A clawback compensation scheme and its effect on method options for earnings management
This study aims to examine the effectiveness of the adoption of clawback in reducing the intention of managers to manipulate earnings. This study differs from previous literatures which are mainly conducted in low uncertainty avoidance and high individualism cultures using an archaival method since...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Ratna Candra Sari [verfasserIn] Mahfud Sholihin [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
E-Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch ; Indonesisch |
| Erschienen: |
2018 |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
clawback, accrual manipulation, real activity manipulation, earnings manipulation |
|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: Jurnal Akuntansi dan Auditing Indonesia - Universitas Islam Indonesia, 2019, 22(2018), 2, Seite 118-124 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:22 ; year:2018 ; number:2 ; pages:118-124 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.20885/jaai.vol22.iss2.art4 |
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DOAJ059055472 |
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This study aims to examine the effectiveness of the adoption of clawback in reducing the intention of managers to manipulate earnings. This study differs from previous literatures which are mainly conducted in low uncertainty avoidance and high individualism cultures using an archaival method since it is conducted in a country with high uncertainty avoidance and low individualism culture using an experimental approach. This study is important because previous studies indicate that national culture provides important explanations or the variance of the effectiveness of compensation schemes. The respondents are students of postgraduate of accounting who have work experience in the field. The study was conducted between February-March 2018. The result of this study shows that the adoption of clawback reduces managers’ intention to engage in earnings manipulation, especially accrual manipulation. However, the study also finds that clawback motivates managers to engage in earnings management using a method that is more difficult to be detected by regulators and auditors. |
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This study aims to examine the effectiveness of the adoption of clawback in reducing the intention of managers to manipulate earnings. This study differs from previous literatures which are mainly conducted in low uncertainty avoidance and high individualism cultures using an archaival method since it is conducted in a country with high uncertainty avoidance and low individualism culture using an experimental approach. This study is important because previous studies indicate that national culture provides important explanations or the variance of the effectiveness of compensation schemes. The respondents are students of postgraduate of accounting who have work experience in the field. The study was conducted between February-March 2018. The result of this study shows that the adoption of clawback reduces managers’ intention to engage in earnings manipulation, especially accrual manipulation. However, the study also finds that clawback motivates managers to engage in earnings management using a method that is more difficult to be detected by regulators and auditors. |
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This study aims to examine the effectiveness of the adoption of clawback in reducing the intention of managers to manipulate earnings. This study differs from previous literatures which are mainly conducted in low uncertainty avoidance and high individualism cultures using an archaival method since it is conducted in a country with high uncertainty avoidance and low individualism culture using an experimental approach. This study is important because previous studies indicate that national culture provides important explanations or the variance of the effectiveness of compensation schemes. The respondents are students of postgraduate of accounting who have work experience in the field. The study was conducted between February-March 2018. The result of this study shows that the adoption of clawback reduces managers’ intention to engage in earnings manipulation, especially accrual manipulation. However, the study also finds that clawback motivates managers to engage in earnings management using a method that is more difficult to be detected by regulators and auditors. |
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2024-07-03T21:32:08.387Z |
| _version_ |
1803595104534921217 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">DOAJ059055472</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230308231535.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230228s2018 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.20885/jaai.vol22.iss2.art4</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)DOAJ059055472</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)DOAJbc0a587e06bb4525aec188b129ddb6be</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield><subfield code="a">ind</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">HF5601-5689</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Ratna Candra Sari</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">A clawback compensation scheme and its effect on method options for earnings management</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2018</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This study aims to examine the effectiveness of the adoption of clawback in reducing the intention of managers to manipulate earnings. 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7.4003124 |