The best laid schemes… gang aft a-gley: judicial reform in Latin America - evidence from Costa Rica

Starting in the 1980s, and accelerating through lic 1990s, international financial institutions (IFIs), non-governmental organizations (NGO5) and development agencies funnelled considerable resources into judicial reform and rule of law programmes in virtually every Latin American and Caribbean coun...
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Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Bruce M. WILSON [verfasserIn] Juan Carlos RODRÍGUEZ CORDERO [verfasserIn] Roger HANDBERG [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Spanisch

Erschienen:	2020

Schlagwörter:	reforma judicial poder judicial sala iv costa rica independencia judicial

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: América Latina Hoy - Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 2007, 39(2020), 0, Seite 97-123
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:39 ; year:2020 ; number:0 ; pages:97-123

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.14201/alh.22765

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ058455914

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title_sort	best laid schemes… gang aft a-gley: judicial reform in latin america - evidence from costa rica
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title_auth	The best laid schemes… gang aft a-gley: judicial reform in Latin America - evidence from Costa Rica
abstract	Starting in the 1980s, and accelerating through lic 1990s, international financial institutions (IFIs), non-governmental organizations (NGO5) and development agencies funnelled considerable resources into judicial reform and rule of law programmes in virtually every Latin American and Caribbean country. The assumption was that reformed court systems would foster free market economic development strategies. This article examines the impact of two frequently advocated aspects of judicial reform, judicial access and judicial independence, on econornic policy making in Costa Rica. We argue that there is a potentially significant disjuncture between the sponsors’ expectations of the judicial reforms’ economic impact and the observed outcomes.
abstractGer	Starting in the 1980s, and accelerating through lic 1990s, international financial institutions (IFIs), non-governmental organizations (NGO5) and development agencies funnelled considerable resources into judicial reform and rule of law programmes in virtually every Latin American and Caribbean country. The assumption was that reformed court systems would foster free market economic development strategies. This article examines the impact of two frequently advocated aspects of judicial reform, judicial access and judicial independence, on econornic policy making in Costa Rica. We argue that there is a potentially significant disjuncture between the sponsors’ expectations of the judicial reforms’ economic impact and the observed outcomes.
abstract_unstemmed	Starting in the 1980s, and accelerating through lic 1990s, international financial institutions (IFIs), non-governmental organizations (NGO5) and development agencies funnelled considerable resources into judicial reform and rule of law programmes in virtually every Latin American and Caribbean country. The assumption was that reformed court systems would foster free market economic development strategies. This article examines the impact of two frequently advocated aspects of judicial reform, judicial access and judicial independence, on econornic policy making in Costa Rica. We argue that there is a potentially significant disjuncture between the sponsors’ expectations of the judicial reforms’ economic impact and the observed outcomes.
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title_short	The best laid schemes… gang aft a-gley: judicial reform in Latin America - evidence from Costa Rica
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