PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach

Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel and promising network architecture, which decouples the controlling function from the forwarding plane. SDN provides the flexibility to program the network through centralized control. However, security issues of SDN should arouse our attention. In this p...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Mingxin Wang [verfasserIn] Huachun Zhou [verfasserIn] Jia Chen [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2018

Schlagwörter:	Flooding attack popularity software-defined networking network security timeout analysis

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: IEEE Access - IEEE, 2014, 6(2018), Seite 59253-59267
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:6 ; year:2018 ; pages:59253-59267

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ052515699

Internformat


LEADER	01000caa a22002652 4500
001	DOAJ052515699
003	DE-627
005	20230308165645.0
007	cr uuu---uuuuu
008	230227s2018 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c
024	7		\|a 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164 \|2 doi
035			\|a (DE-627)DOAJ052515699
035			\|a (DE-599)DOAJ15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072
040			\|a DE-627 \|b ger \|c DE-627 \|e rakwb
041			\|a eng
050		0	\|a TK1-9971
100	0		\|a Mingxin Wang \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
245	1	0	\|a PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach
264		1	\|c 2018
336			\|a Text \|b txt \|2 rdacontent
337			\|a Computermedien \|b c \|2 rdamedia
338			\|a Online-Ressource \|b cr \|2 rdacarrier
520			\|a Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel and promising network architecture, which decouples the controlling function from the forwarding plane. SDN provides the flexibility to program the network through centralized control. However, security issues of SDN should arouse our attention. In this paper, we mainly discuss a specific vulnerability of the centralized control mechanism in SDN, which is likely to suffer denial-of-service (DoS) flooding attack. We propose a popularity and timeout analysis-based controller protection approach to protect the controller from the flooding attack. We develop a controller protection application on the SDN controller in which a popularity table is maintained. When the arriving rate of the packets to the controller exceeds the pre-defined threshold, the selected proactive flow table entries will be installed on the data plane switches to ensure that the requests to the most popular destination addresses can be served with higher priority. Furthermore, we mitigate the unpopular requests to a low priority queue, which can send Packet_In requests to the controller with rate limiting. The timeout analysis module in the application can identify the malicious host by analyzing the lifetime of the flows according to the flow-removed messages. Blocking entries will be added to the blacklist table on the switch. Our controller protection approach can effectively alleviate the impact of the SDN controller-oriented flooding attack. The detection rate is 99.90%, and the false alarm rate is 0.41%.
650		4	\|a Flooding attack
650		4	\|a popularity
650		4	\|a software-defined networking
650		4	\|a network security
650		4	\|a timeout analysis
653		0	\|a Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering
700	0		\|a Huachun Zhou \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
700	0		\|a Jia Chen \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
773	0	8	\|i In \|t IEEE Access \|d IEEE, 2014 \|g 6(2018), Seite 59253-59267 \|w (DE-627)728440385 \|w (DE-600)2687964-5 \|x 21693536 \|7 nnns
773	1	8	\|g volume:6 \|g year:2018 \|g pages:59253-59267
856	4	0	\|u https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164 \|z kostenfrei
856	4	0	\|u https://doaj.org/article/15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072 \|z kostenfrei
856	4	0	\|u https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8488536/ \|z kostenfrei
856	4	2	\|u https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536 \|y Journal toc \|z kostenfrei
912			\|a GBV_USEFLAG_A
912			\|a SYSFLAG_A
912			\|a GBV_DOAJ
912			\|a GBV_ILN_11
912			\|a GBV_ILN_20
912			\|a GBV_ILN_22
912			\|a GBV_ILN_23
912			\|a GBV_ILN_24
912			\|a GBV_ILN_31
912			\|a GBV_ILN_39
912			\|a GBV_ILN_40
912			\|a GBV_ILN_60
912			\|a GBV_ILN_62
912			\|a GBV_ILN_63
912			\|a GBV_ILN_65
912			\|a GBV_ILN_69
912			\|a GBV_ILN_70
912			\|a GBV_ILN_73
912			\|a GBV_ILN_95
912			\|a GBV_ILN_105
912			\|a GBV_ILN_110
912			\|a GBV_ILN_151
912			\|a GBV_ILN_161
912			\|a GBV_ILN_170
912			\|a GBV_ILN_213
912			\|a GBV_ILN_230
912			\|a GBV_ILN_285
912			\|a GBV_ILN_293
912			\|a GBV_ILN_370
912			\|a GBV_ILN_602
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2014
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4012
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4037
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4112
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4125
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4126
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4249
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4305
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4306
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4307
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4313
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4322
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4323
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4324
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4325
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4335
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4338
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4367
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4700
951			\|a AR
952			\|d 6 \|j 2018 \|h 59253-59267

Indexfelder

author_variant	m w mw h z hz j c jc
matchkey_str	article:21693536:2018----::oiaouaiyntmotnlssaesnotol
hierarchy_sort_str	2018
callnumber-subject-code	TK
publishDate	2018
allfields	10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164 doi (DE-627)DOAJ052515699 (DE-599)DOAJ15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK1-9971 Mingxin Wang verfasserin aut PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel and promising network architecture, which decouples the controlling function from the forwarding plane. SDN provides the flexibility to program the network through centralized control. However, security issues of SDN should arouse our attention. In this paper, we mainly discuss a specific vulnerability of the centralized control mechanism in SDN, which is likely to suffer denial-of-service (DoS) flooding attack. We propose a popularity and timeout analysis-based controller protection approach to protect the controller from the flooding attack. We develop a controller protection application on the SDN controller in which a popularity table is maintained. When the arriving rate of the packets to the controller exceeds the pre-defined threshold, the selected proactive flow table entries will be installed on the data plane switches to ensure that the requests to the most popular destination addresses can be served with higher priority. Furthermore, we mitigate the unpopular requests to a low priority queue, which can send Packet_In requests to the controller with rate limiting. The timeout analysis module in the application can identify the malicious host by analyzing the lifetime of the flows according to the flow-removed messages. Blocking entries will be added to the blacklist table on the switch. Our controller protection approach can effectively alleviate the impact of the SDN controller-oriented flooding attack. The detection rate is 99.90%, and the false alarm rate is 0.41%. Flooding attack popularity software-defined networking network security timeout analysis Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering Huachun Zhou verfasserin aut Jia Chen verfasserin aut In IEEE Access IEEE, 2014 6(2018), Seite 59253-59267 (DE-627)728440385 (DE-600)2687964-5 21693536 nnns volume:6 year:2018 pages:59253-59267 https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072 kostenfrei https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8488536/ kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 6 2018 59253-59267
spelling	10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164 doi (DE-627)DOAJ052515699 (DE-599)DOAJ15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK1-9971 Mingxin Wang verfasserin aut PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel and promising network architecture, which decouples the controlling function from the forwarding plane. SDN provides the flexibility to program the network through centralized control. However, security issues of SDN should arouse our attention. In this paper, we mainly discuss a specific vulnerability of the centralized control mechanism in SDN, which is likely to suffer denial-of-service (DoS) flooding attack. We propose a popularity and timeout analysis-based controller protection approach to protect the controller from the flooding attack. We develop a controller protection application on the SDN controller in which a popularity table is maintained. When the arriving rate of the packets to the controller exceeds the pre-defined threshold, the selected proactive flow table entries will be installed on the data plane switches to ensure that the requests to the most popular destination addresses can be served with higher priority. Furthermore, we mitigate the unpopular requests to a low priority queue, which can send Packet_In requests to the controller with rate limiting. The timeout analysis module in the application can identify the malicious host by analyzing the lifetime of the flows according to the flow-removed messages. Blocking entries will be added to the blacklist table on the switch. Our controller protection approach can effectively alleviate the impact of the SDN controller-oriented flooding attack. The detection rate is 99.90%, and the false alarm rate is 0.41%. Flooding attack popularity software-defined networking network security timeout analysis Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering Huachun Zhou verfasserin aut Jia Chen verfasserin aut In IEEE Access IEEE, 2014 6(2018), Seite 59253-59267 (DE-627)728440385 (DE-600)2687964-5 21693536 nnns volume:6 year:2018 pages:59253-59267 https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072 kostenfrei https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8488536/ kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 6 2018 59253-59267
allfields_unstemmed	10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164 doi (DE-627)DOAJ052515699 (DE-599)DOAJ15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK1-9971 Mingxin Wang verfasserin aut PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel and promising network architecture, which decouples the controlling function from the forwarding plane. SDN provides the flexibility to program the network through centralized control. However, security issues of SDN should arouse our attention. In this paper, we mainly discuss a specific vulnerability of the centralized control mechanism in SDN, which is likely to suffer denial-of-service (DoS) flooding attack. We propose a popularity and timeout analysis-based controller protection approach to protect the controller from the flooding attack. We develop a controller protection application on the SDN controller in which a popularity table is maintained. When the arriving rate of the packets to the controller exceeds the pre-defined threshold, the selected proactive flow table entries will be installed on the data plane switches to ensure that the requests to the most popular destination addresses can be served with higher priority. Furthermore, we mitigate the unpopular requests to a low priority queue, which can send Packet_In requests to the controller with rate limiting. The timeout analysis module in the application can identify the malicious host by analyzing the lifetime of the flows according to the flow-removed messages. Blocking entries will be added to the blacklist table on the switch. Our controller protection approach can effectively alleviate the impact of the SDN controller-oriented flooding attack. The detection rate is 99.90%, and the false alarm rate is 0.41%. Flooding attack popularity software-defined networking network security timeout analysis Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering Huachun Zhou verfasserin aut Jia Chen verfasserin aut In IEEE Access IEEE, 2014 6(2018), Seite 59253-59267 (DE-627)728440385 (DE-600)2687964-5 21693536 nnns volume:6 year:2018 pages:59253-59267 https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072 kostenfrei https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8488536/ kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 6 2018 59253-59267
allfieldsGer	10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164 doi (DE-627)DOAJ052515699 (DE-599)DOAJ15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK1-9971 Mingxin Wang verfasserin aut PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel and promising network architecture, which decouples the controlling function from the forwarding plane. SDN provides the flexibility to program the network through centralized control. However, security issues of SDN should arouse our attention. In this paper, we mainly discuss a specific vulnerability of the centralized control mechanism in SDN, which is likely to suffer denial-of-service (DoS) flooding attack. We propose a popularity and timeout analysis-based controller protection approach to protect the controller from the flooding attack. We develop a controller protection application on the SDN controller in which a popularity table is maintained. When the arriving rate of the packets to the controller exceeds the pre-defined threshold, the selected proactive flow table entries will be installed on the data plane switches to ensure that the requests to the most popular destination addresses can be served with higher priority. Furthermore, we mitigate the unpopular requests to a low priority queue, which can send Packet_In requests to the controller with rate limiting. The timeout analysis module in the application can identify the malicious host by analyzing the lifetime of the flows according to the flow-removed messages. Blocking entries will be added to the blacklist table on the switch. Our controller protection approach can effectively alleviate the impact of the SDN controller-oriented flooding attack. The detection rate is 99.90%, and the false alarm rate is 0.41%. Flooding attack popularity software-defined networking network security timeout analysis Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering Huachun Zhou verfasserin aut Jia Chen verfasserin aut In IEEE Access IEEE, 2014 6(2018), Seite 59253-59267 (DE-627)728440385 (DE-600)2687964-5 21693536 nnns volume:6 year:2018 pages:59253-59267 https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072 kostenfrei https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8488536/ kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 6 2018 59253-59267
allfieldsSound	10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164 doi (DE-627)DOAJ052515699 (DE-599)DOAJ15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK1-9971 Mingxin Wang verfasserin aut PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel and promising network architecture, which decouples the controlling function from the forwarding plane. SDN provides the flexibility to program the network through centralized control. However, security issues of SDN should arouse our attention. In this paper, we mainly discuss a specific vulnerability of the centralized control mechanism in SDN, which is likely to suffer denial-of-service (DoS) flooding attack. We propose a popularity and timeout analysis-based controller protection approach to protect the controller from the flooding attack. We develop a controller protection application on the SDN controller in which a popularity table is maintained. When the arriving rate of the packets to the controller exceeds the pre-defined threshold, the selected proactive flow table entries will be installed on the data plane switches to ensure that the requests to the most popular destination addresses can be served with higher priority. Furthermore, we mitigate the unpopular requests to a low priority queue, which can send Packet_In requests to the controller with rate limiting. The timeout analysis module in the application can identify the malicious host by analyzing the lifetime of the flows according to the flow-removed messages. Blocking entries will be added to the blacklist table on the switch. Our controller protection approach can effectively alleviate the impact of the SDN controller-oriented flooding attack. The detection rate is 99.90%, and the false alarm rate is 0.41%. Flooding attack popularity software-defined networking network security timeout analysis Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering Huachun Zhou verfasserin aut Jia Chen verfasserin aut In IEEE Access IEEE, 2014 6(2018), Seite 59253-59267 (DE-627)728440385 (DE-600)2687964-5 21693536 nnns volume:6 year:2018 pages:59253-59267 https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072 kostenfrei https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8488536/ kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 6 2018 59253-59267
language	English
source	In IEEE Access 6(2018), Seite 59253-59267 volume:6 year:2018 pages:59253-59267
sourceStr	In IEEE Access 6(2018), Seite 59253-59267 volume:6 year:2018 pages:59253-59267
format_phy_str_mv	Article
institution	findex.gbv.de
topic_facet	Flooding attack popularity software-defined networking network security timeout analysis Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering
isfreeaccess_bool	true
container_title	IEEE Access
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Mingxin Wang @@aut@@ Huachun Zhou @@aut@@ Jia Chen @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2018-01-01T00:00:00Z
hierarchy_top_id	728440385
id	DOAJ052515699
language_de	englisch
fullrecord	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">DOAJ052515699</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230308165645.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230227s2018 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)DOAJ052515699</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)DOAJ15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">TK1-9971</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Mingxin Wang</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2018</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel and promising network architecture, which decouples the controlling function from the forwarding plane. SDN provides the flexibility to program the network through centralized control. However, security issues of SDN should arouse our attention. In this paper, we mainly discuss a specific vulnerability of the centralized control mechanism in SDN, which is likely to suffer denial-of-service (DoS) flooding attack. We propose a popularity and timeout analysis-based controller protection approach to protect the controller from the flooding attack. We develop a controller protection application on the SDN controller in which a popularity table is maintained. When the arriving rate of the packets to the controller exceeds the pre-defined threshold, the selected proactive flow table entries will be installed on the data plane switches to ensure that the requests to the most popular destination addresses can be served with higher priority. Furthermore, we mitigate the unpopular requests to a low priority queue, which can send Packet_In requests to the controller with rate limiting. The timeout analysis module in the application can identify the malicious host by analyzing the lifetime of the flows according to the flow-removed messages. Blocking entries will be added to the blacklist table on the switch. Our controller protection approach can effectively alleviate the impact of the SDN controller-oriented flooding attack. The detection rate is 99.90%, and the false alarm rate is 0.41%.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Flooding attack</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">popularity</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">software-defined networking</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">network security</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">timeout analysis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Huachun Zhou</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Jia Chen</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">IEEE Access</subfield><subfield code="d">IEEE, 2014</subfield><subfield code="g">6(2018), Seite 59253-59267</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)728440385</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2687964-5</subfield><subfield code="x">21693536</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:6</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2018</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:59253-59267</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/article/15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8488536/</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536</subfield><subfield code="y">Journal toc</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_DOAJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_62</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_65</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_69</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_73</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_95</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_105</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_161</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_170</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_230</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_293</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_602</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4249</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4307</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4322</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4335</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4367</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">6</subfield><subfield code="j">2018</subfield><subfield code="h">59253-59267</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
callnumber-first	T - Technology
author	Mingxin Wang
spellingShingle	Mingxin Wang misc TK1-9971 misc Flooding attack misc popularity misc software-defined networking misc network security misc timeout analysis misc Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach
authorStr	Mingxin Wang
ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv	@@773@@(DE-627)728440385
format	electronic Article
delete_txt_mv	keep
author_role	aut aut aut
collection	DOAJ
remote_str	true
callnumber-label	TK1-9971
illustrated	Not Illustrated
issn	21693536
topic_title	TK1-9971 PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach Flooding attack popularity software-defined networking network security timeout analysis
topic	misc TK1-9971 misc Flooding attack misc popularity misc software-defined networking misc network security misc timeout analysis misc Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering
topic_unstemmed	misc TK1-9971 misc Flooding attack misc popularity misc software-defined networking misc network security misc timeout analysis misc Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering
topic_browse	misc TK1-9971 misc Flooding attack misc popularity misc software-defined networking misc network security misc timeout analysis misc Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering
format_facet	Elektronische Aufsätze Aufsätze Elektronische Ressource
format_main_str_mv	Text Zeitschrift/Artikel
carriertype_str_mv	cr
hierarchy_parent_title	IEEE Access
hierarchy_parent_id	728440385
hierarchy_top_title	IEEE Access
isfreeaccess_txt	true
familylinks_str_mv	(DE-627)728440385 (DE-600)2687964-5
title	PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach
ctrlnum	(DE-627)DOAJ052515699 (DE-599)DOAJ15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072
title_full	PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach
author_sort	Mingxin Wang
journal	IEEE Access
journalStr	IEEE Access
callnumber-first-code	T
lang_code	eng
isOA_bool	true
recordtype	marc
publishDateSort	2018
contenttype_str_mv	txt
container_start_page	59253
author_browse	Mingxin Wang Huachun Zhou Jia Chen
container_volume	6
class	TK1-9971
format_se	Elektronische Aufsätze
author-letter	Mingxin Wang
doi_str_mv	10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164
author2-role	verfasserin
title_sort	potia: a popularity and timeout analysis based sdn controller protection approach
callnumber	TK1-9971
title_auth	PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach
abstract	Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel and promising network architecture, which decouples the controlling function from the forwarding plane. SDN provides the flexibility to program the network through centralized control. However, security issues of SDN should arouse our attention. In this paper, we mainly discuss a specific vulnerability of the centralized control mechanism in SDN, which is likely to suffer denial-of-service (DoS) flooding attack. We propose a popularity and timeout analysis-based controller protection approach to protect the controller from the flooding attack. We develop a controller protection application on the SDN controller in which a popularity table is maintained. When the arriving rate of the packets to the controller exceeds the pre-defined threshold, the selected proactive flow table entries will be installed on the data plane switches to ensure that the requests to the most popular destination addresses can be served with higher priority. Furthermore, we mitigate the unpopular requests to a low priority queue, which can send Packet_In requests to the controller with rate limiting. The timeout analysis module in the application can identify the malicious host by analyzing the lifetime of the flows according to the flow-removed messages. Blocking entries will be added to the blacklist table on the switch. Our controller protection approach can effectively alleviate the impact of the SDN controller-oriented flooding attack. The detection rate is 99.90%, and the false alarm rate is 0.41%.
abstractGer	Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel and promising network architecture, which decouples the controlling function from the forwarding plane. SDN provides the flexibility to program the network through centralized control. However, security issues of SDN should arouse our attention. In this paper, we mainly discuss a specific vulnerability of the centralized control mechanism in SDN, which is likely to suffer denial-of-service (DoS) flooding attack. We propose a popularity and timeout analysis-based controller protection approach to protect the controller from the flooding attack. We develop a controller protection application on the SDN controller in which a popularity table is maintained. When the arriving rate of the packets to the controller exceeds the pre-defined threshold, the selected proactive flow table entries will be installed on the data plane switches to ensure that the requests to the most popular destination addresses can be served with higher priority. Furthermore, we mitigate the unpopular requests to a low priority queue, which can send Packet_In requests to the controller with rate limiting. The timeout analysis module in the application can identify the malicious host by analyzing the lifetime of the flows according to the flow-removed messages. Blocking entries will be added to the blacklist table on the switch. Our controller protection approach can effectively alleviate the impact of the SDN controller-oriented flooding attack. The detection rate is 99.90%, and the false alarm rate is 0.41%.
abstract_unstemmed	Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel and promising network architecture, which decouples the controlling function from the forwarding plane. SDN provides the flexibility to program the network through centralized control. However, security issues of SDN should arouse our attention. In this paper, we mainly discuss a specific vulnerability of the centralized control mechanism in SDN, which is likely to suffer denial-of-service (DoS) flooding attack. We propose a popularity and timeout analysis-based controller protection approach to protect the controller from the flooding attack. We develop a controller protection application on the SDN controller in which a popularity table is maintained. When the arriving rate of the packets to the controller exceeds the pre-defined threshold, the selected proactive flow table entries will be installed on the data plane switches to ensure that the requests to the most popular destination addresses can be served with higher priority. Furthermore, we mitigate the unpopular requests to a low priority queue, which can send Packet_In requests to the controller with rate limiting. The timeout analysis module in the application can identify the malicious host by analyzing the lifetime of the flows according to the flow-removed messages. Blocking entries will be added to the blacklist table on the switch. Our controller protection approach can effectively alleviate the impact of the SDN controller-oriented flooding attack. The detection rate is 99.90%, and the false alarm rate is 0.41%.
collection_details	GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700
title_short	PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach
url	https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164 https://doaj.org/article/15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8488536/ https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536
remote_bool	true
author2	Huachun Zhou Jia Chen
author2Str	Huachun Zhou Jia Chen
ppnlink	728440385
callnumber-subject	TK - Electrical and Nuclear Engineering
mediatype_str_mv	c
isOA_txt	true
hochschulschrift_bool	false
doi_str	10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164
callnumber-a	TK1-9971
up_date	2024-07-04T01:21:27.642Z
_version_	1803609532156346368
fullrecord_marcxml	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">DOAJ052515699</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230308165645.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230227s2018 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)DOAJ052515699</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)DOAJ15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">TK1-9971</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Mingxin Wang</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2018</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel and promising network architecture, which decouples the controlling function from the forwarding plane. SDN provides the flexibility to program the network through centralized control. However, security issues of SDN should arouse our attention. In this paper, we mainly discuss a specific vulnerability of the centralized control mechanism in SDN, which is likely to suffer denial-of-service (DoS) flooding attack. We propose a popularity and timeout analysis-based controller protection approach to protect the controller from the flooding attack. We develop a controller protection application on the SDN controller in which a popularity table is maintained. When the arriving rate of the packets to the controller exceeds the pre-defined threshold, the selected proactive flow table entries will be installed on the data plane switches to ensure that the requests to the most popular destination addresses can be served with higher priority. Furthermore, we mitigate the unpopular requests to a low priority queue, which can send Packet_In requests to the controller with rate limiting. The timeout analysis module in the application can identify the malicious host by analyzing the lifetime of the flows according to the flow-removed messages. Blocking entries will be added to the blacklist table on the switch. Our controller protection approach can effectively alleviate the impact of the SDN controller-oriented flooding attack. The detection rate is 99.90%, and the false alarm rate is 0.41%.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Flooding attack</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">popularity</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">software-defined networking</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">network security</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">timeout analysis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Huachun Zhou</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Jia Chen</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">IEEE Access</subfield><subfield code="d">IEEE, 2014</subfield><subfield code="g">6(2018), Seite 59253-59267</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)728440385</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2687964-5</subfield><subfield code="x">21693536</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:6</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2018</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:59253-59267</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875164</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/article/15342155427e427abc9786a9cd61c072</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8488536/</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536</subfield><subfield code="y">Journal toc</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_DOAJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_11</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_62</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_65</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_69</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_73</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_95</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_105</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_161</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_170</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_230</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_293</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_602</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4249</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4307</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4322</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4335</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4367</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">6</subfield><subfield code="j">2018</subfield><subfield code="h">59253-59267</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
score	7.3993473

Nicht das Richtige dabei?

Schreiben Sie uns!

PoTiA: A Popularity and Timeout Analysis Based SDN Controller Protection Approach

Nicht das Richtige dabei?

Zugang & Verfügbarkeit

Vorhandene Bände

Nicht das Richtige dabei?