive conclusion can be drawn, and although numerous cases have been excluded from the results and are not supported by evidence, there are still several hypotheses, theories, or explanations that are supported by scientific criteria in much the same way. So, often more than one theory, explanation, or law is consistent with a particular set of evidence. The question is what happens when researchers eventually choose one of these alternatives and reject the others? If, according to the assumption, all scientific and epistemic factors have not been able to present a definite final result, then a complete determination is born of the involvement of non-scientific factors. The most important challenge in advancing this argument is to defend the objectivity of science despite being influenced by non-scientific factors. This problem can be solved only by knowing the values objectively and believing that they are based on real things, and that such attitudes about the metaphysics of value is common and can be defended. Other problems such as confusion between scientific and practical fields and complete elimination of underdetermination through purely scientific components are not very serious and it seems that the elimination of transient underdetermination can be achieved only by the influence of non-scientific factors. Of course, unscientific factors include unscientific values, and in practice, this gap can be filled with non-valuable factors. In this case, the underdetermination is not a response to the ideal of "value-free science", but a trace of the ideal of "epistemic purity" in general (including purity of non-epistemic values and non-epistemic non-valuable factors). underdetermination value-free science value-laden science objectivity relativity scientific and non-scientific values Philosophy of religion. Psychology of religion. Religion in relation to other subjects In Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī University of Qom, 2017 23(2021), 2, Seite 75-98 (DE-627)1760629766 25382500 nnns volume:23 year:2021 number:2 pages:75-98 https://doi.org/10.22091/jptr.2021.7007.2550 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/44210e801a00447b85e37fa2ea12e5f0 kostenfrei http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1957_435f87e4ba3d9198dcf1156347b28c2c.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1735-9791 Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2538-2500 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4305 AR 23 2021 2 75-98 |
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The Value-ladenness of Science and Argument from Underdetermination |
abstract |
The conflict between the impact of unscientific factors on science and its process, or in other words, “oriented science”, has a long history. But in recent decades, the issue has been reborn in more detail and with a focus on unscientific values as well as a focus on the natural sciences at the heart of the philosophy of science, with numerous proponents and opponents arguing for their claims. Opponents of influence, often influenced by the positivist discourse that governs science, considered the involvement of any unscientific factors, including contextual values, in conflict with the ideal of science (objectivity and accurate reporting of natural fact), and spoke of neutral or value-free science. Accordingly, to justify any hypothesis, theory or scientific explanation, only scientific criteria should be sufficient, including scientific values, scientific and logical rules and evidences. On the contrary, some introduced such an ideal as unattainable, undesirable, or based on incorrect principles, and considering the scientific and practical consequences of scientific theories and hypotheses, they argued in defense of the impact of unscientific values on the process of science, which is the most important; they are: “inaccuracy of distinction between scientific and non-scientific values”, “necessity of underdetermination of hypothesis or theory through empirical evidence”, and “avoidance of inductive risk”. Underdetermination is a common term in experimental science books as well as philosophy of science. From a descriptive view, since the predominant method in the processes of experimental sciences is induction, it often happens that the collection and analysis of certain data by induction does not lead to a single and unique result, and if we consider all scientific and epistemological factors and criteria, however, no definitive conclusion can be drawn, and although numerous cases have been excluded from the results and are not supported by evidence, there are still several hypotheses, theories, or explanations that are supported by scientific criteria in much the same way. So, often more than one theory, explanation, or law is consistent with a particular set of evidence. The question is what happens when researchers eventually choose one of these alternatives and reject the others? If, according to the assumption, all scientific and epistemic factors have not been able to present a definite final result, then a complete determination is born of the involvement of non-scientific factors. The most important challenge in advancing this argument is to defend the objectivity of science despite being influenced by non-scientific factors. This problem can be solved only by knowing the values objectively and believing that they are based on real things, and that such attitudes about the metaphysics of value is common and can be defended. Other problems such as confusion between scientific and practical fields and complete elimination of underdetermination through purely scientific components are not very serious and it seems that the elimination of transient underdetermination can be achieved only by the influence of non-scientific factors. Of course, unscientific factors include unscientific values, and in practice, this gap can be filled with non-valuable factors. In this case, the underdetermination is not a response to the ideal of "value-free science", but a trace of the ideal of "epistemic purity" in general (including purity of non-epistemic values and non-epistemic non-valuable factors). |
abstractGer |
The conflict between the impact of unscientific factors on science and its process, or in other words, “oriented science”, has a long history. But in recent decades, the issue has been reborn in more detail and with a focus on unscientific values as well as a focus on the natural sciences at the heart of the philosophy of science, with numerous proponents and opponents arguing for their claims. Opponents of influence, often influenced by the positivist discourse that governs science, considered the involvement of any unscientific factors, including contextual values, in conflict with the ideal of science (objectivity and accurate reporting of natural fact), and spoke of neutral or value-free science. Accordingly, to justify any hypothesis, theory or scientific explanation, only scientific criteria should be sufficient, including scientific values, scientific and logical rules and evidences. On the contrary, some introduced such an ideal as unattainable, undesirable, or based on incorrect principles, and considering the scientific and practical consequences of scientific theories and hypotheses, they argued in defense of the impact of unscientific values on the process of science, which is the most important; they are: “inaccuracy of distinction between scientific and non-scientific values”, “necessity of underdetermination of hypothesis or theory through empirical evidence”, and “avoidance of inductive risk”. Underdetermination is a common term in experimental science books as well as philosophy of science. From a descriptive view, since the predominant method in the processes of experimental sciences is induction, it often happens that the collection and analysis of certain data by induction does not lead to a single and unique result, and if we consider all scientific and epistemological factors and criteria, however, no definitive conclusion can be drawn, and although numerous cases have been excluded from the results and are not supported by evidence, there are still several hypotheses, theories, or explanations that are supported by scientific criteria in much the same way. So, often more than one theory, explanation, or law is consistent with a particular set of evidence. The question is what happens when researchers eventually choose one of these alternatives and reject the others? If, according to the assumption, all scientific and epistemic factors have not been able to present a definite final result, then a complete determination is born of the involvement of non-scientific factors. The most important challenge in advancing this argument is to defend the objectivity of science despite being influenced by non-scientific factors. This problem can be solved only by knowing the values objectively and believing that they are based on real things, and that such attitudes about the metaphysics of value is common and can be defended. Other problems such as confusion between scientific and practical fields and complete elimination of underdetermination through purely scientific components are not very serious and it seems that the elimination of transient underdetermination can be achieved only by the influence of non-scientific factors. Of course, unscientific factors include unscientific values, and in practice, this gap can be filled with non-valuable factors. In this case, the underdetermination is not a response to the ideal of "value-free science", but a trace of the ideal of "epistemic purity" in general (including purity of non-epistemic values and non-epistemic non-valuable factors). |
abstract_unstemmed |
The conflict between the impact of unscientific factors on science and its process, or in other words, “oriented science”, has a long history. But in recent decades, the issue has been reborn in more detail and with a focus on unscientific values as well as a focus on the natural sciences at the heart of the philosophy of science, with numerous proponents and opponents arguing for their claims. Opponents of influence, often influenced by the positivist discourse that governs science, considered the involvement of any unscientific factors, including contextual values, in conflict with the ideal of science (objectivity and accurate reporting of natural fact), and spoke of neutral or value-free science. Accordingly, to justify any hypothesis, theory or scientific explanation, only scientific criteria should be sufficient, including scientific values, scientific and logical rules and evidences. On the contrary, some introduced such an ideal as unattainable, undesirable, or based on incorrect principles, and considering the scientific and practical consequences of scientific theories and hypotheses, they argued in defense of the impact of unscientific values on the process of science, which is the most important; they are: “inaccuracy of distinction between scientific and non-scientific values”, “necessity of underdetermination of hypothesis or theory through empirical evidence”, and “avoidance of inductive risk”. Underdetermination is a common term in experimental science books as well as philosophy of science. From a descriptive view, since the predominant method in the processes of experimental sciences is induction, it often happens that the collection and analysis of certain data by induction does not lead to a single and unique result, and if we consider all scientific and epistemological factors and criteria, however, no definitive conclusion can be drawn, and although numerous cases have been excluded from the results and are not supported by evidence, there are still several hypotheses, theories, or explanations that are supported by scientific criteria in much the same way. So, often more than one theory, explanation, or law is consistent with a particular set of evidence. The question is what happens when researchers eventually choose one of these alternatives and reject the others? If, according to the assumption, all scientific and epistemic factors have not been able to present a definite final result, then a complete determination is born of the involvement of non-scientific factors. The most important challenge in advancing this argument is to defend the objectivity of science despite being influenced by non-scientific factors. This problem can be solved only by knowing the values objectively and believing that they are based on real things, and that such attitudes about the metaphysics of value is common and can be defended. Other problems such as confusion between scientific and practical fields and complete elimination of underdetermination through purely scientific components are not very serious and it seems that the elimination of transient underdetermination can be achieved only by the influence of non-scientific factors. Of course, unscientific factors include unscientific values, and in practice, this gap can be filled with non-valuable factors. In this case, the underdetermination is not a response to the ideal of "value-free science", but a trace of the ideal of "epistemic purity" in general (including purity of non-epistemic values and non-epistemic non-valuable factors). |
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If, according to the assumption, all scientific and epistemic factors have not been able to present a definite final result, then a complete determination is born of the involvement of non-scientific factors. The most important challenge in advancing this argument is to defend the objectivity of science despite being influenced by non-scientific factors. This problem can be solved only by knowing the values objectively and believing that they are based on real things, and that such attitudes about the metaphysics of value is common and can be defended. Other problems such as confusion between scientific and practical fields and complete elimination of underdetermination through purely scientific components are not very serious and it seems that the elimination of transient underdetermination can be achieved only by the influence of non-scientific factors. Of course, unscientific factors include unscientific values, and in practice, this gap can be filled with non-valuable factors. 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Religion in relation to other subjects</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">Pizhūhish/hā-yi Falsafī- Kalāmī</subfield><subfield code="d">University of Qom, 2017</subfield><subfield code="g">23(2021), 2, Seite 75-98</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)1760629766</subfield><subfield code="x">25382500</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:23</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2021</subfield><subfield code="g">number:2</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:75-98</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.22091/jptr.2021.7007.2550</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/article/44210e801a00447b85e37fa2ea12e5f0</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://pfk.qom.ac.ir/article_1957_435f87e4ba3d9198dcf1156347b28c2c.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/toc/1735-9791</subfield><subfield code="y">Journal toc</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/toc/2538-2500</subfield><subfield code="y">Journal toc</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_DOAJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SSG-OLC-PHA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2055</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2111</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">23</subfield><subfield code="j">2021</subfield><subfield code="e">2</subfield><subfield code="h">75-98</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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