Metaphysical Explanations for Modal Normativists

I expand 'modal normativism', a theory of metaphysical modality, to give a normativist account of 'metaphysical explanation'. According to modal normativism, basic modal claims do not have a descriptive function, but instead have the normative function of enabling language users...
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Autor*in:	Theodore Locke [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2020

Schlagwörter:	grounding explanation modality essence real definition normativism quasi-realism metaphysical laws

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Metaphysics - Ubiquity Press, 2018, 3(2020), 1
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:3 ; year:2020 ; number:1

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.5334/met.35

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ051326418

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allfields	10.5334/met.35 doi (DE-627)DOAJ051326418 (DE-599)DOAJf17452f61b354f97822724f19f318a61 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng BD95-131 Theodore Locke verfasserin aut Metaphysical Explanations for Modal Normativists 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier I expand 'modal normativism', a theory of metaphysical modality, to give a normativist account of 'metaphysical explanation'. According to modal normativism, basic modal claims do not have a descriptive function, but instead have the normative function of enabling language users to express semantic rules that govern the use of ordinary non-modal vocabulary. However, a worry for modal normativism is that it doesn’t keep up with all of the important and interesting metaphysics we can do by giving and evaluating metaphysical explanations. So, I advance modal normativism by arguing that metaphysical explanations also have a normative rather than descriptive function. In particular, non-causal explanatory claims have formal and semantic properties that make them expressively stricter than basic modal claims and so are better suited to express fine-grained aspects of semantic rules. A major payoff of my normativist account of metaphysical explanations is that it yields a plausible story about how we come to evaluate and know metaphysical explanations—we do this primarily by conceptual analysis. I also respond to a number of objections, including the objection that the epistemic payoffs of my view are not worth the metaphysical costs. grounding explanation modality essence real definition normativism quasi-realism metaphysical laws Metaphysics In Metaphysics Ubiquity Press, 2018 3(2020), 1 (DE-627)1036437612 (DE-600)2946825-5 25158279 nnns volume:3 year:2020 number:1 https://doi.org/10.5334/met.35 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/f17452f61b354f97822724f19f318a61 kostenfrei https://www.metaphysicsjournal.com/articles/35 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2515-8279 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 3 2020 1
spelling	10.5334/met.35 doi (DE-627)DOAJ051326418 (DE-599)DOAJf17452f61b354f97822724f19f318a61 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng BD95-131 Theodore Locke verfasserin aut Metaphysical Explanations for Modal Normativists 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier I expand 'modal normativism', a theory of metaphysical modality, to give a normativist account of 'metaphysical explanation'. According to modal normativism, basic modal claims do not have a descriptive function, but instead have the normative function of enabling language users to express semantic rules that govern the use of ordinary non-modal vocabulary. However, a worry for modal normativism is that it doesn’t keep up with all of the important and interesting metaphysics we can do by giving and evaluating metaphysical explanations. So, I advance modal normativism by arguing that metaphysical explanations also have a normative rather than descriptive function. In particular, non-causal explanatory claims have formal and semantic properties that make them expressively stricter than basic modal claims and so are better suited to express fine-grained aspects of semantic rules. A major payoff of my normativist account of metaphysical explanations is that it yields a plausible story about how we come to evaluate and know metaphysical explanations—we do this primarily by conceptual analysis. I also respond to a number of objections, including the objection that the epistemic payoffs of my view are not worth the metaphysical costs. grounding explanation modality essence real definition normativism quasi-realism metaphysical laws Metaphysics In Metaphysics Ubiquity Press, 2018 3(2020), 1 (DE-627)1036437612 (DE-600)2946825-5 25158279 nnns volume:3 year:2020 number:1 https://doi.org/10.5334/met.35 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/f17452f61b354f97822724f19f318a61 kostenfrei https://www.metaphysicsjournal.com/articles/35 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2515-8279 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 3 2020 1
allfields_unstemmed	10.5334/met.35 doi (DE-627)DOAJ051326418 (DE-599)DOAJf17452f61b354f97822724f19f318a61 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng BD95-131 Theodore Locke verfasserin aut Metaphysical Explanations for Modal Normativists 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier I expand 'modal normativism', a theory of metaphysical modality, to give a normativist account of 'metaphysical explanation'. According to modal normativism, basic modal claims do not have a descriptive function, but instead have the normative function of enabling language users to express semantic rules that govern the use of ordinary non-modal vocabulary. However, a worry for modal normativism is that it doesn’t keep up with all of the important and interesting metaphysics we can do by giving and evaluating metaphysical explanations. So, I advance modal normativism by arguing that metaphysical explanations also have a normative rather than descriptive function. In particular, non-causal explanatory claims have formal and semantic properties that make them expressively stricter than basic modal claims and so are better suited to express fine-grained aspects of semantic rules. A major payoff of my normativist account of metaphysical explanations is that it yields a plausible story about how we come to evaluate and know metaphysical explanations—we do this primarily by conceptual analysis. I also respond to a number of objections, including the objection that the epistemic payoffs of my view are not worth the metaphysical costs. grounding explanation modality essence real definition normativism quasi-realism metaphysical laws Metaphysics In Metaphysics Ubiquity Press, 2018 3(2020), 1 (DE-627)1036437612 (DE-600)2946825-5 25158279 nnns volume:3 year:2020 number:1 https://doi.org/10.5334/met.35 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/f17452f61b354f97822724f19f318a61 kostenfrei https://www.metaphysicsjournal.com/articles/35 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2515-8279 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 3 2020 1
allfieldsGer	10.5334/met.35 doi (DE-627)DOAJ051326418 (DE-599)DOAJf17452f61b354f97822724f19f318a61 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng BD95-131 Theodore Locke verfasserin aut Metaphysical Explanations for Modal Normativists 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier I expand 'modal normativism', a theory of metaphysical modality, to give a normativist account of 'metaphysical explanation'. According to modal normativism, basic modal claims do not have a descriptive function, but instead have the normative function of enabling language users to express semantic rules that govern the use of ordinary non-modal vocabulary. However, a worry for modal normativism is that it doesn’t keep up with all of the important and interesting metaphysics we can do by giving and evaluating metaphysical explanations. So, I advance modal normativism by arguing that metaphysical explanations also have a normative rather than descriptive function. In particular, non-causal explanatory claims have formal and semantic properties that make them expressively stricter than basic modal claims and so are better suited to express fine-grained aspects of semantic rules. A major payoff of my normativist account of metaphysical explanations is that it yields a plausible story about how we come to evaluate and know metaphysical explanations—we do this primarily by conceptual analysis. I also respond to a number of objections, including the objection that the epistemic payoffs of my view are not worth the metaphysical costs. grounding explanation modality essence real definition normativism quasi-realism metaphysical laws Metaphysics In Metaphysics Ubiquity Press, 2018 3(2020), 1 (DE-627)1036437612 (DE-600)2946825-5 25158279 nnns volume:3 year:2020 number:1 https://doi.org/10.5334/met.35 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/f17452f61b354f97822724f19f318a61 kostenfrei https://www.metaphysicsjournal.com/articles/35 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2515-8279 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 3 2020 1
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callnumber-first	B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion
author	Theodore Locke
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title_auth	Metaphysical Explanations for Modal Normativists
abstract	I expand 'modal normativism', a theory of metaphysical modality, to give a normativist account of 'metaphysical explanation'. According to modal normativism, basic modal claims do not have a descriptive function, but instead have the normative function of enabling language users to express semantic rules that govern the use of ordinary non-modal vocabulary. However, a worry for modal normativism is that it doesn’t keep up with all of the important and interesting metaphysics we can do by giving and evaluating metaphysical explanations. So, I advance modal normativism by arguing that metaphysical explanations also have a normative rather than descriptive function. In particular, non-causal explanatory claims have formal and semantic properties that make them expressively stricter than basic modal claims and so are better suited to express fine-grained aspects of semantic rules. A major payoff of my normativist account of metaphysical explanations is that it yields a plausible story about how we come to evaluate and know metaphysical explanations—we do this primarily by conceptual analysis. I also respond to a number of objections, including the objection that the epistemic payoffs of my view are not worth the metaphysical costs.
abstractGer	I expand 'modal normativism', a theory of metaphysical modality, to give a normativist account of 'metaphysical explanation'. According to modal normativism, basic modal claims do not have a descriptive function, but instead have the normative function of enabling language users to express semantic rules that govern the use of ordinary non-modal vocabulary. However, a worry for modal normativism is that it doesn’t keep up with all of the important and interesting metaphysics we can do by giving and evaluating metaphysical explanations. So, I advance modal normativism by arguing that metaphysical explanations also have a normative rather than descriptive function. In particular, non-causal explanatory claims have formal and semantic properties that make them expressively stricter than basic modal claims and so are better suited to express fine-grained aspects of semantic rules. A major payoff of my normativist account of metaphysical explanations is that it yields a plausible story about how we come to evaluate and know metaphysical explanations—we do this primarily by conceptual analysis. I also respond to a number of objections, including the objection that the epistemic payoffs of my view are not worth the metaphysical costs.
abstract_unstemmed	I expand 'modal normativism', a theory of metaphysical modality, to give a normativist account of 'metaphysical explanation'. According to modal normativism, basic modal claims do not have a descriptive function, but instead have the normative function of enabling language users to express semantic rules that govern the use of ordinary non-modal vocabulary. However, a worry for modal normativism is that it doesn’t keep up with all of the important and interesting metaphysics we can do by giving and evaluating metaphysical explanations. So, I advance modal normativism by arguing that metaphysical explanations also have a normative rather than descriptive function. In particular, non-causal explanatory claims have formal and semantic properties that make them expressively stricter than basic modal claims and so are better suited to express fine-grained aspects of semantic rules. A major payoff of my normativist account of metaphysical explanations is that it yields a plausible story about how we come to evaluate and know metaphysical explanations—we do this primarily by conceptual analysis. I also respond to a number of objections, including the objection that the epistemic payoffs of my view are not worth the metaphysical costs.
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