Conceptual Systems Security Requirements Analysis: Aerial Refueling Case Study

In today's highly interconnected and technology-reliant environment, cybersecurity is no longer limited to traditional computer systems and IT networks, as a number of highly publicized attacks have occurred against complex cyber-physical systems such as automobiles and airplanes. While numerou...
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Autor*in:	Martin Span [verfasserIn] Logan O. Mailloux [verfasserIn] Robert F. Mills [verfasserIn] William Young [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2018

Schlagwörter:	Cybersecurity requirements engineering security security engineering systems engineering systems security engineering

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: IEEE Access - IEEE, 2014, 6(2018), Seite 46668-46682
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:6 ; year:2018 ; pages:46668-46682

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2865736

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ051810115

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spelling	10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2865736 doi (DE-627)DOAJ051810115 (DE-599)DOAJ4f1b3b40eb934cbeb238eb7c6ee26d0f DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK1-9971 Martin Span verfasserin aut Conceptual Systems Security Requirements Analysis: Aerial Refueling Case Study 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In today's highly interconnected and technology-reliant environment, cybersecurity is no longer limited to traditional computer systems and IT networks, as a number of highly publicized attacks have occurred against complex cyber-physical systems such as automobiles and airplanes. While numerous vulnerability analysis and architecture analysis approaches are in use, these approaches are often focused on realized systems with limited solution space. A more effective approach for understanding security and resiliency requirements early in the system development is needed. One such approach, systemtheoretic process analysis for security (STPA-Sec), addresses the cyber-physical security problem from a systems viewpoint at the conceptual stage when the solution trade-space is largest rather than merely examining components and adding protections during production, operation, or sustainment. This paper uniquely provides a detailed and independent evaluation of STPA-Sec's utility for eliciting, defining, and understanding security and resiliency requirements for a notional next generation aerial refueling platform. Cybersecurity requirements engineering security security engineering systems engineering systems security engineering Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering Logan O. Mailloux verfasserin aut Robert F. Mills verfasserin aut William Young verfasserin aut In IEEE Access IEEE, 2014 6(2018), Seite 46668-46682 (DE-627)728440385 (DE-600)2687964-5 21693536 nnns volume:6 year:2018 pages:46668-46682 https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2865736 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4f1b3b40eb934cbeb238eb7c6ee26d0f kostenfrei https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8438458/ kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 6 2018 46668-46682
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allfieldsGer	10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2865736 doi (DE-627)DOAJ051810115 (DE-599)DOAJ4f1b3b40eb934cbeb238eb7c6ee26d0f DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK1-9971 Martin Span verfasserin aut Conceptual Systems Security Requirements Analysis: Aerial Refueling Case Study 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In today's highly interconnected and technology-reliant environment, cybersecurity is no longer limited to traditional computer systems and IT networks, as a number of highly publicized attacks have occurred against complex cyber-physical systems such as automobiles and airplanes. While numerous vulnerability analysis and architecture analysis approaches are in use, these approaches are often focused on realized systems with limited solution space. A more effective approach for understanding security and resiliency requirements early in the system development is needed. One such approach, systemtheoretic process analysis for security (STPA-Sec), addresses the cyber-physical security problem from a systems viewpoint at the conceptual stage when the solution trade-space is largest rather than merely examining components and adding protections during production, operation, or sustainment. This paper uniquely provides a detailed and independent evaluation of STPA-Sec's utility for eliciting, defining, and understanding security and resiliency requirements for a notional next generation aerial refueling platform. Cybersecurity requirements engineering security security engineering systems engineering systems security engineering Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering Logan O. Mailloux verfasserin aut Robert F. Mills verfasserin aut William Young verfasserin aut In IEEE Access IEEE, 2014 6(2018), Seite 46668-46682 (DE-627)728440385 (DE-600)2687964-5 21693536 nnns volume:6 year:2018 pages:46668-46682 https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2865736 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4f1b3b40eb934cbeb238eb7c6ee26d0f kostenfrei https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8438458/ kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 6 2018 46668-46682
allfieldsSound	10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2865736 doi (DE-627)DOAJ051810115 (DE-599)DOAJ4f1b3b40eb934cbeb238eb7c6ee26d0f DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK1-9971 Martin Span verfasserin aut Conceptual Systems Security Requirements Analysis: Aerial Refueling Case Study 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In today's highly interconnected and technology-reliant environment, cybersecurity is no longer limited to traditional computer systems and IT networks, as a number of highly publicized attacks have occurred against complex cyber-physical systems such as automobiles and airplanes. While numerous vulnerability analysis and architecture analysis approaches are in use, these approaches are often focused on realized systems with limited solution space. A more effective approach for understanding security and resiliency requirements early in the system development is needed. One such approach, systemtheoretic process analysis for security (STPA-Sec), addresses the cyber-physical security problem from a systems viewpoint at the conceptual stage when the solution trade-space is largest rather than merely examining components and adding protections during production, operation, or sustainment. This paper uniquely provides a detailed and independent evaluation of STPA-Sec's utility for eliciting, defining, and understanding security and resiliency requirements for a notional next generation aerial refueling platform. Cybersecurity requirements engineering security security engineering systems engineering systems security engineering Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering Logan O. Mailloux verfasserin aut Robert F. Mills verfasserin aut William Young verfasserin aut In IEEE Access IEEE, 2014 6(2018), Seite 46668-46682 (DE-627)728440385 (DE-600)2687964-5 21693536 nnns volume:6 year:2018 pages:46668-46682 https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2865736 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4f1b3b40eb934cbeb238eb7c6ee26d0f kostenfrei https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8438458/ kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 6 2018 46668-46682
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title	Conceptual Systems Security Requirements Analysis: Aerial Refueling Case Study
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abstract	In today's highly interconnected and technology-reliant environment, cybersecurity is no longer limited to traditional computer systems and IT networks, as a number of highly publicized attacks have occurred against complex cyber-physical systems such as automobiles and airplanes. While numerous vulnerability analysis and architecture analysis approaches are in use, these approaches are often focused on realized systems with limited solution space. A more effective approach for understanding security and resiliency requirements early in the system development is needed. One such approach, systemtheoretic process analysis for security (STPA-Sec), addresses the cyber-physical security problem from a systems viewpoint at the conceptual stage when the solution trade-space is largest rather than merely examining components and adding protections during production, operation, or sustainment. This paper uniquely provides a detailed and independent evaluation of STPA-Sec's utility for eliciting, defining, and understanding security and resiliency requirements for a notional next generation aerial refueling platform.
abstractGer	In today's highly interconnected and technology-reliant environment, cybersecurity is no longer limited to traditional computer systems and IT networks, as a number of highly publicized attacks have occurred against complex cyber-physical systems such as automobiles and airplanes. While numerous vulnerability analysis and architecture analysis approaches are in use, these approaches are often focused on realized systems with limited solution space. A more effective approach for understanding security and resiliency requirements early in the system development is needed. One such approach, systemtheoretic process analysis for security (STPA-Sec), addresses the cyber-physical security problem from a systems viewpoint at the conceptual stage when the solution trade-space is largest rather than merely examining components and adding protections during production, operation, or sustainment. This paper uniquely provides a detailed and independent evaluation of STPA-Sec's utility for eliciting, defining, and understanding security and resiliency requirements for a notional next generation aerial refueling platform.
abstract_unstemmed	In today's highly interconnected and technology-reliant environment, cybersecurity is no longer limited to traditional computer systems and IT networks, as a number of highly publicized attacks have occurred against complex cyber-physical systems such as automobiles and airplanes. While numerous vulnerability analysis and architecture analysis approaches are in use, these approaches are often focused on realized systems with limited solution space. A more effective approach for understanding security and resiliency requirements early in the system development is needed. One such approach, systemtheoretic process analysis for security (STPA-Sec), addresses the cyber-physical security problem from a systems viewpoint at the conceptual stage when the solution trade-space is largest rather than merely examining components and adding protections during production, operation, or sustainment. This paper uniquely provides a detailed and independent evaluation of STPA-Sec's utility for eliciting, defining, and understanding security and resiliency requirements for a notional next generation aerial refueling platform.
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title_short	Conceptual Systems Security Requirements Analysis: Aerial Refueling Case Study
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