Improved Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Version QARMA-64/128

QARMA is a new tweakable block cipher used for memory encryption, the generation of short tags and the construction of the keyed hash functions in future. It adopts a three-round Even-Mansour scheme and supports 64 and 128 bits of block size, denoted by QARMA-64 and QARMA-128, respectively. Their tw...
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Autor*in:	Ya Liu [verfasserIn] Tiande Zang [verfasserIn] Dawu Gu [verfasserIn] Fengyu Zhao [verfasserIn] Wei Li [verfasserIn] Zhiqiang Liu [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2020

Schlagwörter:	Tweakable block ciphers QARMA meet-in-the-middle attacks impossible differential cryptanalysis tweaks

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: IEEE Access - IEEE, 2014, 8(2020), Seite 8361-8370
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:8 ; year:2020 ; pages:8361-8370

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2964259

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ053243137

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allfields	10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2964259 doi (DE-627)DOAJ053243137 (DE-599)DOAJ48db38cd529b49b3b77b209e27e563a8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK1-9971 Ya Liu verfasserin aut Improved Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Version QARMA-64/128 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier QARMA is a new tweakable block cipher used for memory encryption, the generation of short tags and the construction of the keyed hash functions in future. It adopts a three-round Even-Mansour scheme and supports 64 and 128 bits of block size, denoted by QARMA-64 and QARMA-128, respectively. Their tweak lengths equal the block sizes and their keys are twice as long as the blocks. In this paper, we improve the security analysis of reduced-version QARMA against impossible differential and meet-in-the-middle attacks. Specifically, first exploit some properties of its linear operations and the redundancy of key schedule. Based on them, we propose impossible differential attacks on 11-round QARMA-64/128, and meet-in-the-middle attacks on 10-round symmetric QARMA-128 and the last 12 rounds of asymmetric QARMA-128. Compared with the previously best known results on QARMA-64, our attack can recover 16 more bits of master key with the almost complexities. Compared with the previously best known results on symmetric QARMA-128, the memory complexity of our attack in Section IV is reduced by a factor of 2<sup<48</sup<. Moreover, the meet-in-the-middle attack on 12-round QARMA-128 is the best known attack on QARMA-128 in terms of the number of rounds. Tweakable block ciphers QARMA meet-in-the-middle attacks impossible differential cryptanalysis tweaks Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering Tiande Zang verfasserin aut Dawu Gu verfasserin aut Fengyu Zhao verfasserin aut Wei Li verfasserin aut Zhiqiang Liu verfasserin aut In IEEE Access IEEE, 2014 8(2020), Seite 8361-8370 (DE-627)728440385 (DE-600)2687964-5 21693536 nnns volume:8 year:2020 pages:8361-8370 https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2964259 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/48db38cd529b49b3b77b209e27e563a8 kostenfrei https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8950388/ kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2020 8361-8370
spelling	10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2964259 doi (DE-627)DOAJ053243137 (DE-599)DOAJ48db38cd529b49b3b77b209e27e563a8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK1-9971 Ya Liu verfasserin aut Improved Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Version QARMA-64/128 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier QARMA is a new tweakable block cipher used for memory encryption, the generation of short tags and the construction of the keyed hash functions in future. It adopts a three-round Even-Mansour scheme and supports 64 and 128 bits of block size, denoted by QARMA-64 and QARMA-128, respectively. Their tweak lengths equal the block sizes and their keys are twice as long as the blocks. In this paper, we improve the security analysis of reduced-version QARMA against impossible differential and meet-in-the-middle attacks. Specifically, first exploit some properties of its linear operations and the redundancy of key schedule. Based on them, we propose impossible differential attacks on 11-round QARMA-64/128, and meet-in-the-middle attacks on 10-round symmetric QARMA-128 and the last 12 rounds of asymmetric QARMA-128. Compared with the previously best known results on QARMA-64, our attack can recover 16 more bits of master key with the almost complexities. Compared with the previously best known results on symmetric QARMA-128, the memory complexity of our attack in Section IV is reduced by a factor of 2<sup<48</sup<. Moreover, the meet-in-the-middle attack on 12-round QARMA-128 is the best known attack on QARMA-128 in terms of the number of rounds. Tweakable block ciphers QARMA meet-in-the-middle attacks impossible differential cryptanalysis tweaks Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering Tiande Zang verfasserin aut Dawu Gu verfasserin aut Fengyu Zhao verfasserin aut Wei Li verfasserin aut Zhiqiang Liu verfasserin aut In IEEE Access IEEE, 2014 8(2020), Seite 8361-8370 (DE-627)728440385 (DE-600)2687964-5 21693536 nnns volume:8 year:2020 pages:8361-8370 https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2964259 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/48db38cd529b49b3b77b209e27e563a8 kostenfrei https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8950388/ kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2020 8361-8370
allfields_unstemmed	10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2964259 doi (DE-627)DOAJ053243137 (DE-599)DOAJ48db38cd529b49b3b77b209e27e563a8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK1-9971 Ya Liu verfasserin aut Improved Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Version QARMA-64/128 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier QARMA is a new tweakable block cipher used for memory encryption, the generation of short tags and the construction of the keyed hash functions in future. It adopts a three-round Even-Mansour scheme and supports 64 and 128 bits of block size, denoted by QARMA-64 and QARMA-128, respectively. Their tweak lengths equal the block sizes and their keys are twice as long as the blocks. In this paper, we improve the security analysis of reduced-version QARMA against impossible differential and meet-in-the-middle attacks. Specifically, first exploit some properties of its linear operations and the redundancy of key schedule. Based on them, we propose impossible differential attacks on 11-round QARMA-64/128, and meet-in-the-middle attacks on 10-round symmetric QARMA-128 and the last 12 rounds of asymmetric QARMA-128. Compared with the previously best known results on QARMA-64, our attack can recover 16 more bits of master key with the almost complexities. Compared with the previously best known results on symmetric QARMA-128, the memory complexity of our attack in Section IV is reduced by a factor of 2<sup<48</sup<. Moreover, the meet-in-the-middle attack on 12-round QARMA-128 is the best known attack on QARMA-128 in terms of the number of rounds. Tweakable block ciphers QARMA meet-in-the-middle attacks impossible differential cryptanalysis tweaks Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering Tiande Zang verfasserin aut Dawu Gu verfasserin aut Fengyu Zhao verfasserin aut Wei Li verfasserin aut Zhiqiang Liu verfasserin aut In IEEE Access IEEE, 2014 8(2020), Seite 8361-8370 (DE-627)728440385 (DE-600)2687964-5 21693536 nnns volume:8 year:2020 pages:8361-8370 https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2964259 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/48db38cd529b49b3b77b209e27e563a8 kostenfrei https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8950388/ kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2020 8361-8370
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allfieldsSound	10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2964259 doi (DE-627)DOAJ053243137 (DE-599)DOAJ48db38cd529b49b3b77b209e27e563a8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TK1-9971 Ya Liu verfasserin aut Improved Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Version QARMA-64/128 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier QARMA is a new tweakable block cipher used for memory encryption, the generation of short tags and the construction of the keyed hash functions in future. It adopts a three-round Even-Mansour scheme and supports 64 and 128 bits of block size, denoted by QARMA-64 and QARMA-128, respectively. Their tweak lengths equal the block sizes and their keys are twice as long as the blocks. In this paper, we improve the security analysis of reduced-version QARMA against impossible differential and meet-in-the-middle attacks. Specifically, first exploit some properties of its linear operations and the redundancy of key schedule. Based on them, we propose impossible differential attacks on 11-round QARMA-64/128, and meet-in-the-middle attacks on 10-round symmetric QARMA-128 and the last 12 rounds of asymmetric QARMA-128. Compared with the previously best known results on QARMA-64, our attack can recover 16 more bits of master key with the almost complexities. Compared with the previously best known results on symmetric QARMA-128, the memory complexity of our attack in Section IV is reduced by a factor of 2<sup<48</sup<. Moreover, the meet-in-the-middle attack on 12-round QARMA-128 is the best known attack on QARMA-128 in terms of the number of rounds. Tweakable block ciphers QARMA meet-in-the-middle attacks impossible differential cryptanalysis tweaks Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering Tiande Zang verfasserin aut Dawu Gu verfasserin aut Fengyu Zhao verfasserin aut Wei Li verfasserin aut Zhiqiang Liu verfasserin aut In IEEE Access IEEE, 2014 8(2020), Seite 8361-8370 (DE-627)728440385 (DE-600)2687964-5 21693536 nnns volume:8 year:2020 pages:8361-8370 https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2964259 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/48db38cd529b49b3b77b209e27e563a8 kostenfrei https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8950388/ kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 8 2020 8361-8370
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callnumber-first	T - Technology
author	Ya Liu
spellingShingle	Ya Liu misc TK1-9971 misc Tweakable block ciphers misc QARMA misc meet-in-the-middle attacks misc impossible differential cryptanalysis misc tweaks misc Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering Improved Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Version QARMA-64/128
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topic_title	TK1-9971 Improved Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Version QARMA-64/128 Tweakable block ciphers QARMA meet-in-the-middle attacks impossible differential cryptanalysis tweaks
topic	misc TK1-9971 misc Tweakable block ciphers misc QARMA misc meet-in-the-middle attacks misc impossible differential cryptanalysis misc tweaks misc Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering
topic_unstemmed	misc TK1-9971 misc Tweakable block ciphers misc QARMA misc meet-in-the-middle attacks misc impossible differential cryptanalysis misc tweaks misc Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering
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title	Improved Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Version QARMA-64/128
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title_full	Improved Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Version QARMA-64/128
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title_sort	improved cryptanalysis of reduced-version qarma-64/128
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title_auth	Improved Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Version QARMA-64/128
abstract	QARMA is a new tweakable block cipher used for memory encryption, the generation of short tags and the construction of the keyed hash functions in future. It adopts a three-round Even-Mansour scheme and supports 64 and 128 bits of block size, denoted by QARMA-64 and QARMA-128, respectively. Their tweak lengths equal the block sizes and their keys are twice as long as the blocks. In this paper, we improve the security analysis of reduced-version QARMA against impossible differential and meet-in-the-middle attacks. Specifically, first exploit some properties of its linear operations and the redundancy of key schedule. Based on them, we propose impossible differential attacks on 11-round QARMA-64/128, and meet-in-the-middle attacks on 10-round symmetric QARMA-128 and the last 12 rounds of asymmetric QARMA-128. Compared with the previously best known results on QARMA-64, our attack can recover 16 more bits of master key with the almost complexities. Compared with the previously best known results on symmetric QARMA-128, the memory complexity of our attack in Section IV is reduced by a factor of 2<sup<48</sup<. Moreover, the meet-in-the-middle attack on 12-round QARMA-128 is the best known attack on QARMA-128 in terms of the number of rounds.
abstractGer	QARMA is a new tweakable block cipher used for memory encryption, the generation of short tags and the construction of the keyed hash functions in future. It adopts a three-round Even-Mansour scheme and supports 64 and 128 bits of block size, denoted by QARMA-64 and QARMA-128, respectively. Their tweak lengths equal the block sizes and their keys are twice as long as the blocks. In this paper, we improve the security analysis of reduced-version QARMA against impossible differential and meet-in-the-middle attacks. Specifically, first exploit some properties of its linear operations and the redundancy of key schedule. Based on them, we propose impossible differential attacks on 11-round QARMA-64/128, and meet-in-the-middle attacks on 10-round symmetric QARMA-128 and the last 12 rounds of asymmetric QARMA-128. Compared with the previously best known results on QARMA-64, our attack can recover 16 more bits of master key with the almost complexities. Compared with the previously best known results on symmetric QARMA-128, the memory complexity of our attack in Section IV is reduced by a factor of 2<sup<48</sup<. Moreover, the meet-in-the-middle attack on 12-round QARMA-128 is the best known attack on QARMA-128 in terms of the number of rounds.
abstract_unstemmed	QARMA is a new tweakable block cipher used for memory encryption, the generation of short tags and the construction of the keyed hash functions in future. It adopts a three-round Even-Mansour scheme and supports 64 and 128 bits of block size, denoted by QARMA-64 and QARMA-128, respectively. Their tweak lengths equal the block sizes and their keys are twice as long as the blocks. In this paper, we improve the security analysis of reduced-version QARMA against impossible differential and meet-in-the-middle attacks. Specifically, first exploit some properties of its linear operations and the redundancy of key schedule. Based on them, we propose impossible differential attacks on 11-round QARMA-64/128, and meet-in-the-middle attacks on 10-round symmetric QARMA-128 and the last 12 rounds of asymmetric QARMA-128. Compared with the previously best known results on QARMA-64, our attack can recover 16 more bits of master key with the almost complexities. Compared with the previously best known results on symmetric QARMA-128, the memory complexity of our attack in Section IV is reduced by a factor of 2<sup<48</sup<. Moreover, the meet-in-the-middle attack on 12-round QARMA-128 is the best known attack on QARMA-128 in terms of the number of rounds.
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title_short	Improved Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Version QARMA-64/128
url	https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2964259 https://doaj.org/article/48db38cd529b49b3b77b209e27e563a8 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8950388/ https://doaj.org/toc/2169-3536
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author2	Tiande Zang Dawu Gu Fengyu Zhao Wei Li Zhiqiang Liu
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Improved Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Version QARMA-64/128

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