Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers

Introduction: The central premise underlying international payments for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is that offering governments ex post payments for verified success in reducing emissions will motivate them to protect and restore forests. However, the extent...
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Autor*in:	Jonah Busch [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2018

Schlagwörter:	Ecological fiscal transfers India monitoring and evaluation payment-for-performance REDD+

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Ecosystem Health and Sustainability - American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), 2016, 4(2018), 7, Seite 169-175
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:4 ; year:2018 ; number:7 ; pages:169-175

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.1080/20964129.2018.1492335

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ061865761

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520			\|a Introduction: The central premise underlying international payments for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is that offering governments ex post payments for verified success in reducing emissions will motivate them to protect and restore forests. However, the extent to which performance-based payments motivate governments to protect and restore forests has yet to be evaluated quantitatively. Researchers have only quantitatively evaluated performance-based payments to non-governments for forest outcomes (e.g. payments for ecosystem services) and to governments for non-forest outcomes (e.g. results-based aid). Methods: We describe how researchers now have an opportunity to more easily evaluate performance-based payments to governments for forest outcomes thanks to India’s new ecological fiscal transfers (EFTs), which provide $6-12 billion per year to Indian states in proportion to their forest cover. Discussion: India’s EFTs differ from REDD+ programs in that they pay for states’ stock of forest area in the recent past rather than reductions in the rate of forest carbon loss in the near-future. Nevertheless, India’s EFTs focus on a single outcome and have many recipient governments, significant financial scale, lack of contemporaneous confounding policy changes, universal participation, and long-term data collection. Conclusion: These features make India’s EFTs especially useful for testing the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+.
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author	Jonah Busch
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title	Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers
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title_full	Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers
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title_sort	monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of redd+: the case of india’s ecological fiscal transfers
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title_auth	Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers
abstract	Introduction: The central premise underlying international payments for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is that offering governments ex post payments for verified success in reducing emissions will motivate them to protect and restore forests. However, the extent to which performance-based payments motivate governments to protect and restore forests has yet to be evaluated quantitatively. Researchers have only quantitatively evaluated performance-based payments to non-governments for forest outcomes (e.g. payments for ecosystem services) and to governments for non-forest outcomes (e.g. results-based aid). Methods: We describe how researchers now have an opportunity to more easily evaluate performance-based payments to governments for forest outcomes thanks to India’s new ecological fiscal transfers (EFTs), which provide $6-12 billion per year to Indian states in proportion to their forest cover. Discussion: India’s EFTs differ from REDD+ programs in that they pay for states’ stock of forest area in the recent past rather than reductions in the rate of forest carbon loss in the near-future. Nevertheless, India’s EFTs focus on a single outcome and have many recipient governments, significant financial scale, lack of contemporaneous confounding policy changes, universal participation, and long-term data collection. Conclusion: These features make India’s EFTs especially useful for testing the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+.
abstractGer	Introduction: The central premise underlying international payments for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is that offering governments ex post payments for verified success in reducing emissions will motivate them to protect and restore forests. However, the extent to which performance-based payments motivate governments to protect and restore forests has yet to be evaluated quantitatively. Researchers have only quantitatively evaluated performance-based payments to non-governments for forest outcomes (e.g. payments for ecosystem services) and to governments for non-forest outcomes (e.g. results-based aid). Methods: We describe how researchers now have an opportunity to more easily evaluate performance-based payments to governments for forest outcomes thanks to India’s new ecological fiscal transfers (EFTs), which provide $6-12 billion per year to Indian states in proportion to their forest cover. Discussion: India’s EFTs differ from REDD+ programs in that they pay for states’ stock of forest area in the recent past rather than reductions in the rate of forest carbon loss in the near-future. Nevertheless, India’s EFTs focus on a single outcome and have many recipient governments, significant financial scale, lack of contemporaneous confounding policy changes, universal participation, and long-term data collection. Conclusion: These features make India’s EFTs especially useful for testing the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+.
abstract_unstemmed	Introduction: The central premise underlying international payments for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is that offering governments ex post payments for verified success in reducing emissions will motivate them to protect and restore forests. However, the extent to which performance-based payments motivate governments to protect and restore forests has yet to be evaluated quantitatively. Researchers have only quantitatively evaluated performance-based payments to non-governments for forest outcomes (e.g. payments for ecosystem services) and to governments for non-forest outcomes (e.g. results-based aid). Methods: We describe how researchers now have an opportunity to more easily evaluate performance-based payments to governments for forest outcomes thanks to India’s new ecological fiscal transfers (EFTs), which provide $6-12 billion per year to Indian states in proportion to their forest cover. Discussion: India’s EFTs differ from REDD+ programs in that they pay for states’ stock of forest area in the recent past rather than reductions in the rate of forest carbon loss in the near-future. Nevertheless, India’s EFTs focus on a single outcome and have many recipient governments, significant financial scale, lack of contemporaneous confounding policy changes, universal participation, and long-term data collection. Conclusion: These features make India’s EFTs especially useful for testing the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+.
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title_short	Monitoring and evaluating the payment-for-performance premise of REDD+: the case of India’s ecological fiscal transfers
url	https://doi.org/10.1080/20964129.2018.1492335 https://doaj.org/article/b6bfc969aafb49178fdb5a7bed57da34 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20964129.2018.1492335 https://doaj.org/toc/2096-4129 https://doaj.org/toc/2332-8878
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