Noncompliance With Safety Guidelines as a Free-Riding Strategy: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach to Cooperation During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the bene...
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Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Jose C. Yong [verfasserIn] Bryan K. C. Choy [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2021

Schlagwörter:	evolutionary game theory decision-making COVID-19 free riding evolutionary psychology cooperation

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Frontiers in Psychology - Frontiers Media S.A., 2010, 12(2021)
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:12 ; year:2021

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.3389/fpsyg.2021.646892

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ059513322

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callnumber-first	B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion
author	Jose C. Yong
spellingShingle	Jose C. Yong misc BF1-990 misc evolutionary game theory misc decision-making misc COVID-19 misc free riding misc evolutionary psychology misc cooperation misc Psychology Noncompliance With Safety Guidelines as a Free-Riding Strategy: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach to Cooperation During the COVID-19 Pandemic
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topic_title	BF1-990 Noncompliance With Safety Guidelines as a Free-Riding Strategy: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach to Cooperation During the COVID-19 Pandemic evolutionary game theory decision-making COVID-19 free riding evolutionary psychology cooperation
topic	misc BF1-990 misc evolutionary game theory misc decision-making misc COVID-19 misc free riding misc evolutionary psychology misc cooperation misc Psychology
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title	Noncompliance With Safety Guidelines as a Free-Riding Strategy: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach to Cooperation During the COVID-19 Pandemic
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title_full	Noncompliance With Safety Guidelines as a Free-Riding Strategy: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach to Cooperation During the COVID-19 Pandemic
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title_sort	noncompliance with safety guidelines as a free-riding strategy: an evolutionary game-theoretic approach to cooperation during the covid-19 pandemic
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title_auth	Noncompliance With Safety Guidelines as a Free-Riding Strategy: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach to Cooperation During the COVID-19 Pandemic
abstract	Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the benefits of decreased health risk from others’ compliance with policies despite not contributing to or even undermining public safety themselves. At the same time, humans appear to carry a suite of evolved psychological mechanisms aimed at curbing free riding in order to ensure the continued provision of public goods, which can be leveraged to develop more effective measures to promote compliance with regulations. We also highlight factors beyond free riding that reduce compliance rates, such as the emergence of conspiratorial thinking, which seriously undermine the effectiveness of measures to suppress free riding. Together, the current paper outlines the social dynamics that occur in public goods dilemmas involving the spread of infectious disease, highlights the utility and limits of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches for COVID-19 management, and suggests novel directions based on emerging challenges to cooperation.
abstractGer	Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the benefits of decreased health risk from others’ compliance with policies despite not contributing to or even undermining public safety themselves. At the same time, humans appear to carry a suite of evolved psychological mechanisms aimed at curbing free riding in order to ensure the continued provision of public goods, which can be leveraged to develop more effective measures to promote compliance with regulations. We also highlight factors beyond free riding that reduce compliance rates, such as the emergence of conspiratorial thinking, which seriously undermine the effectiveness of measures to suppress free riding. Together, the current paper outlines the social dynamics that occur in public goods dilemmas involving the spread of infectious disease, highlights the utility and limits of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches for COVID-19 management, and suggests novel directions based on emerging challenges to cooperation.
abstract_unstemmed	Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the benefits of decreased health risk from others’ compliance with policies despite not contributing to or even undermining public safety themselves. At the same time, humans appear to carry a suite of evolved psychological mechanisms aimed at curbing free riding in order to ensure the continued provision of public goods, which can be leveraged to develop more effective measures to promote compliance with regulations. We also highlight factors beyond free riding that reduce compliance rates, such as the emergence of conspiratorial thinking, which seriously undermine the effectiveness of measures to suppress free riding. Together, the current paper outlines the social dynamics that occur in public goods dilemmas involving the spread of infectious disease, highlights the utility and limits of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches for COVID-19 management, and suggests novel directions based on emerging challenges to cooperation.
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title_short	Noncompliance With Safety Guidelines as a Free-Riding Strategy: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach to Cooperation During the COVID-19 Pandemic
url	https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.646892 https://doaj.org/article/53b7d37e15bf4a23ab71d9900f086f04 https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.646892/full https://doaj.org/toc/1664-1078
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up_date	2024-07-03T23:48:08.617Z
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